THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI.
After relief in the Ypres salient the Division, less its artillery,
moved to the VIth Corps area, with headquarters at Achiet le Petit. By
5th October, ten days after coming out of their last battle, the 154th
and 153rd Brigades were back in the trenches in the Heninel-Wancourt
sector, with Divisional headquarters at Boisleux au Mont.
On this occasion the Division was for the first time introduced to the
area which the Germans had wilfully devastated prior to their withdrawal
from it to the Hindenburg line just before the battle of Arras.
One cannot do better than allow a German newspaper, the 'Local
Anzeiger' of 18th March 1917, to describe this area. It says: "In the
course of these last months great stretches of French territory have
been turned by us into a dead country. It varies in width from ten,
twelve, to thirteen kilometres, and extends along the whole of our
new positions. No village or farm was left standing, no road was left
passable, no railway track or embankment was left in being. Where once
were woods, there are gaunt rows of stumps; the wells have been blown
up. In front of our new positions runs like a gigantic ribbon our
Empire of Death."
One could not fail to appreciate the diabolical efficiency with which
the work had been carried out. Where time had been too short to enable
fruit-trees to be felled, their bark had been ringed. Wells before
destruction had been turned into cess-pits. The effect on every unit on
first entering the devastated area was the same. It produced a
determination in all ranks to kill every German that it was possible to
put out of the world with any degree of decency. By this wanton act of
vandalism the Hun had turned himself, in the eyes of the British
soldier, into a vermin fit only for extermination.
"Our new positions" mentioned above were the Hindenburg Line. The
Hindenburg Line was not a line in the true sense of the word, since, in
addition to having length, it also had considerable breadth. It was, in
fact, a highly-elaborated system of trenches running roughly from St.
Quentin to just south of Arras. The trenches were skilfully sited, so as
to have every advantage of observation; they were of immense breadth and
depth; they contained numerous concrete machine-gun emplacements and
dug-outs; they were connected with one another by underground tunnels;
they were protected by tremendous belts of wire many yards in depth.
Yet, in spite of the skill with which it had been constructed, several
portions of the Hindenburg Line were twice captured by the British army.
From this point onwards the Highland Division was so continuously
involved in important operations that space cannot be given to detailed
accounts of uneventful periods in quiet parts of the line. It must,
however, be understood that uneventful is a relative term, and that even
the quiet periods were often eventful enough for those in immediate
contact with the enemy.
As regards the sojourn in the Boisleux au Mont area, suffice it to say
that all three brigades carried out tours of duty in the line there, and
that the Division was relieved on 2nd November. On completion of this
relief the Division moved to Hermaville, the infantry brigades being
billeted at Warlus, Hautvillers, and Izel les Hameaux.
Prior to taking over the line in this sector a change in command had
taken place in the 154th Brigade. Brigadier-General J. G. H. Hamilton,
D.S.O., who had commanded the brigade since General Stewart's death in
September 1916, gave up his command, and returned home for a period of
rest. General Hamilton had come to the brigade from the command of a
battalion, and had been with it through many trying ordeals, including
Beaumont Hamel, Courcelette, Arras, and Ypres. By many of his officers,
both senior and junior, he was regarded not only as their brigade
commander, but also as an intimate friend, and his departure was in
consequence keenly felt.
He was succeeded by Brigadier-General K. G. Buchanan, D.S.O., Seaforth
Highlanders. General Buchanan possessed not only consummate judgment in
all matters of tactics, but also a charming personality, with the result
that his brigade throughout the period of his command could be relied on
to render a splendid account of itself. His coolness in action and his
tactical instincts enabled him so to dispose his troops in the varying
phases of a battle that they were always ready to meet any sudden
emergency. Moreover, his personality was such that officers and men
would at all times make any sacrifice to carry out what he asked of
them. The magnificent resistance offered by the 154th Brigade on the
right flank of the Division both in March and again in April of 1918
afford in themselves ample proof of General Buchanan's powers as an
infantry commander.
The Division had not been long in rest in its new area before it
transpired that it was again required to take part in active operations.
The news that this was the case came rather as a shock, as the Division
had already fought battles in the year 1917 on 9-12th April, 23-24th
April, 16th May, 31st July-1st August, 20-23rd September, and had lost
in casualties since 9th April 457 officers and 9966 other ranks--a total
of 10,523.
Moreover, the forthcoming operations were to be of an experimental
nature, since the plan of attack was to attempt to break through the
Hindenburg Line by employing a large number of tanks in an offensive
which was to be a complete surprise.
To quote Sir Douglas Haig's despatch: "The object of these operations
was to gain a local success at a point where the enemy did not expect
it. Our repeated attacks in Flanders, and of our Allies elsewhere,
had brought about large concentrations of the enemy's forces on the
threatened points, with a consequent reduction in the garrisons of
certain other sectors of the line. Of these weakened sectors the
Cambrai front had been selected as the most suitable for the surprise
operations in contemplation."
In order to maintain this element of surprise up to the last moment,
various measures had to be taken. In the first place, the Division was
left in its present quarters in the neighbourhood of Hermaville, so as
not to draw the attention of the enemy to the area to be attacked. For
the same reason the usual full-sized replica of the enemy's trenches was
taped out west of the town of Arras, and all training took place in that
area.
Further, the Division was not allowed to take over the trenches from
which it was to deliver the attack. It had therefore little opportunity
for preliminary reconnaissances of the battle area, with the exception
that parties of officers and N.C.O.'s daily visited the trenches to spy
out the land. These parties were all clothed in trousers to prevent the
enemy's observers from suspecting the presence of the Highland Division
in the neighbourhood of the position to be attacked.
The Division was given every opportunity of practising the attack with
tanks, the platoons carrying out their training with the actual tanks
and crews which were to accompany them in the operations. It will be
seen that, as usual, liaison was synonymous with success, and that on
the day of the attack the co-operation between the tanks and the
infantry was admirable.
An additional difficulty lay in the fact that somehow or another the
Division had to be concentrated in the battle area some thirty-six to
forty-eight hours before the battle, so as to allow the troops adequate
rest before proceeding to the assembly trenches.
On this account the C.R.E. and the three field companies, R.E., with the
8th Royal Scots, moved to the IVth Corps area early in November to
prepare hidden shelters in which the troops might be accommodated during
this period. The sappers and pioneers worked with such effect that
between the 2nd and 19th November camouflaged accommodation had been
provided for 5500 men in the ruined village of Metz and for 4000 men in
Havrincourt Wood. The necessary dumps of material were also formed by
the C.R.E., tracks for moving guns forward prepared, and, as cavalry
were also detailed to take part in the operations, six water points with
a capacity for watering 7000 horses per hour were constructed. Forward
routes for infantry were also laid out and advanced dressing stations
completed; no mean record for a little over a fortnight's work.
