FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR
From the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows that
the political conduct of the State, while affecting the mental attitude
of the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on the
preparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself.
But, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual and
moral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the military
authorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, still
further demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance of
the State. In the first place, financial preparations for war must be
made, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; the
national finances must be so treated that the State can bear the
tremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. Further,
as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort of
mobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insure
under all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for the
material and industrial needs of the country. Finally, preparations for
war must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be made
to bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far as
possible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come.
If that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, in
whom confidence can be reposed should war break out.
I am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on the
commercial and financial side of the question. In the sphere of
commercial policy especially I cannot even suggest the way in which the
desired end can be obtained. Joint action on the part of the Government
and the great import houses would seem to be indicated. As regards
finance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one may
go so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the national
household in order, but to maintain the credit of the State, so that, on
the outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of money
required for carrying it on without too onerous conditions.
The credit of State depends essentially on a regulated financial
economy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by the
current incomings. Other factors are the national wealth, the
indebtedness of the State, and, lastly, the confidence in its productive
and military capabilities.
As regards the first point, I have already pointed out that in a great
civilized World State the balancing of the accounts must never be
brought about in the petty-State fashion by striking out expenditure for
necessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the military
forces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory general
progress. The incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportion
to the real needs. But, especially in a State which is so wholly based
on war as the German Empire, the old manly principle of keeping all our
forces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to the
effeminate philosophy of the day. Fichte taught us that there is only
one virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only one
vice--to think of self. Ultimately the State is the transmitter of all
culture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of the
individual for itself.[A] These ideas, which led us out of the deepest
gloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at an
epoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years of
the last century. The peace-loving contentment which then prevailed in
Prussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways large
sections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on the
Government.
Among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line of
demarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nations
contested the sole possession of the world," nobody gave any thought to
the great change of times. In the same way many Germans to-day look
contentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shut
their eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great duties
imposed upon us by it. Even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrial
pride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which in
our history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacity
and energy."[B]
[Footnote A: Treitschke.]
[Footnote: B Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte."]
Under conditions like the present the State is not only entitled, but is
bound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens,
since it is vital questions that are at stake. It is equally important,
however, to foster by every available means the growth of the national
property, and thus to improve the financial capabilities.
This property is to a certain extent determined by the natural
productiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. But
these possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labour
of all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced.
Here, then, the State can profitably step in. It can protect and secure
labour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labour
conditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports by
concluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitate
German trade by vigorous political representation of German interests
abroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profits
from international commerce;[C] it can increase agricultural production
by energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitable
protective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent on
foreign countries for our food. The encouragement of deep-sea fishery
would add to this.[D]
[Footnote: C England earns some 70 millions sterling by international
commerce, Germany about 15 millions sterling.]
[Footnote D: We buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish from
foreign countries.]
From the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increase
permanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of the
annual increase in population the home requirements may for some time be
met to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. Home
production now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95
per cent, of the meat required. To maintain this proportion, the
production in the next ten years must be increased by at most two
double-centners per Hectare, which is quite possible if it is considered
that the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by two
million tons.
A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the national
prosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our own
colonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immense
quantities from foreign countries, and so making us gradually
independent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, to
transforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods by
effective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The less
we are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards,
[E] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of the
State will improve.
[Footnote E: We obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476,400 tons
of cotton, 185,300 tons of wool, 8,500,000 tons of iron, 124,000 tons of
copper, etc.]
If the State can thus contribute directly to the increase of national
productions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after the
reduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financial
position. But payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, a
two-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays.
The gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may very
easily be lost again on the other. Even from the financial aspect it is
a bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order to
improve the financial position. The experiences of history leave no
doubt on that point. Military power is the strongest pillar of a
nation's credit. If it is weakened, financial security at once is
shaken. A disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the State
creditors may easily become losers by it. But a State whose army holds
out prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers its
creditors far better security than a weaker military power. If our
credit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatened
political position is chiefly to blame. If we chose to neglect our army
and navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possible
liquidation of our debt. We have a twofold duty before us: first to
improve our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and to
keep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go.
The question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task.
