THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES
(Up to the Action of Gheluvelt, October 31)
The Seventh Division--Its peculiar excellence--Its difficult
position--A deadly ordeal--Desperate attacks on Seventh
Division--Destruction of 2nd Wilts--Hard fight of 20th
Brigade--Arrival of First Corps--Advance of Haig's Corps--Fight of
Pilken Inn--Bravery of enemy--Advance of Second Division--Fight of
Kruiseik cross-roads--Fight of Zandvoorde--Fight of
Gheluvelt--Advance of Worcesters--German recoil--General result--A
great crisis.
It has already been seen that the Seventh Division (Capper's), being
the first half of Rawlinson's Fourth first Army Corps, had retired
south and west after the unsuccessful attempt to relieve Antwerp. It
was made up as follows:--
[Sidenote: The Seventh Division]
DIVISION VII.--General CAPPER.
20_th Infantry Brigade--General Ruggles-Brise_.
1st Grenadier Guards.
2nd Scots Guards.
2nd Border Regiment.
2nd Gordon Highlanders.
2l_st Infantry Brigade--General Walls_.
2nd Bedfords.
2nd Yorks.
2nd Wilts.
2nd Scots Fusiliers.
{233}
22_nd Infantry Brigade--General Lawford_.
1st South Staffords.
2nd Warwicks.
2nd Queen's West Surrey.
1st Welsh Fusiliers.
_Artillery._
22nd Brigade R.F.A.
35th Brigade R.F.A.
3rd R.G.A.
111th R.G.A.
112th R.G.A.
14th Brigade R.H.A. C.F.
_Engineers._
54, 55, F. Co.
7 Signal Co.
Divisional Cavalry.
Northumberland Yeomanry.
[Sidenote: Its peculiar excellence.]
It is not too much to say that in an army where every division had
done so well no single one was composed of such fine material as the
Seventh. The reason was that the regiments composing it had all been
drawn from foreign garrison duty, and consisted largely of soldiers
of from three to seven years' standing, with a minimum of reservists.
In less than a month from the day when this grand division of 18,000
men went into action its infantry had been nearly annihilated, but
the details of its glorious destruction furnish one more vivid page
of British military achievement. We lost a noble division and gained
a glorious record.
The Third Cavalry Division under General Byng was attached to the
Seventh Division, and joined up with it at Roulers upon October 13.
It consisted of--
6_th Cavalry Brigade--General Makings_.
3rd Dragoon Guards.
10th Hussars.
1st Royals.
7_th Cavalry Brigade--General Kavanagh_.
1st Life Guards.
2nd Life Guards.
1st Horse Guards.
1st Horse Guards.
K Battery, R.H.A.
{234}
The First Army Corps not having yet come up from the Aisne, these
troops were used to cover the British position from the north, the
infantry lying from Zandvoorde through Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke, and
the cavalry on their left from Zonnebeke to Langemarck from October
16 onwards. It was decided by Sir John French that it was necessary
to get possession of the town of Menin, some distance to the east of
the general British line, but very important because the chief
bridge, by means of which the Germans were receiving their
ever-growing reinforcements, was there. The Seventh Division was
ordered accordingly to advance upon this town, its left flank being
covered by the Third Cavalry Division.
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{235}
[Illustration: LINE OF 7th DIVISION (CAPPER) & 3rd CAVALRY DIVISION
(BYNG) FROM OCT 17th. ONWARDS]
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[Sidenote: Its difficult position.]
The position was a dangerous one. It has already been stated that
the pause on the Aisne may not have been unwelcome to the Germans, as
they were preparing reserve formations which might be suddenly thrown
against some chosen spot in the Allied line. They had the equipment
and arms for at least another 250,000 men, and that number of drilled
men were immediately available, some being Landwehr who had passed
through the ranks, and others young formations which had been
preparing when war broke out. Together they formed no less than five
new army corps, available for the extreme western front, more
numerous than the whole British and Belgian armies combined. This
considerable force, secretly assembled and moving rapidly across
Belgium, was now striking the north of the Allied line, debouching
not only over the river at Menin, but also through Courtrai, Iseghem,
and Roulers. It consisted of the 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 26th, and 27th
reserve corps. Of these the 22nd, and later the 24th, followed the
{236} Belgians to the line of the Yser, but the other corps were all
available for an attack upon the flank of that British line which was
faced by formidable opponents--a line which extended over thirty
miles and had already been forced into a defensive attitude. That
was the situation when the Seventh Division faced round near Ypres.
Sir John French was doing all that he could to support it, and Sir
Douglas Haig was speeding up his army corps from the Aisne to take
his place to the north of Ypres, but there were some days during
which Rawlinson's men were in the face of a force six or seven times
larger than themselves.
Upon October 16th and 17th the division had advanced from Ypres and
occupied the line already mentioned, the right centre of which rested
about the ninth kilometre on the Ypres-Menin road, the order of the
brigades from the north being 22nd, 21st, and 20th. On October 18
the division wheeled its left forward. As the infantry advanced, the
covering cavalry soon became aware of grave menace from Roulers and
Courtrai in the north. A large German force was evidently striking
down on to the left flank of the advance. The division was engaged
all along the line, for the 20th Brigade upon the right had a brisk
skirmish, while the 21st Brigade in the centre was also under fire,
which came especially heavily upon the 2nd Bedfords, who had numerous
casualties. About ten o'clock on the morning of the 19th the
pressure from the north increased, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade was
driven in, though it held its own with great resolution for some
time, helped by the fine work of K Battery, R.H.A. The 6th Cavalry
Brigade was held up in front, while the danger on the {237} flank
grew more apparent as the hours passed. In these circumstances
General Rawlinson, fortified in his opinion by the precise reports of
his airmen as to the strength of the enemy upon his left, came to the
conclusion that a further advance would place him in a difficult
position. He therefore dropped back to his original line. There can
be little doubt that, if he had persevered in the original plan, his
force would have been in extreme danger. As it was, before he could
get it back the 1st Welsh Fusiliers were hard hit, this famous
regiment losing a major, 5 captains, 3 lieutenants, and about 200
men. The order to retire had failed to reach it, and but for the
able handling of Colonel Cadogan it might well have been destroyed.
On October 20, the situation being still obscure, the 20th Brigade
carried out a reconnaissance towards Menin. The 2nd Wilts and 2nd
Scots Fusiliers, of the 21st Brigade, covered their left flank. The
enemy, however, made a vigorous attack upon the 22nd Brigade to the
north, especially upon the Welsh Fusiliers, so the reconnaissance had
to fall back again, the 1st Grenadier Guards sustaining some losses.
The two covering regiments were also hard pressed, especially the
Wiltshires, who were again attacked during the night, but repulsed
their assailants.
[Sidenote: A deadly ordeal.]
