EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN WAR.
=140.= _General instructions._
1. F.S. Regs., Part I, lay down certain principles for the guidance of
commanders in the combined employment of the various arms. A knowledge
of these principles by artillery commanders is essential for effective
co-operation.
2. The instructions contained in this chapter are based on those
principles, and are intended further to assist artillery commanders
in the solution of problems which will confront them on the field of
battle and in training their commands on a uniform system.
=These principles are generally applicable to any force of artillery
acting under an independent commander, whether his command is of a
temporary nature or not.=
CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
=141.= _Field guns._
1. The principal characteristics of modern field guns are the flatness
of the trajectory of their shell, the rapidity and accuracy of their
fire and their power to deliver effective fire from concealed positions
as well as from those in the open. Other characteristics are mobility,
increased power of concealment, owing to the use of smokeless powder,
and decreased vulnerability, due to the adoption of shields.
2. The effect of field guns is most fully developed against troops in
the open, either in movement or stationary.
They may be used effectively against personnel in entrenchments, in
buildings or behind gun shields. Against personnel protected by
entrenchments the effect will be slight unless the defenders are
compelled to man their entrenchments by the action of the other arms.
Against buildings the effect is usually limited to the rooms facing
the guns, as the projectiles are arrested by a second wall, and their
destructive and incendiary effect is not great. The destructive effect
of direct hits on artillery _matériel_ is considerable, but at long
ranges this would entail a great expenditure of ammunition. (_See_ Sec.
=114= (6).)
=142.= _Field howitzers._
1. Field howitzers by reason of their high explosive shell and the
steep angle of descent of their shrapnel bullets are specially suited:--
i. To attack artillery personnel protected by shields.
ii. To destroy artillery _matériel_.
iii. To attack the defenders of entrenchments.
iv. To destroy defended localities such as villages, farms,
or the strongly entrenched portions of a position.
v. To support an attack up to the moment of assault.
2. Their wide field of fire enables howitzers to cover a zone of
considerable extent, and they are particularly adapted to the support
of infantry in the later stages of an attack, owing to the steep angle
of descent of their projectiles. (_See_ Sec. =157=.)
Troops in movement or other targets presenting only a fleeting
opportunity do not come within the normal rôle of howitzers, which,
however, should be prepared to engage such objectives, if circumstances
make such action advisable.
3. The chief conditions for effective howitzer fire are good gun
platforms, and facilities for both observation of fire and the exercise
of command. A position behind natural cover is obviously preferable,
provided these conditions are fulfilled.
=143.= _Heavy artillery._
1. The special characteristics of heavy artillery are accurate
long-range fire and great shell power, but these advantages are to a
certain extent discounted by a limited mobility. The long-range fire
of guns of this nature should be utilized to bring enfilade and cross
fire to bear on the enemy’s positions. The sites chosen for them should
be such as to facilitate fire being brought to bear on as much of the
ground occupied by the enemy as possible. In normal circumstances these
conditions are most likely to be obtained by dispersion.
The fire of guns of this nature is of special value against shielded
guns, fortified localities and buildings.
2. Owing to the limited mobility of these guns and the fact that they
are unprovided with shields, considerable risk may be incurred without
adequate compensation, if they are placed too far forward, or exposed
on a flank.
Occasions may, however, occur, when to gain decisive results, it will
be necessary to use them in line with those of lighter calibre.
3. If well protected and placed on the flanks of a defensive position
in an open country, their long-range fire may compel a turning movement
to be made on so wide an arc, that time, valuable to the defenders, may
be gained.
=144.= _Mountain artillery._
1. In country where wheeled traffic is impracticable, light guns
carried on pack animals are the only substitute for field artillery,
but the use of mountain artillery is not restricted to such country.
Infantry requires effective support throughout the attack, and as pack
animals can go practically anywhere that an infantry soldier can go
without using his hands, batteries of mountain artillery are peculiarly
suited to work with infantry in difficult country of any kind.
2. Hills, woods, and broken or enclosed country, which might be
impassable to wheeled artillery, present little difficulty to pack
animals, and, as cover, which will conceal a man standing upright is
sufficient for them also, batteries of mountain artillery will often
be able to work their way forward on a battlefield without attracting
attention, where the movement of wheeled artillery could not escape
detection.
Moreover, the utility of mountain artillery is not confined to
supporting the infantry in the various forms an attack may assume, for
in the defence of woods, in temporary forward positions occupied by the
defence, and in rearguard action, its mobility and easy concealment
will often enable it to render valuable service.
In short, mountain batteries are capable of being of great value on
many occasions when circumstances are unfavourable to the use of
wheeled artillery, with which, however, they compare unfavourably in
respect of shell power.
PRINCIPLES OR EMPLOYMENT.
=145.= _Objects of fire._
=1. Artillery cannot ensure decisive success in battle by its own
destructive action.= It is the advance of the infantry that alone is
capable of producing this result.
=To help the infantry to maintain its mobility and offensive power by
all the means at its disposal should be the underlying principle of all
artillery tactics.=
The primary objects of artillery fire should therefore be:--
i. To assist the movements of its own infantry.
ii. To prevent the movements of the enemy’s infantry.
These objects may be attained by--
(_a_) Inflicting losses on the enemy, and breaking down
his fighting spirit.
(_b_) Destroying his _matériel_.
(_c_) Reducing the resisting power of fortified
localities and rendering them more easy of approach.
It is legitimate, therefore, to use artillery fire for any of these
purposes, in so far as they contribute towards the end in view.
=146.= _Concealment._
1. The provision of suitable equipment enables batteries to deliver
effective fire from positions in which they are completely concealed
from the enemy. The batteries may thus be able to retain their
mobility, and remain at the disposal of the commander of the force in
the event of a change in the situation.
2. =Concealment in action increases the difficulties of the hostile
batteries, possibly even to the extent of conferring immunity from
their fire, thus enabling the concealed artillery to devote its
attention to the support and assistance of its own infantry.=
Although the employment of aircraft for reconnaissance has modified the
possibilities of complete concealment to some extent, guns in action
may escape observation from the air if they are carefully sited.
Groups of horses and wagons in the open are very easily seen from
aircraft and even when the guns are not visible may be an indication
of the presence of artillery. Advantage should therefore be taken of
woods, avenues of trees, or other features whenever possible to conceal
the limbers, first line wagons and horses of artillery.
The power of delivering effective fire from concealed positions is,
however, limited. Rapid movement or very fleeting opportunities are
difficult to deal with. Distant observing stations involving the
passage of orders by mechanical means increase the difficulty. The
amount of dead ground which can be left in front of the guns may also
be a matter of serious concern.[10]
[10] Supposing that guns and target are on the same level, then to
guns 60 yards in rear of a crest and 16 feet below it all ground is
dead within 3,000 yards; if 9 feet below it all ground is dead within
2,000 yards; if 3 feet below it all ground is dead within 1,000 yards.
On the other hand batteries exposed to view will usually be compelled
to enter into an artillery engagement for their own protection, in
which they will start at a disadvantage. This is less likely to occur
at the crisis of the fight when the struggle of the infantry at close
quarters may monopolize the attention of the combatants.
=3. Concealed manœuvre favours surprise=, and should therefore be
sought for up to the moment of opening fire, due regard being had to
tactical requirements. Even if the enemy is at once able to locate
the flashes the more vulnerable portions of the battery will probably
have been safely disposed and some measure of surprise attained. The
advantages to be gained from moving batteries into position under
cover of darkness have increased owing to the difficulty of evading
observation by hostile aircraft.
=4. Concealment, both as regards position and manœuvre, must invariably
be foregone for adequate reasons. To support infantry and to enable it
to effect its purpose the artillery must willingly sacrifice itself.=
To move in column of route on a road in circumstances where a lucky
shot will bring the column to a standstill is to court disaster. On the
other hand, when deployed, rapid movement over open ground exposed to
fire for a short distance is accompanied by but slight risk; or, when
the enemy’s attention is fully occupied elsewhere, movements may become
possible which would have no reasonable chance of succeeding if the
enemy was on the look out for them.
5. Knowledge of the general tactical situation and discrimination are
essential on the part of all who order artillery movements on the
battlefield.
=147.= _Economy of force._
1. Artillery, owing to its mobility till subjected to effective fire,
its great rapidity of fire and its power to fire effectively while
remaining concealed, is able in most situations to conserve its energy,
selecting its own time for action and realizing to a great extent the
value of surprise effect.
=The principle of economy of force is, therefore, particularly suitable
to the tactical employment of the arm, but must always be subordinate
to the necessity of employing sufficient force to attain the object in
view.=
2. When an encounter with the enemy takes place sufficient artillery
should be deployed to support the advanced troops and to cover the
deployment of the infantry. The remaining batteries should be assembled
in positions of readiness.
As the plan of action develops, tasks will be assigned to the different
artillery units, and they will be brought into positions suitable for
their purpose. If it is not necessary to open fire immediately they
will remain in observation of the zones assigned to them.
3. =Fire will not be opened with more guns than are necessary for
the task in hand.= In deciding on the number of guns with which
to open fire, the total number available, the frontage that they
can conveniently cover with their fire and the extent and tactical
importance of the objective must be considered. Efforts must also be
made to foresee the course of the action, and to keep a reserve of
fire power in hand to meet successive requirements as they arise.