It is inconceivable that the German people has reached the limits of
possible taxation. The taxes of Prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and
1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from
20.62 marks to 32.25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the same
proportion may hold in the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there is
a huge increase in the national wealth. This amounts, in the German
Empire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5,000 to 6,000 marks per
head of the population. In France the wealth, calculated on the same
basis, is no higher, and yet in France annually 20 marks, in Germany
only 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army and
navy. In England, on the contrary, where the average wealth of the
individual is some 1,000 marks higher than in Germany and France, the
outlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. Thus our most
probable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for their
armaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal danger
politically.
Attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increase
of wealth in Germany continues to be on an ascending scale. Trades and
industries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw a
setback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again.
The advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of the
Empire, is extraordinary. "The total of imports and exports has
increased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in the
year 1908, or by 232 per cent., and in value from 6 milliards to 14
1/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. Of these, the value of the
imports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of the
exports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards.... The value of the import of
raw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in
1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export of
such raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The import
of made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 a
value of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export of
manufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. The value of the
import of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3
milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of food
remained at about the same figure.
The mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension in
Germany during the last thirty years. The amount of coal raised amounted
in 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2
million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The
quantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in
1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35
million to 170 million marks. The output of iron-ore has increased from
6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119
million marks.... From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany
has increased by 127 per cent.; in England only by about 59 per cent.
The raw iron obtained has increased in Germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172
per cent.; in England there is a rise of 27 per cent. only.[F]
[Footnote F: Professor Dr. Wade, Berlin.]
Similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. The financial
position of the Empire has considerably improved since the Imperial
Finance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the Budget may very
soon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent.
It was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growth
of revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressive
capitalization. Such a fact has been the case, and to a very marked
extent. From the year 1892-1905 in Prussia alone an increase of national
wealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. The number of
taxpayers and of property in the Property Tax class of 6,000 to 100,000
marks has in Prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent.,
from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent.; in the first period, therefore, by 2 per
cent., in the last years by 3 per cent. annually. In these classes,
therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greater
proportion in the large fortunes. In the Property Tax class of 100,000
to 500,000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent.--i.e., on
an average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. annually, while in
the last three years it has been 4.6 per cent. In the class of 500,000
marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 per
cent. in the taxpayers and 67 per cent. in the property; and, while in
the fourteen years the increase is on an average 4.5 per cent. annually,
it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8.6 per cent. This means
per head of the population in the schedule of 6,000 to 100,000 marks an
increase of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100,000 to 500,000 marks an
increase per head of 6,400 marks, and in the schedule of 500,000 marks
and upwards an increase of 70,480 marks per head and per year.
We see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable and
annually increasing growth, which the Prussian Finance Minister has
estimated for Prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next three
years, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole Empire 5 milliards
yearly in the same period. Wages have risen everywhere. To give some
instances, I will mention that among the workmen at Krupp's factory at
Essen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent.,
the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent., and the
annual earnings in the Dortmund district of the chief mining office from
1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. This increase in earnings is also shown by
the fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 has
reached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower and
poorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvement
in prosperity is perceptible. It can also be regarded as a sign of a
healthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemployment
are considerably diminished in Germany. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants
left our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen's
unions, only 4.4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas in
the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain and 10 per
cent. (in France it was as much as 11.4 per cent.) of members of
workmen's unions were unemployed.
Against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large national
debt, both in the Empire and in the separate States. The German Empire
in the year 1910 had 5,016,655,500 marks debt, and in addition the
national debt of the separate States on April 1, 1910, reached in--
Marks
Prussia 9,421,770,800
Bavaria 2,165,942,900
Saxony 893,042,600
Würtemberg 606,042,800
Baden 557,859,000
Hesse 428,664,400
Alsace-Lorraine 31,758,100
Hamburg 684,891,200
Lübeck 666,888,400
Bremen 263,431,400
Against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains,
forests, mines, and railways. The stock capital of the State railways
reached, on March 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in--
Marks,
Prussia (Hesse) 9,888
Bavaria 1,694
Saxony 1,035
Würtemburg 685
Baden 727
Alsace-Lorraine 724
--a grand total, including the smaller State systems, of 15,062 milliard
marks. This sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of
1911 for Prussia alone 11,050 milliards. Nevertheless, the national
debts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageously
because these debts are almost all contracted in the country, and
presses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly in
debt.
