The Direct Primary Law of 1911[65] abolished all political conventions
except the state convention, but the Direct Primary Law of 1913[66]
went further and abolished the state convention, striking the article
on conventions and even the definition of a convention from the text
of the law. Although the new law contains in section 45 a provision
that nothing therein contained shall prevent a party from holding
a party convention, to be constituted in such manner and with such
powers in relation to formulating party platforms and policies and
the transaction of business relating to party affairs, as the rules
and regulations of the party may provide, not inconsistent with the
Election Law, it was clearly the intention of its framers that such
party conventions should not deal with the most important subject
which parties had theretofore dealt with, namely, the nomination
of candidates for public office. Indeed, section 46, as amended in
1913, expressly provides that designations of candidates for party
nominations shall be "by petition only" in the manner provided in the
Election Law.
The privilege of nominating elective state officers by means of
delegate conventions thus denied by the Election Law of the state
of New York ought, in my judgment, to be recognized as essentially
a constitutional right, which the legislature should not be at
liberty to abridge. The right to assemble peaceably for the purpose
of nominating candidates is certainly a political right of permanent
importance and vital concern to all citizens, and it should be
guaranteed by constitutional provision and not left to abridgment or
denial by the legislature. The present state constitution regulates
the qualifications of voters, the registration of citizens entitled to
vote, and the creation of registration and election boards. But it does
not contain a single provision in regard to nominations for office,
even for the office of governor, although nominations for state offices
are of far greater importance to the body politic than many of the
matters now regulated by constitutional provision or recited in the
bill of rights. I desire to urge upon your careful consideration the
value of nominating conventions as a constitutional right.
The constantly increasing functions of the modern state have made
the executive and administrative departments the most important and
powerful branches of government, and the increasing complexity of
governmental machinery has rendered it absolutely essential that
competent and trained public officials should be chosen. Government
has become an extremely difficult and scientific business, and special
capacity, training and expert knowledge are more and more required
in executive and administrative office. The test of a good government
is more than ever its ability to produce good administration. If we
are to have efficient and avoid wasteful administration, the greatest
care must be exercised in selecting candidates. As Governor Throop
said nearly a century ago, "there is perhaps no part of the duties
of citizenship which requires more sound judgment and honesty and
singleness of purpose than those relating to the nomination and
election of executive and administrative officers." Indeed, good
government depends in final results much more on the ability and
character of the men who administer it than upon laws or institutions.
The maxim, constantly on the lips of so many, that a government of
laws and not of men is the controlling desideratum, may be grossly
misleading, for the best system of laws in the hands of incompetent,
inefficient and dishonest administrators will produce far worse results
than an inferior system in the hands of competent, efficient and honest
public officials. The most difficult task and the highest duty that our
electorate are ever called upon to perform is, therefore, the selection
of candidates for elective state office. In order to perform that duty,
it is imperative that there should be adequate and reliable means
of information, full opportunity for conference, exchange of views,
debate and criticism as to the capacity and character of candidates,
and effective methods of cooperation and organization in support of
qualified candidates.