To justify the opening of fire there must be a definite tactical object
and a reasonable probability of attaining it. Ineffective fire is not
only a waste of ammunition, but affords encouragement to the enemy and
gives him information. It should therefore be avoided whenever possible.
4. =Expenditure of ammunition should, as a rule, be proportionate
to the tactical importance of the objective and the probability of
obtaining results commensurate with the expenditure.= In deciding
whether to engage an objective its vulnerability and tactical
importance should, therefore, be considered.
When an objective is both vulnerable and tactically important a
considerable expenditure of ammunition is obviously justified, but
important tactical objectives are frequently invisible or relatively
invulnerable. The expenditure of ammunition in such cases must be
governed by the urgency of the tactical situation.
5. The objects of keeping artillery in hand are:--
i. To be able to open fire on new objectives that become
menacing without disturbing the allotment of tasks of
that already engaged.
ii. To be in a position to deal with unforeseen
contingencies.
iii. To have guns available for any force detached to a
distance, such as a general reserve employed on a wide
turning movement.
The methods by which these objects may be attained are:--
(_a_) By bringing batteries into action in concealed
positions, where they can remain in observation, their
fire power being in hand till they are actually ordered
to open fire. A battery need not employ the fire of the
whole of its guns; some may be kept temporarily in hand.
(_b_) By keeping batteries in positions of readiness
in which they retain their mobility and can be moved to
other parts of the field.
(_c_) By keeping batteries actually in reserve, if
their withdrawal from action or from positions in
readiness would cause delay and compromise the success
of any contemplated operation.
It follows as a consequence of the above that the power of the Q.F. gun
must be utilized on occasion to its full extent to compensate for the
small number of guns employed on a given task.
=148.= _Protection._
1. On the march, artillery, owing to its inability to defend itself,
requires protection which is provided by the other arms under the
orders of the commander of the force to which the artillery belongs.
2. On the field of battle artillery will generally be protected by the
distribution of the other arms. When, however, guns are in an exposed
position, an escort should be detailed, and, if this has not been done,
it is the duty of the artillery commander concerned to apply to the
commander of the nearest troops, who will provide an escort.--(_See_
F.S. Regs., Part I., Sec. =105=). In moving from one part of a
battlefield to another artillery commanders must consider, if no escort
has been provided, whether one is necessary or whether to avoid delay
they should rely on their own patrols.
3. When an escort is provided its commander is responsible for the
protection of the artillery. This fact, however, does not absolve the
artillery commander from all care for the safety of his guns. He should
consult with the escort commander when necessary and should be ready to
assist him with any available artillery patrols, when their employment
would conduce to greater security.
4. Once in action artillery should be able to protect its own front,
provided there is no ground within effective rifle range upon which the
fire of the guns cannot rapidly be brought to bear in case of need.
5. Rifles are carried on artillery wagons, except in horse artillery.
In action these rifles should, if considered necessary, be distributed
to the gunners with the wagon lines, who should assist the escort, if
one has been provided, in protecting these vehicles. This precaution is
especially desirable in the case of artillery in action on the exposed
flank of a force, where hostile cavalry may be operating.
=149.= _Intercommunication._
1. Intelligent co-operation depends largely on the receipt of timely
information, and this in turn is dependent on the efficiency of the
system of intercommunication.
2. In open country where the features are bold and the field of fire
and view extensive, infantry can often be supported more effectively
from a flank than by batteries situated in its immediate zone; and
the possibility of bringing effective converging fire to bear on a
given locality may be capable of realization. For this to be done the
divisional artillery commander must have the means of readjusting
from time to time the tasks that have been assigned to the artillery
brigades in the original dispositions for battle.
In close or intricate country, on the other hand, where the view is
restricted, artillery will rarely be able to do more than support
the infantry in its own immediate front. In these circumstances the
artillery and infantry may be formed temporarily into groups and
the units thus associated must co-operate closely with one another.
The limitations of central artillery control must then be met by
an increased devolution of responsibility to subordinate artillery
commanders. (_See_ Sec. =153=, (7).)
Artillery communications therefore involve two distinct ideas, viz.,
i. communication between the divisional artillery commander and
his subordinates; ii. between infantry and artillery subordinate
commanders. Both must be kept in view and organized as far as possible,
but the relative importance of each varies to a great extent with the
nature of the country.
3. The means of communication available are:--
i. Staff or orderly officers.
ii. Mounted orderlies.
iii. Artillery brigade telephones.
iv. Visual signalling.
v. Divisional signal service.
For the purposes of communication between the divisional artillery
commander and his subordinates orderlies are probably the most
reliable, but the number of officers and men available for the purpose
is limited, and moreover their employment involves the expenditure of
considerable time and horseflesh.
The telephone equipment with which each artillery brigade is provided
is primarily intended to link up the brigade commander with his
batteries. But it may also be possible to utilize this equipment for
communication with the divisional artillery commander. When it is
desired to maintain direct communication with the divisional artillery
commander, and the nature of the country makes it possible, the
telephone should be employed. It is impossible, however, to trust
entirely to this means, and arrangements must be made to supplement it
by others that will be available in the event of breakdown.
Visual signalling is apt to disclose positions to the enemy and, except
when the use of the heliograph is possible, is slow and uncertain. In
any case the number of signallers available make it impossible to trust
exclusively to this method of communication. In open country, and for
lateral communications, where it is possible to conceal the use of
flags, etc., from the enemy’s view visual signalling is valuable as a
means of supplementing other methods.
The divisional signal service affords a useful alternative. When it
is desired to use this means of communication it will be advantageous
if the subordinate artillery commander can station himself near the
infantry brigadier with whom he is co-operating, as it is then possible
for him to communicate with the divisional artillery commander by using
the cable that connects divisional and infantry brigade headquarters.
This line, however, cannot be relied on for urgent messages, as it is
often very congested.
4. For the purpose of establishing an understanding between infantry
and artillery subordinate commanders the most satisfactory results in
a combined operation are obtained by a personal exchange of views
between the commanders concerned before the operation begins. (_See_
sec. =153=. (7).)
If this is impossible or if the artillery commander is unable to remain
in the vicinity of the infantry commander he should be represented by
an officer.
5. It is of the utmost importance that communication should be
maintained between the artillery and infantry commanders throughout the
operation. It is unsafe to rely on one means of communication only,
and two, or even more, should usually be arranged for. The mutual
adoption of some system of describing the features of the ground,
such as squared maps or panorama sketches, will often save delay and
misunderstanding.
CO-OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT WITH ARTILLERY.
=150.= _Employment of aircraft._
1. Both during the period of tactical reconnaissance which precedes the
battle, and in the battle itself, the employment of aircraft may assist
the artillery.
2. If it is possible before a battle to ascertain the general position
and number of the hostile batteries by reconnaissances from aircraft, a
valuable clue to the probable grouping of the hostile artillery may be
obtained and the allotment of tasks to his artillery by the divisional
commander facilitated.
3. During the battle aircraft can assist artillery as follows:--
i. By the indication of concealed targets.
ii. By observation of fire.
Aeroplanes may be used for both these objects, but kites are of
value chiefly for observation of fire. The latter, however, can only
operate in a wind of from 20 to 40 miles an hour. They can lift an
observer to a height of 1,500 to 2,000 feet and can keep in telephonic
communication with the ground. They cannot easily be damaged by fire.
=151.= _Signalling from aircraft._
1. The means of communication from aircraft are:--
i. Wireless telegraphy.
ii. Visual signals.
iii. Sound signals.
iv. Dropping written messages.
Wireless telegraphy, in its present state of development, can be used
only in a limited number of aircraft and will not generally be provided
in aeroplanes allotted for work with artillery.
Visual signals can be made by means of Very’s signal lights, coloured
flags or weighted streamers. Electric lamps may also prove of value.
Very’s lights are used in three colours; white, red and green.
The distance at which they can be seen and distinguished varies
with atmospheric conditions, but on a clear day they are easily
distinguishable at 3,000 feet overhead, and if the sun is not very
bright and in the eyes of the observer at a distance of 2 miles with
the naked eye. On a clear evening they can be seen and distinguished
as far as 6 miles. Specially prepared lights can be seen at greater
distances. Red, yellow, or blue flags, 18 inches square, held out by an
observer can be seen with field glasses at a distance of 1 mile with
the aeroplane at a height of 2,000 feet. Dark and light streamers can
be distinguished with the naked eye at a distance of 1 mile.
A Klaxon horn in an aeroplane can be heard on the ground from a height
of 2,000 feet and a distance of 1 mile.
Messages may be written on special weighted message blocks and thrown
over, or written on an ordinary form and placed in a weighted bag with
streamers, or in a parachute.
=152.= _Signalling from the ground to aircraft._
Any place where it is desired to have messages dropped will be marked
by a cross on the ground, made of two strips of white cloth about 15
feet by 3 feet.
White strips on the ground, 6 feet by 1 foot, can be seen from a height
of 3,000 feet, and a prearranged code of signals can be made by this
means. (_See_ Sec. =205=.)
On a clear evening Very’s lights fired from the ground can be seen from
aircraft at a height of 2,000 feet and a distance of 6 miles, and the
different colours distinguished.
DUTIES OF THE DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY COMMANDER.