The debt of the Prussian towns and country communes of 10,000
inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3,000 million marks, in the
whole Empire to some 5,000 million marks. This means that interest
yearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that many
communes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions,
are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, or
even 400 per cent. The taxes also are not at all equally distributed
according to capacity to pay them. The main burden rests on the middle
class; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. Some sources of
wealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculative
income not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations on
the Stock Exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted into
property. Nevertheless, the German nation is quite in a position to pay
for the military preparations, which it certainly requires for the
protection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization,
so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and the
opposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles on
the altar of patriotism.
The dispute about the so-called Imperial Finance reform has shown how
party interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it was
not pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to his
neighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financial
sacrifices. It must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will be
made in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. But a
considerable and rapid rise of the Imperial revenue is required if we
wish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future of
our country without a blow.
Under these conditions I see no other effectual measure but the speedy
introduction of the _Reichserbrecht_ (Imperial right of succession), in
order to satisfy the urgent necessity. This source of revenue would
oppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and would
furnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and to
diminish our burden of debt.
If the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters,
depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if they
could only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in their
favour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the State stepped in as
heir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation based
on official material, could be counted upon. This is not the place to
examine this calculation more closely. Even if it is put at too high a
figure, which I doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very large
under any circumstances.
Since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--that
is to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in the
nature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the first
instance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially to
paying off debts. Otherwise there would be the danger of acting like a
private gentleman who lives on his capital. This idea is also to be
recommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liable
to fluctuations. It would be advisable to devote the proceeds
principally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishing
the debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremely
important. This fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibility
that in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to other
important purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments on
land and sea.
There are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may be
urged against this right of the State or the Empire to inherit. It is
argued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth,
that the State would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in course
of time capital would be united in the hand of the State, that the
independent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus the
ideal of Socialism would be realized. Secondly, the requirement that
relations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will,
is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "According to
our prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of his
fortune must do some positive act. He must make a will, in which he
bequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or to
any other object. It is thus brought before his mind that his natural
heirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if he
wishes to exclude his legal heirs. It is impressed upon him that he is
interfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things,
that he is wilfully altering it. The Imperial right of succession is
based on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individual
than his family. This is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait.
The socialistic State, which deals with a society made up of atoms, in
which every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all are
alike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim of
this sort."[F]
[Footnote F: Bolko v. Katte, in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of November 18, 1910.]
Both objections are unconvincing.
So long as the State uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order to
liquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be met
otherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the State is directly
beneficial to all members of the State, because they have to pay less
taxes. Legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital in
the hands of the State, since, if such results followed, this right of
succession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of the
State be prevented in other ways. The science of finance could
unquestionably arrange that. There is no necessity to push the scheme to
its extreme logical conclusion.
The so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. If a true sense
of family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make a
will, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. If
such ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right of
certain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloof
in life. Indeed, the Crown's right of inheritance would produce probably
the result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family ties
would actually be strengthened. The "primitive German sense of law,"
which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, and
is summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individual
than the State, has so far borne the most mischievous results. It is the
root from which the disruption of Germany, the particularism and the
defective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. It is well that in
the coming generation some check on this movement should be found, and
that the significance of the State for the individual, no less than for
the family, should be thoroughly understood.
These more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weighty
enough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this Imperial
right of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid help
and the whole future of Germany is at stake.
If, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equally
large revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such a
law of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit our
sorely-pressed country. Help is urgently needed, and there would be good
prospects of such law being passed in the Reichstag if the Government
does not disguise the true state of the political position.
Political preparations are not less essential than financial. We see
that all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves against
the attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, and
are winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. Efforts are
also often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so as
to have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on which
England has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her world
policy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even if
she has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she has
built up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and has
secured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitious
careers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of this
English policy. We must realize to ourselves that it is guided
exclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no means
of accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill.
There must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangements
have only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacit
reservation. Every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sic
stantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contracting
party, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are really
benefited. This is a political principle that cannot be disputed.
