SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST ATLANTA
The plan by which General Grant hoped to crush the Confederacy during
the summer of 1864 and to make an end of the resisting power of its
armies has been set forth already. In that plan, as the reader will
remember, an operation second in importance only to Grant's own
campaign in Virginia was Sherman's southward march from Chattanooga,
which was intended to defeat Johnston, seize upon Atlanta, and push
forward thence through the heart of the Confederacy, either to Mobile
or to Savannah, in either case cutting the Confederacy in two and
leaving Lee with no substantial country behind him. Sherman had already
in the spring swept through the country from Vicksburg to Chattanooga,
paralyzing Confederate resistance there, breaking up all the railroad
communications, and opening a wide path on the east of the Mississippi
river for any military operations that the Federal Government might
decide to institute in that quarter of the country. Then Grant in
pursuance of his policy of putting his strongest lieutenants into
the most important commands under himself, had ordered Sherman to
take control of all the forces in the West, subject to no dictation
whatsoever, except such as Grant himself might find occasion to
exercise. And in giving Sherman his orders, Grant steadfastly bore
in mind his conviction that Sherman was a general too capable and too
energetic to need minute instruction or anything more than general
orders. To Sherman he assigned a command and a duty. He left it to
Sherman's own judgment so to handle the command as to execute the duty,
and accomplish the purpose intended.
Many months earlier Grant had left affairs undirected in a part of
the smaller area which he then controlled upon the avowed ground that
"Sherman was there." Upon the same principle and in the same abounding
confidence in his lieutenant, he thought it sufficient in 1864 to
tell Sherman in a general way what he wanted him to do in aid of the
general purposes of the campaign, and to leave him to do it in his own
way. In scarcely any other act of his life did Grant better illustrate
the breadth and strength of his own capacity than he did in thus
appreciating and trusting Sherman, and in treating Meade in like manner
in Virginia so far as his own presence with Meade's army permitted.
Sherman's problem was difficult of execution, but perfectly simple in
its terms. It was his duty to assail Johnston, destroy him if possible,
seize upon Atlanta, the great railroad center of the South, and push
a column thence to the sea. For the accomplishment of this purpose
Sherman had the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General George
H. Thomas, the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by General James B.
McPherson, and the Army of the Ohio, commanded by General John M.
Schofield. His total fighting force was about 100,000 men.
Opposed to him was Johnston, who lay at Dalton, Georgia, with about
43,000 men.
Sherman had hope of reinforcements sufficient at least to make good his
losses on the march which he was about to undertake, while Johnston
perfectly knew that he could hope for no reinforcement at all. Sherman
had lines of communication over which he could bring to his army 130
carloads of provisions each day. Johnston's men sometimes had scanty
rations, and sometimes none at all. He had no secure source of supply
in any quarter, as was usually the case with Confederate armies at this
period of the war. Lee's army had received a ration of three quarters
of a pound of uncooked flour to each man at Spottsylvania just before
the movement from that point, and it was three days later--three
days of hard fighting and hard marching--before the majority of them
received any other rations whatsoever. Johnston's army was similarly
starved during the campaign of Atlanta.
On the fifth of May, 1864, at precisely the same time when Grant moved
into the Wilderness, Sherman set out on his march to Atlanta. With the
true instinct of a fighting commander, he had stripped himself and his
army of all encumbering baggage and other superfluities. He had no
tent, even for himself. And he boasted in after years that he changed
his underclothes only once between Chattanooga and Atlanta. He required
all his officers, high and low, except General Thomas, whose health was
impaired, to follow his own example of unencumbered movement.
The distance from Chattanooga to Atlanta, as the crow flies, is almost
exactly a hundred miles. Johnston's position at Dalton was about
fifteen miles southeast of Chattanooga. The country is a hilly and
broken one, traversed by many streams which afford good defensive
positions to a retiring army, as do also the various gaps among the
hills which must be crossed by an army advancing offensively. Johnston
was strongly fortified at Dalton and Sherman, not venturing to assail
him in his works there, sent McPherson to make a détour, and strike the
Confederate lines of communication at Resaca, ten miles or so farther
south.