=153.= _General instructions._
1. The divisional commander is at all times responsible for the
tactical employment of the artillery under his command. The divisional
artillery commander is responsible for the execution of his orders so
far as they affect the artillery.
2. When a force is marching towards the enemy and an encounter is
anticipated, the divisional artillery commander will detail officers’
patrols (_See_ Sec. =240=) to accompany the advanced troops. These
patrols will be found by the artillery brigades of the division, their
number depending on the nature of the country and the front occupied
by the division when on the march. As soon as an action appears likely
these officers’ patrols will rapidly reconnoitre the ground on which it
is probable that the force will deploy, and send information as soon
as possible to the divisional artillery commander as to the nature and
extent of the available artillery positions. A brief report received
at the right time will be of greater value than a more elaborate and
detailed report which is received too late to be acted upon.
3. The divisional artillery commander will usually accompany the
divisional commander on the march. He must be careful to let all
concerned, particularly his patrols, know where reports can reach him,
both on the march and in action.
4. Should time be of importance and a rapid deployment essential there
may be no opportunity for a detailed reconnaissance by either the
divisional or the artillery commander. If time permits, however, it is
advisable for the divisional artillery commander to make a personal
reconnaissance and report the result to the divisional commander before
the manner of the deployment is settled, stating how best in his
opinion the artillery can be utilized to further the object in view.
5. In forming a plan of action the manner in which the artillery and
infantry will co-operate should be clearly defined, and will depend, as
a rule, on the character of the country. If the country is such that
the task assigned to the division can be carried out by the troops of
the division acting in combination under the immediate control of the
divisional commander, it will, generally, be inadvisable to delegate
the command of portions of the divisional artillery to subordinate
commanders.
Batteries may be able by crossing their fire to afford effective
support to infantry other than that operating in their immediate front.
To tie them down to limited tasks might reduce the fighting capacity
of the division as a whole. In such circumstances, the bulk of the
artillery will deploy and occupy positions under the orders of the
divisional artillery commander, who will allot tasks to each brigade
commander or zones in which he thinks their fire can be employed most
effectively.
6. The country may, however, be such as to necessitate the employment
of the division on more than one tactical operation, in such a manner
that their efforts cannot be directly combined. In such cases it
will be advisable that the artillery and infantry should be formed
temporarily into groups. =The units of the two arms thus associated
for a distinct tactical operation should be under one commander.=
It is the function of the divisional commander to organize these
temporary groups. It is then the function of the divisional artillery
commander to convey the necessary orders to the subordinate artillery
commanders, placing them at the disposal of the group commanders.
It is the duty of a group commander to report to divisional
headquarters when his special task is accomplished. When the special
task has been accomplished, unless a new combined task is then to be
allotted, the artillery of that group should be again placed at the
disposal of the divisional artillery commander without delay, with
a view to the issue of fresh instructions by him for its further
employment. The artillery commander of the group is responsible for
keeping the divisional artillery commander informed as to the course of
the operation in which he is engaged, the general disposition of his
batteries and the expenditure of ammunition.
7. =Whenever a subordinate artillery commander is allotted a task
necessitating co-operation with a certain force of infantry, whether he
is placed under the orders of the commander of that force or not, it
becomes his duty to open communication with its commander, reporting
to him in person, if possible, in order to obtain full information as
to the character of the operation that he is to support and as to the
proposed method of its execution.= (_See_ Secs. =149= (4) and =248=
(2).)
8. The manner in which the divisional commander’s plan is translated
into orders and in which these orders are conveyed to the artillery
must depend to a great extent on the nature of the operation.
Divisional operation orders lay down what is required of the artillery
and contain such information about it as it is necessary for the
other arms to know. If infantry and artillery are grouped together
temporarily as indicated above, divisional operation orders will give
particulars of the grouping, and will also state the task or mission
that is assigned to each group. Consequently in cases where divisional
operation orders are issued to commanders of artillery brigades the
divisional artillery commander will usually only require to supplement
them with a few technical instructions.
In his capacity as a subordinate commander (_see_ F.S. Regs., Part II.
Sec. 10), however, the divisional artillery commander is responsible
that the necessary orders are issued to his own units. When, therefore,
divisional orders are not issued to artillery brigades, or when they
do not give sufficient information respecting the artillery, it is
his duty to issue his own orders, and he is responsible that they
convey to the units under his command all the information respecting
the intention of the divisional commander and the movements of the
other arms which it is desirable for them to know. It will frequently
be necessary to give these orders verbally, and for this purpose the
divisional artillery commander may find it convenient to assemble his
brigade commanders.
It is his duty to make sure that the necessary orders are issued to
the divisional ammunition column commander and that the latter is
acquainted with the dispositions of the various artillery units.
9. The divisional artillery commander must bear in mind that during the
course of an action unexpected developments are always liable to occur
and that the artillery must be prepared to deal with them promptly.
Concealed positions have greatly facilitated this task. Batteries that
are in action, but have not been located by the enemy, can often be
moved rapidly to other parts of the field. The tasks allotted to some
of these batteries may have become of minor importance and they will
be available if required. Other batteries may have accomplished the
tasks assigned to them and thus be at the disposal of the divisional
artillery commander. Notwithstanding these possibilities, however, it
may often be advisable to keep some guns in hand ready to reinforce
guns already in action or to open fire in a new direction.
10. As the action progresses it may be necessary to rearrange the
tasks or zones allotted to artillery brigades to meet the changing
circumstances, or to order changes of position. The position of the
divisional artillery commander during an action should, therefore, be
chosen with a view to the facilities it affords for keeping in touch
with the divisional commander as well as for observing the progress of
events and for communicating with his subordinate artillery commanders.
(_See_ Sec. =149= (2).) If the divisional artillery commander cannot
find a suitable position in the vicinity of divisional headquarters, he
must take steps to keep himself in constant touch therewith, in order
that he may learn at once all information reaching the headquarters
which might be of use to him.
11. For the purposes of directing and controlling the fire of his
batteries the information that is of primary importance to an artillery
commander is firstly to know exactly where the infantry that he is
supporting is from time to time; secondly, what is its immediate
objective; and thirdly, what it is that prevents it from attaining its
object.
The comparative effect of fire from different portions of the enemy’s
position is, however, difficult to estimate from the artillery
positions. The establishment of advanced observation posts may,
therefore, be necessary to watch the situation generally, to obtain
information from infantry commanders, and to report to the artillery
commander concerned. Responsibility for establishing posts for this
purpose will rest either with the divisional artillery commander or
with the commander of the artillery in a temporary group. (_See_ para.
6.)[11]
[11] This does not preclude subordinate artillery commanders from
making the arrangements for observation of fire referred to in Sec.
=199=.
12. The task of the artillery is likely to be much facilitated in
future by the use of aircraft, by means of which targets may be located
and the observation of fire assisted.
The divisional artillery commander should therefore point out to
the divisional commander whenever necessary the directions in which
aircraft can be usefully employed in obtaining information which would
be of value to the artillery.
ARTILLERY IN ATTACK.
=154.= _Action of the advanced guard artillery._
(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Sec. 68.)
1. The advanced guard affords protection to the main body and obtains
information; either function may compel it to fight. When the enemy
is encountered, and offensive action is intended, the advanced guard
should drive back the enemy’s advanced troops till the dispositions
of his main body are disclosed, after which the advanced guard will
usually be compelled to limit its action to holding the ground gained
until the commander has formed his plan and deployed his force.
=It follows that the action of the advanced guard may alternate between
the offensive and the defensive. The action of the artillery must
conform.=
2. The commander of the artillery of the advanced guard will accompany
the advanced guard commander on the march, so that he may receive early
instructions as to his action. The artillery will be allotted positions
that will enable it to co-operate with the rest of the advanced guard
in carrying out the plan of action that the advanced guard commander
may decide to adopt.
The occupation of concealed positions, a wide dispersion of the
available guns and a liberal expenditure of ammunition will then assist
to deceive the enemy as to the strength of the force opposed to him,
and may so contribute materially to the success of the operation.
3. If the enemy is in strength the advanced guard will eventually
encounter opposition which it is unable to overcome. The artillery
should then occupy the best positions available to assist the advanced
guard in holding the ground gained and in repelling any attack that may
be made upon it, in which case the principles involved are identical
with those discussed later under the heading “Artillery in Defence.”
(_See_ Sec. =158= _et seq._)
4. As it is impossible to foresee, when an advanced guard action
is entered upon, where and when the main battle will be fought,
considerations as to possible eventualities should not be allowed to
influence the choice of the most suitable positions for the immediate
purpose. Any breaking up of units that may result must be rectified
later, if possible.
=155.= _Opening phase of the attack._
(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Sec. 105.)
1. If the divisional commander decides to attack, the first functions
of the artillery will be to support the advanced guard against any
possible offensive on the part of the enemy in order to cover the
deployment of the infantry of the main body. Usually concealed
positions will be the best for this purpose.
2. If the infantry deployment takes place successfully and the enemy is
definitely thrown on the defensive the next stage will be the advance
of the infantry through the zone swept by the hostile artillery fire.
The enemy will probably use his artillery to delay this advance and to
inflict loss on the infantry whenever opportunity offers. His guns are
likely to be concealed. =The task of the artillery at this stage will
usually be to locate the enemy’s batteries and, by subduing the fire of
those in action, to support the infantry.=
To carry this out observation posts must be established and every
effort made to locate the hostile batteries or their observation posts.