Nothing can compel a State to act counter to its own interests, on which
those of its citizens depend. This consideration, however, imposes on
the honest State the obligation of acting with the utmost caution when
concluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, so
as to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. Conditions may arise
which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. The
country's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethical
sense--must then turn the scale. "Frederick the Great was all his life
long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could ever
induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."[A]
The great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ or
alliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only if
he is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such an
arrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. Such an alliance is,
as I have shown in another place, the Austro-German. The two States,
from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in the
happiest way complements of each other. The German theatre of war in the
east will be protected by Austria from any attempt to turn our flank on
the south, while we can guard the northern frontier of Austria and
outflank any Russian attack on Galicia.
Alliances in which each contracting party has different interests will
never hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent a
permanent political system.
"There is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded as
effective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocal
interests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and the
other gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation." These
are the words of Frederick the Great, our foremost political teacher
_pace_ Bismarck.
We must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, but
must look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probable
attitude of the other States by reference to their own interests.
Bismarck tells us that "Illusions are the greatest danger to the
diplomatist. He must take for granted that the other, like himself,
seeks nothing but his own advantage." It will prove waste labour to
attempt to force a great State by diplomatic arrangements to actions or
an attitude which oppose its real interests. When a crisis arises, the
weight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale.
When Napoleon III. planned war against Prussia, he tried to effect an
alliance with Austria and Italy, and Archduke Albert was actually in
Paris to conclude the military negotiations.[B] These probably were
going on, as the French General Lebrun was in Vienna on the same errand.
Both countries left France in the lurch so soon as the first Prussian
flag flew victoriously on the heights of the Geisberg. A statesman less
biassed than Napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither Austria
nor Italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a war
under unfavourable conditions.
[Footnote B: When Colonel Stoffel, the well-known French Military Attaché
in Berlin, returned to Paris, and was received by the Emperor, and
pointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection of
Prussia's war preparations, the Emperor declared that he was better
informed. He proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on the
conditions of the Prussian army apparently sent to him by Archduke
Albert, which came to quite different conclusions. The Emperor had
made the facts therein stated the basis of his political and military
calculations. (Communications of Colonel Stoffel to the former
Minister of War, v. Verdy, who put them at the service of the author.)]
France, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests,
unscrupulously brushed aside the Conventions of Algeciras, which did not
satisfy her. She will equally disregard all further diplomatic
arrangements intended to safeguard Germany's commercial interests in
Morocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly her
interest to be undisputed master in Morocco and to exploit that country
for herself. France, when she no longer fears the German arms, will not
allow any official document in the world to guarantee German commerce
and German enterprise any scope in Morocco; and from the French
standpoint she is right.
The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its own
interests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the different
Great Powers must be judged by that standard. There is no doubt,
however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the political
grouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possible
only by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the State with
which closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to its
opponents. A policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but to
further the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyone
and of being left isolated in the hour of danger.
A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking
chances and facing risks. It must be conscious of its goal, and keep
this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances
and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above
all things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and take
bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility
of realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under
favourable conditions. "The great art of policy," writes Frederick the
Great, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events to
one's own profit. It consists rather in deriving advantage from
favourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures." Even in
his Rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adhered
all his life: "Wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; but
boldness alone can acquire." "I give you a problem to solve," he said to
his councillors when the death of Emperor Charles VI. was announced.
"When you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?"
Definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correct
summing up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurate
estimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of the
interests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, and
daring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great laws
of political and military success.
The political preparation for war is included in them. He who is blinded
by the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be able
to make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success.
"The braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claim
which swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity which
shelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were more
despised than by the great Prussian King," so H. v. Treitschke tells us.
"Old Fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us with
remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the
political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss
the golden opportunity.
It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatize
that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist
policy. That title can only be given to the policy which sets up
personal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the real
current of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures,
as Napoleon did in Mexico, and Italy in Abyssinia.
A policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing these
great duties of the State, which are an historical legacy and are based
on the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with the
possibility of a war. This is at once apparent if one considers the
result to the State when war is forced on it under disadvantageous
circumstances. I need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastrophe
to which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led.
