THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN
IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS
1914
BY
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
AUTHOR OF
"THE GREAT BOER WAR," ETC.
SECOND EDITION
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXVI
TO
GENERAL SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON
THIS CHRONICLE OF THE GREAT WAR
IN WHICH HE RENDERED
SUCH INVALUABLE SERVICE TO HIS COUNTRY
IS
DEDICATED
{vii}
PREFACE
It is continually stated that it is impossible to bring out at the
present time any accurate history of the war. No doubt this is true
so far as some points of the larger strategy are concerned, for the
motives at the back of them have not yet been cleared up. It is true
also as regards many incidents which have exercised the minds of
statesmen and of many possibilities which have worried the soldiers.
But so far as the actual early events of our own campaign upon the
Continent are concerned there is no reason why the approximate truth
should not now be collected and set forth. I believe that the
narrative in this volume will in the main stand the test of time, and
that the changes of the future will consist of additions rather than
of alterations or subtractions.
The present volume deals only with the events of 1914 in the British
fighting-line in France and Belgium. A second volume dealing with
1915 will be published within a few months. It is intended that a
third volume, covering the current year, shall carry on this
contemporary narrative of a tremendous episode.
From the first days of the war I have devoted much of my time to the
accumulation of evidence {viii} from first-hand sources as to the
various happenings of these great days. I have built up my narrative
from letters, diaries, and interviews from the hand or lips of men
who have been soldiers in our armies, the deeds of which it was my
ambition to understand and to chronicle. In many cases I have been
privileged to submit my descriptions of the principal incidents to
prominent actors in them, and to receive their corrections or
endorsement. I can say with certainty, therefore, that a great deal
of this work is not only accurate, but that it is very precisely
correct in its detail. The necessary restrictions which forbade the
mention of numbered units have now been removed, a change made
possible by the very general rearrangements which have recently taken
place. I am able, therefore, to deal freely with my material. As
that material is not always equally full, it may have occasionally
led to a want of proportion, where the brigade occupies a line and
the battalion a paragraph. In extenuation of such faults, and of the
omissions which are unavoidable, I can only plead the difficulty of
the task and throw myself upon the reader's good nature. Some
compensation for such shortcoming may be found in the fact that a
narrative written at the time reflects the warm emotions which these
events aroused amongst us more clearly than the more measured story
of the future historian can do.
It may seem that the political chapters are somewhat long for a
military work, but the reader will {ix} find that in subsequent
volumes there are no further politics, so that this survey of the
European conditions of 1914 is a lead up to the whole long narrative
of the actual contest.
I would thank my innumerable correspondents (whom I may not name) for
their very great help. I would also admit the profit which I have
derived from reading Coleman's _Mons to Ypres_, and especially Lord
Ernest Hamilton's _The First Seven Divisions_. These books added
some new facts, and enabled me to check many old ones. Finally, I
desire to thank my friend Mr. P. L. Forbes for his kind and
intelligent assistance in arranging my material.
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE.
WINDLESHAM, CROWBOROUGH,
_October_ 1916.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
THE BREAKING OF THE PEACE
CHAPTER II
THE OPENING OF THE WAR
CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF MONS
The landing of the British in France--The British leaders--The
advance to Mons--The defence of the bridges of Nimy--The holding of
the canal--The fateful telegram--The rearguard actions of Frameries,
Wasmes, and Dour--The charge of the Lancers--The fate of the
Cheshires--The 7th Brigade at Solesmes--The Guards in action--The
Germans' rude awakening--The Connaughts at Pont-sur-Sambre
CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU
The order of battle at Le Cateau--The stand of the 2nd
Suffolks--Major Yate's V.C.--The fight for the quarries--The splendid
work of the British guns--Difficult retirement of the Fourth
Division--The fate of the 1st Gordons--Results of the
battle--Exhaustion of the Army--The destruction of the 2nd
Munsters--A cavalry fight--The news in Great Britain--The views of
General Joffre--Battery L--The action of Villars-Cotteret--Reunion of
the Army
CHAPTER V
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
The general situation--"Die grosse Zeit"--The turn of the tide--The
Battle of the Ourcq--The British advance--Cavalry fighting--The 1st
Lincolns and the guns--6th Brigade's action at Hautvesnes--9th
Brigade's capture of Germans at Vinly--The problem of the Aisne--Why
the Marne is one of the great battles of all time
CHAPTER VI
THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE
The hazardous crossing of the Aisne--Wonderful work of the
sappers--The fight for the sugar factory--General advance of the
Army--The 4th (Guards) Brigade's difficult task--Cavalry as a mobile
reserve--The Sixth Division--Hardships of the Army--German breach of
faith--_Tâtez toujours_--The general position--Attack upon the West
Yorks--Counter-attack by Congreve's 18th Brigade--Rheims
Cathedral--Spies--The siege and fall of Antwerp
CHAPTER VII
THE LA BASSÉE--ARMENTIÈRES OPERATIONS
The great battle line--Advance of Second Corps--Death of General
Hamilton--The farthest point--Fate of the 2nd Royal Irish--The Third
Corps--Exhausted troops--First fight of Neuve Chapelle--The Indians
take over--The Lancers at Warneton--Pulteney's operations--Action of
Le Gheir
CHAPTER VIII
THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES
The Seventh Division--Its peculiar excellence--Its difficult
position--A deadly ordeal--Desperate attacks on Seventh
Division--Destruction of 2nd Wilts--Hard fight of 20th
Brigade--Arrival of First Corps--Advance of Haig's Corps--Fight of
Pilken Inn--Bravery of enemy--Advance of Second Division--Fight of
Kruiseik cross-roads--Fight of Zandvoorde--Fight of
Gheluvelt--Advance of Worcesters--German recoil--General result--A
great crisis
CHAPTER IX
THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES (_continued_)