All undertakings of this nature were made more difficult than usual by
the fact that no increase in the normal amount of lorry traffic on the
roads during the hours of daylight was allowed. Further, no new work was
carried out in the forward area, in case it might be noticed by enemy
airmen. As it turned out, the weather was fortunately cloudy and misty,
so that observation from the air became practically impossible
throughout the period of preparation.
The area through which the Division was destined to advance was
traversed by three separate trench systems, each forming integral parts
of the Hindenburg system. Of these, the first, known as the Hindenburg
front system, was composed of a maze of wide, heavily-wired trenches,
supplemented by numerous saps, the whole presenting such a tangle of
excavations that it was impossible to foretell accurately where the
principle points of resistance were most likely to be found.
The main framework of this front system was, however, composed of a
lightly-held outpost line, a front line, and a support line.
In rear of the front system, and just south of the village of
Flesquières, lay the Hindenburg support system, composed of two lines of
heavily-wired deep trenches, connected with each other and with the
front system by numerous communication trenches.
Four thousand yards in rear of the support system lay a third double
line of trenches, south-west of the village of Cantaing. The area
allotted to the Division was not uniform in shape, being in the
Hindenburg front system 1500 yards in breadth, 2700 yards at the second
system, 3500 yards at the third, and ending just north of the village of
Fontaine Notre Dame at a breadth of 2200 yards.
Our assembly trenches rested on the summit of a spur, from which the
country gradually sloped down to the Grand Ravine, a feature which
traversed the Divisional front just north of the Hindenburg front
system.
From here it switchbacked up to the village of Flesquières, thence it
declined in a series of gentle undulations to Cantaing and Fontaine
Notre Dame.
Just west of Fontaine stood Bourlon Wood, a hanging wood on the summit
and slopes of a spur, from which the whole country-side could be
surveyed, and from which it was always difficult to hide.
The position to be attacked was, in the first instance, divided into
three main objectives: the Blue line, which included the Hindenburg
front system and Chapel Trench; the Brown line, which included
Flesquières and the Hindenburg support system; and the Red dotted line,
which was the sunken road running from Marcoing to Graincourt.
For the first phase, the plan was for the Division to attack on a
two-brigade front, the 152nd Brigade on the right, the 153rd on the
left. Each brigade was to work on a two-battalion front, the leading two
battalions to take as far as the Blue line in the case of the 153rd
Brigade, and the Grand Ravine in the case of the 152nd Brigade.
The order of battle of the leading battalions from right to left was as
follows: 5th Seaforth Highlanders, 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, 6th Black Watch, 5th Gordon Highlanders. The remaining
battalions of the two brigades were detailed for the capture of the
Brown and Red dotted lines, the order of battle from right to left being
6th Gordon Highlanders, 6th Seaforth Highlanders, 7th Black Watch, 7th
Gordon Highlanders.
Each battalion taking part in the attack of the Blue line detailed two
companies for the capture of the enemy front system up to Mole Trench, a
third company to cross the Grand Ravine, while the fourth company was
kept in reserve. The battalions detailed for the capture of the Brown
and dotted Red lines allotted objectives to each of their four
companies.
For the first day's fighting, seventy-two of the 1st Brigade Tank Corps
were allotted to the Divisional front, of which seventy actually took
part in the operation. One-half of the tanks, "E" Battalion, were
allotted to 152nd Brigade, the other half, "D" Battalion, to the 153rd.
They were divided into three waves. The first, formed of twelve "Rovers"
or wire-crushers, moved forward at zero, 150 yards in advance of the
second, to crush the wire protecting the enemy front and support
trenches, and then to engage machine-guns and any special posts outside
the main trenches. The second wave, formed of thirty-six "Fighting"
tanks, dealt with the trenches up to and including the Blue line. The
third, composed of all the remaining fighting tanks, was detailed to
form up an hour and a half after zero just south of the Grand Ravine,
and to proceed with the survivors of the first two to attack the
Flesquières Ridge.
The distribution was on the basis of one section of three tanks to a
platoon frontage (_i.e._, about 150 yards). The general principle on
which sections were to work was for the two outside tanks to cross a
trench, turn alongside it and help to clear it, while the centre tanks
carried on to the next trench, there to be joined by the two others as
soon as the infantry had reached the first trench.
However, in tackling a system which contained many crater posts and
sap-heads, and which was thickly interlaced with short communication
trenches and backed by many subsidiary trenches and detached posts, some
modifications of the general principles were necessary.
Special tasks were therefore given to many of the second wave sections
of tanks, in which each tank was given some sap-head, crater post, or
communication trench to deal with in addition to assailing the main
trenches.
Similarly, detailed instructions were given as to routes and individual
objectives in the village fighting that was anticipated.
Each tank carried on its back a huge fascine or faggot, resting on a
giant pair of arms. A contrivance existed by which these arms raised the
fascines off the back of the tank, and dropped them into any unusually
wide trenches encountered, so as to form a stepping-stone, which enabled
the tanks to keep their noses from dropping into the bottom of the
trench.
In spite of this precaution the Hindenburg Line was in some parts so
broad and deep that a number of tanks were ditched in spite of the
fascines.
The first wave of the infantry followed the tanks at a distance of
150-200 yards, their orders being to assault immediately the tanks
reached and opened fire on a trench. On reaching their objectives, the
infantry marked with red strips of cloth the gaps in the wire, and
filled in portions of the trenches to make crossing-places for
subsequent tanks, cavalry, and artillery.
Each tank carried for the use of the infantry Lewis gun drums, rifle
ammunition, bombs, and rifle grenades.
The field artillery supporting the attacks was divided into two groups,
each composed of two field artillery brigades and one R.H.A. brigade.
Each brigade was supported by one of these groups, that containing 256th
Brigade, R.F.A., being on the right and that containing 255th Brigade,
R.F.A., on the left.
One brigade of artillery covered each battalion front, while the 3rd
Brigade of artillery covered its whole infantry brigade front. The
fifteen 18-pounder batteries firing in the creeping barrage fired 33 per
cent of smoke shells, so as to screen the movement of the tanks.
Two 4·5 howitzer batteries also kept a standing smoke barrage in front
of Flesquières Ridge.
No registration was carried out, so that the presence of fresh batteries
in the area might not be disclosed. The whole of the firing was
therefore carried out from the map and by calibration.
The concentration of artillery, tanks, and infantry immediately behind
the line from which the attack was to be launched was successfully
effected between 17th and 19th November with great rapidity and complete
secrecy, mainly under cover of darkness.
The artillery was moved up on 17th November; the tanks were assembled on
the night of 18th November in Havrincourt Wood, and travelled to their
assembly positions in the early hours of the 20th. The infantry came
into Metz on the evening of the 18th, and began taking over the line on
the 19th.