In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japan
had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as
military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and
assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Her
policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at
the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment
of her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. She
had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance
with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to
place sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover,
compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of
the Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field against
Japan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparations
required by the political position had been made, although the conflict
had long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrous
retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is no
doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made
resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the
campaign by the offensive.
England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and
consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to
her aims or suited to give weight to political demands.
Two points stand out clearly from this consideration.
First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and
political preparations for war. Proper political preparations for war
are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong
enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing
which he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must be
developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects. The
obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace
as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister
and the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with the
all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain
influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs,
and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military
situation is peculiarly favourable. At the same time the Minister who
conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is
in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of
the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he
must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by
war. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has
of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the
realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the
opponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy of
compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a
permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of
recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one,
but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to
end in political and moral defeat.
The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and
hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and
shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always
creates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory,
tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy,
which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts
favourably on the military situation.
In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can
only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution
join hands.
If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next
war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion:
the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the
necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions
are to be created for the inevitably threatening war.
So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two
fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war
from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was
comparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of various
strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small
compass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the
other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive
action on both sides. To-day the situation is different.
We must consider England, as well as France and Russia. We must expect
not only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing of
English forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutch
neutrality by our enemies. It is also not inconceivable that England may
land troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into war
with us. It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in a
position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather
be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and
south-east frontiers. An attack by France through Switzerland is also
increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of
the European States is effected. Finally, we should be seriously menaced
in the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet.
All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur
simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations
they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the
military aspect. The military situation thus created is very
unfavourable.
If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the
army on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet the
situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the
stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure,
and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must
count. The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one
also. A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have
to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be
directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and
all necessary steps could be considered. Until that moment the troops of
the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected
along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when
occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. On the same
principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in
readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport
arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many
different lines of march as possible. Previous arrangements for
unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the
most various political prospects. We should in any case be forced to
adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present
conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent
an invasion by one or other of our enemies.
No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good
prospects of success. The very bravest army must succumb if led against
a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. A
military investigation of the situation shows that a plan
of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents,
under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, and
has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind.
The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy
which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to
overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. On
this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of
Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face. Of
course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an
unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which
the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. If we
attacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help,
and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy
to fight. Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the
cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be
reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral.
This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring
about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor
England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as
we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by
diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows.
If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate
an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her
interests or those of England, that both these States would feel
themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are
offered both in Africa and in Europe, and anyone who has attentively
studied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself on
this point.
In opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that we
should wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force of
circumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now to
struggle hard for. Unfortunately such politicians always forget to state
clearly and definitely what facts are really working in their own
interests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. Such
political wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solid
foundation. We must reckon with the definitely given conditions, and
realize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to great
results.
It is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps and
measures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure a
favourable political situation should the pending questions so momentous
to Germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. This
requires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomatic
position which I do not possess. One thing only can be justly said:
Beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we must
keep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance as
time goes on.
Italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquire
settlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487,000 persons
emigrated from Italy in 1908), can never combine with France and England
to fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in the
Mediterranean, since both these States themselves claim this place. The
effort to break up the Triple Alliance has momentarily favoured the
Italian policy of expansion. But this incident does not alter in the
least the fact that the true interest of Italy demands adherence to the
Triple Alliance, which alone can procure her Tunis and Biserta. The
importance of these considerations will continue to be felt.
Turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with England, France, and
Russia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation of
present-day Turkey. Islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies in
England and Russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join the
Central European Alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunder
of abandoning her in Morocco.
There is no true community of interests between Russia and England; in
Central Asia, in Persia, as in the Mediterranean, their ambitions clash
in spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in Japan and China
is forcing on a crisis which is vital to Russian interests and to some
degree ties her hands.
All these matters open out a wide vista to German statesmanship, if it
is equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy than
recent political events seemed to indicate. And, then, our policy can
count on a factor of strength such as no other State possesses--on an
army whose military efficiency, I am convinced, cannot be sufficiently
valued. Not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. We
have amply shown the contrary. But the spirit which animates the troops,
the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongst
them, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they are
soon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world,
provided only that they are led with skill and determination. The German
nation, too--of this I am equally convinced--will rise to the height of
its great duty. A mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps in
its soul. Whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of this
people, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes a
worthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people on
in united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and will
achieve a truly magnificent result.