The selection of a governor for the great state of New York,
containing more than 10,250,000 inhabitants and comprising a political
constituency larger than any other in this country, is certainly a
matter of vital and profound concern to the whole body politic, to
every citizen, to every community, to every party, to every class, to
every interest. If the short ballot be now adopted, the successful
administration of the whole state government will practically be staked
upon the selection of qualified candidates for governor. All hope of
governmental reform, efficiency and economy will then necessarily
depend upon the statesmanship and character of one man, who will be
vested with full executive and administrative powers over a population
and a territory larger than some of the nations of the world. A wise
and safe choice will be infinitely more essential and more difficult
than in the past. In fact, if the views of certain advocates of the
short ballot prevail, we are to vest all this power in the governor for
a term of four years, without restraint of any kind except his sense
of responsibility to the people, and without any effective check upon
his will or caprice. We should have to trust him absolutely. We should,
in truth, have precisely the definition of an elective despotism and
tyranny--beneficent if we are so fortunate and blessed as to secure an
exceptionally able and high-minded statesman for governor, baneful if
an incompetent, untrained, or scheming politician or demagogue should
be elected. The governor would then have it immediately within his
power to become an absolute state boss through the use of an enormous
and constantly increasing patronage, directly or indirectly reaching
and touching every election district in the state. He would be able to
break party lines asunder, to promote the interests of any group or
faction, to punish adversaries, to cater to any class, to sacrifice
the rights of minorities, to substitute his will or caprice for the
policy of his party, to permit waste and extravagance, to dictate who
should be his successor. A competent candidate for governor who would
be so well known and tested as to be safely relied upon to resist this
temptation would indeed be a phenomenon. If history teaches us that
there is anything certain in human nature, if experience, which is of
far more value than any mere reasoning or theorizing, has again and
again demonstrated any practical and eternal truth in politics, it is
that unrestrained power inevitably leads sooner or later to abuse and
tyranny, and that no one official, be he emperor, king, president, or
governor, can safely be entrusted with any such power.
We should bear in mind that the extreme advocates of the short ballot,
by eliminating all requirements for the approval and consent of the
senate in regard to the appointment of heads of the great state
departments, would make the governor supreme and independent of the
legislature, even more independent and powerful than is the President
under the Constitution of the United States. I sincerely hope that
the Convention will not make this grave mistake. The number of state
elective officers should not be reduced to less than four, namely,
governor, lieutenant-governor, comptroller and attorney-general. The
comptroller should be made an auditing officer charged with supervision
as such over the various departments of the state and independent of
the appointing power. The attorney-general should be made the head of a
department of justice and the responsible legal adviser of the governor
and of every state official. And the heads of all the great departments
should be appointed by the governor with the approval and consent of
the senate. No governor should be given the unrestrained power to
appoint or to remove the heads of all departments. The requirement of
the consent of the senate is a necessary and salutary restraint upon
all governors, good or bad. It is better and safer that governors
should be compelled to submit to some restraints than that absolute
power should be vested in even the best and ablest and purest of men.
The principle of a short ballot is the decrease of elective offices,
but not necessarily the placing of absolute and unrestrained power in
the hands of one man.
It is quite true that a state constitution should deal only with
permanent and fundamental provisions and should not attempt to regulate
matters of detail which can be adequately dealt with by ordinary
legislation and which are in their nature and operation readily
changeable. I am in full accord in this, as in other respects, with
the state platform adopted by the Republican party last year and on
which the Republican delegates to the Constitutional Convention were
elected. Subordinate and non-essential matters of mere regulation
and detail ought not to be embodied in constitutions. But I venture
to assert that in reason and sound policy there can be no more
important, permanent, or fundamental constitutional provision than
one relating to the manner of selecting the highest state officers
in whom all the executive and administrative powers of our state
government are to be vested. This is a subject eminently fit and
proper for a constitution to regulate. If this convention cannot
solve the problem of establishing a sound system of nomination for
elective state offices, at least in outline and cardinal features,
no legislature can be expected to do so. In any event, the new
Constitution should emphatically declare that the right peaceably to
assemble in a political convention composed of duly elected delegates
or representatives for the purpose of nominating candidates for public
office, state or local, should not be abridged, as it is abridged by
the present Election Law.
I further venture to assert that the question of nominating candidates
by delegate conventions involves in its essence the perpetuation of
the fundamental principles of representative government and of the
republican form of government which the founders intended to establish
and to guarantee to each state of the Union.
The one great contribution which the English-speaking race has made
to the science of politics has been the representative principle. It
has been truly declared that every lasting liberty secured for the
individual, every lasting reform towards stability in government and
permanent effectiveness in administration, every lasting advancement
made in politics during the past two centuries, has been by and through
the representative system. The subordination of public officials to the
law, and their liability under the law for every illegal act, sprang
from the representative principle. The independence of the judiciary,
that great bulwark of liberty and of the rights of the individual, has
followed upon the growth and success of the representative principle.