It must be borne in mind that a similar concentration of tanks, guns,
and troops was taking place simultaneously on the fronts of Divisions on
either flank. The fact that all the necessary moves took place, and that
the troops were eventually formed up in the assembly trenches without
any suspicions being aroused in the mind of the enemy, shows how
admirably the arrangements for ensuring secrecy were carried out.
A taped line was laid out in front of the assembly trenches to ensure
that the main wave of tanks formed up on its proper alignment. By zero
hour the bulk of them were on this line, while the remainder which had
been delayed from one cause and another were crossing the British front
line.
The twelve "Rovers" were formed up beyond this line, the third wave
being deployed behind the support line.
The platoons to form the first two waves in the attack took over the
line on the morning of the 19th, and thus had an opportunity of viewing
the ground to their front. At midnight the remainder of the four leading
battalions arrived in their assembly trenches.
Before zero hour the four battalions for the later stages of the initial
attack were assembled in rear of the trench area, with their leading
platoons on the Charing Cross-Trescault road.
As soon as darkness set in the platoons which had arrived first set to
work to make causeways across their trenches for the passage of the
tanks. They also freed the troops that were to assemble during the night
from any chances of confusion and unnecessary fatigue by placing in
position red lamps, flags, signboards, and markers to show routes and
positions of platoons.
Before zero hour all ranks were issued with a hot meal.
Naturally considerable anxiety was felt, as it was feared that the noise
of the engines of the assembling tanks might be heard by the enemy and
cause him to open a heavy bombardment of our trenches. However, though a
light southerly breeze carried the noise made by the seventy tanks on
the move towards the enemy, there was between 2 A.M. and 6 A.M. only
slight hostile artillery activity, and that only on the left front.
During the whole period of assembly there were a few casualties in the
forward battalions of the 153rd Brigade, and none on the 152nd Brigade
front.
At 6.30 A.M., 20th November, the advance began on a fine but cloudy
morning, the visibility being such that a man could be seen at a
distance of about 200 yards. As the artillery barrage opened, the twelve
wire-crushing tanks moved off, accompanied by small parties of infantry
detailed for the capture of the outpost line.
Four minutes later a light artillery barrage came down on and just in
front of our assembly trenches, causing slight casualties. Considerable
hostile machine-gun fire was also opened, but it was wild and harmless.
Between 9.15 and 9.40 A.M. all the leading battalions had reached their
objectives.
The 5th Seaforth Highlanders on the right carried out their advance
practically without a check, making a bag of 9 machine-guns and 230
prisoners, including 14 officers. The total number of casualties
sustained by the battalion in this operation was twenty-five.
On arrival at the railway, "A" Company, 5th Seaforth Highlanders, found
that the situation at Ribécourt was obscure, hostile machine-guns still
being active there. Lance-Corporal E. MacBeath was therefore sent out
with a patrol to report on the situation. Having proceeded 150 yards
from his company MacBeath discovered the first machine-gun, and killed
the gunner with his revolver. A tank then arrived and drove the teams of
some of the other machine-guns down a deep dug-out. MacBeath bounded
down the dug-out steps after them, killed a German who resisted him on
the staircase, and drove the remainder--3 officers and 30 other
ranks--out of the dug-out by another exit. Sending these men to the rear
as prisoners, he again entered the dug-out and thoroughly searched it,
accounting for two more Germans. In all, five machine-guns were found
mounted round the dug-out, which proved to be a battalion headquarters.
The capture of these guns not only freed the right flank of the 5th
Seaforth Highlanders, but also considerably helped the advance of the
9th Norfolks on the right.
For his courage and initiative on this occasion MacBeath was awarded the
Victoria Cross.
The 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had rather more fighting than
the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, as active machine-guns and bombing-posts
were encountered in the first and second German lines and between them.
In the case of the former the Argylls overcame the resistance by
advancing in short rushes, while the advent of the tanks encouraged the
enemy to surrender in other parts of the front. During these operations
a private soldier led his platoon to its objective in Mole Trench, his
platoon commander and two sergeants having become casualties as the
advance began.
On the left of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders the 6th Black
Watch met no resistance until they had passed the Hindenburg front line.
In the later stages of their advance many machine-guns had to be
tackled.
The front line proved a serious obstacle to the tanks, in spite of their
fascines, four of them becoming ditched in it on this battalion front.
In consequence, portions of the second wave came under close-range
machine-gun fire. Of these guns one was disposed of by a sergeant, who,
crawling forward, threw a hand-grenade amongst its team. The remainder
were destroyed with the assistance of tanks.
In the advance to Mole Trench further resistance was encountered by the
6th Black Watch. First two machine-gun posts on the right held up the
advance; but in one case a sergeant, in the other a corporal, worked
forward alone and knocked out the teams with hand-grenades.
On the left the advance was held up by uncut wire; but the infantry
summoned by signals three third-wave tanks from the next battalion
front, which crushed the wire and enabled the advance to be continued.
On arrival in Mole Trench the 6th Black Watch were raked with enfilade
machine-gun fire from Sammy's Trench. A platoon was therefore
immediately detached, which, advancing by section rushes under cover of
the fire of its Lewis guns, wiped out the entire garrison of Sammy's
Trench. The Germans here offered a magnificent resistance, and fought
until the last man was killed.
Still further fighting occurred, heavy machine-gun and rifle fire being
opened on the advancing 6th Black Watch from the Grand Ravine.
Individual skill and initiative were again displayed. The first
machine-gun was put out of action by a private soldier, who, working
towards it alone, killed five and wounded two of the team with rifle
grenades. A tank at that moment arrived, and the Grand Ravine was
cleared, 6 officers and 100 other ranks being taken prisoner.
Meanwhile Lieut.-Colonel N. D. Campbell, commanding this battalion, in
making a reconnaissance of the captured ground, came across a dug-out
which had not previously been noticed, and with the help of his orderly
captured twelve prisoners in it.
On the extreme left the 5th Gordon Highlanders made a surprisingly big
bag in the outpost line, capturing 21 prisoners in one sap-head, and
capturing or killing 22 in another. The Hindenburg front line was
entered without difficulty with the tanks, the bulk of the garrison
having run back to Triangle Support. Up to this point 2 machine-guns and
200 prisoners had been captured.
It was some time before the garrison of Triangle Support could be
overcome, as only one second-wave tank on the battalion front managed to
cross the Hindenburg front line.
Subsequently the resistance collapsed on the arrival of some third-wave
tanks, but not before odd platoons had gallantly fought their way into
the trench.
Wood Trench and Mole Trench were occupied without particular effort; but
beyond Mole Trench lay a sunken road, into which large numbers of the
enemy had fled at the first sight of the tanks. This road was cleared
with the assistance of a tank, which did magnificent execution with its
6-pounder gun, shell after shell bursting in the midst of parties of
panic-stricken Germans.
