_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Donkin._
“I believe it is certain that we cannot depend upon the activity of
the Portuguese government upon this head,” (intelligence,) “either
as to promptitude or security.”
_Colonel Donkin to sir J. Cradock, January 1, Lisbon._
“Experience has _shewn how utterly impossible it is to get correct
intelligence here_; an enemy may be within four or five days march
of this city before it is known, unless he attacks on the very line
our troops occupy.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._
“It is singular how imperfectly all intelligence, though of such
important events, reaches this, and we have not had, for two days,
any account from Oporto.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26._
“Yesterday the chevalier de Castro stated, from authority, a
movement on the part of the French, quite different from a _direct
report_ from the junta of Badajos.”
* * * * *
No. IV.
SECTION I.--EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN CRADOCK’S INSTRUCTIONS.
_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, December 24, 1808._
“Upon the actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon, in such
strength as may render further resistance ineffectual, you will
take care that measures be taken, in due time, for withdrawing
both the British army and _such Portuguese as may be desirous of
accompanying it_.”--“The British admiral will be directed to take
effectual measures, with your assistance, for depriving the enemy
of all the resources, more especially those of a naval description,
which the Tagus contains. Every thing of a naval and military
description, that cannot be brought away, must, in the last
extremity, be destroyed.”
_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 25, 1808._
“I am to signify his majesty’s pleasure that, in the event of any
application being made to you from the regency of Portugal, on the
subject of the occupation of the fortresses with his majesty’s
troops, you do _refer the subject to Mr. Villiers_, who has
received instruction, &c. and you will not make any alteration as
to the mode prescribed for garrisoning the fortresses _without
directions from Mr. Villiers_.”
_Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12, 1809._
“Sir J. Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition you
may make _for horses for your guns_, or any other species of supply
the service may require.”
_Extracts from certain queries put to lord Castlereagh by sir J.
Cradock, with the answers thereto._
QUERY. ANSWER.
“What may be the situation “The relations with the government
of my command?” of Portugal will be arranged when
Mr. Villiers arrives.”
“In what light is the force “Ditto.”
under my command to be
considered?” &c. &c.
“May any Portuguese battalions “The taking of Portuguese battalions
be levied for English pay?” into English pay will, if adopted,
be managed _through Mr. Villiers_.”
“If any want of provisions “The general measures of supplying
should appear in Portugal, may Portugal with provisions will be
I be allowed to adopt measures, _referred to Mr. Villiers_.”
in conjunction with the regency,
for obtaining a supply?”
“If any Portuguese corps can “_Mr. Villiers will be authorised_
be got into such forwardness to enter upon the discussion of this
as to be fit to enter Spain, and subject with the regency, availing
they should be willing to join himself of your assistance,” &c.
sir J. Moore, are they to be put
on British pay?”
* * * * *
No. V.
JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’S PAPERS.
WANT OF SUPPLIES.
_Commissary Rawlings, deputy-commissary-general, to Cradock,
December 22._
“Your excellency is aware of the exhausted state of this country.
The difficulties encountered by sir J. Moore were of the most
serious nature, even before the sources of supply were so much
drained as they now are.”
WANT OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES.
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 17th March._
“I have been obliged to send officers of the artillery and
commissariat department to Gibraltar to attempt the supply of
horses from the Barbary coast; and, such is our actual want,
that the proper movement of even the force we have is nearly
impracticable.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26._
“The means of transport are so confined that I must not expose
any thing to loss; and the artillery must be preserved with the
greatest care, for I cannot equip more than two brigades of
six-pounders, and one light brigade of three-pounders, the latter
being of a very inferior description.”
_Commissary Rawlings to sir John Cradock, March._
“The precarious tenure of this country by British troops has
hitherto precluded the possibility of establishing such an
advantageous contract for the public as, in more permanent cases,
might necessarily be expected: we have literally been supplied from
hand to mouth.”
_Colonel Robe to sir J. Cradock, March 20_.
“It is necessary for me to add that every exertion has been
made to supply the artillery with horses and mules by the
deputy-commissary-general, but, from the exhausted state of the
country, and the demands upon it for the Portuguese army, no more
than two brigades have been furnished with those animals, and these
are much too slight for the general service of the artillery.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 20._
“From the first moment of my arrival in this country, unceasing
exertion has been employed to purchase and procure them” (horses
and mules) “at any price or by any means, but the adequate supply
for even the former small number of the British army could not be
obtained. I have also made repeated representations to England.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._
“I want eight hundred horses and mules for the common conveyance of
provision and the equipment of the artillery.”
_Commissary Rawlings to sir J. Cradock, April 9._
“Some of the persons employed to provide cattle for the troops have
returned without effecting their mission. This disappointment must
be attributed to the movements of the enemy in the north, from
whence our supply has hitherto been obtained.”
_Sir J. Cradock to marshal Beresford, Caldas, April 18._
“You can form no adequate idea of the difficulty to procure
supplies. The subject of forage for the cavalry keeps me in alarm
without intermission, and there is no certainty for a single
day. The country appears to be without the ability to furnish
straw.”--“In short, the supply is just for the day, and barely
sufficient.”--“I have begged of Mr. Villiers to desire the regency
would send a person, in special authority, to this district to
furnish supplies, if they are to be found. I shall act like the
French, and make requisition, with this difference, that we are
ready to pay for every thing to the utmost.”
_Cradock to Berkely, Caldas, April 17._
“Such is the dearth of supply in this part of the country, and
even in advance as far as we could go, that, unless victuallers
are sent (or some other arrangement to the same effect) to Peniché
and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position. We cannot
advance, for all our means of transport are gone back to Lisbon;
and even in a retreat the cavalry could not be fed.”--“If there
is insurmountable risk in sending the victuallers to Peniché,
I request your declaration to this effect; for I must, in that
case, retire the army to a station close to Lisbon, to fed be from
thence.”
_Cradock to Villiers, April 17._
“This letter is plainly to state that, unless some victuallers are
sent, even at risk, to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot
maintain our position, and must retreat.”--“If the articles are in
the country we must have them, and all ceremony must be dispensed
with. The enemy would have them without paying for them: we must
equally exact and pay.”
_Cradock to Beresford, April 20._
“All the recommendation you point out upon the assistance to be
derived from the coast have been long since acted upon to the
utmost of my exertions; but the difficulties started by the admiral
and the commissary were so great, that I cannot say I have much
dependence upon immediate aid.”
_General Cotton to Cradock, April 21._
“I wish I could once see the cavalry together; but I much fear that
before that happens they will be very much out of condition. The
fourteenth have already fallen off very much, owing to the frequent
want of straw and their being supplied with Indian corn, which they
will not eat: added to these circumstances, the commissary obliges
the cavalry to carry (on the horses) three days’ forage.”
_G. Harrison to Mr. Rawlings, Treasury-chambers, February 25._
“It having been represented to the lords commissioners of his
majesty’s treasury that the troops at Lisbon are experiencing the
greatest hardships from the want of shoes, I have received their
lordships commands,” &c. &c.
_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Willoughby Gordon, military secretary,
February 11._
“I trust that the importance of the subject will plead my excuse
for thus repeating my representations of the wretched state of the
clothing and the great coats in particular of his majesty’s troops
serving in this country.”
_Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12._
“Sir John Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition
you make for horses for your guns, or any other species of supply
the service may, from time to time, require.”
* * * * *
No. VI.
SECTION I.--MISCELLANEOUS.
_Captain Morgan, Lusitanian Legion, to sir J. Cradock, Lisbon,
January 19, 1809._
“I left sir R. Wilson very critically situated, occupying a pass
on the Agueda. Sir Robert is wholly unsupported; he has been
advised by colonel Guard to fall back; and, from his information,
he imagines that sir John Moore is withdrawing his troops through
Gallicia. On the other hand, he has received _positive orders from
you_[9] _to defend the frontiers_, and pressing letters to that
effect from the bishop of Oporto.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 30th January._
“The regency and the bishop of Oporto are not pleased at his” (sir
R. Wilson) “quitting the bounds of Portugal.”
_Ditto to Ditto, 6th March._
“I had a letter from sir R. Wilson, from Ciudad Rodrigo (24th
February), wherein he says, that many French prisoners state their
expectations that the French army will retire behind the Ebro. Sir
Robert’s own persuasion is _that the French will retire altogether
from Spain_.”
SECTION II.
_General Cameron to sir J. Cradock, Lamego, January 16._
“I have collected several detachments of recovered men belonging
to sir J. Moore’s army, whom I found scattered in all directions,
without necessaries, and some of them committing every possible
excess that could render the name of a British soldier odious to
the nation.”
_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, March 16._
“There are about one hundred and twenty persons confined on board
the _Rosina_, whose conduct has rendered them a disgrace to the
army.”
SECTION III.
_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, Oimbra, Head-Quarters of
Romana, February 21._
“The marquis of Romana seems to think that the serious _intention
of the enemy is to retreat from Gallicia_ altogether; and even
that he will find much difficulty _in extricating himself_. I must
confess that _I am not so sanguine_; and I judge that the present
retrograde movement from the Minho is more with an intent to
advance from Orense on Montalegre, and in this direction.”