The vivifying spirit or essence of the representative principle is the
determination of all questions of practical government by delegates or
representatives chosen by the people, who it is assumed can act more
intelligently and better discern the true interests of their country
than a multitude of voters dispersed over an extensive territory.
Government under the representative principle includes not merely
legislation by the chosen representatives of the people, but the
practical conduct of the executive department and its administrative
branches by officials selected or nominated by representatives of the
people. Despite all attacks upon our political institutions and all
instances of mistakes and maladministration, the sound common sense of
thoughtful citizens still confirms the judgment of the founders of our
government that the only safe course is to follow the representative
principle. This is as true to-day as it was when the "Federalist" was
written. The direct nomination of executive or judicial officers is in
utter disregard of that principle.
If the function of legislation is in the long run most satisfactorily
performed by a representative body composed of men from every locality
and every part of a state, and if it would be unsafe to vest the
lawmaking power in the executive branch, does it not likewise follow
that the equally important function of selecting candidates for
executive and judicial office and formulating party policies and
platforms will be better performed by a representative body, such as
delegate conventions, than by being left to the mass of voters? If
more intelligent legislation and wiser action are likely to result
from a representative body than from the confusion of a multitude of
voters, is it not also evident that more intelligent and discriminating
selection of executive officers will be made by chosen representatives,
as in nominating conventions, than by the people at large?
It should be borne in mind that our system of republican government
differs from other representative governments in the practical
and effective separation of powers. In England and in France the
legislators, that is the delegates or representatives elected by the
people, appoint and control all executive and administrative officers
and carry on the executive and administrative branches of government.
There the legislative and executive powers are practically united
in the same body. Under our system the legislators do not elect or
appoint executive officers. It is, therefore, essential, as I am
profoundly convinced, that executive officers should be nominated by
duly qualified representatives if the representative principle is to be
maintained.
Nomination of executive officers by direct primaries will inevitably
be subversive of the true spirit of the representative system, and the
secrecy of the vote in the nominating primaries will ultimately be
destructive of all sense of responsibility. The enrolled voter marking
his ballot in secret will frequently feel no sense of responsibility
or accountability to his neighbors and fellow-citizens, and will
frequently fail to appreciate that his vote is a sacred trust to be
exercised for the good of the community. The secrecy of the primary
vote thus does a great moral mischief in destroying the sense of
political responsibility and accountability. A public declaration
in connection with nominations for office, involving as it does a
recommendation to other voters of fitness and qualification for the
particular office, is a much more effective restraint on corruption
and perversion of the popular vote than any scheme of secrecy which
leaves no one publicly responsible for unfit and improper nominations.
In my judgment, the primary system tends to promote the nomination
of self-advertisers, demagogues and wire-pullers by irresponsible
minorities, groups, factions, cabals, or secret societies, generally
composed of persons acting in the dark and dominated or controlled by
leaders who cannot be held to any accountability, however much they may
abuse or prostitute the political power they exercise.
The nomination of candidates for public office, whether national,
state, or local, by means of party conventions, caucuses, or
conferences, was introduced and long existed without any statutory
regulation. The practice sprang up normally and from necessity as soon
as the increase of population rendered it impracticable for the voters
to come together in mass or town meeting. The body of voters, who could
not spend the time necessary to investigate as to the qualifications
of candidates, or attend political debates, and who could know little
or nothing of the competency and character of candidates, naturally
recognized that the best and safest course would be to elect delegates
or representatives from each neighborhood, who, meeting delegates or
representatives from other districts, could exchange views, criticize,
discuss and agree upon policies and nominations, and thus act more
intelligently, advisedly and wisely than would otherwise be possible.