From this time onwards the Seventh Division was to feel ever more and
more the increasing pressure as the German army corps from day to day
brought their weight to bear upon a thin extended line of positions
held by a single division. It will be shown that they were speedily
reinforced by the First Corps, but even after its advent the Germans
were still able {238} to greatly outnumber the British force. The
story from this time onwards is one of incessant and desperate
attacks by day and often by night. At first the division was holding
the position alone, with the help of their attendant cavalry, and
their instructions were to hold on to the last man until help could
reach them. In the case of some units these instructions were
literally fulfilled. One great advantage lay with the British. They
were first-class trained soldiers, the flower of the Army, while
their opponents, however numerous, were of the newly raised reserve
corps, which showed no lack of bravery, but contained a large
proportion of youths and elderly men in the ranks. Letters from the
combatants have described the surprise and even pity which filled the
minds of the British when they saw the stormers hesitate upon the
edge of the trenches which they had so bravely approached, and stare
down into them uncertain what they should do. But though the
ascendancy of the British infantry was so great that they could
afford to disregard the inequality of numbers, it was very different
with the artillery. The German gunners were as good as ever, and
their guns as powerful as they were numerous. The British had no
howitzer batteries at all with this division, while the Germans had
many. It was the batteries which caused the terrific losses. It may
be that the Seventh Division, having had no previous experience in
the campaign, had sited their trenches with less cunning than would
have been shown by troops who had already faced the problem of how
best to avoid high explosives. Either by sight or by aeroplane
report the Germans got the absolute range of some portions of the
British position, pitching their heavy shells exactly into the {239}
trenches, and either blowing the inmates to pieces or else burying
them alive, so that in a little time the straight line of the trench
was entirely lost, and became a series of ragged pits and mounds.
The head-cover for shrapnel was useless before such missiles, and
there was nothing for it but either to evacuate the line or to hang
on and suffer. The Seventh Division hung on and suffered, but no
soldiers can ever have been exposed to a more deadly ordeal. When
they were at last relieved by the arrival of reinforcements and the
consequent contraction of the line, they were at the last pitch of
exhaustion, indomitable in spirit, but so reduced by their losses and
by the terrific nervous strain that they could hardly have held out
much longer.
A short account has been given of what occurred to the division up to
October 20. It will now be carried on for a few days, after which
the narrative must turn to the First Corps, and show why and how they
came into action to the north of the hard-pressed division. It is
impossible to tell the two stories simultaneously, and so it may now
be merely mentioned that from October 21 Haig's Corps was on the
left, and that those operations which will shortly be described
covered the left wing of the division, and took over a portion of
that huge German attack which would undoubtedly have overwhelmed the
smaller unit had it not been for this addition of strength. It is
necessary to get a true view of the operations, for it is safe to say
that they are destined for immortality, and will be recounted so long
as British history is handed down from one generation to another.
On the 21st the enemy got a true conception of {240} the salient in
front of the Seventh Division, and opened a vigorous attack, which
lasted all day and assumed several different phases at different
points. The feature of the morning of the 21st was the severe and,
indeed, disastrous artillery fire upon Lawford's 22nd Brigade. The
exact range of the British position seems to have been discovered
with deadly results. Men, trenches, and machine-guns were all blown
to pieces together. The 2nd Warwicks and the 1st Welsh Fusiliers
were the two battalions upon which the storm beat hardest, and each
of them had some hundreds of casualties. In three days the Welsh
Fusiliers, who were on the exposed left flank, lost three-quarters of
their effectives, including twenty-three of their officers, and yet
preserved their military spirit. It became clearer as experience
accumulated that the best trenches, if they are once fairly located,
can be made untenable or turned into the graves of their occupants by
the use of high explosives. The German fire was so severe that it
was reckoned that one hundred and twenty shells an hour into or round
a trench was a not uncommon rate of fall. The 2nd Queen's also lost
seven officers and many men in this day's fighting. In spite of the
heavy losses from gun-fire the German infantry could make no
progress, being held up by a flanking fire of the South Staffords.
[Sidenote: Desperate attacks on Seventh Division.]
In the afternoon of October 21 a strong attack was made upon the 21st
Brigade in the centre of the line. The brigade was holding a front
of two and a half miles, and, although the attack was generally
beaten back, a certain number of stormers got through between the
trenches and into the woods beyond. Here they lurked for a couple of
days, during which time the 2nd Yorkshire Regiment, behind whose
{241} line they were lying, were often compelled to have each
alternate man facing a different way to keep down the fire. The
battalion sent itself reinforcements by hurrying its right company
over to help to clear its left. This movement was successful, but
was attended with heavy losses, including several officers. Some of
the Royal Scots Fusiliers had been forced out of their trenches on
the right, and made, under Major Ian Forbes, a gallant attempt to
re-establish them, in which Captain Fairlie and many men were lost.
The Wiltshires also endured a very severe attack, which they repulsed
with great loss to the enemy. On this same eventful day, the 21st,
the Second Cavalry Division had been pushed back at Holbeke, and the
Germans got round the right flank of the hard-pressed infantry. It
was then that General Rawlinson brought his Third Cavalry Division
round and established it upon his right instead of his left flank.
From this time until October 30 this cavalry division was holding
Zandvoorde Ridge, sharing day by day in all the perils and the
glories of their comrades of the Seventh Division. There was no more
dangerous point than that which was held by the cavalry, and their
losses, especially those of the 10th Hussars, were in proportion to
the danger. In the course of a few days the Hussars lost Colonel
Barnes, Majors Mitford and Crichton and many officers and men.
On October 22 the Second Division of Haig's First Corps, which had
been fully occupied to the north with operations which will presently
be described, moved down to cover the ground vacated by the Third
Cavalry Division and to relieve the pressure upon the infantry of the
Seventh Division. The 4th Guards Brigade took its position upon
their {242} immediate left. It was time. For four days they had
covered the enormous front of eight miles against at least four times
their own number, with more than six times their weight of artillery.
It was touch and go. They were nearly submerged. It was indeed a
vision of joy when the worn and desperate men, looking over their
shoulders down the Ypres-Menin road, saw the head of a British column
coming swiftly to the rescue. It was the 2nd Highland Light Infantry
and the 2nd Worcesters, dispatched from the 5th Brigade, and never
was reinforcement more needed. Shortly afterwards further help in
the shape of a detachment of the Munster Fusiliers, two troops of the
ever-helpful Irish Horse, and one section of artillery appeared upon
the scene.
[Sidenote: Destruction of 2nd Wilts.]
Upon this date (October 22) the 22nd Infantry Brigade of the Seventh
Division had fallen back to the railway crossings near Zonnebeke.
Thus the salient which the Germans had been attacking was
straightened out. Unhappily, the change caused another smaller
salient farther south, at the point which was held by the 2nd
Wiltshires. On the 22nd and 23rd there was a tremendous shelling of
this sector, which was followed on the 24th by an infantry advance,
in which the Wiltshires, who had been previously much reduced, were
utterly overwhelmed and practically destroyed. The disastrous attack
broke upon the British line just after daybreak. The enemy pushed
through behind each flank of the Wiltshires, elbowing off the Scots
Fusiliers on one side and the Scots Guards on the other. The Germans
got in force into the Polygon Woods behind. There were no reserves
available save the Northumberland Hussars, a corps which has the
honour of being the {243} first British territorial corps to fight
for its country. With the aid of some divisional cyclists, this
handful of men held back the Germans until the 2nd Warwicks from the
north were brought to stem the advance. The Warwicks charged through
the wood, their gallant Colonel Loring riding his horse beside them
without boot or legging, having been wounded some days before.
"Where my men go I go as well," was his answer to medical
remonstrance. He was killed by a bullet, but he died at a moment of
victory, for his last earthly vision was that of his infantry driving
the last Germans out of the wood. Besides their colonel, the
regiment lost many officers and men in this fine advance, which was
most vigorously supported by the 2nd Worcesters, the only
reinforcement within reach. The Worcesters lost 6 officers and 160
men, but did much execution and took a number of prisoners.
[Sidenote: Hard fight of 20th Brigade.]