_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March._
“I still believe Romana had intention to fall back on Chaves, and
join himself to the Portuguese army. _His troops had been much
vexed by the unfriendly conduct of the Portuguese_, and a cordial
co-operation was not to be expected; but that he should separate
altogether is what I neither could expect nor conceive. He
suddenly informed me of his resolution to retreat to Bragança. He
had just received a letter from Sylveira, which he also answered
to that effect, and which created no small surprise, as a plan of
operations had already been settled between them.”
_Major Victor Arentchild to sir J. Cradock, Oporto, March 16._
“General Sylveira has only one regiment with him; and his conduct
has been such, that the people have lost all confidence in him, and
consider him a traitor. I merely mention this to your excellency
as the opinion of the public.... The marquis of Romana’s army is
retreating to Orres, in Gallicia, and is, I fear, in a wretched
condition. The opinion entertained of him is far from good.”
_Mr. commissary Boys to Mr. commissary Rawlings, Almeida, January
13._
“Sir John Moore, with his army, was retreating, and ten thousand
men had deserted from the marquis of Romana, and were pillaging the
country.”
_Lord Castlereagh to marshal Beresford, February 15._
“The Portuguese government having solicited that a British general
officer should be appointed to command and organize their army,
his majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for this
important trust.”
_Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, January 23._
“No effort appears to have been made by the Spaniards, either to
second the British operations, or even to defend Ferrol, or save
the naval means (whatever they may be) in that harbour.”
* * * * *
No. VII.
EXTRACTS FROM MR FRERE’S CORRESPONDENCE.
(N. B. The Italics are not in the original.)
_Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, Seville, March 14._
“Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished
by the defeat of general Reding, that I should much doubt whether
any reinforcements, such as we could now send there, would enable
us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of success, such
as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to arise from
the derangement of calculations which may have been formed at
home.”--“On the other hand, there seems reason to _apprehend_,
that general Soult may at last, in consequence of the resistance
he has experienced, _desist from his unaccountable project, of
entering Portugal and occupying Gallicia_. His return would, of
course, add largely to the disposable and moveable force of the
enemy, while it would not increase ours by any force of that
description.”--“In this view of the subject there are two points
for the employment of a British force; one, _by making a push
to drive the enemy from Salamanca, and the neighbouring towns_,
while the Asturians should make an effort on their side to occupy
Leon and Astorga, thus re-establishing the communications between
the northern and southern provinces. The other, by moving from
the bridge of Alcantara along the northern bank of the Tagus, in
concert with general Cuesta, to attack and _drive the enemy from
Toledo, and consequently from Madrid_. In the latter alternative,
the British could have the advantage of acting in concert with a
disciplined army. They would, likewise, have immediately the start
of any reinforcement from the army of general Soult, supposing him
to abandon Gallicia for the sake of moving southward; and these
movements would not tend in the same degree to draw him from his
present position, in which, for so many reasons, _it is desirable
he should continue_. It would, I should imagine, at the same time,
cover Andalusia, and the points of the greatest interest and
importance in this province, more effectually than the same force
employed in any other manner.”
_Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, March 22._
“The fortieth remains here: under the present circumstances I could
not think of their removal, unless to meet a British force from
Elvas.”
_Mr. Frere to sir A. Wellesley, Seville, May 4._
Extracted from Parliamentary Papers, 1810.
“As it was my object to obtain _a diversion in La Mancha as the
price of co-operation_ on your part, and the impression which they
(the junta) received from colonel Alava’s report was, that your
intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Gallicia, to
come down upon Estremadura to attack general Victor, I was under
some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined, that the point which
I wanted to make a condition was already conceded.”
* * * * *
No. VIII.
EXTRACTS RELATIVE TO CADIZ.
_Sir John Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 16._
“The troops from England for Cadiz may or may not arrive, at
least we may expect delay; but I think the subject of sending a
force from this requires immediate deliberation and settlement. I
am prepared to appropriate for this service any number that may
be deemed proper under existing circumstances. It is only upon
the political part of the subject I can have any hesitation, and
whether the Spaniards will receive the force as they ought. The
orders from England are to send it if the supreme junta shall make
the requisition. The question is, whether we shall anticipate the
demand or not?”
_Sir John Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29._
“This measure (sending troops to Cadiz) is certainly one of
considerable responsibility to those concerned; but upon its
adoption, Mr. Villiers, Admiral Berkely, and myself, could not
well hesitate, after the despatches that were communicated to us,
as addressed to you, as well as those directed to ourselves, which
placed Cadiz in so prominent a point of view, upon the unfavourable
termination of the campaign in the north of Spain.”--“The force in
Portugal is weakened to a degree, especially in British regiments,
that reduces it to almost nothing; but I may look to the arrival
of the force of five thousand men, announced to be on their way;
and if it is intended to maintain Portugal, it will be but fair to
replace the present detachment from them.”
_Sir John Cradock to general Mackenzie, March 9._
“I yesterday received orders from his majesty’s government to
press, in the most expeditious manner, the immediate return of the
forces under your command to the Tagus.”
_Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 9._
“Your lordship will find, by the present communication, that
major-general Mackenzie, at the express desire and advice of
Mr. Frere, has actually left Cadiz with his whole force, (the
fortieth regiment, from Seville, will be united,) and proceeded
to Tarragona, unless your lordship’s orders may have overtaken
major-general Sherbrooke, who passed this port four days ago
(without any communication). It may be presumed that he will follow
the same course, upon the same motives that influenced general
Mackenzie; and at present a new scene of operations is entered upon
in that part of Spain.”
* * * * *
No. IX.
NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL MACKENZIE’S
DETACHMENT FROM LISBON TO CADIZ.
“The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2d February, 1809, and
arrived in Cadiz harbour on the 5th, at night. I immediately
waited on rear-admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt there are
some difficulties started by the marquis Villel (the commissioner
from the central junta, as well as a member of it) to our landing
and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on sir George Smith, on shore,
where this intelligence was, in some degree, confirmed; but sir
George still expressed an expectation that the objections would be
got over. These objections had been, it seems, but lately started.
Next morning I saw Mr. Charles Stuart, who was acting under a
diplomatic authority from Mr. Frere, and had a conference with
him and sir G. Smith, when I explained the nature of my orders,
and it was determined to wait on the marquis Villel. Mr. Stuart
explained to the marquis that the object of my coming was to offer
our assistance in the occupation and defence of Cadiz, and in
making the necessary preparations for such an event; that we were
only the advance of a larger corps coming from England, to act
from this side against the common enemy. The marquis hesitated,
and, after some speeches of compliment, said his authority did not
extend so far; that he must wait for instructions from the central
government; and, in the mean time, said he could permit our landing
at Port St. Mary’s. This I declined, as an unnecessary loss of
time, and contrary to my orders; and it was then agreed to wait for
the decision of the central junta from Seville. I thereupon wrote
to Mr. Frere, and sent him a copy of my instructions from sir J.
Cradock.
The decision of the junta was received on the 8th; and I received
a letter from Mr. Frere, which put an end, for the moment, to our
hope of occupying Cadiz. The reason assigned by the junta was of
the most flimsy nature, viz. “That they had ordered two of their
own battalions to occupy Cadiz;” a measure which was evidently the
thought of the moment, and a mere pretext.
Although I cannot presume to judge of the evil political
consequences which might arise from such a measure, as alluded
to in Mr. Frere’s, yet I had every reason to believe, as well
from the opinion of sir G. Smith, as of all others conversant
in the sentiments of the people of Cadiz, that our landing and
occupying the place would be a very popular measure. Mr. Frere’s
letter expressed a great desire that we should not appear to have
made an offer that was refused; and was desirous that we should
not immediately depart, but that we should land and occupy the
cantonments offered to us. On consulting with sir G. Smith and Mr.
Stuart, this appeared to be contrary to the grounds on which we had
set out; but as we were equally desirous not to appear at variance
with the Spanish government, we agreed to submit to Mr. Frere,
whether it would not be better for the troops to remain for the
present in their transports, as we had already stated that we were
in expectation of being immediately joined by a force from England,
the scene of whose operations was uncertain; and our remaining in
the harbour under this idea would answer every purpose Mr. Frere
proposed by a landing.