Valuable help can be rendered by aerial reconnaissance, but artillery
officers and look-out men should be trained to detect readily the
flashes of guns, the dust thrown up by their discharge and the other
indications of the presence of a battery in action or of an observing
party. When a hostile battery that is impeding the advance of the
infantry has been located, every effort should be made to subdue its
fire. The range should be obtained as accurately as circumstances
permit, and the battery should be subjected to an accurate, rapid,
and intense fire[12] with the object of demoralizing the personnel and
driving them temporarily from their guns or compelling them for the
time being to cease fire. Should this object be achieved the hostile
battery should be closely watched and any further attempt to intervene
should be dealt with by a repetition of the same process. (_See_ Sec.
=223= (3).)
[12] Should the limits within which the hostile battery is located be
wide the fire must be of a searching nature.
3. Unless the enemy’s artillery by exposing itself offers an
opportunity for its destruction, commensurate with the expenditure of
ammunition involved, fire should be confined to those hostile batteries
that can be located, which are impeding the infantry advance. If the
hostile batteries cannot be located ammunition should be husbanded and
efforts directed towards further reconnaissance. =The primary object
being to assist the infantry to close with the enemy, an artillery
engagement should not be entered into at this stage for its own sake.=
=156.= _Second phase of the attack._
1. As soon as the infantry reach a point where the effect of the
enemy’s rifle fire begins to be seriously felt a fresh stage of the
operations is entered upon.
=The forward movement of the infantry is henceforward dependent
largely on effective covering fire. To be effective this covering fire
must be developed by guns, machine guns and rifles in combination.
The artillery commanders must therefore have a thorough grasp of the
tactical situation and appreciate fully the needs of the infantry.=
The two arms must communicate freely and the artillery must watch the
progress of the infantry closely. The actual method by which this
co-operation should be obtained will vary in accordance with the
general nature of the operation. (_See_ Sec. =153= (5).)
2. The defence of a position usually takes the form of the occupation
of certain localities with unoccupied intervening spaces. If the
terrain is suitable to defence these localities will mutually support
one another and will each be supported by artillery. It follows that
the attack must resolve itself into the attack of these localities, and
protracted struggles will take place for their possession. When the
country is intricate and enclosed the attacks on localities tend to
become isolated actions and the system of temporary groupings referred
to in Sec. =153= will be resorted to. The mission assigned to each
group will be the capture of a certain locality. When the country is
open the attacks on the localities, like the defence, can and should be
mutually supporting.
3. The fire which prevents the development of an attack on a defended
locality may come from the locality itself, or from other localities
which are able to give support, or from supporting artillery. Inasmuch
as infantry has difficulty in bringing fire to bear on objectives other
than those in its immediate front, it follows that the artillery fire
of the attack must be distributed according to requirements on all
objectives from which effective fire is being brought to bear on the
attacking infantry, if it is to be effective in helping the infantry
forward.
Judicious distribution rather than over-concentration of artillery
fire is therefore indicated, and to arrange for this distribution, and
to allot suitable tasks or zones to each unit, is the function of the
divisional artillery commander. (_See_ Sec. =153= (5) and (6).)
The method of fire to be employed by each unit will depend on the
nature of the actual target that it is engaging. A battery engaging
hostile artillery which is seriously impeding the advance of the
infantry by its fire should endeavour to overwhelm the hostile
artillery as described in Sec. =223=. A battery engaging infantry
should, by bursts of fire, endeavour temporarily to disturb the enemy’s
aim and reduce the volume and effect of his fire so as to afford its
own infantry an opportunity of gaining ground. These bursts of fire
should become more frequent and intense as the infantry approaches the
enemy’s position and the further advance becomes more difficult. (_See_
Sec. =224=.) Covered in this manner by the fire of the artillery the
infantry approaches nearer and nearer to the enemy till it reaches a
point from which it is possible to assault.
4. During the progress of the fight it will usually become necessary
for the artillery to move forward to positions from which it will
have a clearer view of the infantry fight and thus be able to afford
to the infantry more effective support, especially against local
counter-attacks. For this forward movement to be carried out with
success and to attain its object certain conditions are necessary,
namely:--
i. A line of advance that is either protected from fire or
over which the guns can move deployed and at speed, so
as to avoid the risk of columns of guns and wagons being
brought to a standstill under fire.
ii. The possibility of reasonable protection from fire
during deployment and up to the moment of opening fire.
These conditions may be found to obtain for small forces of artillery
such as sections or single guns, when they do not obtain for a large
number of batteries moving simultaneously. In such cases guns should
be dribbled forward a few at a time as may be found practicable. The
advancing batteries should, when necessary, be supported by the fire of
those in action. In cases of extreme difficulty it may be necessary for
the forward movement to take place under cover of darkness.
5. To support an attack with success a battery commander must be able
to see the ground over which the infantry is advancing and also be able
to control the fire of his battery rapidly and effectively, but the
more cover that can be obtained compatible with control by voice the
better.
6. Artillery as at present equipped has certain limitations as regards
dealing with rapid movement from under cover, such as might be the case
if a counter-attack were made unexpectedly, and must reach the crest to
develop the full effect of its fire against such targets. Its conduct
in such cases must be guided by the principle laid down in Sec. =146=
(4).
=157.= _Third phase of the attack._
1. The infantry covered by the fire of the artillery will endeavour to
reach a position from which it will be possible to deliver the assault.
The distance between this position and the enemy must depend upon the
ground and the resisting power of the enemy.
2. The bursts of artillery fire should become frequent and intense
at this period, the object of the artillery being to demoralise the
defenders and reduce the volume and effect of their fire so as to
afford to the infantry the opportunity to assault.
3. =Every effort should be made to bring a converging fire to bear on
the immediate objective of the attack, such fire being by far the most
demoralizing and decisive in its effect.=
At the same time no portion of the enemy’s position from which
effective fire is being brought to bear on the attackers should be
ignored.
4. The number of batteries employed should be limited to the number
that can be effectively controlled, and should be proportionate to
the extent of the objectives that it is necessary to engage. Provided
sufficient batteries are in action for the extent of the objectives a
greater volume of fire, if required, should be obtained by an increased
rapidity of fire from those batteries that have got the range, rather
than by engaging fresh batteries.
5. The losses that may be inflicted by wild artillery fire at this
period may imperil the success of the whole operation, and unless the
infantry has confidence in the artillery the effect of the covering
fire of the latter may be to delay and hamper rather than facilitate
the delivery of the assault.[13]
[13] The distance at which artillery other than howitzers can with
safety fire over the heads of its own troops varies. At ranges under
1,500 yards _on the level_ it would be dangerous to fire over friendly
troops; at longer ranges infantry should be sufficiently safe at 500
yards (with heavy artillery 800 yards is necessary) from the guns.
=Battery commanders must, therefore, do all in their power to improve
their facilities for observing closely the course of the action and
must keep the most complete control over the fire of their batteries
that it is possible for them to exert.=
6. Whether the artillery can continue its fire until the assaulting
infantry is actually on the point of closing with the enemy, or whether
it should increase its range on the first signs of the commencement
of the assault, must depend on the circumstances of each case. The
distance between the combatants just prior to the assault and the slope
of the ground are important factors. Where the ground in front of
the enemy’s position is steep and broken this distance will probably
be short, but a steep slope gives a better view to the artillery and
small errors in elevation will not be so dangerous to the infantry as
on flat ground. If the ground is flat and exposed the infantry may
be compelled to assault from further off, while the artillery will
experience increased difficulties in estimating the relative positions
of the combatants, and errors in elevation and fuze setting will be
more dangerous to the attacking infantry.
The advantages of artillery support at this period are, however, so
great that the danger from a few shells falling short must not be
allowed to prevent the artillery from continuing their fire till the
latest possible moment. (_See_ F.S. Regs., Part I., Sec. =106=.)
By changing from time shrapnel to percussion shrapnel it may be
possible to defer the moment when the artillery must cease firing at
the immediate objective of the infantry. When it is no longer possible
to continue firing at that objective the range of the artillery
should be increased so as to search the rear of the position, but no
considerable amount of ammunition should be devoted to this object.
7. If the assault is seen to succeed, it is more important to move
some batteries forward to pursue the enemy with fire or to support the
successful infantry in holding the ground gained against a possible
counter-attack than to continue firing over the position. The flanks of
the locality that has been captured will often prove the best positions
for support against counter-attack.
ARTILLERY IN DEFENCE.
(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Secs. 107-109.)
=158.= _General instructions and preliminary measures._
1. When an encounter takes place a force may be thrown temporarily on
the defensive by the numerical superiority of the enemy or by his more
rapid deployment and greater readiness for action. In such a case time
may be required in which to deploy or to bring up reinforcements, or
possibly it may be desired to extricate the troops that are engaged and
break off the action.
2. If it is desired to gain time for deployment, or to bring up
reinforcements, it is usually gained by the action of advanced troops
or the occupation of advanced posts. The artillery plays an important
part in the support of these troops and in covering their withdrawal
later. To give effective support an early deployment of a sufficient
force of artillery for the purpose is necessary.