Attack upon the cavalry--The struggle at Messines--The London Scots
in action--Rally to the north--Terrible losses--Action of
Zillebeke--Record of the Seventh Division--Situation at Ypres--Attack
of the Prussian Guard--Confused fighting--End of the first Battle of
Ypres--Death of Lord Roberts--The Eighth Division
CHAPTER X
A RETROSPECT AND GENERAL SUMMARY
Position of Italy--Fall of German colonies--Sea affairs--Our Allies
CHAPTER XI
THE WINTER LULL OF 1914
Increase of the Army--Formation of the Fifth Corps--The visit of the
King--Third Division at Petit Bois--The fight at Givenchy--Heavy
losses of the Indians--Fine advance of Manchesters--Advance of the
First Division--Singular scenes at Christmas
INDEX
MAPS AND PLANS
Map to illustrate the British Campaign in France and Flanders, 1914
Position of Second Army Corps at Mons, August 23
First Morning of Retreat of Second Army Corps, August 24
Sketch of Battle of Le Cateau, August 26
Line of Retreat from Mons
L Battery Action, September 1, 1914
British Advance during the Battle of the Marne
British Advance at the Aisne
Diagram to illustrate Operations of Smith-Dorrien's Second Corps and
Pulteney's Third Corps from October 11 to October 19, 1914
Southern End of British Line
General View of Seat of Operations
Line of Seventh Division (Capper) and Third Cavalry Division (Byng)
from October 16 onwards
General Scene of Operations
Sketch of Battle of Gheluvelt, October 31
[Illustration: Map of north-east France and Belgium]
{1}
CHAPTER I
THE BREAKING OF THE PEACE
In the frank, cynical, and powerful book of General Bernhardi which
has been so often quoted in connection with the war there is one
statement which is both true and important. It is, that no one in
Great Britain thought seriously of a war with Germany before the year
1902. As a German observer he has fixed this date, and a British
commentator who cast back through the history of the past would
surely endorse it. Here, then, is a point of common agreement from
which one can construct a scheme of thought.
Why then should the British people in the year 1902 begin to
seriously contemplate the possibility of a war with Germany? It
might be argued by a German apologist that this date marks an
appreciation by Great Britain that Germany was a great trade rival
who might with advantage be crushed. But the facts would not sustain
such a conclusion. The growth of German trade and of German wealth
was a phenomenon with which the British were familiar. It had been
constant since the days when Bismarck changed the policy of his
country from free trade to protection, and it had competed for twenty
years without the idea of war having entered British {2} minds. On
the contrary, the prevailing economic philosophy in Great Britain
was, that trade reacts upon trade, and that the successful rival
becomes always the best customer. It is true that manufacturers
expressed occasional irritation at the methods of German commerce,
such as the imitation of British trade-marks and shoddy reproductions
of British products. The Fatherland can produce both the best and
the worst, and the latter either undersold us or forced down our own
standards. But apart from this natural annoyance, the growing trade
of Germany produced no hostility in Great Britain which could
conceivably have led to an armed conflict. Up to the year 1896 there
was a great deal of sympathy and of respect in Great Britain for the
German Empire. It was felt that of all Continental Powers she was
the one which was most nearly allied to Britain in blood, religion,
and character. The fact that in 1890 Lord Salisbury deliberately
handed over to Germany Heligoland--an island which blockaded her
chief commercial port and the harbour of her warships--must show once
for all how entirely Germany lay outside of any possible
world-struggle which could at that time be foreseen. France has
always had its warm partisans in this country, but none the less it
can most truthfully be said that during all the years that Britain
remained in political isolation she would, had she been forced to
take sides, have assuredly chosen to stand by the Triple Alliance.
It is hard now to recall those days of French pinpricks and of the
evil effects which they produced. Germany's foreign policy is her
own affair, and the German people are the judges of those who control
it, but to us it must appear absolutely {3} demented in taking a line
which has driven this great world-power away from her side--or,
putting it at its lowest, away from an absolute neutrality, and into
the ranks of her enemies.
In 1896 there came the first serious chill in the relations between
the two countries. It arose from the famous telegram to Kruger at
the time of the Jameson Raid--a telegram which bore the name of the
Kaiser, but which is understood to have been drafted by Baron
Marschall von Bieberstein. Whoever was responsible for it did his
country a poor service, for British feelings were deeply hurt at such
an intrusion into a matter which bore no direct relation to Germany.
Britons had put themselves thoroughly in the wrong. Britain admitted
and deplored it. Public opinion was the more sensitive to outside
interference, and the telegram of congratulation from the Emperor to
Kruger was felt to be an uncalled-for impertinence. The matter
passed, however, and would have been forgiven and forgotten but for
the virulent agitation conducted against us in Germany during the
Boer War--an agitation which, it is only fair to say, appeared to
receive no support from the Kaiser himself, who twice visited England
during the course of the struggle. It could not be forgotten,
however, that Von Bülow, the Chancellor, assumed an offensive
attitude in some of his speeches, that the very idea of an
Anglo-German Alliance put forward by Chamberlain in 1900 was scouted
by the German Press, and that in the whole country there was hardly a
paper which did not join in a chorus of unreasoned hatred and calumny
against ourselves, our policy, and our arms. The incident was a
perfectly astounding revelation to the British, {4} who looked back
at the alliance between the two countries, and had imagined that the
traditions of such battles as Minden or Dettingen, where British
blood had been freely shed in Prussia's quarrel, really stood for
something in their present relations. Britons were absolutely
unconscious of anything which had occurred to alter the bonds which
history had formed. It was clear, once for all, that this was mere
self-deception, and as the British are a practical race, who are more
concerned with what is than why it is, they resigned themselves to
the situation and adjusted their thoughts to this new phase of their
relations.
