In the mean time events in North America continued to agitate the
diplomatic world of Europe and to stir up trouble. As Great Britain had
begun to interfere with the commerce and navigation of France, the
relations between the two countries grew daily more strained. France had
come to an understanding with Spain, that by the beginning of the year
1778, the two powers would have to combine to make war on Britain, but
Carlos III., getting old and more and more conservative, did not want to
depart from his policy of neutrality and wanted to end his days in
peace. When on the thirteenth of March, the British secretary of state
received from the French ambassador a note, saying that France and the
United States of North America had signed a treaty of friendship and
commerce without any definite advantage to France, but that the king was
determined to protect the lawful commerce of his subjects, a state of
war was established between the two kingdoms. Efforts to change the
decision of Spain were repeated; the return of Florida to Spain was
offered with the consent of the United States. But Florida had by this
time lost all charm for the conservative court of Spain, so awed by the
fact that a republic was to be the neighbor of her American possessions
that it was bound not to do anything that might help the insurgents, and
sooner or later kindle the desire for independence in their own
colonies. Only the prospect of recovering Gibraltar might at that moment
have swayed the decision of Spain. But that seemed beyond reasonable
possibility.
The king was in an embarrassing position. The compact entered into by
the two countries when the Bourbons ascended the Spanish throne, a
certain respect for the senior branch of the family and the grudge which
he bore Britain, tempted him many a time to revise his decision. His
ministers, too, were by no means unanimous in approving Spain's
neutrality. While some held that to assist rebels in their fight upon
their mother country was morally wrong and politically imprudent,
others, impatient of the passive inactivity to which they were reduced,
modestly expressed their disapproval. One of them, Florida Blanca, more
ambitious for himself than for his country, eager at any moment to
embrace an opportunity of making a name for himself, continued to
negotiate with the statesmen of France and secretly hoped that somehow
he would have a hand in the return of Gibraltar to Spain. In this vague
hope he quietly worked to enlarge and improve both the army and the
fleet of his country; he collected a large number of battering cannon at
Seville, and the port of Cadiz soon held a greater number of well-built
vessels than it had seen since the golden age of Spanish maritime power.
Cunningly holding out the prospect of a final alliance against the
common enemy to France, while at the same time offering Britain to
become a mediator in the bloody conflict, he succeeded in delaying any
decisive action on the part of France. The French became irritable.
Finally the diplomats of the two powers came to an agreement and on the
twelfth of April, 1779, a treaty of alliance was signed.
The terms of this treaty were as follows: France was to invade Great
Britain or Ireland; if she succeeded in wresting from the British
Newfoundland, she pledged herself to share the fisheries exclusively
with Spain; she also pledged herself to secure for Spain the return of
Minorca, Pensacola and Mobile, the Bay of Honduras and the coast of
Campeche. Moreover, the two powers pledged themselves to continue the
war on Britain, until that country agreed to return Gibraltar to Spain.
From the United States Spain expected as reward of her services the
basin of the St. Lawrence and the lakes, the unrestricted navigation of
the Mississippi and all the territory lying between that river and the
Alleghany mountains. The United States were by this treaty to be free to
make peace with Britain, as soon as their independence was recognized,
but were not in any way expected to continue war until Gibraltar was
returned to Spain.
The Spanish colonies in America proved at this time that the distance
which separated them from the mother country, and the greater sense of
space and elbowroom which they enjoyed and in which several generations
of their people had been born, was beginning to differentiate the
Spanish Americans from their kinsmen in old Spain. Unable in the varying
aspects of rough pioneer life to preserve the old traditions and
conventions, the character of the people themselves had changed. They
were not to be bound by the numerous considerations that entered into
every step European nations took. They were not slow in taking action,
when there was cause and opportunity for such. The news of the alliance
between France and Spain against Britain was received in Cuba and
Louisiana with intense interest. Within a few days both colonies were
swayed by the desire to avenge wrongs formerly suffered at the hands of
the British, and with a remarkable promptness framed measures to this
effect. Governor Navarro immediately issued privateering patents to
Spanish ships and they as promptly set out on their quest and captured a
number of British vessels. The coasts of Cuba were closely watched for
the possible arrival of a hostile fleet, and the garrison of el Morro
was keenly on the alert.