A commander may, however, deliberately assume a defensive attitude in
one part of the field in order to exhaust the enemy’s powers, while he
prepares an offensive stroke elsewhere. In such a case he will occupy
a position with a portion of his force; strengthening it artificially
if time permits, in order to reduce as much as possible the force to
be locked up in its defence and to free as many as possible for the
subsequent offensive. It is the action of the artillery in the defence
of a position of this kind that is considered in the following sections.
3. The defence of a position usually takes the form of the occupation
of certain localities with unoccupied intervening spaces. (_See_ Sec.
=156= (2).) The troops holding these localities are supported by local
reserves, whose functions include the attack of any hostile force
penetrating between the localities and the recapture at once of any
locality that may be successfully assaulted by the enemy.
In order to carry out this general scheme of defence the position to
be defended is divided into sections each comprising one or more of
these localities. Commanders are appointed to the sections and troops
allotted for their defence, including the local reserves. The remainder
of the force forms the general reserve, which is kept in hand for the
decisive counter-attack. The artillery allotted to the position will be
distributed, in accordance with the general scheme of defence, by the
divisional commander after a careful reconnaissance of the ground, in
which the divisional artillery commander will take part.
4. The tasks which the artillery allotted to the defence of the
position may be called upon to perform are:--
i. To make the enemy’s infantry deploy at a distance, to
delay the advance through the zone in which the hostile
infantry is exposed to artillery fire only, and to make
this advance as laborious and as costly as possible.
ii. To prevent the hostile artillery obtaining the mastery
in such a way as to facilitate the advance of its
infantry.
iii. To combine with the infantry in the close defence of
each defended locality so that if possible there is
no line of approach by which the enemy can move without
being subject to the fire of the two arms in combination.
iv. To support local counter-attacks and, if possible, the
decisive counter-attack. (_See_ Secs. =162=, =163=.)
=The distribution of the artillery will be settled in accordance with
the relative importance of each of the above tasks in the general plan
of battle and with due regard to the nature of the ground.=
5. When the country is enclosed and the field of fire restricted it
will usually be desirable to distribute a large proportion of the
artillery to the sections of the defence and to form temporary groups
of the two arms as has been advocated in the case of the attack. (_See_
Sec. =153= (5), (6), (7).) In such country the close defence of each
defended locality is the chief requirement, and the other tasks assume
a minor importance.
When the country is open with bold features and a good field of fire it
will often be found that the defended localities can be made mutually
supporting, and that artillery posted in one section of the defence can
assist the defence of a locality in another section better than the
batteries actually posted in that section. In this case the formation
of more or less independent groups should seldom be necessary, and the
positions will be selected and tasks allotted to the artillery by the
divisional artillery commander under instructions from the divisional
commander.
In either case it is inadvisable to commit many guns to action until
the direction of the enemy’s attack is definitely ascertained.
=6. At the commencement of the action it is advisable that the
artillery should be concealed as much as possible.=
If the intricacies of the ground make such a course desirable, it is
permissible to post guns in open positions for the close defence of
a locality and to reserve the fire of these guns for the crisis of
the fight. If this is done great care should be taken to conceal the
emplacements.
A ridge in rear of the main position and dominating it will facilitate
the co-operation of the artillery with the infantry defence, provided
the distance between the two is not too great.
Positions where the defender receives the support of his artillery,
while the attacker does not, are usually strong for defence.
=159.= _Opening phase of the defence._
1. The use to be made of the artillery fire of the defence during the
opening phase of the attack must depend on the general plan for the
conduct of the action. A commander may desire to draw the enemy on and
induce him to commit himself in a certain direction so as to offer a
favourable opportunity for early counter-attack, or he may desire to
delay the enemy’s advance and make the progress of his attack as slow,
laborious and costly as possible.
In the former case he will reserve his artillery fire and will rely
largely on surprise effect when he eventually decides to open fire.
Communication must be established throughout the position and control
must be rigidly maintained.
In the latter case the artillery of the defence will endeavour to
make the enemy deploy at a distance and to delay the advance of his
infantry. The enemy will make use of covered approaches and will cross
open spaces as rapidly as possible when exposed to view, adopting
formations that are the least vulnerable to artillery fire.
2. Searching the covered approaches when the effect of the fire cannot
be observed is not likely to have the desired result, and will lead to
the waste of valuable ammunition.
The limits of the open spaces over which the enemy is likely to
attempt to move and, if necessary, the range of any prominent objects
within those limits should be registered (_See_ Sec. =219=), and all
arrangements made to establish a belt of fire through which the enemy
must pass (_see_ Sec. =224= (4)). =The fire should be of such a nature
as to impress upon the enemy the certainty of loss if he attempts to
cross open spaces without deploying.= The result will be to instil
caution, cause deployment to take place at a distance, and make the
advance slow and difficult.
3. The enemy’s artillery will endeavour to support the advance of the
infantry. The best way to defeat this object is for the defending
batteries to be concealed. Batteries that are located at this stage may
be moved and take up other positions, if such are available.
=160.= _Second phase of the defence._
1. =It is only in exceptional circumstances that the artillery of
the defence can hope, by the effect of its own fire, to prevent the
attacking infantry closing with the defence.= A new phase of the
operations will be entered upon when the attacking infantry comes under
the effective rifle fire of the defence.
2. The object of the attacking infantry at this stage will be to build
up firing lines in suitable positions from which to develop effective
covering fire to support a further advance.
From now onward the hostile infantry will be compelled to move in
extended order by rushes; the number of men moving, and the length of
the rushes, depending on the ground, the distance from the defender’s
position, and the volume and effect of his fire. The shorter the
distance from the position and the more effective the defender’s fire,
the shorter will be the length of each rush and the fewer the number of
men taking part in it.
Artillery cannot hope to deal effectively with each individual rush.
=At this stage the object of the artillery should be to foresee the
positions where the hostile firing lines will be formed, and to subject
these firing lines to bursts of fire of such rapidity and intensity as
to keep them glued to the ground, and to prevent them from developing
effective covering fire.= The more threatening the hostile infantry is
the more frequent and intense should be the bursts of artillery fire.
3. The hostile artillery will do all in its power to reduce the volume
and effect of the fire of the defence, both gun and rifle fire.
If the hostile artillery is able to locate the position of the
defender’s infantry the latter may suffer severely, and the power of
the defence may be seriously weakened thereby. The artillery of the
attack therefore must not be ignored, but instead of endeavouring to
destroy the hostile batteries by an overwhelming concentration of fire,
the object will be to neutralize their fire with as few batteries as
possible, so as to free as many as possible to fire on the attacking
infantry.[14]
[14] The methods by which a hostile battery should be neutralized are
described in Sec. =155= (2).
4. =Infantry conquers and retains the ground. The principal effort must
therefore be directed to bringing the infantry advance to a standstill.
When the infantry loses its power of forward movement it is no longer
capable of forcing a decision.=
When this occurs the enemy’s reserves should be expected and a careful
watch kept for their appearance, so that they may be crushed without
delay.
=161.= _Third phase of the defence._
1. If the attacking infantry is successful in reaching a position
from which it is possible to threaten an assault, no effort must be
spared to increase the effect of the fire of the defence. If a forward
movement to an open position is likely to contribute to this object it
must be undertaken without hesitation. The principle laid down in Sec.
=146= (4) applies to this situation.
Should a successful assault be delivered there is sure to be some
confusion in the ranks of the attackers, who will probably endeavour
to re-form. The captured locality should at once be subjected to
artillery fire, converging if possible.
2. If a counter-attack is launched for the recapture of the locality
the artillery will give it the most effective support that is possible
in the circumstances. If time permits the divisional artillery
commander should organize this support under instructions from the
divisional commander; but subordinate artillery commanders must not
wait for orders, when aware that such an attack is taking place.
COUNTER-ATTACKS.
=162.= _Artillery support to local counter-attacks._
1. During the course of the fight all favourable opportunities for
local counter-attacks must be seized. (_See_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Sec.
109.) These local counter-attacks must be assisted by the fire of any
guns conveniently situated for the purpose. The time for preparation
will usually be short, and subordinate artillery commanders must
therefore often decide for themselves how this support can best be
given and what proportion of the guns to employ. Extensive changes of
position should be avoided and should rarely be necessary.
=163.= _Artillery support to the decisive counter-attack._
(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Sec. 110.)
1. The nature of the artillery support to the decisive counter-attack
must depend on the nature of the ground over which it is delivered and
the direction which it takes.
It may be that the counter-attack can best be supported from the
positions already occupied by the artillery in the main position. If
that is the case it will not be necessary to keep artillery in reserve
for the purpose. A change of zones or objectives may suffice to afford
the necessary support.
This will not always be the case. If the troops with which it is
intended to carry out the counter-attack have been placed at a distance
from the main position, and if the direction of the counter-attack
and the ground over which it moves prevents adequate artillery support
being given from the main position, special provision must be made.
Either artillery must from the outset form part of the troops destined
for the counter-attack or batteries must be withdrawn from the main
position for the purpose.
Either course is legitimate, and the method to be adopted is a matter
for the decision of the commander of the force. If he decides to
withdraw guns that are in action every effort must be made to ensure
their timely arrival in their new positions. As the success of the
counter-attack is usually dependent on correct timing this is a matter
of great importance.
2. =The action of the artillery in support of the counter-stroke should
be characterized by boldness.= The moral effect of batteries advancing
boldly in support of their infantry may decide the issue, when success
or failure hang in the balance.