The growth of constituencies, the multiplication of elective offices,
and the neglect of their political duties by the majority of electors
led to many abuses in the management of nominating conventions, and
legislation became necessary in order to prevent frauds in connection
with the conduct of primaries and conventions. In promoting this
legislation, it was argued that, if citizens were assured the right
to be enrolled in the party to which they desired to belong and to
vote at primaries and freely to exercise their choice for delegates to
conventions, they would be stimulated to take part in the primaries,
and that this would result in preventing party nominations for office
from being controlled by those who made politics their business or
used improper or corrupt methods. Hence the primary reform measures
introduced by legislation in our state in the nineties.
These measures, however, proved to be sadly disappointing to many of
their promoters. This was not because the statutes were in themselves
defective or inadequate, but because it was found to be impossible
by mere legislative enactment to induce a majority of the electors
to enroll in their parties or to take any active part or interest in
politics. Although under these primary laws the nominating conventions
could at any time have been readily controlled by the electorate at
large, had the voters only taken the trouble to enroll and vote at the
primaries, great dissatisfaction arose or was fomented or manufactured,
and a demand created for the total abolition of the convention and
the introduction of the experiment of a direct primary system, upon
the notion that this would stimulate greater political interest,
enable the enrolled voters to control and elect their own candidates,
bring nominations closer to the people, and curtail and ultimately
destroy the power of the politicians and bosses. The new experiment
was based upon the assumption that if enrolled electors could vote
directly for candidates instead of for representatives to nominating
conventions, they would thereby be induced to take a more active
interest in politics, to overthrow the control or domination of bosses
and professional politicians, and to make better selections than had
ever been made before. In a word, it was assumed in the face of all
experience to the contrary that, if the voters had the direct power,
they would perform their political duties, that better qualified and
more competent and independent candidates would offer themselves or
somehow would be brought to the attention of the electorate, and that
nominations would then represent the will or choice of the majority in
each party, and not the will of minorities, or the choice of bosses.
How the majority were to ascertain the qualifications of particular
candidates or cooperate to secure the nomination of the best qualified
was left in the air. It seemed to be thought, following the absurd
and exploded doctrines of Rousseau, that the people would always want
and, by a process of political inspiration, would intuitively and
instinctively select, the best men for public office.
The result so far has refuted all these assumptions, hopes and
promises. The people at large do not take part in the primaries, and
the political machines are more powerful than ever. Thus, in New York
county, the Republican vote for governor at the direct primaries of
1914 was only 23,305, out of a total enrollment of 56,108 and a vote in
November of 85,478; the Democratic primary vote was only 48,673 out
of a total enrollment of 132,693 and a vote in November of 90,666, and
the Progressive primary vote was only 6,972 out of a total enrollment
of 19,705 and a vote in November of 5,604. It will be readily perceived
from these figures that a small minority of the voters in each party
took the trouble to participate in the direct primary elections,
even in the case of the nomination for governor of our state, as to
which there was an exciting contest in each party. An examination of
the figures throughout the entire state will show that the voters in
nearly all districts took less interest in direct primary elections for
nominations than they were accustomed to take under the old convention
system and that the controlling power is still being exercised by the
organization, but now acting in secret and utterly irresponsible. For
example, the Republican primary vote for governor in Bronx county was
5,276 against a Republican vote of 29,865 in November, and in Richmond
county the Republican primary vote for governor was 984 against a
Republican vote of 5,477 in November. It is probably correct to assume
that not one-half of the Republican or Democratic voters now enroll,
and that, on an average, less than one-half of the enrolled voters
take the trouble to go to the primaries, even when there is a serious
contest, as was the case last year for governor. There were then
three proposed Republican candidates, Whitman, Hedges and Hinman, and
the result was that less than one-sixth of the Republican vote in
November might have been sufficient to carry the primaries, the total
Republican vote for governor having been 686,701 as against a total
primary vote of 226,037 for the three candidates. Under the present
direct primaries, the voters of a small portion of the state can put a
candidate in nomination by petition; any number of names may be put on
the official primary ballot, and a candidate may be put in nomination
by a very small minority vote confined to a single locality. In fact,
twenty or more names can be placed by petition on the official primary
ballot of any party as candidates for any elective office, and the
name of the person receiving the largest number of votes will be
that of the candidate of a great party, to whose support the party
will be committed and for whose conduct in office the party will be
responsible, although the successful candidate may be entirely unknown
to nineteen-twentieths of the voters at that particular primary. Under
the present primary system, in view of the small number of those
participating in primaries, an insignificant percentage of the voters
at a primary could nominate a candidate of whose qualifications and
personal character the majority of the party were wholly ignorant, or a
candidate whom an overwhelming majority would utterly repudiate. Sulzer
came very near carrying the direct primary of the Progressive party.