There McPherson found Johnston's men behind earthworks, and wisely or
unwisely shrank from attacking them in their defenses. If he could have
carried the works at Resaca Johnston's position would have been one of
extremest danger from which he could escape only by fighting on all
sides at once, and forcing his way through opposing lines, strongly
posted and well fortified. But in McPherson's judgment an attack at
that point with such force as he had with him was unadvisable. He
therefore refrained from attack, and fell back to a secure position in
the hills to await the approach of reinforcements. Sherman promptly
moved to McPherson's position, only to find that Johnston had also
retired from Dalton to Resaca, and had concentrated his entire army
there in a strong defensive position.
Even with all his army present Sherman, himself, hesitated to attack
Johnston in his works--a fact which seems a sufficient answer to that
criticism of McPherson which has been freely exploited in writings
concerning this campaign.
Sherman, however, had so greatly the advantage of Johnston in numbers
that he could afford to send large detachments against the Confederate
general's communications, while still holding a threatening position of
his own in front. This he did with consummate skill, forcing Johnston
with his small army to retreat southward following the railroad, and
destroying as he went.
Johnston left Resaca on the night of the fifteenth of May, and on the
nineteenth took position at Cassville, where he seemed to offer battle
to his enemy. But after some sharp skirmishing the Confederate general
retreated again during the night of the twentieth to a point south of
the Etowah river and to Alatoona.
After a few days of rest and reprovisioning, Sherman moved again, not
directly against his antagonist, but by the flank, so as to threaten
Marietta and Atlanta itself, which lies only a few miles south of
Marietta. By this movement Sherman hoped to force Johnston to abandon
his strong position at Alatoona Pass, where he securely held the
railroad over which Sherman had need to bring his supplies in any
further advance that he might make southward.
Promptly recognizing the purpose of this movement, Johnston marched
westward to assail his enemy in flank. The two armies met at New Hope
Church, a point a few miles west of Marietta, and a few miles northwest
of Atlanta. Here for six days there was continuous and very bloody
fighting, both armies doing their work in a fashion that rivaled even
that of the contending forces in Virginia.
By virtue of his superior numbers, Sherman was able to make strong
detachments to assail the communications and the flanks of Johnston's
army, and thus to compel him to fall back again to a strong defensive
position on the railroad above Marietta, on Kenesaw, Lost and Pine
Mountains.
Against this position Sherman advanced with caution, strongly
entrenching himself in its front. There the fighting was continuous and
costly of human life on both sides. There it was that General Leonidas
Polk, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, who had been educated
at West Point for the military service, but who had afterwards risen to
the highest place of honor in his church as a Bishop, and had at the
outbreak of the war entered the Confederate service in which he had
risen to the rank of major general, was instantly killed by a cannon
shot which Sherman himself had directed to be fired into a group of
Confederate officers of whom he caught sight on a hill. This was on
June 14.
If he had had anything like Sherman's force with which to contest
Sherman's advance, Johnston's position at this time would have been
one of peculiar strength and opportunity. But his line was ten miles
long, and the ground was so broken that the reinforcement of one part
of it by another was peculiarly difficult, while, on the other hand,
Sherman's assailing position was geographically such that he might
concentrate forces at will and without observation against any point in
Johnston's line which he might select for assault.
Without further following the details of this struggle it is enough to
say that day by day Johnston slowly retired toward Atlanta, obstinately
fighting at every point and baffling all the efforts of his brilliant
assailant to break through his lines, or to take him by surprise in the
rear of either of his flanks.
On the morning of the twenty-seventh of June Sherman determined to end
this struggle by a tremendous assault upon his enemy's entrenchments.