By this time the 7th Black Watch, who were detailed to pass through the
5th Gordon Highlanders for the second phase of the attack, came up, and
with some of the latter crossed the Grand Ravine and moved towards
Chapel Trench. Here again the Germans fought stubbornly, some 40 of them
being killed before the trench was occupied. The 5th Gordon Highlanders
thus arrived on their objectives, having captured a total of 10
machine-guns, 2 trench-mortars, and 400 prisoners, including a battalion
commander complete with his staff.
So far the attack had proceeded smoothly enough, but in the next phase
the conditions under which the advance was to be carried out changed
considerably. Up to the present the main difficulty of the tanks had
been the width and depth of the trenches which they had to traverse,
effective action against them on the part of the enemy having been
negligible.
In the next stage the advance was to be carried out through the enemy's
gun line, with the result that the tanks had not only to contend with
the crossing of the trenches, but were also exposed to the close-range
fire of field-guns. As the infantry depended absolutely and entirely on
the tanks for the crushing of the large belts of wire opposed to them,
any losses sustained by the tanks, as will be seen, seriously prejudiced
the infantry's chances of success.
The enemy's support system, which was to be overcome in the next bound,
consisted of a strong fire-trench known as the Hindenburg Support,
protected by two to four belts of heavy wire, and supported by a trench
some 100 yards in rear known as Flesquières Trench--a trench in many
places shallow, and protected by little wire. Of these the former lay on
the crest of the Flesquières Ridge, and the latter just behind it. Both
skirted a chateau at the south-west corner of the village, which, with
its walls and wooded grounds, offered great possibilities for concealed
defences.
On the right, the 6th Gordon Highlanders advanced on a two-company
front, the leading two companies being detailed for the capture of the
Hindenburg support system. These companies were preceded by six tanks.
On arriving at the enemy wire the tanks came within view of a field
battery some 500 yards distant, which immediately opened on them, and by
a succession of direct hits knocked out all six in the space of a few
minutes, an admirable exhibition of shooting on the part of the German
gunners.
Owing to the formation of the enemy's entanglements, which projected in
irregular V shapes for over 180 yards from the trench, the infantry did
not appreciate, until they were held up by the wire, that the tanks had
failed to penetrate it. In this position they were suddenly swept by
close-range machine-gun fire, and in a few moments had lost some sixty
men killed and wounded.
As a farther advance in face of the uncut wire was out of the question,
the companies were immediately withdrawn to Station Avenue and the
sunken Ribécourt-Flesquières road. An advance up Station Avenue was then
organised with the intention of breaking into the Hindenburg support
line on the right and of working inwards along it. Though it turned out
that Station Avenue did not join up with the Hindenburg support line,
one platoon was successful in dashing across the open, entering the
support line, and capturing two machine-guns. This platoon, in
attempting to work along the trench towards its left flank, found
portions of it so shallow that they could not continue their advance in
face of the intense machine-gun fire coming from Flesquières.
Meanwhile the remaining two companies of the 6th Gordon Highlanders had
been collected in the Ribécourt-Flesquières sunken road.
The 6th Seaforth Highlanders fared better. Seven tanks on the left and
centre of the battalion front passed through the wire, and enabled the
left company to enter the trench with only three casualties.
On the right of the battalion front the tanks appear to have lost their
direction, as no gaps were cut in the wire. "C" Company, however,
discovered a gap on their left flank, and having passed through it,
pushed on towards the trench. Here they had some severe fighting before
they finally established themselves in it, inflicting heavy losses on
the enemy and capturing many prisoners.
This company then tried to force their way along the Hindenburg support
line towards their right to join up with the 6th Gordon Highlanders. By
leaving the trench and running along the parapet, shooting and bombing
the Germans, they cleared some fifty yards of the trench. The rifle and
machine-gun fire from Flesquières, however, became so heavy that they
were forced to take to the trench again and establish a bombing-block on
their flanks between them and the enemy.
While this fighting was in progress the surviving tanks were pushing on
towards Flesquières Trench; but they, too, came under artillery fire,
and were knocked out by direct hits.
The personnel of the tanks suffered heavy losses, as in some cases the
tanks burst into flames on being struck by a shell, and their crews were
burnt to death before help could be brought to them. There is no need to
describe the sufferings of the unfortunate men who died in this manner,
imprisoned in the flaming tanks.
The tanks which still survived shortly became non-effective for the time
being owing to shortage of petrol. The crews which survived, however,
still continued to assist the infantry after their tanks were out of
action. For example, 2nd Lieutenant Blow, after his tank, the Edward
II., was struck by a shell, took his Lewis guns from it, placed one in
action at the head of a communication trench, and himself fired a Lewis
gun from the roof of his tank until the gun became too hot to hold. He
then attached himself to the Seaforths for the remainder of the action.
The second wave of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, in spite of a heavy
fire directed against them from Flesquières Trench, made repeated
attempts to enter it, in which all officers except one per company
became casualties.
One officer in particular, 2nd Lieutenant Donald Grant, displayed great
courage and initiative in his efforts to gain his objective. Leading his
platoon along a communication trench, east of Flesquières Wood, he drove
the enemy before him, bayoneting many himself. When all his men but one
were casualties, he climbed out of his communication trench and
attempted to rush Flesquières Trench from above ground. He and his
companion were, however, immediately shot dead.
The 7th Gordon Highlanders, just as they had done at Beaumont Hamel and
again at the chemical works, carried their advance to the farthest point
reached in the attack. They made short work of the Hindenburg Support,
where they picked up 100 prisoners. On approaching Flesquières Trench
their tanks became subjected to close-range field-gun fire, and drew
most of the fire of the riflemen and machine-gunners. The infantry were
thus able to enter the trench and establish themselves in it after some
heavy fighting.
On the right at first only one section gained a lodgment in this trench,
but a platoon advancing over the area which the section had just
traversed followed it into the trench, and then fought its way along it
with bombs and rifles until it reached the battalion right boundary.
The next waves thus passed on to assault the village, unsupported by
tanks, and in the face of a terrific fire. At one period they were able
to sweep the main street of the village with Lewis-gun fire; but
subjected to machine-gun fire from all sides, they could not maintain
their position, and were forced back into Flesquières Trench.
The Germans then delivered a counter-attack against the right of the 7th
Gordon Highlanders, and forced them out of Flesquières Trench, which in
this sector was in many places only a few inches deep.
The 7th Gordon Highlanders were thus left, holding the Hindenburg
support line throughout the battalion front, and with three platoons in
Flesquières Trench.