This shows how readily the direct primary system engenders factions
and irresponsibility, and how unfit it is for securing the expression
of the intelligent and instructed will of the majority of any party.
Moreover, there is no way of ascertaining for whom petitions are being
circulated; no publicity is required even after the time for filing
petitions, and the great majority of enrolled voters generally have no
idea of the candidates for office on the official primary ballot until
they open the official ballots at their polling-places. The press is
either uninterested or partisan, and it fails adequately to discuss the
qualifications and character of candidates.
I submit that it is absurd to claim that such a method of nominating
state officers to administer government for a population of over
10,000,000 is more likely to secure competent and trustworthy
candidates, or to express the real preference and the sober and
intelligent judgment of the majority of the voters of each party, than
the old method of nominating state officers by public conventions
composed of delegates and representatives of the voters from each
assembly or election district of the state, proceeding in the open with
full opportunity for investigation, discussion and criticism.
The conventions of the two great political parties held at Saratoga
last year, at which the party platforms in respect of the approaching
Constitutional Convention were adopted and fifteen delegates-at-large
"recommended," were wholly unofficial and unregulated by law. What
was practically the nomination by the conventions of candidates for
delegates-at-large was unauthorized and operated only as a mere
recommendation. They had to be nominated by petition as fully as
if the conventions had never met. These conventions thus nominated
delegates because they realized, and every thinking man in the state
appreciated, that it would be preposterous to leave the selection and
nomination of fifteen delegates-at-large to the mass of enrolled voters
who would have no opportunity for conference and exchange of views in
respect of the qualifications and character of the candidates. Some
informed, responsible and representative body of men had to act, and
therefore the conventions acted--in the very teeth of the law. They,
however, refrained from considering candidates for the great office
of governor, on the theory that it would be violating the spirit and
intent of the Election Law to take any action in regard to candidates
for that office! What inconsistency! The most important and vital
subject of the governorship was left to the hazard of petitions
circulated among the enrolled voters throughout the state. There were
no organizations of any kind among the voters, except what are known as
the political organizations, and no other means of communication and
exchange of views or debate. Of course, it was confidently anticipated
that the organization in each party would determine, or at least would
have it within its power to determine, who should be the candidates of
that party. Such proved to be the case. No candidate was nominated at
the direct primaries for a state office unless he was supported by the
regular organization or machine of his party. And that, I believe, will
be the practical result of direct primaries in nine cases out of ten,
and more readily and frequently and unsatisfactorily than under the old
convention system.
Careful observers of the operation of the primary law last year in this
state, and for several years in other states, have become convinced
that the result of this so-called reform has been not only to increase
the power of the regular organization or machine but to render it
utterly irresponsible. The organization now acts in secret behind
closed doors and without accountability to any one except its own
inner circle. The leaders have only to whisper their orders over the
telephone to the workers in each district, preserving no record, and
the desired result is accomplished. If an unfit and improper nomination
is made, the leaders can disclaim all responsibility and say that
such is the will of the sovereign people. As the vote at the primary
is secret, no one can be blamed; there is no individual or group of
individuals upon whom responsibility can ever be fastened. If it be
argued that there is actual responsibility and that everyone knows
it, then I answer that this is only by admitting that, after all, the
secret machine or boss is in fact responsible and still rules, and now
more effectively than ever.