In the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces,
and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger,
our Government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future;
but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of Germany unless it
wins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto the
brave words of Goethe:
"Bid defiance to every power!
Ever valiant, never cower!
To the brave soldier open flies
The golden gate of Paradise."
EPILOGUE
After I had practically finished the preceding pages, the Franco-German
convention as to Morocco and the Congo Compensation were published; the
Turko-Italian War broke out; the revolution in China assumed dimensions
which point to the probability of new disorders in Eastern Asia; and,
lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale,_ but a real
offensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between France and
England. Such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanently
between the two States, but clearly every possibility of war has been
foreseen and provided for.
I have been able to insert all the needful references to the two first
occurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on the
Anglo-French conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks.
The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed,
have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a
collision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished this
object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed
that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was
determined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can the
attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered
correct. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain
was resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations for
war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance
on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this
crisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained the
concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable
moment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will wait
until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and
Russia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the
other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it
can actively support the Rhine army.
This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government,
but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined,
that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes.
It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as
regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our
manufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition of
territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not
inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in
obtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make the
possession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained can
never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were
compelled to abandon.
I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial
concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed
force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo
region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of
November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their
present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from
this precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be no
doubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possession
for France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish
_enclave_ cannot be obtained. The access to the Ubangi and the Congo has
at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case
of war with us by a few companies of Senegalese.
It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial
arrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way for
a better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot be
assumed that France will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she has
carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a
moment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely because
she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a
desolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea,
in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, v.
Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not,
therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to
revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect,
the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France.
The acquisition of territory in the Congo region means at first an
actual loss of power to Germany; it can only be made useful by the
expenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawn
from our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position.
But, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, not
merely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, but
primarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in its
entirety. From this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangement
means a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainly
surrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold the
sovereignty of Morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violent
infraction of the Algeciras convention by France, although we had
weighty interests at stake. If in the text of the Morocco treaty such
action was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus the
notion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, such
explanation is tantamount to a complete change of front.
An additional political disadvantage is that our relations with Islam
have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. I cannot, of
course, judge whether our diplomatic relations with Turkey have
suffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige in
the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance
for us. It is also a reasonable assumption that the Morocco convention
precipitated the action of Italy in Tripoli, and thus shook profoundly
the solidity of the Triple Alliance. The increase of power which France
obtained through the acquisition of Morocco made the Italians realize
the importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in the
Mediterranean.
The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep
rift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and the
mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large
sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in
spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily
supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this
weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the
Press and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the better
has followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the great
disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the critical
times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire
must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to
ride the storm. The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to war
removes all further doubt on this point.
The existence of such relations between England and France confirms the
view of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in the
various chapters of this book. They show that we are confronted by a
firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder
any further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they have
done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance,
and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left no
doubt on this point.[A]
[Footnote A: Cf. speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911.]
The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all
pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead
in the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressive
intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would
support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the
limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with
England. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not altered
by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new
acquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every new
colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and
that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They form
objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clear
commentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that once
more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates.
In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count
on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a
_rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at
most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may
fairly imagine we have some prospect of success.
If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in
the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world
generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more
face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the
world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any
case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide
that the hour of attack has come.
We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike
preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down.
All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to
represent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of the
people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to
military and political success, without carrying still further the
disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and
frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between
Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will
prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy
which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers
threatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needs
and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any
conventional scruples distract it from this object.
Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged
basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of
sufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situation
calls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it
to the happy goal.
The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever.
England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of her
interests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanelles
question, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts of
her colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in Great
Britain. Attention has already been called to the significance and
difficulty of her relations with North America. France also has
considerable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, before
it can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East will
probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in
sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted
German policy can utilize in order to influence the general political
situation in the interests of our Fatherland.
If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of
Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the
future of our country and our State, we can face approaching events with
confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to
fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz
Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God:
"From the height of the starry sky
May thy ringing sword flash bright;
Let every craven cry
Be silenced by thy might!"