But soon a new phenomenon engaged their attention. They had already
realised that the Germans, for some motive which appeared to them to
be entirely inadequate, were filled with hatred, and would do the
British Empire an injury if they had the power. Hitherto, they had
never had the power. But now it was evident that they were forging a
weapon which might enable them to gratify their malevolence. In 1900
was passed the famous German law regulating the increase of their
navy. The British, preoccupied by their South African War, took no
great notice of it at the time, but from 1902 onwards it engaged
their attention to an ever-increasing degree. The original law was
ambitious and far-reaching, but it was subjected to several
modifications, each of which made it more formidable. By a system as
inexorable as Fate, year after year added to the force which was
being prepared at Wilhelmshaven and at Kiel--a force entirely out of
proportion to the amount of German commerce to be defended or of
German coast-line to be protected. The greatest army in the world
was rapidly being supplemented by a fleet {5} which would be
dangerously near, both in numbers and quality, to our own. The
British Admiralty, more influenced by party politics than the German,
showed at times commendable activity, and at other periods
inexcusable indifference. On the whole, it was well ahead in its
building programmes, for a wide circle of the public had become
thoroughly awakened to the danger, and kept up a continual and most
justifiable agitation for a broader margin of safety. Fortunately,
the two final rulers of the Navy--McKenna and Churchill--rose to
their responsibilities, and, in spite of a clamour from a section of
their own party, insisted upon an adequate preponderance of naval
construction. A deep debt of gratitude is owed also to the action of
Lord Fisher, who saw the danger afar off and used all his remarkable
powers of organisation and initiative to ensure that his country
should be ready for the approaching struggle.
Great Britain, being much exercised in mind by the menacing tone of
Germany, expressed not only in her great and rapid naval
preparations, but in an astonishing outburst of minatory speeches and
literature from professors, journalists, and other leaders of the
people, began from 1902 onwards to look round her for allies. Had
she continued to remain isolated, some turn of the political wheel
might have exposed her to a Continental coalition under the
leadership and inspiration of this bitter enemy. But for the threats
of Germany, Britain would in all probability have been able to keep
aloof from entanglements, but as it was, the enemies of her enemy
became of necessity her friends. In an attempt to preserve her
independence of action so far as was still possible, she refused to
form an alliance, and only committed {6} herself in a vague fashion
to an ill-defined _entente_. By settling several outstanding causes
of friction with France, an agreement was come to in the year 1903
which was extended to Russia in 1907. The general purport of such an
arrangement was, that the sympathies of Great Britain were with the
Dual Alliance, and that these sympathies would be translated into
action if events seemed to warrant it. An aggressive policy on the
part of France or Russia would be absolutely discountenanced by
Britain, but if France were attacked Britain would pledge herself to
do her utmost to prevent her from being overwhelmed. It was
recognised that a victorious Germany would constitute a serious
menace to the British Empire--a fact which neither the Pan-German
fanatics nor the German national Press would ever permit us to
forget. In this policy of insuring against a German attack King
Edward VII. took a deep interest, and the policy is itself attributed
to him in Germany, but as a matter of fact it represented the only
sane course of action which was open to the nation. Germans are fond
of representing King Edward's action as the cause of subsequent
events, whereas a wider knowledge would show them that it was really
the effect of five years of German irritation and menace. This,
then, was the political situation up to the time of the actual
outbreak of war. Upon the one side were the German and Austrian
Empires in a solid alliance, while Italy was nominally allied, but
obviously moved upon an orbit of her own. On the other hand, Russia
and France were solidly allied, with Britain moving upon an
independent orbit which had more relation with that of her friends
than Italy's with that of Central Europe. It might clearly {7} have
been foreseen that Britain's fate would be that of France, while
Italy would break away under any severe test, for a number of open
questions divided her vitally from her secular enemy to the
north-east, The whole story of the campaign of Tripoli in 1911 showed
very clearly how independent, and even antagonistic, were the
interests and actions of Italy.
Germany, in the meanwhile, viewed with considerable annoyance the
formation of the elastic but very real ties which united France and
Britain, while she did not cease to continue the course of action
which had encouraged them. It had been one of the axioms of
Wilhelmstrasse that whilst the British occupied Egypt, no friendship
was possible between them and the French. Even now they were
incredulous that such a thing could be, and they subjected it to a
succession of tests. They desired to see whether the friendship was
a reality, or whether it was only for fair-weather use and would fly
to pieces before the stress of storm. Twice they tried it, once in
1905 when they drove France into a conference at Algeciras, and again
in 1911, when in a time of profound peace they stirred up trouble by
sending a gunboat to Agadir in south-western Morocco, an event which
brought Europe to the very edge of war. In each case the _entente_
remained so close and firm that it is difficult to imagine that they
were really surprised by our actions in 1914, when the enormous
provocation of the breach of the Belgian treaty was added to our
promise to stand by France in any trouble not of her own making.
