EARLY'S INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA
It will be remembered that General Grant set out upon his Virginia
campaign of 1864 with the definite and avowed purpose of crushing
and destroying Lee in the field. The completeness of his failure
to accomplish this purpose was made manifest in July, when Lee,
confronting the consolidated armies of the Potomac and the James,
nevertheless felt himself strong enough to detach from his own force
a vigorous body of troops under Early, with instructions to sweep
Hunter out of the Valley of Virginia and undertake a third invasion of
Maryland, so conducted as to threaten Baltimore and Washington.
This movement was a peculiarly daring one, but the strategy of it
was brilliant. The detachment of the troops sent to Early seriously
weakened the force that Lee had under his command for the defense of
the Confederate capital, but he hoped for such results from Early's
movement as should again compel the Federal Government to weaken or
withdraw Grant's army from the siege of Petersburg. He had twice before
succeeded by such tactics in compelling the Army of the Potomac to
withdraw from Virginia and stand upon its defense at the North. In both
instances as soon as that army had withdrawn Lee himself had moved with
all his force to the support of the invading column. There is little
doubt that he intended to repeat this operation if Early's threat to
Washington should prove effective in compelling Grant's withdrawal from
Virginia. But by this time volunteering by hundreds of thousands and
drafts, some of which brought as many as half a million men into the
field, had so enormously increased the Federal numbers that Grant was
strongly disposed to leave the defense of Washington to quite other
troops than those he had with him in his operations at Petersburg. The
disparity of numbers between the two armies had now become too great to
be offset by brilliant strategy, or by any energy in daring enterprise.
Hunter had so far carried out Grant's plan of ravaging the Valley of
Virginia and moving upon the Confederate lines of communication at
Lynchburg, as to create in Lee's mind a serious apprehension. Partly
to meet this danger, and partly with a larger strategic purpose,
Lee detached Early, and sent him down the Valley with about 8,000
men. Slipping into the upper or southern end of the valley without
discovery, Early plunged forward impetuously, and so completely broke
Hunter's resistance that that general, instead of retiring before his
enemy toward the Potomac, abandoned the field completely, and took
refuge in West Virginia, thus leaving Early's pathway to the region
beyond the Potomac open and unobstructed. Early was an officer of
extraordinary vigor and promptitude. He quickly crossed the Potomac
and pushed on to Monocacy near the city of Frederick. There he was met
by a force under General Lew Wallace on the ninth of July. Hurling
his army upon Wallace he quickly swept him from the field. He then
pushed forward until, on the eleventh of July, he came within sight of
Washington City itself, and for a time it was gravely feared there that
he would enter and possess the Federal capital.
Grant had known nothing of Early's detachment from Lee's army until the
news came to him that the Confederates were marching upon Washington in
threatening force. As has been said before, it was Grant's conviction
that Washington ought to be able to take care of itself so long as the
main body of the Army of Northern Virginia was kept busy in his own
front at Richmond and Petersburg. Nevertheless, as soon as news came to
him that Early had defeated Hunter and driven him out of the valley,
and that the Confederates were rapidly advancing upon Washington,
Grant detached a strong force, and hurried it to the capital city. In
the meanwhile the authorities at Washington seem to have been thrown
into a panic as dangerous as it was senseless. They did, indeed, take
certain measures of defense. They put arms in the hands of the clerks
in the several departments, and sought with these to make some show
of opposition to the approach of the Confederate veterans. This was
manifestly useless. The time had long gone by when untrained clerks,
however well armed, could be expected to stand for one moment against
the battle-hardened veterans who had learned their trade under Lee or
Grant in the desperate struggles in Virginia. It is not an exaggeration
but simple truth to say that at that time a single regiment from
either the Army of Northern Virginia or the Army of the Potomac could
easily and almost without effort have swept away a hundred thousand
untrained militiamen, however patriotic they may have been, and however
they may have been inspired with personal courage. To send a mob of
department clerks, however numerous, against such a force as that
which Early commanded was like sending sheep to a contest with wolves.
It meant the butchery of the poor fellows, without the smallest hope
that their sacrifice of life could yield anything of advantage to the
Federal cause or could delay the Confederate progress by more than
a few minutes at the most. But Grant had promptly met the danger by
hurrying two corps of his veterans to Washington city. Fortunately for
the Federal cause, this force got there in time to interpose itself
effectively between Early and the capital.
After burning the city of Chambersburg Early was compelled to retire,
which he did at once without loss, taking up a strong position in
the Valley of Virginia, where his presence as a continual threat to
Washington city was more effective than his coöperation with Lee at
Petersburg could have been.
Posted in the valley, Early's little force of 8,000 men served to
occupy twice or thrice that number of Grant's troops in the defense of
Washington, and in preparation for repelling an apprehended invasion of
the country north of that city.
This Monocacy campaign, as it is called in history, involved no great
battle, but as a strategic influence it was an achievement of the
utmost importance to General Lee. Before that campaign was begun
Hunter's presence in the Valley and his mastery there served not only
to cut off from Lee the rich supplies which it was his custom to draw
from that quarter of the country, but also to threaten him dangerously
in the rear. If Hunter had been let alone, he must presently have
forced his way to Lynchburg, cutting Lee's chief line of communication
with the south and west, and opening the way to a junction between his
own force and the forces which were pushing forward by Grant's order
from Tennessee toward that point. By the detachment of Early with
8,000 men Lee had succeeded in preventing all this; in driving Hunter
beyond the mountains into West Virginia, where his force could render
no assistance whatever to Grant's campaign; in clearing the valley of
all Federal forces; and in compelling Grant to keep at Washington a
strong force which he might otherwise have utilized in his operations
at Petersburg.
For several months after the Monocacy campaign this continued to be
the situation. It grew at last so intolerable to Grant that he sent
Sheridan to the Valley to drive Early out, and possess that fair
region. In the meanwhile the results of Early's brilliant campaign with
a handful of men, and his still more important success in holding the
Valley of Virginia with that same handful of men, had its influence
upon operations at the principal seat of hostilities.