ARTILLERY IN WOOD AND VILLAGE FIGHTING.
=163= A. _The employment of artillery in wood fighting._
1. As obstacles to movement and view woods exercise an important
influence on artillery tactics both in attack and defence. A wooded
area increases the difficulty of observation of fire.
2. A wood of small extent that is held by the enemy lends itself to
envelopment, and the hostile troops will usually be posted outside it.
In such a case the wood itself should not materially interfere with
artillery support for the attacking infantry.
3. A wood of large area presents a serious obstacle to effective
co-operation between the attacking artillery and infantry. The enemy
may have prepared the wood for internal defence, using existing
clearings and making others; or he may have taken up a position behind
it, sufficiently near to bring a concentrated artillery and rifle fire
to bear upon the attacking troops as they attempt to debouch. In either
case the problem which confronts the attacking infantry is the same,
namely, to issue from a belt of wood and cross an open space under
close fire from hostile artillery and infantry.
Provided observation parties can establish themselves in suitable
positions and adequate means of intercommunication are available, the
attacking artillery may be able to support the infantry from positions
outside the wood.
The most effective means of assisting the infantry, however, will be
the employment of sections or even single guns in the wood itself in
close support of the firing line.
4. In dealing with a wood of considerable extent the best position for
troops compelled to act on the defensive will often be in rear of the
wood at such a distance from it that artillery and infantry fire can be
brought to bear at close ranges on the hostile infantry as it attempts
to issue from the wood.
The edge of the wood should be prepared with abatis or entanglements
and arrangements should be made for artillery fire to be brought to
bear on any gaps between the obstacles or other places where hostile
bodies are likely to assemble when emerging from the wood.
Arrangements should further be made for artillery to support the action
of local reserves against hostile bodies that may succeed in issuing
from the wood, and to deal with outflanking movements by the enemy.
If a clearing of suitable extent exists or can be made within the wood,
troops may be placed in position along the edge of it furthest from the
enemy, the opposite edge being prepared with obstacles as explained
above. Guns should be placed in position with the infantry, care being
taken to dispose them so that their fire can be brought to bear on any
open spaces likely to be crossed by the enemy.
Special arrangements should be made for the timely withdrawal of the
guns to positions behind the wood should the infantry be driven back to
the main position.
5. Against troops located in a wood high explosive shell or percussion
shrapnel will be more effective than time shrapnel.
=163= B. _Artillery in the attack and defence of villages._
1. Villages not only lend themselves to conversion into strong tactical
localities, but troops are instinctively attracted towards them.
2. In defending a village infantry will usually be entrenched outside
it, in front of it, and on its flanks. Artillery should also be placed
outside the village in positions where the guns command the approaches
to it and the exits from it.
A portion of the artillery may be posted in advance of the village at
the outset, in order to compel the enemy to make an early deployment.
In this case careful arrangements should be made for the timely
withdrawal of the guns to positions on the flanks or in rear of the
village, as the attack develops.
As in the case of wood fighting it is important to arrange for adequate
artillery support for local counter-attacks by the local reserves.
3. In the attack of a village artillery fire should be concentrated on
the hostile infantry as soon as it is located.
When the enemy has been driven from his trenches the fire of the
artillery should be concentrated on the village itself in order to deny
its cover to the hostile troops retiring through it.
When the attacking infantry reaches the village the artillery should
push forward on the flanks and engage any hostile bodies posted in rear
of the village to command the exits from it.
ARTILLERY IN NIGHT OPERATIONS.
=164.= _General instructions._
1. “Night operations may be classified as _night marches_, _night
advances_ and _night assaults_.” (_See_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Sec. 129.)
Artillery must be prepared to take part in any of these operations.
It may also be required to participate in the defence, at night, of a
position or locality.
2. In a night march artillery usually marches at the least exposed
portion of the column, _i.e._, in rear or on the protected flank. In
this case preliminary reconnaissance by the artillery is not possible,
its preparations being chiefly directed to reducing the noise caused by
the horses’ harness and by the vehicles.
3. “The purpose of a night advance is to gain ground from which further
progress will be made in daylight and not to deliver a decisive assault
during darkness.” (_See_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Sec. 134.)
Such advances are made when in contact with the enemy, either as a
preliminary to opening a battle, or to gain an advantage during its
course. The ultimate object in view in each case may be either an
assault at dawn, or to gain better fire positions. The immediate aim of
the artillery must be to get the guns during darkness into favourable
fire positions, ready to open fire at dawn. Careful reconnaissance of
the positions to be occupied is an essential preliminary. (_See_ Sec.
=189=.)
4. Night assaults may be undertaken to gain a point of support for
further operations in daylight, to drive in an enemy’s advanced troops
or to secure an outpost position as a preliminary to an attack at dawn.
(_See_ F.S. Regs., Pt. I, Sec. 135.)
The extent to which artillery can participate in a night assault
depends principally on whether the assault follows immediately on a
night march or is a continuation of previous operations. In the former
case artillery can rarely be of assistance during darkness; in the
latter, guns may occasionally be able to assist, provided thorough
preparations have been made in daylight, and careful steps taken to
ensure the timely cessation of fire.
5. In the defence artillery may be able to give effective assistance
when the front to be defended is narrow, and there is limited ground
over which the enemy must pass if he wishes to attack. In these
circumstances all arrangements for concentrating fire on various zones
should be made in advance.
ARTILLERY IN RETIREMENTS AND RETREATS.
=165.= _Retirements._
(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Sec. 113.)
1. It must be a point of honour with troops never to retire, without
orders, from a position they have been detailed to hold to the end.
On occasions it may be advisable to order batteries when exposed to
accurate and destructive fire to cease fire temporarily; or they may
be compelled to do so by want of ammunition. In either case they must
remain in action and wait for the fire to diminish, or the arrival of
more ammunition. When any movement to the rear is ordered it must be
carried out in an orderly manner, otherwise it cannot fail to have a
bad moral effect.
2. Should it become necessary to abandon a position, a portion of the
artillery will usually be required to establish itself as quickly as
possible in positions from which the retirement of the rest of the
force can be covered. The fire of heavy guns from positions overlooking
the main position, combined with that of field guns which, owing to
their greater mobility, may occupy more advanced positions, would
usually form the most effective means for securing the withdrawal of
the rest of the force.
When it is a question of ensuring the safe withdrawal of the main body,
artillery must be ready to take any risk, and loss of _matériel_ is
then fully justified.
3. The organization of a rearguard to cover further retreat is the
function of the commander assisted by the general staff, but, in order
that the most efficient artillery units may be allotted to such a
force, it is necessary for divisional artillery commanders to keep
themselves acquainted with the position and relative condition of each
artillery brigade as regards losses and ammunition.
It is also the duty of the artillery commander to appoint a commander
of the rearguard artillery, and to inform him of the batteries at his
disposal and of the name of the commander of the rearguard.
4. The withdrawal of the rest of the artillery and its subsequent
formation on the march is the next most important duty for the
divisional artillery commander in co-operation with the general staff
of the division.
=166.= _Rearguards._
(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Secs. 71, 72.)
1. The object of a rearguard is to gain time and then to withdraw
without becoming too deeply engaged. This is best effected by
compelling the enemy to halt and deploy for attack as frequently and at
as great a distance as possible.
With these objects in view a rearguard is usually strong in artillery.
2. The commander of the artillery of a rearguard should, as a rule,
accompany the rearguard commander, in order that he may have early
information as to the next position to be occupied, its extent and the
general dispositions for its occupation.
3. Batteries in direct fire positions are apt to be pinned to their
positions by the hostile artillery, and withdrawal from such positions
is often difficult. As, moreover, the close defence of a position
is rarely required in a rearguard action it will not, as a rule, be
necessary for artillery to bring fire to bear on the ground close in
front of the position. Positions in rear of the crest are therefore
preferable but battery commanders must arrange to keep their immediate
front under observation.
4. The flanks of a rear guard position are specially important and some
guns should usually be employed in their defence. It is the duty of the
commander of these guns to see that they have an escort. Any artillery
patrols that may be available should also be allotted to them rather
than to guns centrally situated whose position is more secure.
5. While it is the duty of the rearguard commander to select the
time and method of retiring and the position where the next stand is
to be made an artillery officer should, if possible, accompany the
officer detailed to reconnoitre this position in order to select the
most suitable positions for the batteries and to supply the artillery
commander with information.
Subordinate artillery commanders must endeavour to have lines of
retirement reconnoitred, in order to avoid interfering with the
movements of other troops.
6. The supply of ammunition to a rearguard requires careful
arrangements to be made by the divisional artillery staff in accordance
with the orders of the divisional commander. Sections of brigade
ammunition columns may be disposed at suitable points; or sometimes
small depôts of ammunition may be left in easily recognized localities
at which empty ammunition wagons can refill. The commander of the
rearguard artillery must be informed of the arrangements made for
replenishing ammunition.
EMPLOYMENT OF HORSE ARTILLERY WITH CAVALRY.
(_See also_ “Cavalry Training.”)
=167.= _General instructions._
1. =The paramount duty of horse artillery is to prepare the way for the
cavalry and to support it in the fight.=
The principles laid down in the preceding sections regarding the
employment of artillery apply equally to the horse artillery, although
the special characteristics and functions of cavalry may call for
modification in methods.