Allusion has been made to the campaign of threats and abuse which had
been going on for many years in Germany, but the matter is of such
importance in its {8} bearing upon the outbreak of war that it
requires some fuller discussion. For a long period before matters
became acute between the two countries, a number of writers, of whom
Nietzsche and Treitschke are the best known, had inoculated the
German spirit with a most mischievous philosophy, which grew the more
rapidly as it was dropped into the favourable soil of Prussian
militarism. Nietzsche's doctrines were a mere general defence of
might as against right, and of violent brutality against everything
which we associate with Christianity and Civilisation. The whooping
savage bulked larger in this perverted philosophy than the saint or
the martyr. His views, however, though congenial to a certain class
of the German people, had no special international significance. The
typical brute whom he exalted was blonde, but a brute of any other
tint would presumably suffice. It was different in the case of
Treitschke. He was a historian, not a philosopher, with nothing
indefinite or abstract about his teaching. He used his high position
as Professor in the Berlin University to preach the most ardent
Chauvinism, and above all to teach the rising generation of Germans
that their special task was to have a reckoning with England and to
destroy the British Empire, which for some reason he imagined to be
degenerate and corrupt. He has passed away before he could see the
ruin which he helped to bring about, for there is no doubt that his
deeds lived after him, and that he is one of half a dozen men who
were prominent in guiding their country along the path which has
ended in the abyss. Scores of other lesser writers repeated and
exaggerated his message. Prominent among these was General von
Bernhardi, a man of high standing and a very {9} great authority upon
theoretical warfare. In the volume on _Germany and the Next War_,
which has been already quoted, he declared in the year 1911 that
Germany should and would do exactly what it has done in 1914. Her
antagonists, her allies, and her general strategy are all set forth
with a precision which shows that German thinkers had entirely made
up their minds as to the course of events, and that the particular
pretext upon which war would be waged was a matter of secondary
importance. These and similar sentiments naturally increased the
uneasiness and resentment in Great Britain, where the taxation had
risen constantly in the endeavour to keep pace with German
preparations, until it was generally felt that such a state of things
could not continue without some crisis being reached. The cloud was
so heavy that it must either pass or burst.
The situation had been aggravated by the fact that in order to win
popular assent to the various increases of the naval estimates in
Germany, constantly recurring anti-British agitations were
deliberately raised with alarms of an impending attack. As Britain
had never thought of attacking Germany during the long years when she
had been almost defenceless at sea, it was difficult to perceive why
she should do so now; but none the less the public and the
politicians were gulled again and again by this device, which, while
it achieved its purpose of obtaining the money, produced a
corresponding resentment in Great Britain. Sometimes these
manoeuvres to excite public opinion in favour of an increased navy
went to extreme lengths which might well have justified an official
remonstrance from England. A flagrant example was the arrest, trial,
and condemnation of Captain Stewart {10} for espionage upon the
evidence of a suborned and perjured criminal. It is a story which is
little to the credit of the Imperial Government, of the High Court at
Leipzig, or of the British authorities who failed to protect their
fellow-countryman from most outrageous treatment.
So much for the causes which helped to produce an evil atmosphere
between the two countries. Looking at the matter from the German
point of view, there were some root-causes out of which this
monstrous growth had come, and it is only fair that these should be
acknowledged and recorded. These causes can all be traced to the
fact that Britain stood between Germany and that world-empire of
which she dreamed. This depended upon circumstances over which this
country had no control, and which she could not modify if she had
wished to do so. Britain, through her maritime power and through the
energy of her merchants, had become a great world-power when Germany
was still a collection of petty States. When Germany became a
powerful Empire with a rising population and an immense commerce, she
found that the choice places of the world, and those most fitted for
the spread of a transplanted European race, were already filled up.
It was not a matter which Britain could help, nor could she alter it,
since Canada, Australasia, and South Africa would not, even if she
had desired it, be transferred to German rule. And yet it formed a
national grievance, and if we can put ourselves in the place of the
Germans we may admit that it was galling that the surplus of their
manhood should go to build up the strength of an alien and possibly a
hostile State. To this point we could fully see that grievance--or
rather that misfortune, since {11} no one was in truth to blame in
the matter. It was forgotten by their people that the Colonial
Empire of the British and of the French had been built up by much
outlay of blood and treasure, extending over three centuries.
Germany had existed as a united State for less than half a century,
and already during that time had built up a very considerable oversea
dominion. It was unreasonable to suppose that she could at once
attain the same position as her fully grown rivals.
Thus this German discontent was based upon fixed factors which could
no more be changed by Britain than the geographical position which
has laid her right across the German exit to the oceans of the world.
That this deeply rooted national sentiment, which for ever regarded
Britain as the Carthage to which they were destined to play the part
of Rome, would sooner or later have brought about war, is beyond all
doubt. There are a score of considerations which show that a
European war had long been planned, and that finally the very date,
determined by the completion of the broadened Kiel Canal, had been
approximately fixed. The importations of corn, the secret
preparations of giant guns, the formations of concrete gun-platforms,
the early distribution of mobilisation papers, the sending out of
guns for auxiliary cruisers, the arming of the German colonies, all
point to a predetermined rupture. If it could not be effected on one
pretext, it certainly would on another. As a matter of fact, an
occasion was furnished by means which have not yet been fully cleared
up. It was one which admirably suited the German book, since it
enabled her to make her ally the apparent protagonist and so secure
her fidelity to the {12} bond. At the same time, by making the cause
of quarrel one which affected only the Slavonic races, she hoped to
discourage and detach the more liberal Western Powers and so divide
the ranks of the Allies from the outset. It is possible, though not
certain, that she might have effected this in the case of Great
Britain, but for her own stupendous blunder in the infraction of
Belgian neutrality, which left us a united nation in our agreement as
to the necessity of war.
The political balance of the Great Powers of Europe is so delicately
adjusted that any weakening of one means a general oscillation of
all. The losses of Russia in a sterile campaign in East Asia in 1904
disturbed the whole peace of the world. Germany took advantage of it
at once to bully France over Morocco; and in 1908, judging correctly
that Russia was still unfit for war, Austria, with the connivance and
help of Germany, tore up the Treaty of Berlin without reference to
its other signatories, and annexed the provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Russia immediately issued a futile protest, as did
Great Britain, but the latter had no material interest at stake. It
was otherwise with Russia. She was the hereditary guardian of Slav
interests which were directly attacked by this incorporation of an
unwilling Slav population into the Austrian Empire. Unable for the
moment to prevent it, she waited in silent wrath for the chance of
the future, humiliated and exasperated by the knowledge that she had
been bullied at the moment of her temporary weakness. So great had
been the indignity that it was evident that were she to tolerate a
second one it would mean the complete abandonment of her leadership
of the race.