At this time the 20th Brigade, being the extreme right of the Seventh
Division, held an extended line from Kruiseik cross-roads, about a
mile east of Gheluvelt village, to near Zandvoorde, with a salient at
the village of Kruiseik. On the night of the 25th the Germans
planned a furious attack upon the whole salient. The assailants, who
were mostly Saxons, broke through the 2nd Scots Guards just north of
Kruiseik and got behind the line, which was pushed back for some
distance, though Captain Paynter, with the right-hand company, held
his position. A counter-attack by the Guards retook the line,
together with 200 prisoners, including 7 officers. On the morning of
the 26th the Germans were back on them, however, and began by blowing
in the trenches of the Border Regiment south of Kruiseik. The German
{244} guns had found the exact range of the trenches, and the
defenders had the same terrible and intolerable experience which had
befallen some of their comrades two days before. It was simply
impossible to stand up against the incessant shower of shattering
shells. So great was the concussion and the nervous strain that many
of the men exposed to it got completely dazed or even became
delirious. Grenadiers, Scots Guards, and South Staffords, of the
20th Brigade, held the line until the front trenches were carried by
the Germans and many of the occupants made prisoners. It was pitch
dark, and it was impossible to tell friend from foe. Major Fraser of
the Scots Guards, going forward to reconnoitre, was shot dead and his
party was destroyed. A house in a field taken by the Guards yielded
no fewer than 200 prisoners, but in the confused fighting in the
darkness our losses were greater than our gains. It was in this
night-fighting that Lord Dalrymple, Colonel Bolton, and other
officers, with some hundreds of men, fell into the hands of the enemy
after a most heroic resistance to overpowering numbers and to a
weight of artillery which was crushing in its effect. The King's
Company of the 1st Grenadiers was isolated and in great danger, but
managed to link up with the British line. The 1st South Staffords
also lost some hundreds of men, and was only saved by fine handling
on the part of Colonel Ovens. Kruiseik was abandoned, and a new line
taken up half a mile farther back. It was a critical night, during
which the energy and firmness of General Capper were splendidly
employed in reforming and stiffening his sorely tried division. On
the 26th the 20th Brigade, which had been so heavily {245} hit the
day before, was drawn out of the line for a rest, and the two other
brigades closed up to cover a shorter line. The work of the 20th at
Kruiseik had been magnificent, but their losses were appalling,
including their Brigadier, Ruggles-Brise, who was wounded. Here, for
the instant, we shall leave the Seventh Division, though their ordeal
was by no means done, and we shall turn to those other forces which
had been forming in the northern or Ypres section of the long battle
line.
[Sidenote: Arrival of First Corps.]
The reader will remember, if he casts his mind back, that the whole
British line, as it extended from the south about October 18,
consisted of the Second Corps and the advance guard of the Indians
near La Bassée; then, in succession, the Third Corps in the
Armentières district, the First Cavalry and Second Cavalry near
Messines and Wytschaete, the Seventh Division near Gheluvelt, and
finally the Third Cavalry on their left, joining up with the French,
who carried the line to where the Belgians were reforming on the
Yser. The First Corps had detrained from the Aisne, and was
concentrated between St. Omer and Hazebrouck upon October 18 and 19.
They represented a last British reserve of about thirty-five thousand
men to set against the large new armies who were advancing from the
north. The urgent question to be decided was where they should be
placed, since there were so many points which needed reinforcement.
Sir John French has explained in his dispatch the reasons which
swayed him in deciding this question. "I knew," he said, "that the
enemy were by this time in greatly superior strength upon the Lys and
that the Second and Third Cavalry and Fourth Corps {246} (Seventh
Division) were holding a much wider front than their strength and
numbers warranted. Taking these facts alone into consideration, it
would have appeared wise to throw the First Corps in to strengthen
the line, but this would have left the country north and east of
Ypres and the Ypres Canal open to a wide turning movement by the
Third Reserve Corps and at least one Landwehr Division which I knew
to be operating in that region. I was also aware that the enemy was
bringing large reinforcements up from the east, which could only be
opposed for several days by two or three French cavalry divisions,
some French Territorials, and the Belgian Army."
He proceeds to state his opinion that the Belgian Army was in no
condition to withstand unsupported such an attack, and that if it
were allowed to sweep past us it was very likely to wash away all
opposition before it, and get into the Channel ports in our rear.
With this consideration in his mind, Sir John French took the bold
and dangerous, but absolutely necessary, step of leaving the long,
thin, thirty-mile line to do the best it could, and prolonging it by
another ten or twelve miles by forming up the First Corps on the same
alignment, so as to present as long a British breakwater as possible
to the oncoming flood. There was nothing else to be done, and the
stronger the flood the more need there was to do it, but it is safe
to say that seldom in history has so frail a barrier stood in the
direct track of so terrible a storm.
In accordance with this resolution, Haig's First Corps moved, on
October 20, through Poperinghe and Ypres and took their place upon
the north or left side of the Seventh Division. On their own left in
this position was the French cavalry corps of {247} General de Mitry,
while the Third Division of British cavalry was on their right. As
the movement commenced Sir John French had a personal interview with
General Haig, in which he held out hopes that the greater part of the
new German levies had been deflected to hold our southern advance,
and that he would only find the Third Reserve Corps and some Landwehr
in front of him to the north of Ypres. His object was to advance
upon the line of Bruges and drive the enemy towards Ghent. Meanwhile
the gallant little Belgian army, which was proving itself a glutton
at fighting, was entrenched along the line of the Ypres Canal and the
Yser River, where they held their own manfully in spite of all that
they had endured.
[Sidenote: Advance of Haig's Corps.]
The first large landmark in the direction of Bruges was Thorout, and
towards this the First Corps, with the Third Cavalry Division upon
its right, took its first steps, little thinking that it was butting
forward against an approaching army of at least double its own
strength. It was very quickly made to realise its position, however,
and any dreams of a victorious entry into Bruges were speedily
dispelled. Only too fortunate would it be if it could hold its own
line without retreat and disaster. Upon the 21st Haig's men attacked
Poel-Chapelle and Passchendaale, French cavalry and Territorials (the
Eighty-seventh and Eighty-ninth Divisions) under General Bidon
advancing on their left, while the Seventh Division, as already
described, kept pace upon its right. There was strong opposition
from the first, but the corps advanced in spite of it until the
pressure from the north became too severe for the French, whose flank
was exposed to the full force of it.
{248}
The British attack upon the morning in question was planned as
follows. The Second Division was to advance upon Passchendaale. The
First had orders to take Poel-Chapelle. The latter movement was
headed by the 3rd Brigade, who were directed by General Landon to go
forward about nine o'clock, the 1st Queen's having the station for
their objective while the 1st South Wales Borderers attacked the
village. The 1st Gloucesters were in reserve. The enemy met the
attack with shell-fire, which it was difficult to locate, as the
country was flat and enclosed. The progress of the movement,
however, was steady though slow. About ten o'clock there were signs
of a considerable hostile infantry advance from the north. The
attack, however, made good progress up to midday, when there was a
general retirement of the French Territorials, followed later by the
French cavalry upon the British left. They moved back towards
Bixschote. The Gloucester Regiment, who had been thrown out to
reinforce that flank, were also driven back, and were in turn
reinforced by the Coldstream Guards. This battalion executed a
bayonet charge in clearing the small village of Koekuit, but later on
had to retire, finding their flank exposed. It should be mentioned
that one French corps, the Seventh Cavalry Division, kept its
position upon the British left, and it is also only fair to point out
that as the German advance was mainly from the north, it was upon the
left flank, covered by the French, that it would fall. The 1st
Camerons were now dispatched to the flank to stiffen the French
resistance, taking up their position near the inn which is midway
upon the road between Steenstraate and Langemarck, north of the
village {249} of Pilken--an inn with which they were destined to have
stirring associations. With the support of the 46th Battery, the
Highlanders held up a German brigade which was thrusting through
behind our main line; but farther west, in the Steenstraate
direction, the defence against a northern advance was miserably thin,
consisting only of one company of the Sussex Regiment and the 116th
Battery. In the circumstances the more success Haig's troops
attained in front, and the more they advanced, the more dangerous was
their position upon the flank.