2. The main functions of cavalry in war are--
i. To discover the enemy’s dispositions and movements.
ii. To screen and protect its own army from the observation
of the enemy and hostile interference,
iii. To take its place as part of the fighting machine in
co-operation with the other arms on the battlefield.
3. Cavalry is trained to fight either mounted or dismounted, and the
power to combine shock with fire action, or to adopt either method at
will, not only increases its independence, but adds materially to its
offensive and defensive power.
For the full development of fire power artillery is required, hence a
force of cavalry is usually accompanied by one or more batteries of
horse artillery.
4. The duty of the horse artillery commander being to help and support
the cavalry, it is essential that he should know the general intentions
and tactical plan of the cavalry leader. It will, however, frequently
be impossible for the cavalry leader to do more than give a general
indication of his plans and intentions; the horse artillery commander
must therefore study his superior’s methods, and endeavour to regard
the situation, as it develops, from the point of view of that officer,
training himself to appreciate his wishes rapidly and to anticipate his
orders.
5. The horse artillery commander and his subordinates must have a
thorough understanding of the principles upon which the conduct of a
cavalry fight is based, to enable them to grasp at once the object of
each movement and to ensure co-operation on the part of the guns.
6. The methods to be adopted by the horse artillery will vary according
as the cavalry to which it is attached is opposed to cavalry or other
troops and whether fire or shock action is to form the principal means
of reaching the desired result.
Where shock action is anticipated, opportunities for effective
participation in the fight will occur with so little warning, and be
of so fleeting a nature that horse artillery must be granted a greater
measure of independence than is the case with other artillery in the
field.
To take advantage of such opportunities promptness of decision,
readiness of resource, and rapidity of action are essential, and these
characteristics should distinguish all ranks.
=168.= _Position on the march._
1. On the march the distribution of the horse artillery will be decided
by the commander of the force. As a rule, the artillery of a mounted
force is kept concentrated with the main body. When marching in column,
horse artillery is usually placed near the head of the column, normally
in rear of the leading unit.
2. Whether the first line wagons accompany the guns or march in rear
of the fighting portion of the column will depend upon the tactical
situation; within striking distance of the enemy, and when the power
to deploy quickly and manœuvre with freedom is desirable, the latter
course will usually be advisable.
3. When moving on a broad front, or across country, guns should be
allowed a certain latitude in conforming to the pace and movements of
the cavalry, advantage being taken of roads or firm ground.
=169.= _Escorts._
1. In normal conditions horse artillery requires no special escort.
When guns are detached from the main body or otherwise exposed, it is
the duty of the horse artillery commander to ensure that a suitable
escort is detailed.
Should no escort have been detailed and should the development of the
situation at any time render an escort desirable, it is the duty of the
horse artillery commander on the spot to call upon the commander of the
nearest body of cavalry to provide one.
2. The principal duties of the escort are--
i. To give timely warning of any threatened attack.
ii. To keep hostile riflemen beyond effective range of
the guns.
iii. To cover the withdrawal of the guns if attacked by
greatly superior forces.
3. It is important that communication be maintained between the guns
and their escort. For this purpose the escort commander will attach an
officer or non-commissioned officer to the artillery commander.
4. The senior officer with the wagon line, whether in action or on the
move, will make such dispositions as may be possible for their defence.
=170.= _The approach march._
1. The object of the approach march of a force of cavalry is to close
upon the enemy in order to attack him. The principles governing the
disposition of the force are dealt with in “Cavalry Training.”
2. The position of the horse artillery will be ordered by the cavalry
commander. As a rule, horse artillery will move massed on the flank
of the cavalry in line with the head of the main body. The formation
adopted must ensure elasticity and allow the guns some latitude in
conforming to the pace of the main body when moving over undulating
country.
The guiding principle is that the guns shall be readily detachable and
free to move at a rapid pace to the selected fire position without
interfering with the deployment of the remainder of the force.
3. On commencing the approach march the horse artillery will assume
the most convenient formation, probably divisional mass or column of
brigade masses, all wagons other than those of the firing batteries
joining the first line transport of the force.
4. The horse artillery should usually remain concentrated with a view
to bringing the most intense fire possible to bear on the hostile
formations when encountered, but occasions will occur especially in
undulating country when it will be advisable to leave some guns on
one ridge, to cover the occupation of the next. It may sometimes be
advisable to place the guns on both flanks, in order to deny ground to
the enemy by which he might otherwise approach.
5. The horse artillery commander must accompany the cavalry commander
during the approach march. He will thus be in a position to receive the
earliest information regarding his superior’s plans and will himself be
well placed to watch the situation and examine the ground on which the
action is expected to take place. His headquarters will not actually
accompany him, but such of its members as he requires will remain in
close touch.
6. As a general rule, the plan will consist of a mounted attack
combined with the fire attack of guns, machine guns and, if the range
admits, of their escort.
In combining fire action with mounted action the chief factors of
success are:--
i. The timely separation of the guns, etc., from the
mounted attack, so that their fire may be available
the moment that collision is inevitable, and in order
that the freedom of manœuvre of the cavalry may not be
cramped nor the fire of the guns masked by the movement
of the cavalry which they are supporting. Fig. 27
illustrates this principle, which generally holds good.
ii. The correct timing of the attacks, so that the enemy
will not be allowed to deal with the two separately. For
this reason it will often be necessary to push the guns
and machine guns boldly forward.
The nature of the country, the time available, the action of the enemy
and the safety of the guns are factors to be considered when deciding
to what extent the guns can be separated from the cavalry.
7. As soon as the cavalry commander has settled on his general plan of
attack he informs his artillery commander of the general rôle that he
wishes the artillery to take in it. The situation is liable to change
with such rapidity that more than this is usually impossible, and the
exact spot for coming into action, and the moment for opening fire or
changing position, can only be decided by the artillery commander in
accordance with the development of the fight.
After receiving his instructions, therefore, the artillery commander
proceeds to reconnoitre for positions and will have complete freedom of
action within the limits of the instructions he has received. It will
generally be advisable for the artillery commander to leave an officer
with the cavalry commander, to keep him informed, as far as possible,
of the latter’s plans and intentions.
[Illustration: FIG. 27.]
=171.= _The advance into action._
1. The manœuvres which precede the charge take place in such rapid
succession that little time will be available for elaborate orders
or dispositions. Horse artillery brigade commanders must therefore be
ready to join the artillery commander as quickly as possible, when he
proceeds to carry out his reconnaissance, so as to receive his verbal
orders and communicate them without delay to brigade leaders.
2. The two chief duties of the horse artillery commander are to
reconnoitre a position for his brigades and to watch the manœuvres
of his own and the corresponding movements of the opposing cavalry.
To save delay and to enable him to devote more time to the tactical
situation he should usually be accompanied and assisted in his
reconnaissance by the commanders of horse artillery brigades.
3. =The principal considerations involved by the above duties are,
firstly, the selection of a position the fire from which will not
easily be masked by the advance of the cavalry, and, secondly, the
correct moment for coming into action, taking into account the time
which must elapse between opening fire and obtaining effect.= If
the cavalry machine guns are to act on the same flank as the horse
artillery their commander must ascertain the position of the guns, so
that he may avoid masking their fire at a critical moment.
4. Every effort should be made to conceal the guns till the last
moment, so that the fire may come as a surprise. A covered line of
advance, to the selected position should, therefore, be sought, while,
if exposed ground has to be crossed, the distance of the enemy and the
possibility of coming under fire must be considered in deciding on the
formation to be adopted, it may be possible to deceive hostile patrols
by masking the guns with the detachments. The position itself must be
suitable for direct laying.
5. Both in the advance to and occupation of the position the artillery
commander should ensure that the exposed flank of the guns is watched
by artillery patrols, if no escort has been provided. If no natural
obstacle covers this flank in action, it may be advisable to dispose
some of the guns so as to cover it with their fire.
6. Batteries should be retained in positions of readiness as long as
possible, in order not to lessen their mobility, should the situation
change unexpectedly.
The temptation of gaining a temporary advantage must not be allowed to
lead artillery into premature action. Such tactics, far from assisting
in the defeat of the hostile cavalry, are liable to divulge the cavalry
leader’s plans and may give the enemy a chance of immobilizing, with
a fraction of his own artillery, the guns thus engaged, while the
remainder of his troops are able to manœuvre in a direction out of
reach of fire.
As a general rule, fire should not be opened until the cavalry is in a
position to take immediate advantage of its effect. On the other hand
the cavalry commander’s plan may render it desirable to open fire for
some special purpose, such as to occupy the enemy’s attention or to
force him to deploy prematurely or in a faulty direction.
=172.= _The fight._
1. =The most favourable moment for the guns to open fire will usually
be when the opposing cavalry has definitely committed itself.=
2. As success depends on the result of the cavalry charge, it is the
paramount duty of the horse artillery to concentrate its fire on that
portion of the enemy’s cavalry on which the decisive attack is about to
be delivered.
The time during which this portion of the enemy’s force is likely to be
exposed to fire being of very brief duration, effect must be sought by
the greatest rapidity of fire and well judged distribution.
3. When the guns can no longer engage the immediate object of the
attack, fire should be directed on any supports or reserves that may be
visible. It is most important that any formed bodies of fresh troops
be dealt with at once.