The 7th Black Watch on the left flank of the Division encountered a
series of misfortunes. In the first place, two of their tanks were
ditched in crossing the front line. Secondly, before encountering
Hindenburg support line, they met tremendous resistance from Cemetery
Alley. Here both their second and third waves became involved in heavy
fighting, and after a severe engagement, in which the attackers were
subjected to a considerable volume of machine-gun fire from Cemetery
Ridge, the trench was captured with 200 prisoners.
Hindenburg support line was thus successfully captured in conjunction
with tanks; but on crossing this trench, all the remaining tanks were
knocked out. As uncut wire lay in front of them, and a great volume of
fire was being directed against them from the village, the waves could
not continue their advance. Attempts were made to get forward by small
parties, but with no success, and the battalion was ordered to
consolidate its gains as it stood.
At this stage the prospects of a farther advance were not good. The
German gunner, always an unpleasantly efficient person, seemed to have
got the measure of the tanks, and without them it appeared impossible in
the near future to give the advance further impetus.
Meanwhile, Lieut.-Colonel S. MacDonald, D.S.O., commanding the 6th
Seaforth Highlanders, had arrived at the Hindenburg support line, and
had reorganised his two companies there for further efforts. He found
that the village, wood, and chateau were a series of strong nests of
machine-guns. However, employing tanks in the vicinity, which had run
out of petrol, to open on the village with their 6-pounders and Lewis
guns, he led his battalion forward in person, and gained a foothold in
Flesquières Trench, which extended from the Ribécourt-Flesquières road
for 300 yards to the left.
From this position Colonel MacDonald, showing splendid qualities of
leadership, organised two determined attempts to reach the village under
cover of rifle and Lewis-gun fire. Though one or two machine-guns were
put out of action, the intense fire which this enterprise attracted from
the high walls of the chateau grounds and the houses in the village,
checked the advance on both occasions. During one of these attempts a
private soldier, single-handed, killed the team of a machine-gun and
carried the gun back to the British lines.
About 5 P.M. seven more tanks arrived, of which six entered the village.
They were not, however, sufficiently closely supported by the infantry,
and the attack failed. The enemy, with great cunning, offered no
resistance to the tanks in the streets, either lying motionless in his
emplacements or retiring into dug-outs and cellars while the tanks were
passing. The tanks, after cruising about the village until the light
began to fail, returned after an uneventful voyage.
Meanwhile, in support of the tanks two platoons of the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders were ordered to advance through the wood, and two to enter
the village from the north. The first party was held up in the wood by
machine-guns, and the second entered the village only to meet the tanks
withdrawing. They therefore attempted to establish a chain of posts
round the village; but, fired at from front and flanks, were compelled
to withdraw.
Arrangements were now made to prevent the enemy from evacuating his guns
during the night by placing a machine-gun barrage on the northern slopes
of the Flesquières Ridge. With this object the 152nd Machine Gun Company
alone fired over 19,000 rounds before daylight. By dawn, however, the
enemy had withdrawn from Flesquières Trench and the villages.
A patrol of the 7th Gordon Highlanders had left their trenches as early
as 3.45 P.M., circled the north-west side of the village to the
north-west corner, and reported that that flank was only held by a few
machine-guns and snipers. At 4 P.M. a patrol of the 7th Black Watch
found Flesquières Trench unoccupied, and the battalion moved into it.
At 2.45 A.M. three patrols of the 7th Gordon Highlanders returned and
reported that they had advanced as far as the Brown line, and that the
whole area was clear of the enemy. About the same time a patrol of the
7th Black Watch returned with similar information. These two battalions
therefore advanced and occupied the Brown line, troops of the 7th Gordon
Highlanders passing right through the village and encountering only
slight machine-gun and rifle fire.
At 6.15 A.M. on the following morning troops of the 6th Gordon
Highlanders and 6th Seaforth Highlanders also established themselves on
the Brown line without opposition.
Thus within twenty-four hours of the attack having been launched the
Brown line was occupied in its entirety, largely owing to the vigilance
with which the 153rd Brigade had kept in touch with the enemy's
movements by patrolling.
During the final advance to the Brown line considerable booty was taken,
the following guns being captured by the 6th Gordon Highlanders: two 5·9
howitzers and two 4·2 guns; by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, five
field-guns; by the 7th Gordon Highlanders, two 8-inch howitzers, five
5·9 howitzers, and a field-gun.
By nightfall on the day of the attack the artillery had considerably
advanced their positions, one brigade being at the Grand Ravine, and two
in No Man's Land.
The advance to the Red dotted line was now accomplished without
difficulty. On the right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders passed through the
6th Gordon Highlanders, reached the Red dotted line, and made a
reconnaissance in force towards Cantaing with a total of fourteen
casualties. On their left the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders also
reached the Red dotted line, having killed five Germans and captured
thirty-three in an attack by section rushes against a sunken road. They
also reconnoitred towards Cantaing, but found it strongly held.
Similarly, the 6th Black Watch and the 5th Gordon Highlanders occupied
the Red dotted line with a total of two and three casualties
respectively. The former captured three field-guns and four 4·2
howitzers, and the latter three field-guns.
During these operations the 154th Brigade, which had assembled at Metz
at 5 A.M. on the day of the attack, had at 10 A.M. moved two battalions
to the old British front line and two just clear of Metz, in readiness
to move forward should Flesquières fall.
On the evening of the 20th it was decided that should the Red dotted
line be captured during the night, the 154th Brigade should pass through
the 152nd and 153rd Brigades, capture the Cantaing Line and Cantaing,
and advance on the village of Fontaine Notre Dame.
Of these objectives Cantaing and the Cantaing Line proved themselves to
be formidable obstacles. The latter, though the trenches were for the
most part only traced out, contained numerous completed dug-outs and
machine-gun emplacements, and was for the greater portion of its length
protected by a double belt of wire some fifteen yards in depth. The
defences of the village of Cantaing were also considerably strengthened
by a well-traversed trench encircling its south-western corner.
The 154th Brigade began its advance with the 4th Gordon Highlanders
covering the front of the 152nd Infantry Brigade, and the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders covering the 153rd. In rear were the 9th Royal
Scots on the right, and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the left.
The 4th Gordon Highlanders passed through the Red dotted line at 10.30
A.M., and continued their advance at first uneventfully. As, however,
they began to approach Cantaing Trench, machine-guns from the trenches
and from buildings in the village, as well as light trench-mortars,
opened on them in sufficient volume to hold up the advance until shortly
after noon. At that hour ten tanks arrived from Premy Chapel, and made
towards the village, followed by "B" Company of the 4th Gordon
Highlanders. Cantaing was entered, and after a little street fighting
300 prisoners were taken from it.