About 2.30 the German advance from the north became more formidable,
and the 1st South Welsh Borderers, between Langemarck and
Poel-Chapelle, were heavily counter-attacked and suffered
considerable loss, between two and three hundred in all. Two
companies of the 2nd Welsh were pushed up to their help. It was
clear, however, that the advance could not be continued. The 1st
Brigade was therefore ordered to hold the line between Steenstraate
and Langemarck, with their centre at the inn north of Pilken, so as
to face the German advance from the north. Then from Langemarck the
British line turned southwards, being carried on for two miles by the
3rd Brigade to hold the enemy who were coming from the east. The 2nd
Brigade was in reserve at Boesinghe. During this long and difficult
day the Second Division, operating upon the right of the First, was
not subjected to the same anxiety about its flank. It advanced upon
its objective in the face of severe opposition, ending more than once
in a brief bayonet encounter. Several counter-attacks were made by
the Germans, but they were all beaten back with loss. About two
o'clock, however, {250} the Second Division learned of the flank
pressure which was holding up the First Division, and also of the
extreme need for help experienced by the 22nd Brigade of the Seventh
Division on their right. In these circumstances it was necessary to
abandon the idea of further advance and to send south those
reinforcements, the opportune arrival of which has been already
described.
As a net result of the two days' operations General Haig was not able
to attain the line of Passchendaale-Poel-Chapelle, as originally
planned, but he gained sufficient ground to establish himself from
Langemarck to Zonnebeke, more than half-way to his objective. The
whole character of the operations during these days was more of the
familiar British type, being conducted upon the surface of the earth
rather than under it, and cavalry making its last appearance for many
a long day. Many fine deeds of valour were done. In one of these
Captain Rising, of the Gloucester Regiment, with ninety men, defended
some point with such heroic tenacity that when, some days afterwards,
the Brigadier attempted to get the names of the survivors for
commendation not one could be found. Quaintly valorous also is the
picture of Major Powell, of the North Lancashires, leading his wing
with a badly-sprained ankle, and using a cottage chair for a crutch,
upon which he sat down between rushes. It is hopeless, however, and
even invidious to pick instances where the same spirit animated all.
The result was definite. It had been clearly shown that the enemy
were in considerably greater strength than had been imagined, and
instead of a rearguard action from weak forces the British found
themselves in the presence of a strong German {251} advance. All day
large forces of the enemy were advancing from Roulers and were
impinging upon different points of the Franco-British line. These
troops were composed of partially-trained men, volunteers and
reservists, but they attacked with the utmost determination, and
endured heavy losses with great bravery. It is a remarkable proof of
the elaborate preparations for war made by Germany that, behind all
their original gigantic array, they still had ready within the
country sufficient arms and uniforms to fit out these five new army
corps. He who plans finds it easy to prepare, and whoever will
compare this profusion of munitions in Germany with the absolute lack
of them in the Allied countries will have no further doubt as to
which Government conspired against the peace of the world.
On October 21, Sir John French began to feel that there were new
factors in his front. In the evening, at a meeting with Haig and
Rawlinson, he discussed the unexpected strength of the German
reinforcements and admitted that the scheme of an advance upon Bruges
would become impossible in the face of such numbers. Intelligence
reports indicated that there was already a German army corps in front
of each British division. General Joffre had promised considerable
French reinforcements upon October 24, and all that could be done was
for the British troops to hold their ground to the last man and to
resist every pressure until the equality of the forces could be
restored. Could they hold the line till then? That was the
all-important question.
October 22 was the first day of that long ordeal of incessant attacks
which the First Corps was called {252} upon to endure, until by
constant attrition it had become almost as worn as the Seventh
Division to the south. On this day the German attack, which had not
yet attained the full volume of later days, spent itself here and
there along the extended lines. Only at one point did the enemy have
some success, which, however, was the prelude to disaster.
[Sidenote: Fight of Pilken Inn.]
The line from Steenstraate to Langemarck, defending the British left
flank, was held by the 1st Brigade, the Scots Guards upon the extreme
left, then the Cameron Highlanders, and the Black Watch in reserve.
In the middle of the line north of Pilken was a solitary inn, already
mentioned, round which trenches had been cut in horse-shoe fashion,
the concavity of the shoe pointing southwards. This point marked the
junction between the Camerons and the Scots Guards. About 3 P.M.
this position was driven in and captured by a sudden and determined
advance of the enemy. The German charge was a fine feat of arms, for
it was carried out largely by _Einjahrige_, who may be roughly
compared to the Officers' Training Corps of our British system.
These high-spirited lads advanced singing patriotic songs, and
succeeded in carrying the trenches in the face of soldiers who are
second to none in the British Army--soldiers, too, who had seen, much
service, while the German cadets were new to the work. The
performance was much appreciated by British officers and men.
The Black Watch endeavoured without success to restore the line, and
the 1st Northamptons were called upon from divisional reserve, while
from all parts troops converged towards the gap. On the arrival of
the Northamptons they pushed up towards {253} the interval which now
existed between the Scots Guards and the remains of the Camerons, but
found the gap broader than had been thought, and strongly occupied.
It was then evening, and it was thought best to delay the
counter-attack until morning and so have time to bring up
reinforcements. The 1st North Lancashires and the 2nd South
Staffords were accordingly ordered up, together with the 1st Queen's
Surrey and the 2nd Rifles, the whole operation being under the
immediate command of General Bulfin. The advance began at six in the
morning, over very difficult ground which had been barb-wired during
the night. The progress was slow but steady, and at eleven o'clock
an assault upon the inn was ordered. The position was critical,
since the enemy was now firmly lodged in the very centre of the flank
of the British position, and was able to enfilade all the trenches of
the First Division. The Queen's Surrey, the 2nd King's Royal Rifles,
and the 1st North Lancashires charged home with splendid energy,
capturing the trenches round the inn, besides releasing sixty
Camerons and taking over five hundred prisoners. The trenches were
carried by the North Lancashires, led by Major Carter. It was the
second time within six weeks that this battalion had made a decisive
bayonet charge. The price paid was six officers and 150 men. The
inn itself was rushed by Captain Creek's company of the Queen's,
while Major Watson, of the same regiment, organised the final
advance. The fighting at this point was not finished for the day.
In the late evening the enemy, with fine tenacity of purpose,
attacked the inn once more and drove the Queen's out of a salient.
The line was then straightened on each side {254} of the inn and
remained firm. Both the attack on the inn and the defence of the
line were splendidly supported by the field artillery.
Whilst the 1st Brigade had in this fashion got into and out of a
dangerous position, there had been a severe attack upon two regiments
of Landon's 3rd Brigade stationed at Langemarck. The defending units
were the 2nd Welsh Regiment and the 1st Gloucesters. Aided by a
strong artillery backing, they beat off these attacks and inflicted a
very heavy loss upon the enemy. The Allied line to the north was
solid and unbroken.
[Sidenote: Bravery of enemy.]
The British losses during these operations of the First Corps
amounted to 1500 men, while those of the Germans were exceedingly
heavy. These inexperienced troops advanced with an indiscriminating
enthusiasm which exposed them to severe retaliation. It is doubtful
if at any time in the campaign the British fire found so easy a mark.