On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, {13} heir to the
throne of the Austrian Empire, made a state visit to Sarajevo in the
newly annexed provinces. Here he was assassinated, together with his
wife. The immediate criminals were two youths named Princip and
Cabrinovic, but what exact forces were at the back of them, or
whether they merely represented local discontent, have never yet been
clearly shown. Austria was, however, naturally incensed against
Serbia, which was looked upon as the centre of all aggressive
Slavonic action. Politics take fantastic shapes in this
south-eastern corner of Europe, and murder, abduction, forgery, and
perjury are weapons which in the past have been freely used by all
parties. The provocation in this instance was so immense and the
crime so monstrous that had it been established after trustworthy
examination that Serbia had indeed been directly connected with it,
there is no doubt that the whole of Europe, including Russia, would
have acquiesced in any reasonable punishment which could be
inflicted. Certainly the public opinion of Great Britain would have
been unanimous in keeping clear of any quarrel which seemed to uphold
the criminals.
Austria seems to have instantly made up her mind to push the matter
to an extreme conclusion, as is shown by the fact that mobilisation
papers were received by Austrians abroad, bearing the date June 30,
so that they were issued within two days of the crime. An inquiry
was held in connection with the trial of the assassins, which was
reported to have implicated individual Serbians in the murder plot,
but no charge was made against the Serbian Government. Had Austria
now demanded the immediate trial and punishment of these accomplices,
she would {14} once again have had the sympathy of the civilised
world. Her actual action was far more drastic, and gave impartial
observers the conviction that she was endeavouring not to obtain
reparation but to ensure war. It is inconceivable that so important
a document as her ultimatum was launched without the approval of
Berlin, and we have already seen that Germany was in a mood for war.
The German newspapers, even before the Austrian demands were made,
had begun to insist that in view of the distracted domestic politics
of Great Britain, and of the declaration by M. Humbert in the French
Senate that the army was unprepared, the hour for definite
settlements had arrived.
The Austrian ultimatum was such a demand as one nation has never yet
addressed to another. Indeed, it could hardly be said that Serbia
would remain a nation if she submitted to it. Some clauses, though
severe, were within the bounds of reason. That papers should not be
allowed to incite hatred, and that secret societies which were
supposed to be connected with the crime should be forcibly
suppressed, were not unfair demands. So, too, that all accessories
to the plot, some of whom are mentioned by name, should be tried, and
that certain measures to prevent a possible recurrence of such plots
should be adopted. All these demands might be justified, and each of
them was, as a matter of fact, accepted by Serbia. The impossible
conditions were that Austrian judges should sit in Serbia upon
political cases and that delegates of Austria should have partial
administrative control in the neighbouring kingdom. Even these
outrageous demands were not rejected absolutely by the Serbian
Government, though it {15} proclaimed itself to be unable to accept
them in the crude form in which they were presented. A humble and
conciliatory reply concluded with an expression of the desire to
submit any point still open to impartial arbitration. The Austrian
Government--or the forces behind it--appeared, however, to have no
desire at all to find a peaceful solution. So precipitate were they
in their action, that on the receipt of the Serbian reply, in less
than an hour the Austrian Minister had left Belgrade, and a
diplomatic rupture, the immediate prelude to war, had taken place
between the two countries. So far only two figures were on the
stage, but already vast shadows were looming in the wings, and all
the world was hushed at the presentiment of coming tragedy.
It has been shown that Russia, the elder brother of the Slav races,
had once already been humiliated over Austrian policy and could not
be indifferent to this new attempt to coerce a Slavonic people. The
King of Serbia in his sore need appealed to the Czar and received a
sympathetic reply. A moderate castigation of Serbia might have been
condoned by Russia, but she could not contemplate unmoved a course of
action which would practically destroy a kindred State. The Austrian
army was already mobilising, so Russia also began to mobilise in the
south. Events crowded rapidly upon each other. On July 28 came the
declaration of war from Austria to Serbia. Three days later--days
which were employed by Great Britain in making every possible effort
to prevent the extension of the mischief--Germany as Austria's ally
declared war upon Russia. Two days later Germany declared war upon
France. The current ran swiftly as it drew nearer to Niagara.
{16}
The scope of this chronicle is more immediately concerned with the
doings of Great Britain in this sudden and frightful misfortune which
had fallen upon Europe. Her peaceful efforts were thrust aside, for
she was dealing with those who had predetermined that there should be
no peace. Even Austria, the prime mover in discord, had shown
herself inclined to treat at the last moment, but Germany had
hastened her onwards by a sudden ultimatum to Russia. From that
instant the die was cast. The attitude of France was never in doubt.
She was taken at a disadvantage, for her President was abroad when
the crisis broke out, but the most chivalrous of nations could be
relied upon to fulfil her obligations. She took her stand at once by
the side of her ally. The one all-important question upon which the
history of the world would depend, as so often before, was the action
of Great Britain.
Sir Edward Grey had proposed a conference of ambassadors to deal with
the situation, a suggestion which was set aside by Germany. So long
as the matter was purely Balkan it was outside the sphere of special
British interests, but day by day it was becoming more clear that
France would be involved, and a large party in Great Britain held
that it would be impossible for us to stand by and witness any
further dismembering of our neighbour. Thus the shadow which had
settled so heavily upon the south-east of Europe was creeping across
from east to west until it was already darkening the future of
Britain. It was obviously the German game, whatever her ultimate
designs might be upon the British Empire, to endeavour to keep it
peaceful until she had disposed of her Continental opponents. For
this reason a {17} strong bid was made for British neutrality upon
July 29, through the Ambassador at Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen. In an
official conversation the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg,
declared that Germany was ready to pledge herself to take no
territory from France in case of victory. He would make no promise
as regards the French colonies, nor was anything said as to the
French Fleet, nor as to the gigantic indemnity which was already
discussed in some of the German papers. In a word, the proposition
was that Great Britain was to abandon her friend at the hour of her
need on condition that she should be robbed but not mutilated.
