THE CRUCIAL QUESTION
I have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in some
detail, because I thought that our general political and military
position can only be properly estimated by considering the various
phases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilities
and dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces on
our coasts and land frontiers. In this way only can the direction be
decided in which our preparations for war ought to move.
The considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval war
with England and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shall
need to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully from
a hostile attack by sea. They also proved that we cannot count on an
ultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. If an
Anglo-French army invaded North Germany through Holland, and threatened
our coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence by
sea. The same argument applies to the eastern theatre. If Russian armies
advance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combined
fleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would be
rendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land.
We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces on
land so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under all
circumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on the
Continent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe before
we can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policy
based on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal in
Italy there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin her
triumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her own
country.
But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced by
the naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landing
with strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the land
army would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affecting
the progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitally
necessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that every
attack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled.
At the same time the consideration of the political position presses the
conviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talk
of a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may lay
the lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave ample
scope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to put
aside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmost
energy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the whole
future of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of the
broad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of the
individual States showed that the position of affairs everywhere is
critical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place as
a World Power or our downfall. The internal disruption of the Triple
Alliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey,
threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period which
destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing
ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. We must use it, if
we wish to be mindful of the warning of the Great Elector, that we are
Germans. This is the point of view from which we must carry out our
preparations for war by sea and land. Thus only can we be true to our
national duty.
I do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculated
merely for the exigencies of the moment. All that we undertake in the
cause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answer
the pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of the
future. But we must find the danger of our position a stimulus to
desperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hour
something of what we have lost in the last years.
Since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position on
the continent of Europe, we must first of all face the serious problem
of the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the great
numerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority will certainly
exist if Italy ceases to be an active member of the Triple Alliance,
whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over to
Irredentism. The preparations for the naval war are of secondary
importance.
The first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to make
the total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educate
the entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to make
universal service an existing fact.
The system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by a
splendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, has
in long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, and
has brought us victory upon victory in the German wars of unification.
Its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussed
in a separate chapter. The German Empire would to-day have a mighty
political importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which our
greatness was founded.
France has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; Russia in
Europe, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000.
Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants. But since
the Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very
various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are
also deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded to
the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself
successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the
inner line, even though England took part in the war.
Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of
universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued
to carry it out effectively. The country where universal service exists
is now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only
kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the
able-bodied are called up for training. In particular, very little use
has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army.
In this direction some reorganization is required which will
energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army,
such as we have not at the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand,
we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers.
Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not
shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make
up our deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by
150,000 men. The necessary training staff and equipment would not be
forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could
not all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of an increased army
only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and
Landwehr is correspondingly raised. We can therefore only slowly recur
to the reinforcement of universal service. The note struck by the new
Five Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds. But although we wish
to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even
if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that
we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the
superior forces of our opponents.
We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we
must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. These
means can only be found in the spiritual domain.
History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have
only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been
equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party
exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[A] In most cases
it was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment,
greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able
strategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. Rome
conquered the world with inferior forces; Frederick the Great with
inferior forces withstood the allied armies of Europe. Recent history
shows us the victory of the numerically weaker Japanese army over a
crushingly superior opponent. We cannot count on seeing a great
commander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear.
Nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to the
hostile forces. But we can try to learn what will be the decisive
factors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victory
or defeat. If we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, and
keep the essential points of view always before us, we might create a
real source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents which
would be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. Should we
then in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policy
which results from the special nature of present-day war, it must be
possible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize a
considerable numerical superiority.
[Footnote A: _Cf_. v. Bernhardi, "Vom heutigen Kriege," vol. i., chap. ii.]
The essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, battery
with battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships,
and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probable
opponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreast
with the enemy in all material domains. This idea leads to a certain
spiritual servility and inferiority.
Rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on which
the ultimate decision turns. The duty of our War Department is to
prepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and to
apply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle of
superiority. This must secure for us the spiritual and so the material
advantage over our enemies. Otherwise we run the danger of being crushed
by their weight of numbers.
We cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit by
uninspired rivalry in arming. We must trace out with clear insight the
probable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread new
paths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. New
goals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teaches
us by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress,
in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. The spiritual
capacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must be
sought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action,
are the soil in which great successes ripen.
It would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely the
nature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideas
which will prove decisive in it. These questions have been thoroughly
ventilated in a book recently published by me, "Vom heutigen Kriege"
("The War of To-day"). In this place I will only condense the results of
my inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further consideration
of the essential questions of the future.
In a future European war "masses" will be employed to an extent
unprecedented in any previous one. Weapons will be used whose deadliness
will exceed all previous experience. More effective and varied means of
communication will be available than were known in earlier wars. These
three momentous factors will mark the war of the future.
"Masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they contain
elements of weakness as well. The larger they are and the less they can
be commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tactical
efficiency diminishes. The less they are able to live on the country
during war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they are
therefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slower
and less mobile they become. Owing to the great space which they require
for their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them into
effective action simultaneously. They are also far more accessible to
morally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and may
prove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies run
short, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authority
over the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions.
The increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longer
range, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exacting
claims on the _moral_ of the soldier. The danger zone begins sooner than
formerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become far
wider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. The
soldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during which
he is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under all
circumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firing
which the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautious
movement. All branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances.
Shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In short,
while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demands
made on them have become considerably greater.
Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling and
feeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and main
roads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign,
aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to their
use, and the commanders counted upon them.
The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a great
superiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities and
tactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists.
The commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy,
and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space than
they can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superior
force in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effective
troops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostile
army, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of it
before the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of the
field.
Since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chiefly
shown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessary
conclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare.
In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strength
which it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action.
Inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attack
to suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect a
superior force against his surprised opponent. The initiative, which is
the privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and place
which is very profitable in operations and tactics. The attacked party
can only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of the
intentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which hold
out promise of success. The more rapidly, therefore, the attacking
General strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable his
troops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its nature
guarantees.
This superiority increases with the size of the masses. If the advancing
armies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, it
will be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to take
proper measures against a surprise attack. On the other hand, the
prospects of success of the attacking General will be very favourable,
especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops at
his disposal.
Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibility
of gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and all
the more so the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it is
impossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously and
completely into action. A victory, therefore, in the decisive
direction--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries of
the opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, and
its effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations.
If the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superior
numbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize his
numerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victory
over the arithmetically stronger army. In conformity to this law,
Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability and striking
strength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful in
mere numbers.
No further proof is required that the superiority of the attack
increases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, and
to the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility of
concealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of the
enemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet very
appreciable.
We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure the
superiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, it
is incumbent on us: First, during the period of preparation to raise the
tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and
especially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movements
and damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself to
act on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit the
manoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to be
superior in the decisive directions. Above all, a State which has
objects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacks
by enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. It
must, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, since
a strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods.
This principle holds good pre-eminently for Germany. The points which I
have tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to face
the future with confidence. All our measures must be calculated to raise
the efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all else
must give way. We shall thus have a central point on which all our
measures can be focussed. We can make them all serve one purpose, and
thus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all too
easily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts of
a collective whole. Much of our previous omissions and commissions would
have borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifying
principle.
The requirements which I have described as the most essential are
somewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate a
resolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age.
The larger the armies by which one State tries to outbid another, the
smaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and not
merely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment as
such. Huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "They will be
suffocated by their own fat," said General v. Brandenstein, the great
organizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation of
the French. The complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to the
whole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injure
the tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually his
own movements. The necessary attention has never been paid in the course
of military training to this latter duty. Finally, the tactical
efficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as it
certainly will prove in the wars of the future.
A mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure of
public opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, have
conduced to measures which inevitably result in an essential
contradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained,
and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. It would
be illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it is
recognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reached
on them.
This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is
attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military
service. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less,
and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had
to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a
good trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_,
which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by no
means helped by the very brief training which these units at best
receive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity
for serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavy
strain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would be
indirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of the
field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain
the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This mass
would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to
some degree the task of making good the losses.