One thousand five hundred dead were counted in the vicinity of
Langemarck, and the total loss (including over six hundred prisoners)
could not have been less than 10,000 men. Correspondence afterwards
captured showed that the Twenty-third Reserve Corps sustained such
losses that for a time at least it was out of action. The
Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps was also hard hit. A letter from a
soldier in the 246th Regiment mentions that only eighty men were left
of his battalion after the action of the 24th.
On October 24 and 25 the arrival of French reinforcements allowed the
British to shorten up their defensive line, which had been unduly
extended. The Seventeenth Division of the Ninth French Army Corps
took over the line of the Second Division, which {255} was drawn back
to St. Jean, and in turn took over part of the front of the Seventh
Division. French territorial troops, under General de Mitry,
relieved the First British Division on the line
Hannebeke-Langemarck-Steenstraate. The First Division was drawn back
to Zillebeke.
[Sidenote: Advance of Second Division.]
Meantime the Second Division, having the French Ninth Corps upon its
left and the Seventh Division upon its right, made an attack towards
Bacelaer, taking two guns and some prisoners. This advance was
renewed upon the 26th, this being the day upon which, as already
described, the Germans pushed back the 20th Brigade of the Seventh
Division at the Kruiseik salient, creating a situation which brought
the Second Division to a standstill.
In this movement forward of the Second Division from October 24 to
26, the Guards' 4th Brigade were on the right, the 6th Brigade on the
left, with the French to the left of them. The 5th Brigade were in
reserve. Two small villages were taken by storm, the Germans being
driven out of loopholed houses, though at a considerable cost of
officers and men. It was in this operation that Colonel Bannatyne,
the gallant leader of the 1st King's Liverpool, was killed. Ten
other officers and several hundred men of this corps were killed or
wounded. The 1st Berkshires, fighting to the left of the King's,
shared in its losses and in its success. The Irish Guards were held
up before Reutel and separated from the rest of the force, but
managed to extricate themselves after some anxious hours.
On October 27, Sir John French came in person to Hooge, at the rear
of the fighting line, and inquired into the state of the hard-pressed
troops. He found {256} the Seventh to be now such a skeleton
division that it was thought best to join it with Haig's First Corps,
forming one single command.
The attendant Third Cavalry Division was also attached to the First
Corps. These readjustments took place upon October 27. They were,
of course, of a temporary character until the eagerly awaited Eighth
Division should arrive and so give General Rawlinson a complete
Fourth Corps. At present there was a very immediate prospect that
half of it might be annihilated before the second half appeared. The
general arrangement of this section of the battlefield was now as
depicted, the Seventh Division being entirely south of the
Ypres-Menin roadway.
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{257}
[Illustration: General Scene of Operations]
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This date, the 27th, was memorable only for an advance of the 6th
Brigade. These continual advances against odds were wonderful
examples of the aggressive spirit of the British soldiers. In this
instance ground was gained, but at the cost of some casualties,
especially to the 1st Rifles, who lost Prince Maurice of Battenberg
and a number of officers and men.
[Sidenote: Fight of Kruiseik cross-roads.]
And now the great epic of the first Battle of Ypres was rising to its
climax, and the three days of supreme trial for the British Army were
to begin. Early upon October 29, a very heavy attack developed upon
the line of the Ypres-Menin road. There is a village named
Gheluvelt, which is roughly half-way upon this tragic highway. It
lay now immediately behind the centre of the British line. About
half a mile in front of it the position ran through the important
cross-roads which lead to the village of Kruiseik, still in the
British possession. The line through the {258} Kruiseik cross-roads
was that which was furiously assailed upon this morning, and the
attack marked the beginning of a great movement to drive in the front
continuing throughout the 30th and culminating in the terrible ordeal
of the 31st, the crisis of the Ypres battle and possibly of the
Western campaign.
FitzClarence's 1st Brigade lay to the north of the road, and the
battered, much-enduring 20th Brigade upon the south. They were
destined together to give such an example of military tenacity during
that day as has seldom been equalled and never exceeded, so that the
fight for the Kruiseik crossroads may well live in history amongst
those actions, like Albuera and Inkermann, which have put the powers
of British infantry to an extreme test. The line was held by about
five thousand men, but no finer units were to be found in the whole
Army. The attack was conducted by an army corps with the eyes of
their Emperor and an overpowering artillery encouraging them from the
rear. Many of the defending regiments, especially those of the 20th
Brigade, had already been terribly wasted. It was a line of weary
and desperate men who faced the German onslaught.
The attack began in the mists of the early morning. The opening was
adverse to the British, for the enemy, pushing very boldly forward
upon a narrow front and taking full advantage of the fog, broke a way
down the Menin road and actually got past the defending line before
the situation was understood. The result was that the two regiments
which flanked the road, the 1st Black Watch and the 1st Grenadiers,
were fired into from behind and endured terrible {259} losses. Among
the Grenadiers Colonel Earle, Majors Forrester and Stucley, Lord
Richard Wellesley, and a number of other officers fell, while out of
650 privates only 150 were eventually left standing, the 2nd Gordons,
upon the right of the Grenadiers, suffered nearly as heavily, while
the 1st Coldstream, upon the left of the Black Watch, was perhaps the
hardest hit of all, for at the end of that dreadful day it had not a
single officer fit for duty. The right company of the 1st Scots
Guards shared the fate of the Coldstream. The line was pushed back
for a quarter of a mile and Kruiseik was evacuated, but the dead and
wounded who remained in the trenches far exceeded in numbers those
who were able to withdraw.
Two small bodies who were cut off by the German advance did not fall
back with their comrades, and each of them made a splendid and
successful resistance. The one near Kruiseik was a mixed party under
Major Bottomley of the 2nd Queen's West Surrey. The other was C
Company of the 2nd Gordons under Captain B. G. R. Gordon and
Lieutenant Laurence Carr. These small islands of khaki, in the midst
of a broad stream of grey, lay so tight and fired so straight that
they inflicted very great damage upon the enemy, and were able to
hold their own, in ever-diminishing numbers, until under the
protection of darkness the survivors regained the British line.
In the meantime, a number of small dashing counter-attacks by the
indomitable infantry was bringing the British line forward again.
South of the road the Gordons, under Colonel Uniacke, dashed
themselves again and again against the huge host which faced them,
driving them back, and then in their turn recoiling before the
ponderous advance of {260} the army corps. They were maddened by the
sound of the rolling fire ahead of them, which showed that their own
C Company was dying hard. In one of these counter-attacks Captain
Brooke brought every straggler into the fray, and died while trying
to cut his way through to his comrades. To the north of the road
Captain Stephen, with the remains of the 1st Scots Guards, threw
themselves upon the German flank and staggered it by their fire. The
Germans, who had almost reached Gheluvelt, were now worried in this
way on either flank, while the 2nd Border battalion and the Welsh
Borderers with the rallied remains of the broken regiments were still
facing them in front. The enemy was held, was stricken front and
flank with a murderous fire, and recoiled back down the Menin road.
Imperial eyes and overmastering guns were equally powerless to drive
them through that iron defence. Five thousand British soldiers had
driven back an army corps, but had left more than half their number
upon the scene of victory.
The Second Division, to the north of the road in the direction of
Reutel, had been ordered to counter-attack, and the other brigades of
the Seventh Division to the south did the same. While Haig had a man
standing he was ready to hit back. Between these two flanking forces
there was a movement in the centre to follow the Germans back and to
recover some of the lost ground. Landon's Third Brigade, less the
Gloucester Regiment, was pushed forward. These troops moved past
Gheluvelt and advanced along the line of the road, the 1st Queen's,
their right-hand unit, linking up by a happy chance with their own
2nd Battalion, who were now on the left of the 22nd Brigade of the
Seventh Division. Left {261} of the Queen's were the 2nd Welsh to
the immediate south of the main road, while to their left again lay
the 1st South Wales Borderers, in front of the village of Gheluvelt.