Meanwhile about the south-western end of the village, in the trenches in
that vicinity and in the sunken road running to Cantaing Mill, bodies of
the enemy continued to offer a magnificent resistance. "D" Company of
the 4th Gordon Highlanders managed to force their way through the wire
into a position on the Cantaing-Flesquières road, but could make no
farther progress. Two Stokes guns were then brought into action, but
even these failed to dislodge the enemy. Indeed, it was not until 3
P.M., when one of the tanks _en route_ for Fontaine arrived, that the
pocket was finally cleared. This gallant stand made by the enemy had
disorganised this attack, which came to a standstill with "B" and "D"
Companies of the 4th Gordon Highlanders consolidating the line north and
north-east of the village, and with "A" and "C" Companies connecting
them on the right flank with the 29th Division, who were by this time in
Nine Wood. Subsequently three squadrons of the Queen's Bays and the 9th
Cavalry Brigade M.G. Squadron arrived, and took up defensive positions
round the perimeter of the village in conjunction with the 4th Gordon
Highlanders.
While this operation was in progress, the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, on the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders, could not join
in the advance until 11.20 A.M., as they were held up by heavy fire from
the village of Anneux. However, at that hour the village was captured by
the 62nd Division, and they were able to move forward again.
By noon the advance had again been completely held up about 300 yards
from the Cantaing Line by heavy enfilade fire from Cantaing on the right
and Bourlon Wood on the left. As no tanks had as yet arrived, the
battalion therefore began to dig in.
During this time and until the end of the day low-flying enemy
aeroplanes, sometimes only 150 feet from the ground, patrolled our
lines, observed the position of our troops, disclosed them by dropping
lights, and fired with machine-guns on the men.
Meanwhile, the 4th Gordon Highlanders having been led away rather to the
right to deal with Cantaing, touch had been lost between the two
battalions. A company of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders was therefore
ordered forward to fill the gap between the Gordons and the Argylls.
At 3.30 P.M. the situation was cleared up by the arrival of seven tanks,
which moved forward, followed by the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders and the company of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders. At the
sight of the tanks the Germans in the Cantaing Line surrendered, 130 men
being taken prisoners.
The advance on Fontaine Notre Dame was thus begun, and was carried out
without any opposition being met beyond a few shots fired by riflemen in
Bourlon Wood. The village was in our hands by 5 P.M.
The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were then disposed so as to
defend Fontaine, the point of junction being north of the village, with
the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on the left and the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders on the right. One company of the latter was also
detached to connect up the 62nd Division north of Anneux with the
reserve platoons of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
garrisoning the Cantaing Line.
[Illustration: MAP VIII.--THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI: POSITION AT 7 P.M.,
21ST NOVEMBER 1917.]
During the night the enemy infantry remained inactive. Fontaine was
found to be a large village little damaged by shell-fire, but as
darkness had fallen shortly after its capture, it was impossible to make
a systematic search of all the cellars and dug-outs contained in it, in
which parties of Germans might be hiding.
But though the enemy remained quiet, the position in Fontaine was a
desperate one. The enemy still held Bourlon and La Folie Woods. The
village was, in fact, like a nut gripped by the crackers.
At 6.30 P.M. steps were taken to ensure that the flanks of the defenders
of Fontaine were securely connected with the neighbouring troops, the
9th Royal Scots, who had relieved the 4th Gordon Highlanders in
Cantaing, being ordered to swing forward their left flank until they
were definitely in touch with the right of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders.
At the same time the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were
instructed to make certain that no gap existed between the troops on the
west side of Fontaine and the Cantaing Line. It was imperative that no
such gaps should exist, as should the enemy succeed in penetrating
between Fontaine and the Cantaing Line during the dark, there was every
chance of the entire garrison of Fontaine being cut off.
At 8 P.M., as there was no activity on this part of the front, the
brigadier ordered the 4th Seaforth Highlanders to take over the defences
of Fontaine, thus relieving three companies of the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, who were to be used in their turn to defend the
flanks in rear of the village. The object of these orders was to place
the defence of the village under a single command.
Fontaine Notre Dame was subsequently lost in a counter-attack. It has
often been urged that this would not have been the case had a stronger
garrison been detailed for its defence. This is not true. Fontaine could
only have been secured by a successful attack on Bourlon Wood.
Sufficient troops could have at any time been moved into Fontaine to
give such an attack adequate support on its right flank. No number of
troops could be expected successfully to hold Fontaine against
counter-attack so long as the enemy held Bourlon Wood.
The village was indeed merely the point of junction of two defensive
flanks. Only two policies appeared possible: either an attack must be
delivered against Bourlon Wood by the Division on the left, or Fontaine
must be evacuated. To put more men into the village would have been to
expose more men to certain defeat in the event of counter-attack. It
would have been the equivalent of putting a large nut within the grip of
the crackers instead of a small one.
The perimeter of the village was some 3500 yards, the strength of the
4th Seaforth Highlanders roughly 400, or approximately one man to eight
and three-quarter yards of front. In addition, six Vickers guns had also
taken up defensive positions in the village.
Immediately after the completion of the relief by the 4th Seaforth
Highlanders, it was reported that the enemy were massing for attack in
Bourlon Wood, and shortly afterwards that they were dribbling forwards
on to the Cambrai road, in just the same manner as they had done for the
counter-attack near Poelcappelle on 20th September 1917.
At 5.30 A.M. on 23rd November, Lieut.-Colonel Unthank, D.S.O.,
commanding the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, who had established his
headquarters in the centre of the village, sent an officer and the
battalion scouts to establish four posts of observation on the Cambrai
road north of the village. These were in position by 7 A.M.
As soon as dawn broke a fleet of twelve enemy aircraft circled over
Fontaine at a low altitude. The battalion headquarters staff were lined
up in the main street, and forced the planes to fly at a higher altitude
by their rifle-fire. They, however, continued to observe and to engage
our troops with machine-gun fire all morning.
At 10.30 A.M. the first S.O.S. signal was fired by the infantry, and a
fierce battle was soon raging. The enemy's plan was to attack the
village from both flanks simultaneously, from the Cambrai-Bapaume road
on the right, and from Bourlon Wood on the left. At the same time, he
delivered a holding attack from the north.
The Germans advanced most gallantly in five waves, separated from one
another by a distance of about ten yards. Numbers of officers were
conspicuous directing the advance. These waves advanced determinedly,
regardless of casualties, on the left to within bombing distance of the
front line.
Meanwhile parties of the enemy, who had no doubt remained hidden in the
village all night, opened fire on the backs of the defenders from the
church and adjoining houses.