In Louisiana the feeling against the British ripened into the plan of
reconquering Pensacola. D. Bernardo de Galvez, who had settled in that
colony in 1776, had in 1779 been elected Governor and invested with full
rights, proprietary and otherwise. The official council of the colony
was of the opinion that Louisiana should assume a passive defensive,
until advices and perhaps reenforcements were received from Havana. But
Galvez, enterprising and energetic in all his undertakings, and a
fighter whose valor had been tried before, was determined to attack the
British without delay. He collected a force of only seven hundred men,
according to Valdes, fourteen hundred according to Blanchet, among them
many veterans and militia men, and marched towards Fort Manchac. It was
a perilous and trying expedition through a country then little more than
a wilderness. But he arrived at his goal and surprised the garrison,
taking the British prisoners. Encouraged by this success, he left the
captured fort under guard of a part of his force and turned towards
Baton Rouge. There he found the enemy much stronger; the British under
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson opposed his attacks so
strenuously, that his forces had to entrench themselves in anticipation
of a prolonged siege. But after nine days, on the twenty first of
September, Dickson surrendered and his garrison, too, were made
prisoners. Point Thompson and Point Smith, British establishments on the
eastern bank of the Mississippi, followed, and leaving General de Camp
in charge of the conquered territory, Galvez hurried to Cuba to secure
reenforcements for his attack on Mobile and Pensacola.
In Havana he found everything in readiness to engage in or furnish an
expedition against the British possessions. He had in the meantime been
raised to the rank of Field Marshal and everything seemed to favor his
plan. During the preparations there arrived in the port the squadron of
D. José Solano, consisting of eight thousand men under the command of
the Lieutenant-General D. Victorio Navia. Receiving a valuable addition
to his troops from Solano, Galvez prepared to embark with five
regiments, a small squadron of dragoons, two companies of artillery and
forty pieces of ordnance. The expedition was abundantly supplied with
ammunition and provisions. On the sixteenth of October, 1780, they set
sail with fifty transports, escorted by Solano, seven ships, five
frigates and three brigantines. But on the following day a terrible
hurricane surprised them out at sea, seriously damaging some of the
ships and dispersing the others. Galvez was obliged to return to the
sailing port without even knowing the fate of some of his vessels. A
number of them on escaping from the storm drifted towards Campeche,
others to the mouth of the Mississippi, still others to unknown ports
and one was known to have been wrecked.
News coming to Havana, that the forces at Mobile, which had in the
meantime been taken by General de Campo, were in need of food and
threatened with an attack by the British, a council of generals was held
and ordered two ships, capable of transporting five hundred men and
carry a sufficient amount of provisions, to be immediately prepared and
sent on their way. The convoy sailed on the sixth of December under the
command of the Captain of the frigate, D. José de Rada. On arriving at
the mouth of the Mobile, he did not dare to enter, having found some
variation in the channel, and sailed directly for the Balize of the
Mississippi. He left his cargo at the entrance and returned to Havana.
Two days later two British frigates penetrated the very Bay of Mobile
and the detachment of the village was reported to be attacked. D.
Bernardo de Galvez urged that, although the state of things did not
permit a repetition of the expedition that had sailed from Havana in
October, some troops be given him with which to reenforce the garrisons
of Louisiana and Mobile. There, as soon as a favorable opportunity
presented itself, he would pledge the inhabitants to a further effort
and attack Pensacola. The plan was approved by the council, thirteen
hundred and fifteen men were organized, including five companies of
grenadiers, five vessels were equipped as transports and the war-ship
_San Ramon_, under command of D. José Calvo, the frigate _Santa Clara_,
commanded by Captain D. Miguel Alderato, the _Santa Cecilia_, commanded
by Captain D. Miguel de Goicochoa, the tender _Caiman_, commanded by
Captain D. José Serrato, and the packet _San Gil_ under Captain D. José
Maria Chacon, were designated as escorts. The whole fleet was placed
under the command of D. Bernardo de Galvez, who now bore the title of
General.