Subsequent experience of German promises may lead us to doubt,
however, whether they would really have insured France against the
worst that the victor could inflict.
Sir Edward Grey answered with as much warmth as the iced language of
diplomacy will permit. His dispatch of July 30 begins as follows:
"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality
on such terms.
"What he asks us in effect is, to engage to stand by while French
colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not
take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
"From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for
France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her,
could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great Power, and
become subordinate to German policy.
"Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make
this bargain with Germany {18} at the expense of France, a disgrace
from which the good name of this country would never recover."
At a subsequent period the Premier, Mr. Asquith, voiced the sentiment
of the whole nation when he declared that the proposal was infamous.
The immediate concern of the British Government was to ascertain the
views of the rival Powers upon the question of Belgian neutrality,
which had been solemnly guaranteed by France, Prussia, and ourselves.
How faithfully this guarantee had been observed by France in the past
is shown by the fact that even when an infraction of the frontier at
Sedan in 1870 would have saved the French Army from total
destruction, it had not been attempted. There were signs in advance,
however, that Germany proposed to turn the French defences by
marching through Belgium. The arrangement of the new German
strategic railways upon the frontier all pointed to such a plan. It
was evident that such an action must at once bring Britain into the
struggle, since it is difficult to see how she could ever hold up her
head again if, after promising protection to a smaller nation, she
broke her bond at the moment of danger. The French, too, who had
left their northern frontier comparatively unfortified in reliance
upon the integrity of Belgium, would have rightly felt that they had
been betrayed by Britain if they suffered now through their
confidence in the British guarantee. The Balkans were nothing to
Great Britain, but she had more than her interests, she had her
national honour at stake upon the Belgian frontier.
On July 31 the British Government asked France and Germany whether
they were still prepared to stand by their pledge. France answered
promptly {19} that she was, and added that she had withdrawn her
armies ten kilometres from the frontier, so as to prove to the world
that her position was defensive only. From Germany there came an
ominous silence. Meanwhile, in Brussels the German representative,
Herr von Below-Saleske, was assuring the Belgian Government that
nothing was further from the intention of Germany than an infraction
of the frontier. These assurances were continued almost to the
moment of the arrival of German troops in Belgium, and give one more
instance of the absolute want of truth and honour which from the days
of Frederick the Great has been the outstanding characteristic of
German diplomacy. Just as the Seven Years' War was begun by an
attack upon an ally in times of peace, so her last two campaigns have
been opened, the one by the doctored telegram of Ems, and the other
by the perfidy to Belgium, which is none the less shameful because it
has been publicly admitted by the Chancellor.
Another incident of these crowded days deserves some record, as it
has been quoted in Germany as an instance of Great Britain having
stood in the way of a localisation of the war. This impression is
produced by suppressing a telegram in which it is shown that the
whole episode arose from a mistake upon the part of Prince
Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador. On August 1 Sir Edward Grey,
still feeling round for some way in which the evil might be
minimised, suggested through the telephone to Prince Lichnowsky that
if both Germany and France could see their way to stand out, the
conflict would then be limited to Austria and Russia. This practical
and possible suggestion was transmitted to Berlin in {20} the absurd
form that Britain would hold France out of the war, while Russia
would be abandoned to Germany and Austria. The Kaiser lost no time
in assenting to so delightful a proposal. It was at once pointed out
to Prince Lichnowsky that he had made a mistake, and the Prince
telegraphed to Berlin a correction of his previous message. This
second telegram was suppressed by the German Government, while, some
weeks afterwards, they published the inaccurate dispatch in order to
give the world the impression that Britain had actually made a move
towards peace which had been withdrawn when it was found that it was
eagerly welcomed by Germany. The very idea that Britain could in any
way pledge the actions of France is grotesque upon the face of it.
Whilst making this false suggestion as to the action of Britain, the
German Government carefully concealed the fact that Sir Edward Grey
had actually gone the extreme length in the interests of peace, of
promising that we should detach ourselves from our Allies if a
conference were held and their unreasonable attitude was an obstacle
to an agreement.
Whether, if Belgian neutrality had been honoured, Great Britain would
or would not have come into the war is an academic question which can
never be decided. Certainly she would never have come in as a united
nation, for public opinion was deeply divided upon the point, and the
Cabinet is understood to have been at variance. Only one thing could
have closed the ranks and sent the British Empire with absolute
unanimity into the fight. This was the one thing which Germany did.
However great her military power may be, it seems certain that her
diplomatic affairs were grievously mismanaged, and {21} that, in
spite of that cloud of spies who have been the precursors of her
Uhlans in each of her campaigns, she was singularly ill-informed as
to the sentiments of foreign nations. The columns of a single honest
British paper would have told her more of the true views and spirit
of the nation than all the eavesdroppers of her famous secret service.
We now come to the critical instant as regards Britain, leading to a
succession of incidents in Berlin so admirably described in Sir
Edward Goschen's classical report that it seems a profanation to
condense it. Having received no reply to their request for a
definite assurance about Belgium, the British Government instructed
their Ambassador to ask for an immediate answer upon August 4. The
startling reply from Von Jagow, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was
that the German troops had actually crossed the frontier. With a
cynical frankness the German statesman explained that it was a matter
of life or death to the Imperial Army to get their blow in quickly by
the undefended route. In answer to the shocked remonstrance of the
British Ambassador, he could only assert that it was now too late to
reconsider the matter. About seven in the evening Sir Edward Goschen
conveyed an ultimatum upon the subject to the German Government,
declaring war unless by midnight a more satisfactory answer could be
given.