On the right the enemy was first checked by troops holding the last
house in Fontaine on the Cambrai road. The enemy, not being able to
dislodge them, turned northwards and entered the railway cutting,
driving the small posts from it into the outskirts of the village. To
check his farther advance in this direction two platoons were brought
from the reserve south of the village to the station, and Colonel
Unthank led his headquarters personnel along the Cambrai road. On the
way the colonel met the two platoons falling back from the station;
these he ordered back again, and advanced with his party also in that
direction. He found the enemy two hundred yards from the station
buildings in great force. For a short time he kept them in check with
the troops at his command, but after a few minutes was driven by weight
of numbers into the street running parallel to the Cambrai road and
north of it.
The pressure now increased as Captain Peverell, the adjutant who was in
charge of the party defending the Cambrai road on the extreme right, was
wounded and his party driven in. At the same time the company defending
the north-west and western edges of Fontaine were forced back by weight
of numbers, first on to the Cambrai road, and then into a sunken road
running into the village at its south-western corner. During this
withdrawal the company was heavily engaged and suffered severe losses,
the company commander being wounded.
South of the Cambrai road on the right two platoons holding the sunken
road running from Fontaine to La Folie Wood offered a most heroic
resistance. They held the ground until they had fired every round of
ammunition that they carried or could collect from the dead and wounded.
Then covered by a gallant band of four men, they fell back into the
sunken Cantaing-Fontaine road.
While these actions were in progress, Colonel Unthank with his small
party had withdrawn to the centre of the village. The enemy was now
pressing them on three sides, and they had no alternative but to
extricate themselves from a most dangerous situation. They accordingly
withdrew southwards. At the edge of the village they found the enemy
advancing in waves on both flanks. Though they were now reduced in
number to seven, they halted, faced the enemy, and opened rapid fire on
him for a minute, and then dashed across the open under a heavy
cross-fire to the Cantaing-Fontaine road.
Colonel Unthank and his men had fought magnificently against
overwhelming odds; he did not withdraw from the village with the
remnants of his headquarters until 2.30 P.M., a few moments before the
German cordon round the village was completed, and even then paused to
take a final toll from the Boches. As he withdrew a British machine-gun
was seen on the Cambrai road still in action with Germans all round it.
The survivors of the defenders of Fontaine were now all gathered
together in the two sunken roads running southwards from the village.
The enemy were continuing to advance on the right, and the defenders of
the road with their ammunition almost spent made a gallant attempt to
relieve the pressure by a counter-charge. The men were, however, so
terribly exhausted that the charge lost its impetus just as the enemy
were beginning to retire. The troops then returned to the road.
A line was now organised, so that a continuous line of resistance was
formed connecting the Cantaing Line on the left with the sunken roads.
The troops in the eastern sunken road also gained touch with the 9th
Royal Scots. The enemy thus found it impossible to debouch from the
village or to work round the left flank. Several times he attempted to
throw back the 154th Brigade and continue his advance, but each attempt
was shattered by the rifle and Lewis-gun fire of the defenders. He could
do no more than occupy the trench at the south-western corner of the
village. The organisation of this line, which brought the enemy's
initial success to a standstill, was a fine piece of tactical work, and
reflects great credit on the local commanders and the troops.
Meanwhile the 9th Royal Scots had had some splendid shooting during the
afternoon. Five times the enemy attempted to deliver an attack across
the country intervening between Fontaine and La Folie Wood, but on each
occasion the Royal Scots delivered such a fire that his troops withered
away, and contented themselves with digging in behind a ridge. Quiet
prevailed along the whole front in the evening, the enemy not feeling
disposed to test our line again. Patrols reconnoitred the country
immediately in front of our line, but met none of the enemy.
During the night the 7th Black Watch relieved the 4th Seaforth
Highlanders and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and the
Queen's Bays were withdrawn from Cantaing. The front held by the
Division was also contracted on the right, so as just to include
Cantaing.
On the evening of the 22nd orders were issued for a combined attack to
be delivered on Bourlon Wood and Fontaine on the following day, the wood
being allotted to the 119th Brigade, 40th Division, and the village to
the 152nd Brigade.
This attack, delivered as it was from the point of a salient, included
all the natural disadvantages that attend such operations, as a
defensive flank had to be formed progressively as the attack advanced.
The 6th Gordon Highlanders on the right and the 6th Seaforth Highlanders
on the left were detailed by the 152nd Brigade to carry out the
operations, the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders being employed to
form the defensive right flank as the attack progressed. That is to say,
the two former battalions were to capture Fontaine, while the last,
facing north-east, was to connect up the defences of Fontaine with the
defences of Cantaing.
Twelve tanks were allotted to the 152nd Brigade for the operation, a
number which was more than doubled by reinforcements which arrived
during the day.
An artillery barrage was also arranged which opened for twenty minutes
south of the village, and then moved across the area to be attacked at
the rate of 200 yards every ten minutes.
The tanks moved off at 10 A.M., the plan being for those destined for
the village to enter it from the flanks. On the right the 6th Gordon
Highlanders advanced on a two-company front, their objective being the
high ground north of Fontaine village; the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders followed in rear, ready to form the defensive flank.
As is liable to happen when an attack is delivered from the point of a
salient, the advancing infantry were badly enfiladed by machine-guns
from the direction of La Folie Wood on their right flank. In addition,
every house on the south side of the village seemed to hold one or more
machine-guns, which the tanks, having entered the village from the
flanks, had left undamaged.
Repeated attempts were made to cross a zone swept from end to end by
bullets fired from the front and flank; but though part of "C" Company,
8th Gordon Highlanders, managed to reach the outskirts of the village,
they could not maintain themselves there, the battalion being compelled
to dig in on a line about 500 yards south of the village.
On the left the 6th Seaforth Highlanders advanced with the task of
capturing the ground lying between the wood and the village, and of
joining up with the 6th Gordon Highlanders north of the village.
This battalion, too, suffered heavily from enfilade fire from houses in
the village which had escaped the tanks.
However, chiefly owing to the gallantry of individual officers and men,
the enemy resistance was overcome. One officer, for instance, advancing
ahead of his platoon against a machine-gun in a ditch alongside the
Bapaume-Cambrai road, shot two of the team, and then carried back the
gun under fire. A sergeant put a gun out of action by heading an attack
along a trench occupied by a party of about thirty Germans, of which he
bayoneted three himself, thus cowing the others into surrendering. A
dash through the German barrage by an officer and one N.C.O. captured
fifty Germans garrisoning a trench.
By means of these and similar exploits "C" Company, pushing in by
section rushes, and closely supported by "D" Company, reached the
north-east corner of Bourlon Wood. "D" Company from this point tried to
gain the high ground north of the village, but the fire from Fontaine
was so intense that their efforts had to be abandoned.
Meanwhile "A" and "B" Companies with the tanks were endeavouring to
enter the west side of the village. They successfully cleared the
outskirts, but every endeavour made to enter the main streets failed.
Machine-gunners or riflemen seemed to be manning the windows of every
house.