As has been pointed out by many able writers, the convention system in
the past has been of inestimable service to this country. With all its
vagaries, it afforded the highest test of a political representative
institution in a democratic community and the soundest and purest
application of the principle of representation or delegated authority;
it operated to bind party elements firmly together; it afforded
full opportunity for exchange of views, criticism and debate, for
the propagation of principles, for the conciliation of factions;
it inspired enthusiastic party life. The convention, if honestly
conducted, was a thoroughly representative and deliberative body, and
it was the true cause of party success and of the maintenance and
perpetuation of party principles and policies, as well as political
faith and devotion. In a word, the convention was and still is the best
instrument ever devised for securing concert of choice and responsible
and intelligent action by large bodies of voters belonging to the same
political party and believing in the same political faith, principles
and policies.
I am not at all blind to the fact that there have been great abuses
in the convention system, and that conventions have been at times
corruptly organized or conducted. But I know of no form of abuse or
corruption which could not have been remedied by appropriate and
intelligent legislation, or which could not have been prevented in New
York by action of the voters if the legislation of the past twenty-five
years had been generally availed of by the majority in each party.
The control of all nominations was in the hands of the majority, if
they had only taken the trouble to enroll and vote for competent
representatives at primary elections. There is no practical remedy for
abuse of power, fraud, or corruption in nominations for office but
the participation in politics of all voters as a duty of citizenship.
The notion that the direct primary would eliminate the professional
politician and the boss has been shown to be false in every state
where the scheme has been tried. Indeed, quite the contrary has been
the result, and the last condition is worse than the first; for, to
repeat myself, manipulators, wire-pullers and political bosses now
work in secret and by underground channels without any responsibility
or accountability whatever, and are, nevertheless, able cynically to
point to the direct primary as the expression of the people's sovereign
will--a primary which may be carried by a very small minority of the
party.
I assume that all the members of this Constitutional Convention believe
that the existence of political parties is essential to the success
of free government and to permanence and stability of political
policy, and that the perpetuation of party government is desirable
for the welfare and best interests of this state. Men cannot secure
results and compass their ends in politics, any more than in most
other human concerns and matters requiring concerted action, except by
organization, cooperation, discipline and responsibility. The value
of the service rendered to the American people by the great political
parties is incalculable, and if these parties are to be disrupted
and their organization and cohesiveness undermined, the result must
inevitably be a most serious injury to the body politic. Whether we
regard political parties, on the one hand, as organizations of men
believing in the same political faith, principles and policies and
uniting to introduce or uphold those principles and policies, or, on
the other hand, merely as organizations to secure office and administer
government--both of which aspects present patriotic motives--it is
desirable for the permanent welfare of the people of every free country
that parties should be maintained, and particularly that there should
be two great responsible parties, each striving for control and ready
to assume the responsibility of government and of the adoption of
particular measures. A public official who belongs to a great political
party and owes his preferment to that party is under a double sense
of responsibility for efficiency, honesty and consistency in public
office. He has a sense of responsibility and duty to the state as a
whole, and he has a sense of responsibility and duty to his party, and
both are moral factors of inestimable worth in securing integrity,
efficiency and industry in public office.
In its real origin, the movement to abolish the convention system
and introduce direct nominating primaries sprang not from any hope
of reforming the existing political parties but from a desire to
subvert and destroy the American system of government by political
parties. The scheme was later taken up by men who sincerely desired to
reform party management and correct party abuses, who conscientiously
despaired of reform within the parties themselves, and who conceived
and finally came to believe that betterment could be brought about only
by uprooting and casting aside all the party machinery, organization
and discipline which had been built up by the practical experience of
over a century. The plea of bringing the government back to the people
was catching and plausible, and it found eager response in the deeply
rooted dislike of party machinery, party discipline and party constancy
on the part of those who habitually neglect all attention to politics
and the political duties of citizenship except during periods of
popular excitement and upheaval.