From Herr von Jagow the Ambassador passed to the Chancellor, whom he
found much agitated. He broke into a harangue in which he used the
phrase, now become historic, that he could not understand the British
Government making such a fuss about a mere scrap of paper, and
declared that a breach of {22} territorial neutrality was a matter of
no great consequence. A recollection of the history of his own
country would none the less have reminded him that it was precisely
on account of an infringement of their frontier by the troops of
Napoleon that Prussia had entered upon the ill-fated war of 1806. He
continued by saying that he held Great Britain responsible for all
the terrible events which might happen. Sir Edward pointed out that
it was a matter of necessity that Great Britain should keep her
engagements, and added with dignity that fear of the consequences
could hardly be accepted as a valid reason for breaking them.
Such in brief was the momentous interview which determined the
question of peace or war between these two great Empires. Sir Edward
immediately forwarded a telegraphic summary of what had occurred to
London, but this telegram was never forwarded by the Berlin
authorities--one more of those actions for which the word "caddish"
is the most appropriate British adjective. Throughout all our German
experiences both before the war and during it, we have always found
our rivals to be formidable; they have usually proved themselves to
be both brave and energetic; but hardly ever have we recognised them
as gentlemen. Three centuries ago the leading nations of Europe had
attained something subtle and gracious which is still denied to the
Germans.
The populace of Berlin hastened to show these same unamiable
characteristics. Whereas the retiring Ambassadors in London, Paris,
and also in Vienna, met with courteous treatment, the German mob
surrounded the British Embassy and hurled {23} vituperations, and
finally stones, at its occupants. Defenceless people were hustled,
assaulted, and arrested in the streets. A day or two previously the
Russian Embassy had been brutally insulted by the populace upon its
departure--a fact which produced some regrettable, but very natural,
reprisals in Petrograd, to use the new name for the Russian capital.
The French Ambassador and his suite had also been very badly treated
in their journey to the Dutch frontier. Thus it was shocking, but
not surprising, to find that the Berlin mob indulged in excesses
towards the British representatives, and that shameful scenes marked
the final hours of Sir Edward Goschen's official duties. Truly, as
Herr von Jagow admitted, such incidents leave an indelible stain upon
the reputation of Berlin. It is pleasant to be able to add that Von
Jagow himself behaved with propriety, and did what he could to
mitigate the violence of the populace.
It is difficult for us to imagine how any German could possibly for
an instant have imagined that Great Britain would stand by in silent
acquiescence while the little country which she had sworn to protect
was overrun by German troops; but that such a delusion existed is
shown not only by the consternation of the Chancellor at Sir Edward's
message, but also by the extreme irritation of the Emperor. What
part Emperor William had played in the events which led up to the war
may possibly remain for ever the subject of debate. There are those
who argue that the Crown Prince and the military party had taken
advantage of his absence on one of his Norwegian tours, and had
hurried matters into such an impasse that he was unable to get them
back to more peaceful {24} lines. One would wish to think that this
were true, and there is evidence that on previous occasions his
influence has been exerted upon the side of peace to an extent which
was unwelcome to many of his own subjects. On the other hand, it is
very difficult to believe that such a situation, led up to by many
preparatory steps which included the _fons et origo mali_, the
provocative and impossible Austrian ultimatum, could have been
arranged without the assent of a man who has notoriously continually
interfered directly in all large, and many small, transactions of
state. However this may be, it is beyond dispute that the action of
Great Britain deprived him for the instant of his usual dignity and
courtesy, and he dispatched a verbal message by one of his
aides-de-camp in the following terms:
"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret
for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time
that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings
of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with
other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also
begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles
of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence
of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those
titles."
The Ambassador adds feelingly that this message lost nothing of its
acerbity by the manner of its delivery. Some artist of the future
will do justice to the scene where the benign and dignified old
diplomatist sat listening to the rasping utterances of the insolent
young Prussian soldier. The actual departure of the Embassy was
effected without {25} molestation, thanks once more to the good
offices of Herr von Jagow. On the same day, in the presence of a
large but silent crowd, the German Ambassador left London and
embarked for home in a vessel placed at his disposal by the British
Government. His voyage back, _via_ Flushing, was safely
accomplished, but it is worth recording that it was only the warning
from a British warship which prevented him and his staff from being
blown up by the mines which had already, within a few hours of the
outbreak of hostilities, been strewn thickly by his countrymen in the
path of neutral shipping across the highway of commerce in the North
Sea. Should our kinsmen of America ever find themselves in our
place, let them remember that it is "all in" from the beginning with
the Germans.
Let America also remember our experience that no pupil can go to a
German school, no scholar to a German university, and no invalid to a
German health-resort, without the chance of some sudden turn of
politics leaving them as prisoners in the country. Even the elderly
heart patients at Nauheim were detained by the German authorities.
An old admiral among them, Admiral Neeld, made a direct appeal as
sailor to sailor to Prince Henry of Prussia, and was answered by the
proverb that "War is war." Our contention is that such actions are
_not_ war, and that their perpetration will never be forgotten or
forgiven by the nations of the world, who can have no security that
when their subjects pass the German frontier they will ever get clear
again. Such practices are, of course, entirely distinct from that of
interning reservists or males of fighting age, which was freely done
by the Allies. It is only fair to say that after {26} a long delay
there was a release of schoolgirls, and afterwards one of doctors, by
the Germans, but many harmless travellers, students, and others were
held for a long period of the war at a time when tens of thousands of
Germans were free in Great Britain.