By evening these troops had recovered some of the ground, but the
village of Kruiseik, which had always constituted a salient, was now
abandoned. The cross-roads also remained in the hands of the enemy.
Landon's Brigade continued to bar the further German advance
preparing in stern resignation for the renewed and heavier blow which
all knew to be in readiness, and which was destined two days later to
bring them a glorious annihilation.
It was clear upon the evening of the 29th that serious mischief was
afoot, for there were great signs of movement on the German side, and
all night the continual rattle of wheels was heard to the eastward.
These menacing sounds were actually caused by a very strong
reinforcement, the Fifteenth German Corps (Strasburg) of the regular
army, which, followed by the Thirteenth Corps and the Second Bavarian
Corps, were coming into the battle line with the declared intention
of smashing their way through to Ypres. Correspondence, afterwards
captured, showed that the German Emperor had issued a special appeal
to these troops, declaring that the movement was one which would be
of decisive importance to the war. It was, of course, not the
venerable town of Ypres which had assumed such a place in the mind
both of the Emperor and his people, but it was Calais and the Channel
coast to which it was the door. Once in the possession of these
points, it seemed to their perfervid minds that they would be in a
position to constrain Great Britain to an ignominious peace, a course
which {262} would surely have ruined the cause of the Allies and
placed the whole world under the German heel. No less was the issue
at stake. The British Army from Langemarck in the north to La Bassée
in the south were resolutely determined that the road was barred,
while to left and to right they had stout-hearted comrades of Belgium
and of France.
[Sidenote: Fight of Zandvoorde.]
At half-past six upon October 30 a very heavy attack developed, which
involved the whole line of the First Corps and also the French Ninth
Corps upon its left. This attack upon the left was carried out by
the Reserve Corps 26 and 27, with whom we had had previous dealings,
and it was repulsed with considerable loss by the French and the 6th
British Brigade. To the south, however, the British were very
violently engaged down the whole line of trenches from the position
of the Seventh Division near the Ypres-Menin road, through
Zandvoorde, where the Third Cavalry Division was holding on under
great difficulties, and on southward still, past the position of the
Second Cavalry down to Messines, where the First Cavalry Division was
also heavily engaged. The front of battle was not less than twelve
miles in length, with one continuous long-drawn rattle of small arms
and roar of guns from end to end.
The British may have anticipated that the chief blow would fall at
the same spot as had been attacked the day before. As a matter of
fact, it was directed farther south, at Zandvoorde, on the immediate
right of the Seventh Division.
The first sign of success for the strenuous German efforts upon
October 30 was the driving in of Kavanagh's 7th Guards' Cavalry
Brigade from their trenches at the Zandvoorde Ridge. On this ridge,
{263} which is not more than a hundred and twenty feet high, the
Germans concentrated so tremendous and accurate a fire that the
trenches were in many places demolished and became entirely
untenable. The survivors of the Life Guards and Blues who made up
this brigade withdrew steadily through the reserve trenches, which
were held by the 6th cavalry Brigade, and reformed at Klein Zillebeke
in the rear. Two squadrons, however, and Lord Worsley's machine-gun
section were killed or taken by the assailants. The unoccupied
trenches were seized by the Sixth Bavarian Reserve Division, who
advanced rapidly in order to improve their advantage, while their
artillery began to pound the reserves. The cavalry had been
strengthened, however, by the Greys and 3rd Hussars upon the left,
while the 4th Hussars lined up on the right, and C, I, and K Horse
Artillery batteries vigorously supported. In spite of great
pressure, the position was held. Farther south the First Cavalry
Division was also at very close grips with the Twenty-sixth Division
of the Thirteenth German Army Corps, and was hard put to it to hold
its own. Along the whole cavalry position there was extreme strain.
A squadron of the 1st Royals were forced to evacuate the chateau of
Holebeke, and the line in this quarter was pushed back as far as St.
Eloi, thus flattening a considerable salient.
The danger of a position which consists of so long a line with few
reserves is that any retirement at any point immediately exposes the
flanks of the neighbouring units to right and left. Thus the
evacuation of Zandvoorde threw open the right flank of the Seventh
Division, even as its left had been in the air upon the day before.
On getting through, the Germans were {264} on the right rear of the
1st Welsh Fusiliers and enfiladed them badly, destroying all the
officers and a considerable proportion of the regiment, which had
already been greatly reduced. Colonel Cadogan was among those who
fell. The 22nd Brigade was forced to fall back, and the 2nd
Yorkshires and 2nd Scots Fusiliers, of the 21st Brigade, being left
in a salient, suffered heavily, especially the latter battalion, the
conduct of which from first to last was remarkable even among such
men as fought beside them. These two regiments held on with the
greatest determination until orders to retire reached them, which
were somewhat belated, as several orderlies were killed in bringing
them. The 2nd Bedfords, who had themselves sustained very severe
losses from the German artillery fire, covered the retirement of the
remains of these two gallant units. The Seventh Division then
covered the line from the canal through Klein Zillebeke and along the
front of the woods to near Gheluvelt.
The position was now most critical. The Germans were in possession
of Zandvoorde Ridge on the British right flank, a most important
position whence guns could command a considerable area. Ypres was
only four miles distant. There was nothing but a line of weary and
partially broken infantry to protect the flank from being entirely
pierced. The whole of a German active army corps was attacking upon
this line. The order was given to hold the new positions at all
costs, but on the evening of the 30th the situation was full of
menace for the morrow. The German flood was still thundering against
the barrier, and the barrier seemed to be giving. At about 2 P.M. on
October 30 the 1st Irish Guards and the 2nd Grenadiers, who were in
reserve to two battalions of the Coldstream {265} in trenches in the
Polygon Wood, near Reutel Village, were ordered to help the Seventh
Division. General Capper subsequently directed them to take the
place of the cavalry on the right of his division. The Irish Guards
were accordingly on the right of the Seventh Division from now
onwards, and the Grenadiers were on their right, extending down to
the canal in front of Klein Zillebeke. The commander of the Ninth
French Corps also, with that fine loyalty which his comrades have
shown again and again during the war, easing many a difficult and
perhaps saving some impossible situations, put three battalions and
some cavalry at the disposal of the British. Two regiments of
Bulfin's 2nd Brigade were also brought across and thrust into the
gap. But the outlook that evening was not cheering. The troops had
been fighting hard for two days without a break. The losses had been
heavy. The line had been driven back and was greatly strained. It
was known that the Germans were in great strength and that the attack
would be renewed on the morrow. The troops and their leaders faced
the immediate future in a spirit of sombre determination.
[Sidenote: Fight of Gheluvelt.]
During the 30th Landon's Brigade had strengthened their position near
Gheluvelt, and General Haig, realising that this was the key of his
line, moved up the 2nd King's Royal Rifles and the 1st North
Lancashires to form a reserve under the orders of General Landon.
These regiments took a position south-west of Gheluvelt and connected
up more closely between the Seventh Division and the 3rd Brigade of
the First Division. It was well that a closely-knitted line had been
formed, for at the dawn of day upon the 31st a most terrific attack
was made, {266} which was pushed with unexampled fierceness during
the whole day, falling chiefly upon the centre and left of the
Seventh Division and upon the 1st Queen's and 2nd Welsh of the Third
Brigade.