I had, besides, some military objections to a landing; for, without
reckoning the uncertainty of an embarkation from Port St. Mary’s,
I knew how dilatory all proceedings are in Spain. That if we were
once placed in the scattered cantonments proposed, and we had a
sudden call for embarkation, above a week would have been lost in
effecting it; and from former experience, the effects of a certain
disorder would, probably, have thrown a large number of our men
into the hospitals. It is further evident that the detachment
could not have been re-embarked without some stain on the national
honour. It must have very soon marched into the interior of Spain,
and thus have involved our country in its support, without having
obtained the object for which it was detached,--the possession of
Cadiz. On all these considerations I thought it right to defer
landing, until we should hear further from Mr. Frere, to whom both
Mr. Stuart and myself wrote, and I presume he was satisfied with
the reasons given. In all these proceedings I had the cordial
approbation of sir G. Smith, who, notwithstanding unfavourable
appearances, seemed sanguine to the last that the point would
be carried. I therefore wrote to sir J. Cradock, by the Hope
brig, on the 9th, stating what had been done, and that we should
remain in Cadiz harbour (with Mr. Frere’s approbation) until we
received orders from him or from England. And I wrote, by the same
conveyance, to the same purport, to Lord Castlereagh.
On the 15th, we had the misfortune to lose sir G. Smith, who died
that morning; and on the 18th, I received a letter from Mr. Frere,
in which he seemed to have altered his opinion as to the propriety
of our occupying Cadiz, and stating that the only mode which
appeared to him likely to succeed in obtaining the possession was
my leaving a small part of my detachment there, and proceeding with
the rest to join Cuesta’s army; that, as a force was expected from
England for the same purpose for which my detachment came, what I
left behind might follow me on their arrival.
I confess I was much disappointed at this proposal, the whole of
my detachment not appearing more than equal to the charge of the
place; but as it had not been laid before the junta, I considered
it my duty to state the objections to it, as they arose out of
my instructions. Such a measure would have completely committed
our country, in a particular point, in the interior, with a very
small detachment, a thing which I was instructed his majesty’s
ministers wished to avoid; whilst the admittance of a handful of
men could not be considered as any possession of the place, where
there were about four thousand volunteers well drilled. I therefore
submitted to Mr. Frere, to defer the proposition of this measure
until the arrival of troops from England, which might be looked
for, according to his statement, every hour. We should be, then, in
a condition to take possession of Cadiz effectually, and advance,
in some point, respectably, towards the enemy. If, however, Mr.
Frere should determine to bring forward the measure immediately,
I further informed him, that I was ready to move on, as soon as we
could obtain the necessary equipments.
Mr. Stuart embarked on the 21st, on board the Ambuscade, on a
secret mission. On the 22d, and before I received any further
communication from Mr. Frere, a popular commotion broke out
suddenly at Cadiz, in consequence of the measure which the junta
had adopted, of marching some of their own troops into the town,
as the reason (or rather pretext) for declining to receive us. The
regiment now on its march in, was composed of Poles, Swiss, and
other foreigners, deserters from the French army, whose entrance
the people were determined to resist. The utmost care was taken to
prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any part whatever on
this occasion; and, except in some cases where I was applied to
by the governor, for the interference of some British officers as
mediators, we steered perfectly clear. It was now evident that the
people were favourable to our landing and occupying the town, for
it was frequently called for during the tumult.
As soon as I could safely send an account of this commotion to
Mr. Frere, I despatched an officer (captain Kelly, assistant
quarter-master-general) with a detail. The Fisguard sailed on the
24th, for Lisbon and England, by which ship I informed sir J.
Cradock, as well as lord Castlereagh, of all that had passed since
my last; and just at that time colonel Roche arrived from Seville.
He was sent down, by Mr. Frere, to Cadiz, in consequence of Mr.
Stuart’s mission. I had till now expected Mr. Frere’s decision,
on the subject of the proposition in his letter of the 18th; but
as so much time had elapsed, I conjectured he might have dropped
it for the present; and conceiving that something favourable to
the object of my mission might be drawn from the present state
of things, I had a full conversation with colonel Roche on the
subject. He told me the junta were dissatisfied with our not having
accepted the cantonments offered to us; but he did not seem to
think our views unattainable, particularly at the present moment.
I asked his opinion as to the practicability of general Stuart’s
being admitted, with two of my three battalions, into Cadiz, if I
advanced with the third to Seville to join the fortieth regiment,
thus making an equal division of my force. Colonel Roche was of
opinion that this would be acceded to; and I, therefore, despatched
him, as soon as possible, with a proposal to this effect to Mr.
Frere. Though two battalions could not be considered a sufficient
garrison, yet, from the evident popularity of our troops, and
the speedy expectation of a reinforcement from England, I thought
it would be extremely proper to make the trial. It also appeared
to me that by advancing to Seville I should not run much risk of
involving those two battalions in any operations before the arrival
of general Sherbrooke, which could embarrass him in the execution
of the orders he might bring from home.
This proposition certainly exceeded any thing authorised by my
instructions, but, I trust, the circumstances will be found to
warrant it.
After colonel Roche’s departure for Seville, captain Kelly returned
from thence, on the 26th, with a verbal confidential message from
Mr. Frere, stating that marshal Soult was marching from Gallicia
into Portugal, in three columns, and that Mr. Frere would write
to me by express, or by next post. On the 27th, I received this
promised letter, enclosing the copy of an intercepted letter from
Soult to Joseph Buonaparte; and Mr. Frere expresses his opinion
that my detachment may now be more useful in Portugal than at Cadiz.
Knowing, as I did before I left Lisbon, that every proper step was
taking for evacuating Portugal, in case of necessity, and that
nothing else than succours from home could enable sir John Cradock
to hold his ground there, it became more than ever necessary to
ascertain whether his army will be received into Cadiz, in case
of the evacuation of Portugal. In case the present negotiation
succeeded, I had arranged with admiral Purvis to send a frigate
with the intelligence to Lisbon immediately. If it failed, every
thing was in readiness to sail with the detachment thither; for,
although the assistance I should bring might not be sufficient of
itself to make any alteration in the resolutions already taken,
yet, if reinforcements arrived from England, we should be a welcome
addition.
On the morning of the 2d of March I received a letter from colonel
Roche, dated February 28, stating that my proposition had not yet
been decided on, but that it would be taken into consideration
that day. He expressed much apprehension of a party in the French
interest.
The morning of the 3d having passed without any letter from Mr.
Frere or colonel Roche, as I had been assured by the latter
I should receive, at furthest by the post of that morning, I
despatched another courier, dreading some accident. In the
afternoon, however, I received a long and important letter from
Mr. Frere, from which I concluded the negotiation had failed
(although he did not say so in terms); and a letter I received
shortly afterwards from colonel Roche confirmed this failure.
Mr. Frere’s letter entered very minutely into the state of the
Spanish and French armies; mentioned the failure of Soult’s attempt
to penetrate into Portugal by the Minho, and the improbability
of his persisting in it, from the position of the Spanish army,
assisted by the Portuguese. He then points out, in strong terms,
the essential use my detachment could be of at Tarragona, in giving
spirit and vigour to the cause in that country, where it is most in
need of support.
As the return of my detachment to Portugal, except in the case
of resisting the enemy, would not have a favourable appearance;
and the proceeding to Tarragona would so evidently shew our
determination to support the general cause, and leave the Spanish
government without an excuse afterwards for refusing to admit our
troops into Cadiz, it was my intention to have complied with Mr.
Frere’s solicitations, as the employment of my detachment on the
sea-coast would easily admit of its being afterwards withdrawn,
without committing any other British force for its support; and the
motives urged by Mr. Frere were so strong, that I scarcely thought
myself vindicable in hesitating to comply.
I accordingly wrote on the night of the 3d March to this effect
to Mr. Frere, sir J. Cradock, and lord Castlereagh. But on the
4th, in the evening, captain Cooke, of the Coldstream guards,
arrived from England with despatches for general Sherbrooke, who
had not yet arrived. Captain Cooke came in the Eclair brig of war,
and had stopped at Lisbon, which he left again on the evening of
the 2d, and brought me a message to the following purport from
sir J. Cradock, viz. ‘That he was determined to defend Portugal
to the utmost of his power; that in this situation he considered
my detachment as the choice part of his little army; that the
enemy were actually on the borders, though there was not yet any
intelligence of their having entered Portugal; and that unless
some extraordinary circumstance, of which he could form no idea,
prevented it, he should look for my immediate return to Lisbon.’
This order, of course, put an end to all further deliberation. The
idea of proceeding to Tarragona was abandoned. I wrote to this
effect to Mr. Frere, and embarked at midnight on the 4th. Contrary
winds detained in Cadiz harbour the whole of the 5th, but on the
6th the fleet sailed, and arrived in the Tagus on the 12th.
I trust, in the whole of these proceedings, in a very intricate
and delicate situation, an honest and anxious desire has been
evinced on my part, to accomplish the object of my mission; the
failure of which, I am persuaded, will be found to arise from the
apprehensions and disunion of the central junta, and not from the
inclinations of the people of Cadiz.
(Signed) J. R. MACKENZIE,
_Major-general._
_Lisbon, March 13, 1809._”
* * * * *
No. X.
COMMUNICATIONS WITH MINISTERS--NEGLECT OF PORTUGAL.
SECTION I.
_Mr. Canning to Mr. Villiers, January 24, 1809._
“You are aware, by my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th of December,
enclosing copies, &c. &c. _that, in the event of the evacuation of
Portugal, by the force under sir J. Cradock’s command, an event
rendered the more probable by the transactions in Gallicia_.”