By a gross perversion of facts German publicists have endeavoured to
show that Great Britain was to blame for the final rupture. The
pretence is too absurd to deceive any one, and one can hardly think
that they believe it themselves. One has only to ask what had Great
Britain to do with the death of the Heir Apparent of Austria, with
the sending of the fatal ultimatum, with the declaration of war
against Russia and France, or, finally, with the infraction of the
Belgian frontier? She had nothing to do with any one of these
things, which all, save the first, emanated from Vienna or Berlin,
and were the obvious causes of the war. Britain was only involved
because she remained true to her solemn contract, a breach of which
would have left her dishonoured. It is mere effrontery to pretend
that she desired war, or that she left anything undone which could
have prevented it. We lay our record with confidence before foreign
nations and posterity. We have nothing to conceal and nothing to
regret.
On the other hand, supposing that one were to grant the whole of the
German contention, suppose one were to admit that Germany did not
know of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum or foresee its effect
upon the other nations of Europe, that she took her stand by the side
of Austria purely out of motives of chivalrous loyalty to an ally,
and that she was forced, by so doing, to find herself at variance
with Russia and France--suppose so inconceivable a hypothesis {27} as
this, even then it cannot in any way condone the admitted wrong which
Germany did in invading Belgium, nor does it show any possible cause
why, because Germany was false to her word in this matter, Britain
should be so also. This point is so unanswerable that the only
defence, if it can be called a defence, which Germany has ever put
forward is, that if she had not infringed Belgian neutrality,
somebody else would have done so. Not one shadow of evidence has
ever been put forward to justify so monstrous an assertion, which is
certainly not endorsed by the Belgians themselves.
In this connection one may allude to the so-called secret military
engagements which were found and published by the Germans at Brussels
and which were supposed to show that Great Britain herself
contemplated the infraction of Belgian neutrality. One can only
realise how bankrupt is Germany of all reason and argument when one
considers such a contention as this. For years the German threats
had been obvious to all the world. They had brought their strategic
railways to the frontier of Belgium, and erected their standing camps
there. Naturally Belgium was alarmed at such preparations and took
counsel with Great Britain how her pledge should be redeemed and how
her soil could be defended in case Germany proved perfidious. It was
a simple military precaution which involved not the breach of a
treaty but the fulfilment of one--not the invasion of Belgium but its
protection after it was invaded. Each successive so-called
"revelation" about the actions of Great Britain has only proved once
more that--
"Whatever record leaps to light
She never shall be shamed."
{28}
These attempts to confuse the issue irresistibly recall the message
of Frederic to Podowils when he was about to seize Silesia even as
William seized Belgium. "The question of right," he said, "is the
affair of ministers. It is your affair. It is time to work at it in
secret, for the orders to the troops are given." March first and
find some justification later.
Germany would have stood higher in the world's esteem and in the
estimate of history if, instead of playing in most grotesque fashion
the wolf to the lamb, and accusing her unprepared and distracted
neighbours of making a surprise attack upon her at the moment when
she was at the height of her preparations, she had boldly stated her
true position. Her dignity and frankness would have been undeniable
if she had said, "I am a great power. I believe I am the greatest.
I am willing to put it to the test of war. I am not satisfied with
my geographical position. I desire a greater seaboard. You must
give it to me or I shall take it. I justify my action by the fact
that the position of every state rests ultimately upon its strength
in war, and that I am willing to undergo that test."
Such a contention would have commanded respect, however much we might
resent it. But these repeated declarations from the Emperor himself,
the Chancellor, and so many others that they were deliberately
attacked, coupled with appeals to the Almighty, make up the most
nauseous mixture of falsehood and blasphemy which the world has ever
known. The whole conception of religion became grotesque, and the
Almighty, instead of a universal Father of the human race, was
suddenly transformed into "our good {29} old God," a bloodthirsty
tribal deity worthy of those Prussian pagans who as late as the
fourteenth century offered human sacrifices to their idols in the
Eastern Mark. The phenomenon was part of that general national
madness to which, it is to be hoped, the German of the future will
look back with bewilderment and shame.
One contention put forward by certain German apologists in connection
with the war would hardly be worth referring to, were it not for the
singular light which it casts upon the mental and moral position of a
large number of the German public. It was that some special culture
had been evolved by Germany which was of such value that it should be
imposed by force upon the rest of the world. Since culture must in
its nature be an international thing, the joint product of human
development, such a claim can only be regarded as a conspicuous sign
of its absence. In spiritual and intellectual matters it could not
be asserted that Germany since 1870 had shown any superiority over
France or England. In many matters she was conspicuously behind. It
might fairly be claimed that in chemistry, in music, and in some
forms of criticism, notably biblical exegesis, she was supreme. But
in how many fields was she inferior to Great Britain? What name had
she in poetry to put against Tennyson and Browning, in zoology to
compare with Darwin, in scientific surgery to excel that of Lister,
in travel to balance Stanley, or in the higher human qualities to
equal such a man as Gordon? The fruits of German culture do not bear
out the claim that it should forcibly supplant that of either of the
great Western nations.
We have now seen how the great cloud which had {30} hung so long over
Europe burst at last, and the blast of war swept the land from end to
end. We have passed through the years of hopes and alarms, of the
_ententes_ of optimists and the _détentes_ of politicians, of
skirmishes between journals and wrestles of finance, until we reach
the end of it all--open primitive warfare between the two great
branches of the Germanic family. In a purple passage Professor Cramb
spoke of the days when the high gods of virility would smile as they
looked down upon the chosen children of Odin, the English and the
Germans, locked in the joy of battle. The hour had struck, and it is
a partial record of those crowded and heroic days which is here set
forth with such accuracy of detail as diligence may command and
circumstances allow.
{31}