A weak point developed, unfortunately, in the front line, for the
Seventh Division in its enfeebled condition was further weakened by
forming somewhat of a salient in the Kruiseik direction. They
behaved with all their usual magnificent gallantry, but they were not
numerous enough to hold the ground. The line was broken and the
remains of the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, after being exposed to
heavy fire from 5.30 A.M., were outflanked and surrounded in the
early afternoon. The bulk of the survivors of this battalion had
been sent to reinforce the line elsewhere, but the remainder, some
sixty in number, were killed, wounded, or taken, including their
gallant colonel, Baird Smith, who had been hit the day before. The
Picton tradition which disregards wounds unless they are absolutely
crippling was continually observed by these stern soldiers. On the
left of the Scots Fusiliers the 2nd Bedfords were also involved in
the catastrophe, but drew off with heavy losses.
The left wing of the Seventh Division began to retire, and the 1st
Queen's upon the right of the 3rd Brigade had both their flanks
turned and were reduced to a handful under Major Watson and
Lieutenant Boyd, who still held together as a unit. It was a great
morning in the history of this regiment, as the two battalions had
fought side by side, and their colonels, Pell and Coles, had both
fallen in the action.
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{267}
[Illustration: SKETCH OF BATTLE OF GHELUVELT OCT 31st.]
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The line of the 3rd Brigade had been drawn up across the Menin road
some four hundred yards to the east of the village. The road itself
was held by {268} the 2nd Welsh Regiment, supported by the 54th
Battery (Major Peel), which was immediately behind the village. Both
the battalion and the battery fought desperately in a most exposed
situation. The Welsh Regiment were driven out of their trenches by a
terrific shell-fire followed by an infantry attack. They lost during
the day nearly six hundred men, with sixteen officers, killed,
wounded, or missing. Colonel Morland was killed and Major Prichard
badly wounded. Finally, after being pushed back, holding every
possible point, they formed up under Captain Rees across the open in
a thin skirmishing line to cover the battery, which was doing great
work by holding back the German advance. One German gun was in
action upon the Menin road. Lieutenant Blewitt took a British gun
out on to the bare road to face it, and a duel ensued at five hundred
yards, which ended by the German gun being knocked out at the third
shot by a direct hit.
When the First Division at the centre of the British line were driven
in, as already described, and the Seventh Division were pushed back
into the woods, the situation became most critical, for there was a
general retirement, with a victorious enemy pressing swiftly on upon
the British centre. The men behaved splendidly, and the officers
kept their heads, taking every opportunity to form up a new line.
The 2nd Rifles and 1st North Lancashires in immediate support of the
centre did all that men could to hold it firm. The German artillery
lengthened their range as the British fell back, and the infantry,
with their murderous quick-firers scattered thickly in the front
line, came rapidly on. Communications were difficult, and everything
for a time was chaos {269} and confusion. It looked for an hour or
two as if Von Deimling, the German leader, might really carry out his
War Lord's command and break his road to the sea. It was one of the
decisive moments of the world's history, for if the Germans at that
period had seized the Channel ports, it is difficult to say how
disastrous the result might have been both to France and to the
British Empire. At that moment of darkness and doubt a fresh
misfortune, which might well have proved overwhelming, came upon the
hard-pressed forces. About 1.30 a shell exploded in the headquarters
at the chateau of Hooge, and both General Lomax, of the First
Division, and General Munro, of the Second, were put out of action,
the first being wounded and the second rendered unconscious by the
shock. It was a brain injury to the Army, and a desperately serious
one, for besides the two divisional commanders the single shell had
killed or wounded Colonels Kerr and Perceval, Major Paley, Captains
Ommany and Trench, and Lieutenant Giffard. General Landon, of the
3rd Brigade, took the command of the First Division at a moment's
notice, and the battle went forward. A line was hurriedly formed,
men digging as for their lives, whilst broken units threw themselves
down to hold off the rolling grey wave that thundered behind. The
new position was three-quarters of a mile back and about four hundred
yards in advance of Veldhoek, which is the next village down the
Ypres road. The Seventh Division had also been rolled back, but the
fiery Capper, their divisional chief, who has been described as a
British Samurai, was everywhere among his regiments, reforming and
bracing them. The British soldiers, with their incomparable {270}
regimental officers, rose to the crisis, whilst General Haig was
behind the line at Hooge, directing and controlling, like a great
engineer who seeks to hold a dam which carries an overpowering head
of water. By three o'clock the new line was firmly held.
[Sidenote: Advance of Worcesters.]
Now General Haig, seeking round for some means of making a
counter-attack, perceived that on his left flank he had some reserve
troops who had been somewhat clear of the storm and might be
employed. The 2nd Worcesters were ordered to advance upon Gheluvelt,
the initiative in this vital movement coming from General
Fitz-Clarence of the 1st Brigade. On that flank the troops had not
joined in the retirement, and, including the South Wales Borderers of
the 3rd Brigade, were still in their original trenches, being just
north of the swathe that had been cut in the British line, and just
south of where the Second Division, extended to cracking point, with
one man often for every eight or nine feet, and no supports, were
defending the left flank of the Army.
When the village of Gheluvelt and the trenches to the north of it had
been captured by the enemy, a gap had been left of about five hundred
yards between the northern edge of the village and these South Wales
Borderers. This gap the 2nd Worcesters were ordered to fill. They
were in reserve at the time in the south-west corner of the Polygon
Wood, but on being called upon they made a brilliant advance under
Major Hankey. One company (A) was detached to guard the right flank
of the advance. The other three companies came on for a thousand
yards. At one point they had to cross two hundred and twenty yards
of open under heavy shrapnel-fire. One hundred men fell, but the
momentum of the charge {271} was never diminished. Their rapid and
accurate fire drove back the German infantry, while their open order
formation diminished their own losses. Finally they dashed into the
trenches and connected up the village with the line of the Welsh
Borderers. Their right platoons, under Captain Williams, held the
village until nearly midnight. Altogether the advance cost the
battalion 187 casualties, including 3 officers, out of 550 who were
in the ranks that day. Up to dusk the Worcesters were exposed to
heavy shrapnel-fire, and small detached parties of the enemy came
round their right flank, but their position was strengthened and
strongly held until the final readjustment of the line. It was a
fine advance at a critical moment, and did much to save the
situation. The whole movement was strongly supported by the guns of
the 42nd Battery, and by some of the 1st Scots Guards upon the left
of the Welsh Borderers.
It has been stated that a line had been formed near Veldhoek, but
this difficult operation was not performed in an instant, and was
rather the final equilibrium established after a succession of
oscillations. The British were worn to a shadow. The 2nd Queen's
had 2 officers and 60 men left that night, the 2nd Welsh had 3
officers and 93 men. Little groups, who might have been fitted into
a large-sized drawing-room, were settling a contention upon which the
fate of the world might depend. But the Germans also had spent all
their force. The rattle of musketry behind their advance was enough
to tell them that the British were still in their trenches, and the
guns were for ever playing on them with deadly effect. Gradually
they began to dissolve away among the thick woods which flank the
road. They were {272} learning that to penetrate the line of a
resolute adversary is not necessarily the prelude to victory. It may
mean that the farther you advance the more your flanks are exposed.
So it was now, when the infantry to the north on one side and the
Third Cavalry Division on the other were closing in on them. That
long tentacle which was pushing its way towards Ypres had to be
swiftly withdrawn once more, and withdrawn under a heavy fire from
the 29th, 41st, and 45th field batteries.
[Sidenote: German recoil.]