_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, February 6._
“_Should you be compelled to evacuate Portugal_,” _&c._
_Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 6._
“The period of the British army’s stay in this place _appearing to
draw near to its conclusion_.”
SECTION II.
_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Guard, January 3._
“The garrisons of Elvas and Almeida have engaged my most serious
thoughts.”--“But, as they were occupied by the command of his
majesty’s ministers, and _we remain without any fresh instructions
under the present critical circumstances_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 10._
“I feel what a risk I run in thus leaving Lisbon defenceless, but
_I obey the original orders of government_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 12._
“_We are still without any instructions whatever from England._”
_Sir J. Cradock to captain Halket, January 13._
“Though we cannot say _when_ it may take place, and it shall be
deferred to the last moment, _in hopes of hearing from England_,
yet I believe it to be our duty to prepare every thing for the
event of an embarkation.”
_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, January 17._
“I lament to say that there appears nothing before us but the
resolution _to remain in Portugal to the last proper moment,
awaiting orders from England_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 19._
“With our force inferior and ill-composed, as it is, _we are
determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of
receiving orders from England_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely_, _February 9_.
“The orders we daily expect may be either for _immediate
embarkation, or to maintain Portugal_.”--“I am pursuaded we have
but this one wish, which is to act for the credit of our country,
and endeavour, under the _want of all information, to discover what
may be the object of the government we serve_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to general Mackenzie, February 26._
“Since the 14th of January _we are without instructions from
England_.”
SECTION III.
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 15._
“What appears to be my duty is to keep the fixed idea that the
_army in Portugal should remain to the last moment_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 15._
“I am just favoured with your communication about the dangerous
effects likely to be produced by the measure of withdrawing the
troops from Lisbon to occupy the military position of Oyeras,
Passo d’Arcos, &c. I fear (though the contrary was intended to be
expressly stated) that you are led into the idea that the position
in question was solely intended for embarkation. My avowed design
was to await (in a military post suited to our force) orders
from England, or to defend ourselves with reasonable prospect of
success against any attempt from the enemy, or even from thence
to make a forward movement, should future events lead to such
a proceeding.”--“What I must object to is to take up a false
position, say Alcantara, or other heights about the town, which
would only defend a certain position and leave the remainder to
the power of the enemy, one which we must leave upon his approach
and seek another bearing the appearance of flight and yet not
securing our retreat. The whole having announced the intention to
defend Lisbon, but giving up that idea upon the appearance of the
enemy: for positions liable to be turned on every side cannot be
persevered in by an inferior force.”--“My political reasoning upon
this subject was contained in the letter I wrote the admiral, and,
I must repeat, it continues unweakened,” &c.--“After your strong
representations of this morning, I shall certainly not persevere;
and, as there is no instant necessity for the measure, will await
the progress of events.”
* * * * *
No. XI.
STATE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCE UNDER SIR J. CRADDOCK, JANUARY
6, 1809, EXTRACTED FROM THE HEAD-QUARTER STATES.
Disposable for the Field.
Garrisons. Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry.
Men. Men. Men.
Santarem 68 190 2,492 General Richard Stewart.
Saccavem 97 169 1,450 General M’Kenzie.
Lisbon .. 519 .... General Cotton.
.. .. 236 attached to different
--- --- ----- battalions.
165 879 4,178
--- --- -----
Total 5,222
Garrisons. Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry.
Men. Men. Men.
Almeida 38 .. 1,440
Elvas 33 .. 679
Oporto .. .. 379
Lisbon and Forts 315 .. 2,682
--- -- -----
Total 486 .. 5,170
-----
General total 10,392
------
Note.--Every man capable of bearing arms is included in this
state.
ORDER OF BATTLE, APRIL 6, 1809, CALDAS.
Sir J. Cradock, commander-in-chief.
Major-general Sherbrooke, second in command.
Artillery.--Major-general Howarth. Cavalry.--Major-general Cotton.
Under arms.
Men.
First line, five brigades 10,418
Second line, three brigades 3,810
Reserve, one brigade 1,858
Cavalry 800
------
Total 16,886
------
STATE OF THE ARMY UNDER SIR A. WELLESLEY, APRIL 22.
Head-quarters, Leyria.
Under arms. Sick. Command. Effective.
Men. Men. Men. Men.
Artillery 441 88 408 937
Cavalry 1,439 13 418 1,870
Infantry 16,539 1,937 314 18,790
------ ----- ----- ------
Total 18,419 2,038 1,140 21,597
------ ----- ----- ------
6lb. 3lb. Howitzers.
Number of guns 20 6 4
Total 30
STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, MAY 1, 1809.
Head-quarters, Coimbra.
Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file.
Men. Men. Men. Men. Men.
1,413 3,074 19,510 230 24,227
Deduct { Hospital 2,357
{ Absent 1,217
------
Total present under arms 20,653
------
STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JUNE 25, 1809.
Head-quarters, Abrantes.
Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file.
Men. Men. Men. Men. Men.
1,586 3,736 21,267 406 26,995
Deduct { Hospital 3,246
{ Commands 1,396
30 Pieces of artillery. ------
Total present under arms 22,353
------
STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JULY 25, 1809.
Head-quarters, Talavera.
Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file.
Men. Men. Men. Men. Men.
1,584 3,734 29,694 398 35,410
Deduct { Hospital 4,827
{ Commands 1,596
------
Total present under arms 28,987
Deduct regiments on march 9,141
30 Pieces of artillery. ------
Real present under arms 19,846
------
STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1809.
Head-quarters, Badajos.
Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file.
Men. Men. Men. Men. Men.
1,947 4,273 28,409 389 35,018
In Hospital 8,827 }
Command and missing 2,526 } Total absent 11,353
------
Total present under arms 23,765
------
* * * * *
No. XII.
SECTION I.
MARSHAL BERESFORD TO SIR J. CRADOCK.
_March 29, 1809._
SIR,
I have the honour to annex your excellency a copy of requisitions,
from their excellencies the government of this kingdom, for the
speedy succouring of Oporto, which your excellency is informed is
so immediately in danger, from the approach of the French army,
whose advance posts are now within four leagues of that town.
I annex, for the information of your excellency, the instructions
which, under the existing circumstances, I had issued to the
general, commanding beyond the Douro; but the object of which has
been frustrated by events, at once unfortunate and melancholy.
The corps of brigadier-general Victoria, consisting of two
battalions of the line, which, on the appearance of the urgent
danger in the north, I had directed to cross the Douro, are now
in Oporto, as is the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion,
part of the regiment of Valença, and some regiments of militia;
but I cannot get any return of the troops there, though, I
understand, the number is considerable; and to this must be added
a considerable number of ordenanza from without, and the armed
population which will, I understand, amount to eight or ten
thousand men, and of the arms come from England, three thousand
stand that were sent to the army north of the Douro, are probably
now in Oporto, with a proportion of ammunition. I have thought
it right to give this statement of the actual state of things at
Oporto, as far as I can get information of, that your excellency
may be aware of it; and it is with regret that I farther add
that there prevails, in the town, the greatest anarchy and
insubordination,--and that, in short, by the latest accounts, the
populace entirely govern the law, civil and military.
Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under
the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the
various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we
had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary
for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me
to submit to your excellency’s consideration the propriety of
advancing the British force to Leyria, to be then pushed on to
Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts
may render expedient. But my principal reason was that, as there
appeared an intention of co-operation (of which, however, there is
no certainty) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be
most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one before the
other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their plan, and if
we should, or not, be able. To do this would be merely a matter
of calculation of time, as, supposing, on our arrival at Leyria,
Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it,
and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would
get so distant from us, as to permit the army, pushing from Leyria
to Oporto, without apprehension from the army of Victor, who, by
the time he could possibly hear of our movement, would be in the
Sierra Morena, which would clearly show that his principle object,
and from which he did not seem willing to be diverted, was either
the destruction of Cuesta’s army, to enter more securely into
Portugal, or to push to Seville; but, at all events, he would be
too distant to give us apprehensions of any surprise upon this
capital, as we have daily information of his movements, and which
would enable us, wherever we were in Portugal, even to reach it
before him. If, however, the final co-operation of these two
armies is intended for the conquest of this kingdom, and that
Soult does not think that of his army from Gallicia and that from
Salamanca sufficient, then he will satisfy himself, until Victor
is ready to act with him, in the possession of the country beyond
the Douro, where he will refresh and rest his troops, re-equip
them, and otherwise provide them, to be ready for the projected
co-operation,--whilst the army from Salamanca will, probably,
satisfy itself with the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and
act and wait in conjunction with Soult, both waiting till Victor
has settled his present objects, and then all co-operating.
It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances,
of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto, not only for
the British troops, but, also, of those of the allies, as, by my
instructions, I must consider you as commanding the allied armies;
and the time is now certainly arrived, for what efforts they can
make being combined: undoubtedly, their being employed in separate
projects will cause each falling separately, and without advantage
to the common cause.