A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops.
Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are
already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full
strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on
mobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much according
to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much
inferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, which
were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this,
notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new
French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphere
of activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war their
duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered
territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. In fact,
they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the
field army. In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and
mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. By acting
at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually
become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of
offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset
of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied
with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be.
Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such
troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive
operations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treated
as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some
are less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanical
conception.
For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regulars
only, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasks
for which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, if
necessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior and
more efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tactical
striking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greater
numbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in the
decisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than ever
before.
The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which are
placed at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on this
principle, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses that
he preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strong
advantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops and
therefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of his
army by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, be
employed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve as
much as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in the
numbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in the
actual war.
It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best to
render the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be a
mistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their
_personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal to
them. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level of
efficiency throughout the troops would be lowered.
Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. An
increase of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far more
than a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It is
supremely important to increase the strength of the officers on the
establishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficient
will it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality,
not quantity. Concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. If we
wish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengthening
the army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number of
professional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. This step
is the more necessary because the present available cadres are
insufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to provide
for their thorough training.
The gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand with
an increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. We
shall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, the
efficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can be
improved by organization, equipment, and training.
I must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to the
questions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch of
military activity, especially in the offensive, which requires prompt
original action--I mean the importance of personality.
From the Commander-in-Chief, who puts into execution the conceptions of
his own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune,
and the Brigadier, who must act independently according to a given
general scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and left
to his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private in
the field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in the
face of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any other
age, personality dominates all else. The effect of mass tactics has
abolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is left
to himself. The direct influence of the superior has lessened. In the
strategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity of
that arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than before
from their troop and are left to their own responsibility. Even in the
artillery the importance of independent action will be more clearly
emphasized than previously. The battlefields and area of operations have
increased with the masses employed. The Commander-in-Chief is far less
able than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of the
field; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates.
These conditions are very prominent in attacking operations.
When on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold his
ground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize the
reserves. On the offensive, however, the conditions change from moment
to moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannot
be anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. Even
the individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, now
wait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often have
to choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losing
touch with the main body. The offensive makes very varied calls on the
commander's qualities. Ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy,
deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded from
him. He must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. All this
puts a heavy strain on personality.
It is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number of
self-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinct
advantage. This object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve to
attain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. And this
object can be attained. Personality can be developed, especially in the
sphere of spiritual activity. The reflective and critical powers can be
improved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate the
conditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element in
which he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly and
more easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp.
Self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortune
are produced by knowledge. This is shown everywhere. We see the awkward
and shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the same
process is often traced among the higher commands. But where the mental
development is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, the
personality fails at the moment of action. The elegant guardsman
Bourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task of
leading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. General
Chanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolute
determination in the midst of defeat. Thus one of the essential tasks of
the preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army and
thus indirectly to mould and elevate character. Especially is it
essential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those in
high command. In a long military life ideas all too early grow
stereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thought
and can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. The danger of such
development cannot be shut out. The stiff and uniform composition of the
army which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to a
one-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness of
actual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. Something akin
to this was seen in Germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _en
masse_. United will and action are essential to give force its greatest
value. They must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritual
independence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency and
solving new problems by original methods.
It has often been said that one man is as good as another; that
personality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion is
erroneous. In time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no real
struggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance is
enough. But in war, personality turns the scale. Responsibility and
danger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as a
chemical test separates the pure metal from the dross.
That army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in the
important posts during peace-time and has kept them there. This is the
only way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and to
break down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress and
success. It redounds to the lasting credit of William I. that for the
highest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in time
of peace made his selection from among all the apparently great men
around him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all opposition
those who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour of
need, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. This
is no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy and
distrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action,
appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure of
the stern reality of war that the truth of Goethe's lines is proved:
"Folk and thrall and victor can
Witness bear in every zone:
Fortune's greatest gift to man
Is personality alone."