At two points a mile apart he hurled his columns against them with
all the fury that it was possible to infuse into the minds and the
conduct of veteran soldiers. At the same time he ordered all other
troops on all other parts of the line to maintain an incessant fire by
way of preventing the removal of troops from the unassailed parts of
Johnston's lines, for the reinforcement of those defending the points
of special attack.
It was Sherman's hope to break through Johnston's lines, cut his army
in twain, hold one half of it in position by stubborn fighting and
crush the other half by a desperate rush. This plan was baffled only
by the desperate courage and splendid obstinacy of the fighting on the
Confederate side. The Federal columns advanced to the charge with all
the determination that is possible even to the best of veteran troops.
The Confederates resisted with a like determination, mowing down their
adversaries by a withering fire from behind the breastworks, and so far
depleting their strength as to render it impossible for them to force
their way over or through the resisting lines. A very few of Sherman's
men succeeded in reaching the Confederate works, and these were
promptly shot down or made prisoners. Sherman's loss in this attempt
was more than 2,500 men, while the Confederate loss was less than one
third as great.
Thus defeated in his attempt to push his way to Atlanta, while holding
on to his communications in rear, Sherman now determined upon a
desperate move which violated all the traditions of war and all the
teachings of the books on strategy, but which both Lee and Grant had
boldly adopted and with success, on other and most notable occasions.
Loading his wagons with ten days' supplies of food and ammunition he
decided to abandon his communications altogether, move independently
of them, and trust to the fortunes of war for a success which might
justify the daring of his endeavor. He had tried and failed to force
Johnston back to Atlanta. He now determined to maneuver him into such
retreat and in the course of his maneuvering boldly to take the risk of
the destruction or the capture of his own army.
His plan was to swing his entire army--foot loose from its
communications--around Johnston's flank, and to strike the railroad in
the Confederate general's rear, between Marietta and Atlanta. If he
could succeed in doing this, he would easily compel Johnston to make
a hasty retreat upon the defenses of Atlanta. But should he fail in
doing it he would have on his hands an army in the field, destitute
alike of provisions and ammunition so soon at least, as the supplies it
carried with it should be consumed. In that event he must surrender to
a foe vastly inferior to himself in numbers, for no army can long live
without food and no army can fight after its ammunition is expended.
Thus Sherman undertook to accomplish certain great military operations
within ten days' time, with the certainty present to his mind that
should he fail he must fail disastrously, sacrifice all the achievement
which he had set out to gain, and possibly even surrender an army that
outnumbered its adversary far more than two to one.
Following the same plan which Grant was following in Virginia but by
reverse process, Sherman on the night of July second made a movement by
his right flank southward, withdrawing first the troops on his left,
and passing them to the right, in rear of troops still holding the
lines.
Johnston was quick to penetrate Sherman's purpose, and by way of
defeating it he promptly abandoned his position, and fell back to the
Chattahoochee river, which closely flanks Atlanta on the northwest.
Sherman had hoped that Johnston would attempt the immediate crossing of
that stream, and he therefore hurried forward his strongest divisions,
in the hope of catching his enemy in the act, and assailing him at a
disadvantage. But Johnston was too wily for that. He had prepared for
himself in advance a line of fortifications along the Chattahoochee,
which Sherman has described as one of the strongest pieces of field
fortifications he ever saw.
Here Johnston briefly paused while Sherman prepared to turn his
position by crossing the river both above and below. The works,
however, gave Johnston the opportunity he desired to make his crossing
unmolested, and with his little handful of men after his brilliant and
sturdily fighting retreat, before an army heavily outnumbering his own
Johnston retired to the defenses of Atlanta.
Then on the seventeenth of July came a change of commanders on the
Confederate side which did more than anything else that happened or
could have happened during the campaign, to help forward Sherman's
success. Angrily and with insulting comment, the Confederate
authorities removed Johnston from command and ordered him to turn over
his authority to General John B. Hood.