I would, however, certainly, under present circumstances, be
unwilling to send the few troops I could spare from the army,
between the Tagus and the Mondego, to Oporto, as, unsupported by
British, I fear it would be losing so many men, that on a future
occasion, with such support, may weigh in the scale; and indeed,
the very insubordinate state of the troops, of which I have just
received a second report and complaint, from general Miranda, would
render it highly unwise to send them to a town in the state that
Oporto now is, where the best disposed troops, except a great body
went there, if they were not debauched to insubordination, would be
borne down by the multitude; and it is to be feared that whatever
Portuguese troops enter the town will fall with it, as the temper
of the people prevents the possibility of even any preparations for
retreat, in case of misfortune, to the outward and very extended
lines of defence. Having stated so much, I must leave the question
to your excellency, &c.
I have the honour, &c.
W. C. BERESFORD.
SIR J. CRADOCK TO MARSHAL BERESFORD.
_Lisbon, March 29, 1809._
DEAR SIR,
I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your
excellency’s letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the
request from the regency, &c. that I should move the British troops
to the succour of Oporto, at this moment menaced, &c.
Upon a subject of such importance, I experience considerable
relief, that the general view of approaching circumstances has
been, for a length of time, within my reflection, and that all
my reasoning (whatever it may be) has been transmitted to the
government in England, and the part I am now called upon to act
is simply but the execution of those measures I have long thought
it prudent to pursue, and which the present critical and involved
state of affairs seem to confirm and give no reason to alter in any
part.
It has always appeared, to my judgement, that the enemy has but
two objects to attain in this kingdom. The possession of Lisbon
and Oporto, I believe it to be universally admitted, and I need
not point out to your discrimination the infinitely superior
value of the former above the latter. There are such positive
local disadvantages attached to Oporto, independent of its remote
position, that no military disposition, in which a small English
army is to bear part, can apply. It pains me, therefore, to decline
obedience to an application from so high an authority as the
governors of the kingdom. It may be their duty to make the request,
though I much doubt if their judgement goes along with it; but it
appears to be mine not to transfer the small British force, under
my command, (totally inadequate to separate objects,) from the
defence of this part of the kingdom to the very doubtful succour of
a place two hundred miles distant, and by a movement to the north
with this professed view, feel myself engaged in a war that leaves
Lisbon and the Tagus defenceless and unprotected from the inroads
of other bodies of the enemy that may be prepared to combine in a
general invasion.
I shall hasten, therefore, from all general observation, to the
exact case before us, and state, in a concise manner, our actual
situation, leaving to your judgement, how far it may be necessary
to communicate some particulars that relate to the British army,
and lay before the governors and your excellency the best ideas
I can form for the employment of the British auxiliary force, in
conjunction with the Portuguese, for the ultimate protection of
Portugal under the pressure of all existing circumstances.
It may be granted that the enemy, with a force from seventeen
to twenty thousand, a considerable portion of which (it is said
five thousand) is cavalry, is directly menacing Oporto, there is
reason to believe that the division at Salamanca, estimated from
nine to twelve thousand, with a powerful force of artillery, is
moving to Ciudad Rodrigo, either for the investment of that place,
or to act in conjunction with general Soult, by an advance into
the Upper Beira. In the present view it is necessary to state,
with the weight it so well deserves, that the united forces of
generals Victor and Sebastiani are, apparently, pursuing general
Cuesta, just retiring before them; but it appears that a part
of the enemies had diverged to Merida, and had spread alarm and
dismay, even to the town of Badajos, on the frontiers of Portugal,
from whence, to the heights of Almeida, or the opposite of Lisbon,
through the whole of the Alemtejo: except the weak garrison of
Elvas, there is nothing to interrupt the immediate passage.
Against such an attempt from the enemy I derive no security from
the contiguity of general Cuesta’s army; for, besides the general
disinclination he has so strongly marked to the British character,
he has other objects to pursue, and his principal wish is to gain
time for the organization of his own force. To a person so well
acquainted with Portugal, and the circumstances of the present
hour, as your excellency is, it is quite superfluous to enter upon
further details, &c. It is only required to lay before you, in
confidence, the exact amount of the British forces, as the real
point upon which the whole subject depends: I may state it at
twelve thousand effective men, to take the field, if the necessary
garrison to maintain Lisbon in some tranquillity, and retain
possession of the maritime forts is left. It may be increased to
fourteen thousand, if these points are risked; but even to gain
the advantage of numbers to so limited a force, I cannot recommend
the measure, for the anarchy that prevails at Oporto, and would
be, perhaps, worse at Lisbon, is more to be dreaded than the
presence of an enemy, and may render all exertion useless. The
necessary means of transport for our army, notwithstanding every
effort, from the earliest moment, are quite inadequate, and not
more than two and a half brigades of artillery (fifteen guns) can
be equipped. To adventure upon an advance to Oporto, two hundred
miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this
moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings
of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the
understanding, and the ultimate view of things. If the British
army sets out with the declared object to succour Oporto, or expel
the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same; nothing
but the accomplishment will suit the English character; and I
confess that the best reasoning of my judgement, upon every public
and private principle, for the credit of the British army, and the
hope of any effectual assistance from the Portuguese nation is,
that the British troops should never make one retrograde step:
from that moment I will date the extinction of all Portuguese aid,
military as well as civil. The British army, from its description,
may disregard this common occurrence in war, but I am persuaded, in
the present state of the Portuguese army, and with the sentiments
of suspicion now alive, all explanation would be vain, and that it
would be left to the small body of English, alone, to sustain the
whole future conflict.
I have now only to state what my inferior judgement points out;
and as the arduous situation of command is allotted to me, I must
try to execute to the best of my power. I shall remain faithful
to my first principles, and persevere in the defence of Lisbon
and the Tagus. I invite the co-operation of the Portuguese force,
and, under your guidance and auspicious control, I look to a very
powerful accession of strength. I am convinced nothing will be
done by them in detached parties or in any isolated situation.
They will acquire confidence by number, and emulation will arise,
a rapid discipline will ensue from their connection with us, and
the whole, animated by your presence, will give the best promise of
success. Until we have consulted again I shall not say whether our
general position should be at Lumiar, extending the whole right to
Saccavem, or any other station more in advance. At this moment I
have only to express the indispensable circumstance of some fixed
basis, upon which the allied army will act, and by our united
strength try to counteract the peculiar disadvantages that attends
the defence of Portugal from positions that cannot be properly
embraced, and always leave some part exposed.
Allow me to conclude, with the solemn expression of my own
conviction, that nothing will give so much chance of a prosperous
result to the arduous scene in which we are engaged (either as
to reality or view) as the knowledge to the enemy, that, before
he conquers Portugal, he must defeat an army of some magnitude,
determined to fight him, and awaiting his approach, unbroken and
not exposed to the danger of a false movement. Such a conquest
cannot be an easy one, and must prove, if he pursue it, a powerful
diversion in favour of Spain.
It will gain me the sincerest pleasure, &c.
JOHN CRADOCK.
* * * * *
No. XIII.
JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF MARSHAL SOULT.
_Captain Brotherton to colonel Donkin, (quarter-master-general,)
Lamego, March 17, 1809._
“The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those arts
which Frenchmen are so expert in--circulating proclamations and
insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of terror,
plunder, and desolation, _treating the inhabitants with feigned
moderation and kindness_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 20, 1809, Caldas._
“It also appears to be the object of the enemy to ingratiate
himself with the populace of Oporto, _by even feeding them_ and
granting other indulgences.”--“It is also said that a Portuguese
legion, to consist of _six thousand_ men, has been instituted.”
_Extract from Soult’s Official Report of the expedition to
Portugal._
“Dans, quinze jours. Les villes de _Braga_, _Oporto_, _Bacellos_,
_Viana_, _Villa de Conde_, _Povoa de Barcim_, _Feira_, et
_Ovar_, eurent exprimé leurs vœux, des nombreuses deputations
se rendirent à Oporto pour les remettre au marechal Soult et
le prier de le faire parvenir à l’empereur. Des adresses qui
renfermaient l’expression de ce vœu étaient couverts de plus de
trente mille signatures du clergé, de la noblesse, des négocians,
et du peuple.”--“Pendant son séjour à Oporto. Le M. Soult fit des
proclamations et rendit divers arrêtés sur l’administration et la
police de la province _Entre Minho e Douro_. Il nomma au nom de
l’empereur aux emplois qui étaient vacans et apres avoir reçu la
manifestation politique des habitants il organiza la garde national
ainsi qu’une légion de cinq bataillons.”--“_Aucume contribution ne
fût frappé_ les fonds trouvés dans les caisses royales suffirent
pour fournir aux besoins des troupes, _et même pour donner de
secours aux Portugais_.”