The scattered German infantry who had taken refuge in the woods of
Hooge, which lie to the south of the road, were followed up by
mounted and dismounted men of the Royals, 10th Hussars, and 3rd
Dragoon Guards, aided by some French cavalry. These troops advanced
through the woods, killing or taking a number of the enemy. By
nightfall the Germans had fallen back along the whole debated line;
the various British units, though much disorganised, were in close
touch with each other, and the original trenches had in the main been
occupied, the Berkshire Regiment helping to close the gap in the
centre. The flood had slowly ebbed away, and the shaken barrier was
steady once more, thanks to the master-hands which had so skilfully
held it firm. The village of Gheluvelt remained in the hands of the
Germans, but the British trenches were formed to the west of it, and
the road to the sea was barred as effectually as ever. These are the
main facts of the action of Gheluvelt, which may well be given a name
of its own, though it was only one supremely important episode in
that huge contention which will be known as the First Battle of Ypres.
In the southern portion of the Ypres area at {273} Klein Zillebeke a
very sharp engagement was going on, which swung and swayed with as
much violence and change as the main battle on the Menin road. The
German attack here was hardly inferior in intensity to that in the
north. Having pushed back Lawford's weak brigade (22nd) it struck
full upon part of Bulfin's 2nd Brigade, which had been detached from
the First Division and sent to cover the right of the Seventh
Division. Its own flank was now exposed, and its situation for a
time was critical. The German advance was sudden and impetuous,
coming through a wood which brought the dense mass of the enemy's
leading formation almost unseen right up to the British line. The
position of the 2nd Brigade was pierced, and the two regiments
present, the 2nd Sussex and the 1st Northamptons, were driven back
with loss. Their brigadier rallied them some hundreds of yards to
the rear, where they formed up into a skirmish line in the open, and,
though unable to advance, kept back the Germans with their
rifle-fire. The losses still continued, however, and the enemy came
on again and again with numbers which seemed inexhaustible. Suddenly
there was a charging yell from behind a low slope covering the rear,
and over the brow there appeared some three hundred survivors of the
2nd Gordons, rushing at full speed with fixed bayonets. At the same
moment the dismounted troopers of the 6th Cavalry Brigade and a
company of sappers ran forward to join in the charge. The whole
British force was not one to three of its opponents, but as the
reinforcing line swept on, cheering with all its might, the survivors
of the hard-pressed brigade sprang up with a shout and the united
wave burst over the Germans. Next moment they had {274} broken and
were flying for their lives through the Zwartelen Wood. The pursuit
lasted for some distance, and a great number of the enemy were
bayoneted, while several hundreds were taken prisoners.
[Sidenote: General result.]
There have been few more critical occasions in the British operations
than this action upon October 31, when the Germans so nearly forced
their way to Ypres. It is the peculiarity of modern warfare that,
although vast armies are locked in a close struggle, the number of
men who can come into actual contact at any one point is usually far
more limited than in the old days, when each host could view the
other from wing to wing. Thus the losses in such an action are small
as compared with the terrific death-roll of a Napoleonic battle. On
the other hand, when the operations are viewed broadly and one groups
a series of actions into one prolonged battle, like the Aisne or
Ypres, then the resulting losses become enormous. The old battle was
a local conflagration, short and violent. The new one is a
widespread smoulder, breaking here and there into flame. In this
affair of Gheluvelt the casualties of the British did not exceed 2000
or 3000, while those of the Germans, who were more numerous and who
incurred the extra loss which falls upon the attack, could not have
been less than twice that figure. One thousand five hundred dead
were actually picked up and six hundred prisoners were taken. Some
hundreds of prisoners were also taken by the enemy. The British
artillery, which worked desperately hard all day, had many losses
both upon the 30th and the 31st. The 12th Battery had all its guns
silenced but one, and many others were equally hard hit.
On the night of the 31st considerable French {275} reinforcements
began to arrive, and it was high time that they did so, for the First
Corps, including the Seventh Division, were likely to bleed to death
upon the ground that they were holding. It had stood the successive
attacks of four German corps, and it had held its line against each
of them. But its own ranks had been grievously thinned and the men
were weary to death. The strain, it should be added, was equally
great upon the Ninth French Corps to the north, which had its own set
of assailants to contend with. Now that the line of the Yser, so
splendidly guarded by the Belgians, had proved to be impregnable, and
that the French from Dixmude in the north had repulsed all attacks,
the whole German advance upon Calais, for which Berlin was screaming,
was centred upon the Ypres lines. It was time, then, that some
relief should come to the hard-pressed troops. For several days the
French on the right and the left took the weight of the attack upon
themselves, and although the front was never free from fighting,
there was a short period of comparative rest for Haig's tired men.
In successive days they had lost Kruiseik, Zandvoorde, and Gheluvelt,
but so long as they held the semicircle of higher ground which covers
Ypres these small German gains availed them nothing.
[Sidenote: A great crisis.]
Looking back at the three actions of the 29th, 30th, and especially
of the 31st of October, one can clearly perceive that it was the
closest thing to a really serious defeat which the Army had had since
Le Cateau. If the Germans had been able to push home their attack
once again, it is probable that they would have taken Ypres, and that
the results would have been most serious. Sir John French is
reported {276} as having said that there was no time in the Mons
retreat when he did not see his way, great as were his difficulties,
but that there was a moment upon October 31 when he seemed to be at
the end of his resources. To Sir John at Ypres converged all the
cries for succour, and from him radiated the words of hope and
encouragement which stiffened the breaking lines. To him and to his
untiring lieutenant, Douglas Haig, the Empire owed more that day than
has ever been generally realised. The latter was up to the firing
line again and again rallying the troops. The sudden removal of the
two divisional commanders of the First Corps was a dreadful blow at
such a moment, and the manner in which General Landon, of the 3rd
Brigade, took over the command of the First Division at a moment's
notice was a most noteworthy performance. The fact that three
divisions of infantry with brigades which resembled battalions, and
battalions which were anything from companies to platoons, destitute
of reserves save for a few dismounted cavalry, barred the path to a
powerful German army, is one of the greatest feats of military
history. It was a very near thing. There was a time, it is said,
when the breech-blocks had actually been taken from the heavy guns in
order to disable them, and some of the artillery had been passed back
through Ypres. But the line held against all odds, as it has done so
often in the past. The struggle was not over. For a fortnight still
to come it was close and desperate. But never again would it be
quite so perilous as on that immortal last day of October, when over
the green Flemish meadows, beside the sluggish water-courses, on the
fringes of the old-world villages, and in the heart of {277} the
autumn-tinted woods, two great Empires fought for the mastery.
Such was the British epic. There was another to the north which was
no less wonderful, and which will be celebrated by the poets and
historians of the lands to which the victors belong. It will tell of
the glorious stand during this critical ten days of the Belgians, so
weary, so battered, and yet so indomitable. It will tell how they
made head against the hosts of the Duke of Würtemberg, and how in the
end they flooded their own best land with the salt water which would
sterilise it in order to cover their front. It will tell also of the
splendid Frenchmen who fought at Dixmude, of Ronarch with his
invincible marines, and of Grossetti, the fat and debonair, seated in
an armchair in the village street and pointing the road to victory
with his cane. Not least, perhaps, in that epic will be the tale of
the British monitors who, with the deadly submarines upon one side of
them and the heavy German batteries upon the other, ran into the
Flemish coast and poured their fire upon the right flank of the
attacking Germans. Ten days the great battle swung and swayed, and
then here as at Ypres the wave of the invaders ebbed, or reached its
definite flood. It would be an ungenerous foe who would not admit
that they had fought bravely and well. Not all our hatred of their
national ideals nor our contempt for their crafty misleaders can
prevent us from saluting those German officers and soldiers who
poured out their blood like water in the attempt to do that which was
impossible.
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