In a subordinate position Hood had demonstrated a vigorous fighting
capacity. He had not before commanded an army, and in the opinion
of those who had directed his operations, he was a man peculiarly
unfit to command an army. General Longstreet once said of him, "Hood
is one of the best division commanders I ever knew. He would fight
anybody anywhere, at any time. But he has no more discretion than any
pugnacious schoolboy might be expected to manifest."
Hood's proceedings at and after Atlanta certainly justified this
judgment of a great general who had had full opportunity to observe his
conduct and estimate his capacities. For surely at no point in the war
was a situation more blunderingly or more bravely handled than was that
at Atlanta under Hood. If that general had had any discretion at all
he must have seen that it was the one function of his army to delay,
embarrass and prevent Sherman's march through Georgia to the sea. Yet
no sooner was that march undertaken than Hood abandoned all effort
to check it, left Sherman free to do as he might, and himself marched
northward upon a wild-goose chase of campaigning in pursuit of the pot
of gold at the farther end of the rainbow. With all that we shall deal
hereafter.
Hood's reckless impetuosity promptly manifested itself. Abandoning
all of Johnston's precautions, and quitting his defenses, Hood
hurled column after column upon the enemy on the twentieth of July
and succeeding days, only to have them broken to pieces in a mad
endeavor to accomplish the impossible. He inflicted heavy losses upon
Sherman's army, to be sure, but his madness entailed upon his own
force losses which it could far less well afford. There is no doubt
whatever that his impetuosity, which some critics have characterized
as foolhardiness, greatly aided Sherman in his purpose of capturing
Atlanta.
Beaten in these insane ventures Hood was slowly forced back upon the
inner defenses of the town, but he had not yet learned his lesson.
As late as the twenty-second of the month he again moved out of his
fortifications and assailed Sherman with a vigor which would have been
praiseworthy had he possessed a force adequate to his undertaking.
Seven times he pushed his men forward to the assault, and seven times
he was bloodily repulsed. It was gallant fighting that he did, but
fighting ill directed and foolishly undertaken. To paraphrase the
familiar quotation, it was magnificent, but it was not war. So far as
the facts are ascertainable, it appears that Hood's losses greatly
exceeded those which he inflicted upon his enemy, a very serious
circumstance in view of the fact of his greatly inferior numbers.
On the twenty-seventh of July Sherman again moved by his right flank
in the attempt to cut the railroad lines south of Atlanta. On the
twenty-eighth Hood assailed him violently, and a severe action occurred
involving heavy losses on both sides. Thus far in the campaign,
according to the official reports, the Confederates had lost 8,841 men,
and the Federals 9,917.
The campaign had been accompanied by various and extensive cavalry
raids, chiefly on the part of the Federal troops. On one of these raids
the Federal General Stoneman was captured with 700 of his men, while
General McCook, who was to have met and coöoperated with him, lost the
greater part of his force as prisoners.
Continuing his southward movements by the right flank Sherman at last
succeeded in placing his army south of Atlanta, where a deal of hard
fighting occurred.
The position thus taken up by the Federals rendered it imperative
that Hood should either assail and crush his foe or make such escape
as he could from Atlanta. His efforts to crush his foe had failed too
conspicuously for even so venturesome a commander to renew them, and
accordingly on the night of September first Hood destroyed all that
he could of government property, and withdrew to a strong position
eastward of the town. Sherman immediately occupied Atlanta, and quickly
made an impregnable fortress of it.
His army now lay fortified almost in the center of what remained of
the Confederacy. A pause for reorganization, recuperation and the
bringing in of supplies was all that remained to him before he should
undertake that march to the sea by which Grant had ordered him again to
cut the Confederacy in twain. He expected to make that march in daily
and hourly conflict with Hood's forces. But as we shall see hereafter,
when the story of that matter is told, he made the march in fact, with
no opposition at all, beyond that of some handfuls of cavalry, for the
reason that Hood, after the surrender of Atlanta, had gone rainbow
chasing northward into Tennessee.