_Intercepted letter of the duke of Dalmatia’s to general La
Martiniere, Orense, March 2, 1809._
“J’ai reçu vôtre lettre du 27 Jan. j’éprouve toutes les
dispositions que vous avez faites je vous ai deja dit que vous
pouviez disposer pour le service des fonds qui sont dans la caisse
royale de Tuy. Faites entrer en ville le plus de subsistance que
vous pourriez. Si de valence on vous tire de coups de canon envoyez
leurs des bombes. Bientôt vous pourrez mettre les chevaux au vert,
mais faites les garder. Dans les equipages qui sont à Tuy. Il y’a
douze cent pair de souliers, de cuir pour un égal nombre et un
peu de drap, vous pouvez en disposer pour vôtre troupe. Ralliez
au depôt général tout ce qui appartient au corps d’armée et qui
étoit resté en arrière, ainsi vous auriez bientôt une petite armée
qui se soutiendra d’elle même et faire la police dans le province
dont vous devez tirer de quoi vivre, soignez bien les hospitaux et
n’envoiez personne sur Ribidavia. J’espère que sous peu je vous
aurai ouvert une autre communication, le province d’Orence est en
très grande partie pacifié, je marche sur les débris du corps de
Romana pour en finir avec eux, ils sont du côté de Monterey. Si
apres cet expédition il y avoit encore en Gallice des troubles,
je reviendrai avec toute mon armée pour les appaiser et alors
malheur à ceux qui les auroient occasionné: _je veux la paix et
la tranquilité, que les habitans se livrent aux travaux de la
campagne, qu’ils soient protegés et que la troupe se conduise bien.
Les mutins et les malintentionés François et Espagnols, doivent
être sevèrement punies._ Il faut de tems en tems des examples. Je
crois que vous pourriez correspondre avec moi par des gens du pays.
Mais il faut bien leur payer ou leur promettre, qu’en arrivant
pres de moi ils le seront généreusement et prendre de gages pour
repondre de leur fidelité, donnez de vos nouvelles au général
Marchand. Pour le même moyen dite au colonel l’Abbeville de bien
mettre en état son artillerie.
“MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.”
* * * * *
No. XIV.
SIR A. WELLESLEY TO SIR J. CRADOCK.
_Lisbon, April 23._
Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday,
and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to
entertain in respect to the further movements to the northward. I
conclude that you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria.
I think that, before any further steps are taken in respect to
Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor;
how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the
means of defence of the east of Portugal while the British will be
to the northward, and, eventually, the means of defence of Lisbon
and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon the country.
All these subjects must have been considered by you; and, I fear,
in no very satisfactory light, as you appear to have moved to the
northward unwillingly: and I should be glad to talk them over with
you.
In order to consider of some of them, and to make various
arrangements, which can be made only here, I have requested
marshal Beresford to come here, if he should not deem his absence
from the Portuguese troops, in the present state, likely to be
disadvantageous to the public service; and I have directed him to
let you know whether he will come or not.
It might, probably, also be more agreeable and convenient to you
to see me here than with the army; and if this should be the case,
it would be a most convenient arrangement to me to meet you here.
I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a
view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should, however,
choose to come, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will
bring with you the adjutant-general and quarter-master-general, the
chief engineer and the commanding officer of the artillery, and the
commissary.
Ever yours, &c.
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
N.B. Some paragraphs of a private nature are omitted.
* * * * *
No. XV.
_Extracts of a Letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord
Castlereagh, Lisbon, April 24, 1809._
“I arrived here on Saturday, and found that sir John Cradock and
general Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward,
with the troops under their command respectively; the former to
Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, however, does
not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving
forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by his letters to
Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no further till he should
hear that Victor’s movements were decided, and, therefore, I
consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state in
which, if I found them, it was the intention of the king’s minister
that I should assume the command; and, accordingly, I propose to
assume it as soon as I shall communicate with sir John Cradock.
I have written to him, and to general Beresford, to apprize him
that I conceive advantage will result from our meeting here, and
I expect them both here as soon as possible. In respect to the
enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his posts
to the southward further than the river Vouga. He has nothing in
Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, of which you have been
most probably apprized; but he has some posts on the river Tamega,
which divides that province from Minho, and it is supposed that
he wishes to reserve for himself the option of retreating through
Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find it necessary. General
Sylveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in Tras os Montes, but I
am not acquainted with its strength or its composition. General
Lapisse, who commands the French corps which, it was supposed,
when I left England, was marching from Salamanca into Portugal,
has turned off to his left, and has marched along the Portuguese
frontier to Alcantara, where he crossed the Tagus, and thence he
went to Merida, on the Guadiana, where he is in communication with,
indeed I may say, part of the army of Victor; he has an advanced
post at Montejo, nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida.
Victor has continued at Medellin since the action with Cuesta; he
is either fortifying that post, or making an entrenched camp there.
Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which, it is
said, will soon be twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand
cavalry, a part of them good troops; I know nothing of the marquis
de la Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal. I intend
to move upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangements upon
which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to impede
or delay Victor’s progress, in case he should come in while I am
absent. I should prefer an attack upon Victor, in concert with
Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of
this kingdom and of the favourite town of Oporto, of which it is
most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon Victor,
connected with Cuesta’s movements, did not require time to concert
it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the
north of Portugal. If Soult should go, I think it most advisable,
for many reasons, in which I need not enter at present, to act upon
the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to bring the British
army to the eastern frontier. If the light brigade should not have
left England, when you receive this letter, I trust that you will
send them off without loss of time; and I request you to desire
the officer commanding them to endeavour to get intelligence, as
he will go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro and the mouth
of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop at the latter place
for orders, if he should find that the British army is engaged in
operations to the northward, and if he should not already have
received orders at Aveiro. The twenty-third dragoons might also
receive directions to a similar purport. The hussars, I conclude,
have sailed before this time. We are much in want of craft here;
now that we are going to carry on an operation to the northward
constant convoys will be necessary, and the admiral does not appear
to have the means in his power of supplying all that is required of
him. The twenty-fourth regiment arrived this day, &c. &c.
(Signed) “ARTHUR WELLESLEY.”
* * * * *
No. XVI.
LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.
_Abrantes, June 22, 1809._
MY LORD,
When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have marched
before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are
in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The
French are continuing their retreat. Sebastiani has also fallen
back towards Toledo, and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his
head-quarters at Truxillo, on the 19th. I am apprehensive that
you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my
arrival upon the Tagus. But it was, and is, quite impossible to
move without money. Not only were the officers and soldiers in the
greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the
disorders of which I have had occasion to complain; but we can no
longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources
for the transport of our own supplies either by land or by water.
Besides this, the army required rest, after their expedition to
the frontiers of Gallicia, and shoes, and to be furbished up in
different ways; and I was well aware that, if necessity had not
obliged me to halt at the present moment, I should have been
compelled to make a longer halt some time hence. To all this add,
that, for some time after I came here, I believed that the French
were retiring, (as appears by my letters to your lordship,) and
that I should have no opportunity of striking a blow against them,
even if I could have marched. I hope that you will attend to my
requisitions for money; not only am I in want, but the Portuguese
government, to whom Mr. Villiers says that we owe £125,000. I
repeat, that we must have £200,000 a month, from England, till
I write you that I can do without it; in which sum I include
£40,000 a month for the Portuguese government, to pay for twenty
thousand men. If the Portuguese government are to receive a larger
sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be
proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay
the Portuguese debt and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides,
debts of sir John Moore’s army still due in Spain, which I am
called upon to pay. In short, we must have £125,000, and £200,000 a
month, reckoning from the beginning of May, &c. &c.
(Signed) “ARTHUR WELLESLEY.”
* * * * *
No. XVII.
LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY.
_Badajos, October 30, 1809._
MY LORD,
I have had the honour of receiving your excellency’s despatch,
(marked 1.) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to
M. de Garay, of the 8th of September, and a copy of his note, in
answer to your excellency, of the 3d of October.
I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavour to attribute
to the irregularities of the English commissariat the deficiencies
of supplies and means of transport experienced by the British army
in its late service in Spain; I am not disposed to justify the
English commissariat where they deserve blame; but I must think it
but justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to
their exertions for the scanty supplies it received.
From some of the statements contained in M. de Garay’s note it
would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during
the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great
distress was suffered, at a very early period, by both armies;
particularly the quotation of a letter from general Cuesta, of
the 1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed
to have made, that the Spanish troops and _their prisoners_ were
better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these
statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great
distress for want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment;
and, although that distress might have been aggravated, it could
not have been occasioned by the inexperience or irregularity of the
English commissariat.