As a rule, it is only when the guns become masked from the hostile
cavalry, that their fire should be directed on to the enemy’s
artillery. If, however, the enemy’s artillery exposes itself while
limbered up or is bringing a heavy fire to bear on the main body of
the cavalry during its approach march, the artillery commander will be
justified in modifying the above procedure to meet such cases.
=173.= _Pursuit or retreat._
1. If the attack succeeds the artillery commander should send forward
part of the artillery at once to support and assist the immediate
pursuit. The object of these guns is to prevent the enemy re-forming or
holding positions which would check the pursuit.
At the same time the artillery commander should retain control of
some portion of the artillery so that he may be ready to comply with
any demand which the cavalry commander may make on him for guns to
co-operate in an organized pursuit.
2. If the attack fails the horse artillery must remain in action and by
its fire form a screen in rear of which the cavalry may rally.
=174.= _Horse artillery with cavalry acting dismounted._
1. Occasions will frequently occur on reconnaissances, in advanced
or rearguard actions, and in the seizure of advanced positions, when
mounted troops will be involved in a fire fight, where mounted shock
action is either not contemplated or is not of primary importance.
2. In such circumstances the mobility of mounted troops is generally
employed in enabling successive fractions to move rapidly from one
tactical point to another covered by the fire of those at rest. When
taking part in such a fight, horse artillery should be guided by the
general principles laid down for artillery co-operating with infantry.
(_See_ Sec. =154= _et seq._)
As a rule an action of this nature will be initiated more deliberately
than in a purely mounted combat.
The first requisite is information. The second that, in order to keep
in touch with the developments of the action--conducted as it will
probably be over a wide area--the positions for the guns should be
chosen with a view to affording facilities for movement as well as for
effective fire support.
3. A combination of a mounted attack with the fire attack will often
form part of the plan of action.
In this case the mounted attack will usually endeavour to gain the
flank of its objective while the artillery with the dismounted part of
the force brings fire to bear at the right moment, in order to distract
the enemy’s attention and pin him to his ground and so prevent any
change of position to meet it.
4. Sometimes, however, it will be essential for mounted troops to drive
home an attack against a locality on foot. On such occasions they must
be formed for attack in depth, the object being to establish a firing
line in a position as close as possible to the enemy and to obtain
superiority of fire over him. When such is the case the action of the
horse artillery will resemble that of field artillery in co-operation
with infantry, and time will usually be available to draw up a
systematic plan of attack. (_See_ Sec. =153=.)
5. The assistance of horse artillery will also be of great value when
a mounted force has recourse to dismounted action either with a view
to holding a locality till other troops arrive or simply to denying
it to the enemy. Its method of employment will approximate to that of
field artillery in the defence, but full advantage should be taken of
its mobility to support any extensions or changes of front which may be
adopted.
=175.= _Horse artillery in a general engagement._
1. Occasions for the employment of shock tactics against infantry or
artillery may arise on the battlefield of the future, as they have in
the past. Success can, however, only be anticipated when the enemy is
either taken by surprise or when demoralized.
2. Surprise may be achieved by a skilful use of the ground or through
the enemy’s attention being absorbed by the attack of the other arms.
The enemy’s demoralization will depend on the action of the guns and
infantry. Hence cavalry before attacking the enemy’s infantry or
artillery must chiefly look to the way being prepared for it by the
action of the other arms.
Horse artillery must be ready to assist in this preparation, and it
will be the duty of its commander, under the instructions of the
cavalry commander, to ascertain how best this assistance can be
rendered. To this end the establishment of communication with the
commanders of adjacent bodies of troops will be advisable.
=176.= _Ammunition supply._
1. Previous to an action the commander of each horse artillery brigade
ammunition column should send an officer or non-commissioned officer to
artillery headquarters.
2. The artillery commander is responsible for informing the ammunition
column commanders as early as possible of the intended course of action
and of the localities to which they are to move.
The original positions of these columns should be chosen with a view to
the facilities for replenishing ammunition and suitability for defence.
3. If the force is to operate on a wide front, or if part of it is to
act independently, instructions as to detaching sections or attaching
orderlies to the various cavalry and artillery brigades will be
necessary.
4. In the event of a cavalry or horse artillery brigade requiring more
ammunition its commander will either send back the orderly to the
ammunition column or apply direct to cavalry divisional headquarters as
may be most convenient. The place to which the ammunition is to be sent
and what arrangements, if any, have been made for its protection should
be stated.
MOBILE ARTILLERY IN THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF A FORTRESS.
=177.= _The attack._
(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Secs. 118-125.)
1. In the attack of a fortress the first object will be to capture any
advanced positions which the enemy may have occupied. These positions
will often be provided with field works the extent of which will depend
on a variety of circumstances. To drive the enemy out of such positions
the employment of heavy mobile artillery may be necessary, but
opportunities will also occur for the employment of the lighter guns in
support of the infantry attacks.
These operations should be conducted on the same principles as laid
down in Secs. =154-157=, every opportunity being taken to cause losses
to the enemy which he cannot replace.
2. During the siege operations the field artillery will be employed
as directed by the commander of the besieging force. The whole, or
a portion of it, may be temporarily or permanently placed under the
orders of the siege artillery commander.
The positions of batteries, which have not been placed under the siege
artillery commander’s orders, will be selected by divisional artillery
commanders, under the orders of divisional commanders. Care must be
taken to ensure that the fire from these batteries will assist, and not
interfere with, the siege artillery.
3. In the attack of permanent works, the fire of field guns being
of little or no value, their use should be restricted to supporting
infantry assaults, or to repelling sorties, which compel the enemy’s
troops to expose themselves.
Howitzers and heavy artillery, on the other hand, would usually be
called upon to take part in destroying the enemy’s armament and works.
4. Accuracy of fire being most important, the judicious selection of
observing stations and positions is as important for field batteries as
for heavier guns. The gun sites should be concealed and artificially
protected, and, when possible, platforms for the howitzers should be
provided. A good system of intercommunication and an efficient supply
of ammunition are additional factors of importance.
=178.= _The defence._
(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Secs. 126-128.)
1. In the defence of a fortress delay is usually one of the principal
objects. The longer the close investment can be prevented the more will
it assist this object.
2. If assisting in the defence of a coast fortress, the first duty of
the mobile artillery will be to oppose hostile landing parties. For
this purpose it must be able to sweep the probable landing-places with
shrapnel fire. It should, if possible, be screened from view of the
ships supporting a landing. The best positions for opposing a hostile
advance, from whatever quarter it may come, should be chosen in peace,
and the sites for the guns thoroughly reconnoitred.
3. With the object of delaying the investment of the fortress one or
more advanced positions may be occupied in front of the main line
of defence. The distance of an advanced position from the main line
of defence cannot be precisely laid down, but it must be far enough
forward to deny to the enemy artillery positions from which fire can
be opened against the main works, and should be strengthened by all
artificial means available. In the advanced position will be placed the
heavier guns of the movable armament; the light guns being employed in
the counter-attacks that will be made from it with a view of inflicting
loss upon the enemy, and hindering the establishment of his batteries.
Sites for the various guns and howitzers available should be got ready
in good time if this has not been done in peace.
4. As the assailants make good the ground, the last of the advanced
positions will eventually be evacuated. The mobile artillery will
then be distributed amongst the various sections of the defence, a
proportion being retained with the general reserve.
5. As soon as the direction of the main attack has been made clear, the
artillery on this front will be reinforced by all the guns that can
be spared from elsewhere. The disposition of this armament will vary
according to its nature and local conditions. Well-concealed positions
for the howitzers and for Q.F. guns, positions from which they can fire
direct against assaulting infantry, must be sought.
6. The same general rules apply to the use of projectiles in the
defence as in the attack; high explosive shell being employed against
_matériel_, and shrapnel fire against personnel.
ARTILLERY IN IRREGULAR WARFARE.
=179.= _General principles._
(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Chap. X.)
1. The extent to which tactical methods differ in small wars from those
obtaining in regular campaigns varies widely in different cases.
In each instance the special characteristics, armament and tactics of
the enemy must be considered, in addition to the nature of the country
in which the operations are to take place, and the object in view.
General indications, therefore, can alone be given as to the form which
artillery tactics should assume.
2. The importance of impressing such foes as are met with in these
campaigns with a feeling of inferiority cannot be overestimated.
Consequently a bold offensive is generally adopted and every endeavour
made to inflict serious loss on the enemy. Against opponents such
as are met with in irregular warfare the moral effect of guns is
very great, but without material effect, moral effect is like to be
transitory. Sometimes it may be expedient merely to drive the enemy off
by shell fire, but, as a rule, this should not be the primary object of
the guns.
3. In irregular warfare, guns should generally be dispersed rather
than concentrated, so as to bring effective fire to bear at any point
where opportunities may present themselves. Moreover any artillery the
enemy may possess will usually be inferior in numbers and certainly
in training and efficiency, and therefore direct fire and shorter
ranges than are usual in regular warfare should be employed. Against
irregulars armed with rifles, who rely chiefly on fire action, covering
fire from part of the artillery may be necessary, but a prolonged
preparation of the attack may cause the enemy to disperse before the
attack can be pushed home and is incompatible with anything in the
nature of a surprise. The guns not used for covering fire should be
pushed forward in order that when the enemy is finally driven out of
his position he may be vigorously pursued by shell fire.