A communication sent by the General of the Marine to D. José Calvo shows
in what esteem Galvez was held and how eager were the Spanish
authorities to help him with his attack on Pensacola:
"To the question contained in your paper of yesterday, that I manifest
to you the terms under which you must subordinate to and obey the orders
of the Field Marshal of the Royal armies, D. Bernardo de Galvez, I beg
to advise that your honor shall put in practice with all your well-known
and notorious diligence those that the expressed Don Bernardo shall give
your Honor relative to the conquest of Pensacola, without separating
yourself in other things from what the Royal Ordinances of the Armada
provide, endeavoring that the strictest discipline be observed in all
the ships under your orders as provided therein. May our Lord keep you
many years.
"JUAN BAUTISTA BONET,
"Sr. D. José Calvo.
"Havana, 6th of February, 1781."
Galvez embarked on the thirteenth of February, the troops followed on
the fourteenth and the convoy sailed on the twenty-eighth. The General
had previously sent Captain D. Emiliano Maxent in a schooner to New
Orleans with orders to the Commandant of Arms, so that the troops which
D. José Rada had left and those that had arrived there on account of the
October hurricane should set out to meet the convoy. He had ordered them
to be ready to sail at the first signal. On the first of March the
General sent D. Miguel de Herrera of the Regiment of Spain to Mobile by
schooner with letters for D. José Espeleta, directing him to proceed to
the east of Santa Rose island, fronting the port of Pensacola. He
advised him to march by land to form a union with the troops of his
command. Such were the extensive and well calculated preparations made
by the Spaniards for the recapture of Pensacola. After Galvez had
effected the junction of his troops with those of Mobile and New
Orleans, he proceeded towards the place which was well fortified and
garrisoned.
The progress of the blockade was at first very slow. Colonel Campbell,
who commanded the British, offered a stubborn resistance to the attacks
of the Spanish troops. But Galvez was equally persistent and undaunted
continued in his operations. Very much smaller in number than the
Spanish forces, the British seemed from the first to be doomed to
defeat. But the decisions of the siege hung a long time in the balance.
After a brave struggle against odds, the British began to relax in their
firing, while the Spaniards seemed ever to bring into the firing line
new batteries. Finally the powder magazine was blown up and demolished
some of the advance works, and on the ninth of May, 1781, the British
garrison surrendered with honors. The conquest of Pensacola decided the
fate of Florida, which returned to Spanish dominion. As a reward for his
valor the king promoted D. Galvez to the rank of Lieutenant-General and
gave him the title Conde de Galvez. The British garrison had to pledge
themselves not to serve during the war against Spain or her allies, but
were left free to do so against the United States.
During the administration of Governor Navarro, which was soon to come to
an end, there was one measure enacted, which anticipated our modern
prohibition. It was promulgated by means of a proclamation of the year
1780, which prohibited, except for medicinal uses, the sale of liquor.
So disastrous and wide-spread were the ravages caused by an immoderate
consumption of distilled spirits, brandy, wine, etc., in the population
of the island, and especially among the soldiers, that heavy fines were
imposed upon the offenders; the first offence was punished by a fine of
fifty pesos, the second by one of one hundred pesos and the third by
banishment and a fine. The fear that the British would invade Havana or
Puerto Rico caused a revival of all military activities and the building
of additions and improvements of the fortifications. In the year 1781
Governor Navarro, being old and sickly, resigned his office and retired
to Spain, where the king rewarded his services with the
Captain-Generalship of Estramadura.