I know nothing of the orders which M. de Garay states were sent
by the government to the different provincial juntas, to provide
provisions and means of transport for the British army on its
passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such
orders were sent, it was obvious that the central junta, as a
government, have no power or influence over the provincial juntas
and magistrates, to whom their orders were addressed, as they
produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were
procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English
commissaries. But it is obvious, from M. de Garay’s account of
these orders, that the central junta had taken a very erroneous
view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of
the provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those
operations. The government provided, by their orders, for the
troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying upon
their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection
of one body, of not less than fifty thousand men, even for one
day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable
omission, which paralyzed all our efforts, they rendered that
success doubtful, by countermanding the orders given to general
Venegas by general Cuesta, and thus exposing the combined armies to
a general action with the enemy’s concentrated force. The effect of
their orders will appear more fully in the following detail:--
As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent
a commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, to endeavour to procure mules to
attend the army, in concert with don Lozano des Torres, that city
and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army commanded
by the late sir John Moore had been most largely supplied. M.
de Garay expresses the astonishment of the government that the
British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means
of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding
this expression of astonishment, he informs your excellency, in
the name of the government, that they had given orders to the
provincial juntas of Badajos and Castile (at Ciudad Rodrigo) and
the magistrates, to provide and supply us with the means which, of
course, they must have been aware that we should require. No army
can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport;
and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want
at that moment.
The means of transport, commonly used in Portugal, are carts, drawn
by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to move
more than twelve miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that
which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on
operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige
the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to
bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and
there were none to carry provisions.
Having failed in procuring, at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the
neighbourhood, the means of transport which I required, I wrote to
general O’Donaghue, on the 16th of July, a letter, in which, after
stating our wants and the failure of the country in supplying them,
I gave notice that if they were not supplied I should discontinue
my co-operation with general Cuesta, after I should have performed
my part in the first operation which we had concerted, viz. the
removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and, if not supplied as I
required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From
this letter of the 16th July, it will appear that I called for
the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain
if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat
across the Tagus of the 4th of August, but even previous to the
commencement of the operations of the campaign.
Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was
communicated to the central junta, both by Mr. Frere and general
Cuesta, the British army has, to this day, received no assistance
of this description from Spain, excepting twenty carts, which
joined at Merida, ten on the 30th of August, and ten on the 2d of
September; and about three hundred mules of about five hundred
which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None
of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to the army
from Seville, or by Igea or Cevallos, or the two brigades of forty
each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I
conclude that they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are
the remainder of the (one hundred) ten brigades of carts which were
intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these
mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for
our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st of August, the day
on which, after five weeks’ notice, I was obliged to separate from
the Spanish army.
It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from
Spain, as then carried into execution, was “sudden,” or ought to
have surprised the government: nor does it appear to have been
perilous from what has since appeared in this part of Spain.
I ought, probably, on the 16th of July, to have determined to
suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the
means required; but having, on the 11th of July, settled with
general Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by
the armies under the command of general Venegas, general Cuesta,
and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint
general Cuesta. I believed that general Venegas would have carried
into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his
army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation;
and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience
than that general Venegas’s corps should be exposed alone to the
attack of the enemy; and, above all, I was induced to hope that I
should be supplied.
Accordingly, I marched, on the 18th of July, from Plasencia, the
soldiers carrying on their backs their provisions to the 21st, on
which day a junction was formed with general Cuesta’s army; and,
from that day to the 24th of August, the troops or their horses did
not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency,
both in quality and quantity, were so great that I considered it
a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during that
period, half of the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations.
The forage for the horses was picked up for them by their riders
wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which
are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was that,
exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army lost,
in the short period of five weeks, not less than one thousand five
hundred horses.
I have no knowledge of what passed between general Cuesta and don
Lozano des Torres and the intendant of provisions of the Spanish
army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first
time on the 22d of July, when he waited upon me to claim, for the
Spanish army, sixteen thousand rations of bread which had been
brought into Talavera, and had been sent to my quarters, and which
were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops
were in want; and the second time, on the 25th of July, when he
waited upon me, also at Talavera, to desire that the ovens of that
town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army, they
having moved to St. Ollalla, and the British army being still at
Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example
of the preference which was given to the British troops while they
were in Spain.
The orders stated to have been given by the central to the
provincial juntas and magistrates, were not more effectual in
procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In
the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British
commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates in the
different villages of the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in
resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on
different days before the 24th of July, of two hundred and fifty
thousand rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed;
the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the
enemy when he retired on that day; and, I conclude, that the French
army have since subsisted on these resources.
The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice
or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their
use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men
were only prevented from starving during the period to which I have
adverted; nor was it attended by the troop of biscuit bakers, nor
did it enjoy any of the advantages of their labours, nor was the
supposed magazine of four hundred thousand pounds of biscuit ever
performed. These are notorious facts, which cannot be disputed,
of the truth of which every officer and soldier in the army can
bear testimony. I assure your excellency, that not only have the
supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for
whenever the bills for them could be got in, but the old debts due
to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army, under the
command of the late sir John Moore, have been discharged; and I
have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with
the army, and the different juntas with which I have communicated,
to let the people know that all demands upon the British
government, which could be substantiated, would be discharged.
I beg to refer your excellency to my despatches of the 21st of
August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at
Truxillo, on the 20th of August. Of the state of supplies and
provisions at that period, lieutenant-colonel Walters had, by
my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish commissariat
for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two
armies; and he as well as I was satisfied with the principle and
detail of that arrangement. But if the British army received only
one-third of a ration on the 18th of August, and only one-half of
a ration on the 19th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses
of the army received nothing; and if the state of the magazine
at Truxillo was such, at that time, as to hold out no hope, not
of improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement,)
but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all
descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point
of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement
made by lieutenant-colonel Waters was to be the sole source of the
supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, a
sufficiency to supply one day’s demand upon it.
But it is said that M. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the
British army; upon which I have only to observe that I had trusted
too long to the promises of the Spanish agents, and that I had
particular reason for want of confidence in M. de Calvo; as, at
the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have
all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and
to the exclusion of the Spanish army, I had in my possession an
order from him, (of which your excellency has a copy,) addressed
to the magistrates of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the
head-quarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British
commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazines
at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity
to the agreement entered into with the Spanish commissaries by
lieutenant-colonel Waters.
As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause
(as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from
Spain, I beg to observe to your excellency that I was not mistaken
in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed,
general Equia’s army suffered the greatest distress in the
neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and
the magazines had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the
British army.
In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the Spanish
general officers, many things were done of which I did not approve;
some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive
agreements.
M. de Garay has stated that the orders of the marquis de Romana
were framed in conformity with suggestions from marshal Beresford;
and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were
approved of by me.
The marquis de Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I believe
as late as the 9th of August; and the armies of Estramadura retired
across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This reference to dates
shews that there was, and could have been no connexion in the
operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing of
the marquis of Romana’s operations; and till I heard, on the 3d of
August, that marshal Ney’s corps had passed through the mountains
of Estramadura at Baños, and was at Naval Moral, I did not believe
that that part of the enemy’s army had quitted Astorga, or that the
marquis was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Gallicia.
Marshal Beresford’s corps was collected upon the frontiers of
Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming
the troops; and it was hoped he would keep in check the enemy’s
corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal;
that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on
the left of the British army; and I particularly requested marshal
Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended,
and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers that the corps
under marshal Beresford could effect any operation at that period
of the campaign, and never was a party to any arrangement of an
operation in which that corps was to be concerned.
In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which
I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to the
positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have
been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were
aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note, that the
operations were carried on with my concurrence, is unfounded.
I expected, from the communications I had with general Cuesta,
through sir Robert Wilson and colonel Roche, that the Puerto de
Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; and, at all
events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I
was aware that all the operations, nay, the security, of the army
depended, would not have retired without firing a shot.
It was agreed, between general Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July,
that general Venegas, who was under his command, should march
by Trembleque, Ocaña, Puerte Dueños, to Arganda, near Madrid;
where he was to be on the 22d and 23d of July, when the combined
armies should be at Talavera and Escola. This agreement was not
performed, and the consequence of its non-performance (which had
been foreseen) occurred; viz. that the combined armies were engaged
with the enemy’s concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of
the non-performance of this agreement was that the central junta
had countermanded the orders which general Venegas had received
from general Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I
shall make no observation upon this proceeding, excepting that the
plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into
execution, by general Venegas, in this instance.
It was agreed, by general Cuesta, on the 2d of August, that when I
marched against Soult on the 3d, he would remain at Talavera. That
agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion,
without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion that he ought
not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the
charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive that
if general Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made
any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added
thirty-four thousand to the numbers already opposed to the combined
armies in Estremadura, the enemy was too strong for us; and it was
necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if general
Cuesta had held the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I
should have been able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know
the exact situation of every individual left there; and I think
that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.
When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to
observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting
the assistance afforded by general Cuesta to remove the hospital
from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts on the 4th of
August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and
of the men subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance
from the Spanish army or the country. We were obliged to lay down
our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army,
and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal
of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance
which could have been afforded was withheld, on the 22d and 23d of
August, M. de Calvo and don Lozano des Torres being in the town.
In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I
am of opinion that if general Bassecourt had been detached towards
Plasencia on the 30th of July, when I recommended that movement,
and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been
stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to
enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and here
again the hospital would have been saved.
He was not detached, however, till the 2d; and then I understood,
from M. de Garay’s note, that it was general Cuesta’s opinion that
the movement was useless.