During this action the enemy made several attempts to defeat the whole
attack by cutting in across the Bapaume-Cambrai road (south-west of the
village), a form of counter-attack to which an attack from a salient is
particularly liable. All his attempts in this direction collapsed under
the fire of rifles and Lewis guns.
By the early afternoon the situation had become stationary, the
surviving tanks all having returned from the village.
A fresh attack was therefore planned, as it would have been impossible
for the 6th Seaforth Highlanders to maintain themselves in their
advanced position unless some effort was made to relieve the pressure on
their flanks. Two companies of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders were
therefore ordered to advance through Anneux to the south-east corner of
Bourlon Wood, now in the hands of the 40th Division, and forming up
there, to attempt to clear Fontaine by bombing in conjunction with a
fresh company of twelve tanks. At the same time, it was arranged that
100 rifles of the 6th Gordon Highlanders and two companies of the 8th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders should form up on the right flank and
co-operate in the attack.
Immediately before the hour fixed for the operation to begin, the enemy
successfully counter-attacked the 40th Division in Bourlon Wood, and
uncovered the left flank of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders. They had, in
consequence, to fall back, with the result that the situation west of
Fontaine became uncertain.
However, while this withdrawal was taking place, the tanks had begun
their advance through a heavy artillery barrage, which accompanied the
German counter-attack on Bourlon Wood. Several of them were put out of
action by direct hits, in consequence of which some confusion and
disorganisation arose, which resulted in none of the tanks entering the
village on the front of the two companies of the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders.
In view of the intensity of the machine-gun fire which was being poured
out of Fontaine, it seemed clear that an attack unsupported by tanks had
no possible chance of success. The enterprise was therefore abandoned,
and the men withdrew and dug in so as to form a connecting link between
the 6th Seaforth Highlanders and the troops south of the village.
This gallant attack on Fontaine illustrates the extreme difficulty of
taking an undemolished village with or without tanks, if strongly held
and organised for defence, unless there is sufficient time available to
subject it to a severe and thorough bombardment.
No further changes in the situation occurred, except that after dusk the
line was so adjusted as to be continuous from the left of the 6th
Seaforth Highlanders in the south-east corner of Bourlon Wood to the
right of the 9th Royal Scots south-east of Cantaing.
During the night of the 23-24th the Division was relieved by the Guards
Division, and a continuous line was handed over five miles in advance of
the trenches occupied by the Division at zero hour on the 20th.
The part played by the Highland Division in the battle of Cambrai was a
great one. It had reached its final objective, though Fontaine was
ultimately lost; it had captured 2609 unwounded prisoners, including 66
officers, with a loss of 27 officers and 312 men killed and missing, and
of 41 officers and 1190 men wounded.
In the action the tanks certainly played a gallant and conspicuous part,
and since they were alone responsible for crushing the wire throughout
the varying phases of the attack, contributed largely to the success of
the infantry. It must, however, be borne in mind that the tanks suffered
serious losses. In "D" Battalion ten tanks were knocked out by direct
hits, and in "E" eighteen. Many others, through mechanical trouble, were
unable to reach their objective. Indeed, of the seventy that took part
in the first day's action, only twenty-six rallied at the conclusion.
It will thus be seen that in many cases the infantry gallantly continued
their advance without the support of their tanks, so that the success
was equally due to their splendid qualities, which enabled them to reach
their objectives by substituting for the help they anticipated from the
tanks their own initiative and resource. Those tanks that remained in
action did magnificent work, as is testified by the following figures.
In one day "Z" Battalion fired 2000 6-pounder shells, and 95,000 rounds
of small-arms ammunition, excluding any rounds fired by the tanks that
were knocked out. In many cases tanks not only fired every round of
their own ammunition, but also all the ammunition that they were
carrying for the infantry.
One has now reached a point at which one may pause and consider the last
three attacks carried out by the Division. They were delivered at the
height of the German's defensive power; two of them against trench
systems perfected by every modern artifice, deliberately constructed
with ample leisure in which to complete them; one against the
barrage-proof pill-box; all of them before the German had exhausted the
flower of his army in his violent attacks of the first six months of
1918.
In every case the Highland Division reached the final objective allotted
to it; true, in two cases, with an exposed flank, counter-attacks
ultimately reduced its gains, but only inconsiderably. In the aggregate
of its three attacks, it advanced 14,000 yards, accounting for
practically every German in the area traversed, capturing as unwounded
prisoners 87 officers and 3403 unwounded men, irrespective of the
wounded collected by the R.A.M.C.; defeated at least a dozen
counter-attacks; and lost in the three actions in killed, wounded, and
missing a sum total of only 162 officers and 4128 other ranks. That is
to say, its losses in these attacks exceeded the number of unwounded
prisoners captured by only 75 officers and 725 other ranks, the German
killed, wounded, and wounded prisoners not being taken into account in
this balance.
Many Divisions reached their final objectives, but few can have done so
three times in four months with the balance of dead loss in man-power,
as opposed to the Germans, so immeasurably in their favour. The three
battles were, indeed, immense successes, and proved indisputably that in
1917 in the Highland Division the Germans had an opponent for whom they
were no match.
How, then, was this success achieved? One can say with truth that the
leap-frog system of attack gave the infantry the best possible chances
of success; one can say with equal truth that in Generals Harper,
Oldfield, Pelham-Burn, Buchanan, and Beckwith, and its unit commanders,
the men had magnificent leaders; one can say that the men themselves
were as gallant and courageous as soldiers can be; but there was
something further.
It was that the Division was trained throughout to act intelligently. It
had learned to fight scientifically by the combination of skill and
gallantry, and not by animal courage alone, untempered by intelligence.
The success of the Division and the cheapness in life of its successes
was due, as General Maxse had put it, "to the fact that all usual war
problems had been thought out beforehand, discussed in detail, and
embodied in simple doctrines well known to all ranks."
One cannot leave this battle without a word of praise for the courage
and steadiness of the German soldier in the face of one of the heaviest
attacks of the war. Without warning the Germans were assaulted in the
early dawn by tanks, against which the infantryman is practically
defenceless, in numbers which had not previously been contemplated. At
the same time, they were bombarded and barraged by a vast artillery,
subsequently they were attacked again and again by tanks. Yet though, it
is true, certain of them broke and fled or surrendered, in the main they
stood their ground, and set a magnificent example of stubborn and
skilful defence, in which their gunners supported the infantry with the
greatest devotion.
The battle of Cambrai was the first occasion on which troops of the
Highland Division had penetrated the enemy's positions to such a depth
as to liberate French civilians. All who took part in the battle will
never forget the gratitude of these French people, who, having lived for
three years behind the German lines, were ultimately released as the
result of a great battle fought in their presence round their homes.