It could not have been considered as useless by general Cuesta on
the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the
combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could
not have been considered as useless even on the morning of the 2d,
as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence
of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A reference to the date of
the period at which the general considered this detachment as
useless would have been desirable.
I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by
general Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the
morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on the
morning of the 3d, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, or
twenty-four miles, on that day; which I conceive a sufficient
distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days
before. The accounts received, on the evening of the 3d, of
the enemy’s position at Naval Moral, and of his strength, and
of general Cuesta’s intended march on that evening, leaving my
hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and
consider our situation, and, at least, not to move before daylight
on the 4th; shortly after which time, general Cuesta arrived at
Oropesa.
Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me
that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and that
every moment’s delay must expose them to the risk of being cut
off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if
it had been successful, could not have improved our situation;
two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained
before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of
the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the
British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that moment.
It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army;
but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days afterwards, shewed
that they were not equal to any great contest.
M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our
operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our
marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies,
which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the
British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the
plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was
occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred.
When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy
at Plasencia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps
appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move
towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy’s corps which had passed
through the Puerto. That intention was altered, only when I heard
of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found
that, by general Cuesta’s movement from Talavera, the rear of the
army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut
off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option,
to join or to attack us in separate bodies.
It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement
was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier
intelligence of their approach.
The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the
Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the junta of Castile,
if they knew of the collection of the enemy’s troops at Salamanca,
sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the
accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Noble
and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the
enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in such strength, and
the post of Talavera was abandoned, the central junta will find it
difficult to convince this country and the world that it was not
expedient to alter the plan of our operations and the direction of
our march.
But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of
our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any
measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army,
in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was
from the offensive to the defensive; the march was retrograde; and
if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met
them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly,
we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for the Spanish
army; and although our troops were starving at the time, they were
forwarded, untouched, to their destination.
I have sent to marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de
Garay’s note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army
under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which
I propose to forward to your excellency. I shall here, therefore,
only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy and
disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish
supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that
the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great
distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier.
Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are
remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of
the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled,
and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by
officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations
which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter
upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not
think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to shew the
fallacy of M. de Garay’s calculations of the relative numerical
strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; if the
fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be of the
same opinion, respecting the expediency of co-operating with the
Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should
not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no
injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is,
in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in
the state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and
which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the deficiency
of thirty-six thousand men, which the British and Portuguese
armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their
undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay is of
opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those
blessings for which they are contending.
I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) WELLINGTON.
* * * * *
No. XVIII.
COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
_Camp, August 17, 1809._
SIR,
I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the
officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in
more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following
circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of
repeating them for your excellency’s information.
My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in
order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule loads,
a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to
them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave the corn
they had collected. My servants told me, that the same party fired
two shots towards other British men employed in getting forage. The
assistant-commissary of my division, likewise, states to me, that
the men he sent out for forage were fired at by the Spaniards.
I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) R. HILL, major-general.
COPY OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL STOPFORD TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SHERBROOKE.
_Jaraceijo, August 16, 1809._
SIR,
I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations of
some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking some
forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, I wish to
know what I am to do, in order to get some for the horses.
(Signed) E. STOPFORD, second brigade of guards.
END OF VOL. II.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Now lord Stuart de Rothesay.
[2] Now lord Howden.
[3] An appellation given among soldiers to men who, under pretence
of sickness, shrink from the performance of their duties in the
field.
[4] It is necessary again to remark that I possess only an
unauthenticated copy of general Semelé’s Journal.
[5] Soult distinguished himself in that battle.
[6] In the British army, when speaking of the number present
under arms, the corporals and privates only are understood. In
the French army, the present under arms includes every military
person, whether officers, non-commissioned officers, or soldiers; a
distinction which should be borne in mind.
[7] Viz. 1800 left in Viana and Braga.
500 including the wounded taken in Oporto.
1300 taken at Chaves, by Sylveira.
[8] The bands formed of smugglers were called Quadrillas.
[9] Note by sir J. Cradock. This is not a correct statement, but
quite the contrary; it must have been the bishop.
* * * * *
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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.
Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
when a predominant preference was found in the original book.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Table of Contents:
Pg v: ‘Recals Mortier’ replaced by ‘Recalls Mortier’.
Pg ix: ‘Berresford reaches’ replaced by ‘Beresford reaches’.
Pg ix: ‘Ney abandous Gallicia’ replaced by ‘Ney abandons Gallicia’.
Pg xi: ‘7. Battle of Talavera ... 406’ replaced by
‘7. Operations of the British, French & Spanish armies ... 409’.
Pg xi: ‘8. Operations in the valley of the Tagus ... 416’ replaced by
‘8. Battle of Talavera ... 416’.
Main text:
Pg 22: ‘eighteen hunded yards’ replaced by ‘eighteen hundred yards’.
Pg 28: ‘aid-de-camp to the’ replaced by ‘aide-de-camp to the’.
Pg 45: ‘An aid-de-camp of’ replaced by ‘An aide-de-camp of’.
Pg 60: ‘not be be provisioned’ replaced by ‘not be provisioned’.
Pg 63: ‘on the the 9th’ replaced by ‘on the 9th’.
Pg 83: ‘their cummunications’ replaced by ‘their communications’.
Pg 144: ‘literal interpetation’ replaced by ‘literal interpretation’.
Pg 146: ‘unsuccessful auxilliaries’ replaced by
‘unsuccessful auxiliaries’.
Pg 152: ‘Silviera’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’.
Pg 153: ‘develope his plans’ replaced by ‘develop his plans’.
Pg 154: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’.
Pg 159: ‘recal of general’ replaced by ‘recall of general’.
Pg 167: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’.
Pg 170: ‘river to Ribadavia’ replaced by ‘river to Ribidavia’.
Pg 179: ‘the inflame the’ replaced by ‘to inflame the’.
Pg 189: ‘the Cabado river’ replaced by ‘the Cavado river’.
Pg 200: ‘at the Ponte Ave’ replaced by ‘at the Ponte d’Ave’.
Pg 211: ‘and the Guadaramo’ replaced by ‘and the Guadarama’.
Pg 211: ‘second the Guardiana’ replaced by ‘second the Guadiana’.
Pg 218: ‘the river Garganza’ replaced by ‘the river Guadiana’.
Pg 226: (in caption) ‘AGAINST GUESTA’ replaced by ‘AGAINST CUESTA’.
Pg 229: ‘were thus paralized’ replaced by ‘were thus paralyzed’.
Pg 235: ‘charge not be sustained’ replaced by ‘charge not sustained’.
Pg 240: ‘The garison of the’ replaced by ‘The garrison of the’.
Pg 244: ‘and run back’ replaced by ‘and ran back’.
Pg 248: ‘paralized a large’ replaced by ‘paralyzed a large’.
Pg 250: ‘marched by Guarda’ replaced by ‘marched by Guardia’.
Pg 263: (in Sidenote) ‘Lord LonLondonderry’ replaced by
‘Lord Londonderry’.
Pg 266: ‘The Portugese troops’ replaced by ‘The Portuguese troops’.
Pg 282: ‘Olivera de Azemiz’ replaced by ‘Oliveira de Azemis’.
Pg 308: ‘CHAP. III’ replaced by ‘CHAPTER III’.
Pg 309: ‘every other other part’ replaced by ‘every other part’.
Pg 369: ‘Porguese and Spanish’ replaced by ‘Portuguese and Spanish’.
Pg 408: ‘develope its attack’ replaced by ‘develop its attack’.
Pg 409: (in caption) ‘Plate 7. to face Pa.’ replaced by
‘Plate 7. to face Pa. 409’.
Pg 416: ‘unite under three’ replaced by ‘unite in under three’.
Pg 427: ‘and strenghened by’ replaced by ‘and strengthened by’.
Pg 427: ‘Spanish auxilliaries’ replaced by ‘Spanish auxiliaries’.
Pg 453: ‘Crauford’s brigade’ replaced by ‘Craufurd’s brigade’.
Pg 456: ‘by quarelling with’ replaced by ‘by quarrelling with’.
Appendix:
Pg 471: some numbers in these tables are clearly incorrect (eg 3,339
and 24,082) but none have been changed.
Pg 482: ‘bâtir les chateux’ replaced by ‘bâtir les châteaux’.
Pg 486: ‘I always nrged’ replaced by ‘I always urged’.
Pg 486: ‘of effervenscence of’ replaced by ‘of effervescence of’.
Pg 491: ‘The taking Portuguese’ replaced by ‘The taking of Portuguese’.
Pg 492: ‘proper movoment of’ replaced by ‘proper movement of’.
Pg 495: ‘to Mr. Rawlins’ replaced by ‘to Mr. Rawlings’.
Pg 527: ‘pounds of buiscuit’ replaced by ‘pounds of biscuit’.
Pg 527: ‘ever officer’ replaced by ‘every officer’.