Although I am one of those who believe in independence in politics
and in the right and duty of every citizen to vote against his party
if in his judgment the public interests so require, I profoundly
believe that party government and party organization and machinery are
absolutely essential under our form of government. Political parties
in America have given stability to governmental policies and have
created the only effective restraint upon disintegration and individual
caprice or demagogism. There must be coherence in political forces;
there must be concentration and direction of the political energy of
communities; there must be some systematic and practical method of
investigating the qualifications of candidates and selecting competent
public officials; there must be stability, harmony and cooperation in
governmental policies. These can be secured in the long run only by
and through permanently organized and disciplined political parties. No
other method has yet been discovered by which effectively to express
political opinion, to secure stability in governmental administration
and policies, and to effectuate the real and permanent judgment of the
people and promote their best interests.
President Wilson some years ago, in referring to attacks upon party
government in the United States, used the following striking language,
which I think should be now recalled:
"I know that it has been proposed by enthusiastic, but not too
practical, reformers to do away with parties by some legerdemain of
governmental reconstruction, accompanied and supplemented by some
rehabilitation, devoutly to be wished, of the virtues least commonly
controlling in fallen human nature; but it seems to me that it would be
more difficult and less desirable than these amiable persons suppose
to conduct a government of the many by means of any other device
than party organization, and that the great need is, not to get rid
of parties, but to find and use some expedient by which they can be
managed and made amenable from day to day to public opinion." "Whatever
their faults and abuses, party machines are absolutely necessary under
our existing electoral arrangements, and are necessary chiefly for
keeping the several segments of parties together.... It is important to
keep this in mind. Otherwise, when we analyze party action, we shall
fall into the too common error of thinking that we are analyzing
disease. As a matter of fact the whole thing is just as normal and
natural as any other political development. The part that party has
played in this country has been both necessary and beneficial, and if
bosses and secret managers are often undesirable persons, playing their
parts for their own benefit or glorification rather than for the public
good, they are at least the natural fruits of the tree. It has borne
fruit good and bad, sweet and bitter, wholesome and corrupt, but it is
native to our air and practice and can be uprooted only by an entire
change of system."[67]
For these reasons I earnestly urge upon the Constitutional Convention
of the state of New York the restoration of nominating state
conventions for elective state offices. I do so because I believe
that they are the best means of maintaining political parties,
of formulating their principles and policies, of purifying and
disciplining their management, of stimulating political enthusiasm
and disinterestedness, and of selecting and nominating fit and
representative individuals as candidates for high public office. I
further urge that the nominees of any such convention should not
need any further designation than the filing of a certificate by the
proper convention officers. If it be concluded, however, that the
direct primary system should be continued for the purpose of party
nominations, then it should be provided that the name of the nominee
of the convention should be placed on the official primary ballot
with the designation "nominated by convention." This would enable the
enrolled voters to ratify or overrule the action of their convention.
I am, however, convinced that this nominating primary would impose
an unnecessary burden upon the electorate, and that it would be a
mistake to increase the number of elections. We should then have
three elections: first, the election of delegates to the nominating
convention; second, the official primaries, and third, the general
election. It seems to me that it would answer every purpose if adequate
provision were retained for independent nominations by petition and
if nominating primaries were dispensed with. This would enable voters
belonging to any party to place candidates in the field in opposition
to the nominees of the convention if they were dissatisfied with those
nominees.
Assuming that we are to continue the system of electing judges to our
highest judicial offices, that is, judges of the Court of Appeals and
justices of the Supreme Court, then I submit that candidates for these
very important offices should be nominated by conventions and not by
direct primaries. I regard this as even more essential in the case
of nomination for judicial office than in the case of nomination for
executive office.
The qualities required in a candidate for high judicial office are
knowledge of the law, love of justice, high personal character,
calmness, impartiality and independence. Mere popularity, or what so
often is necessary to popularity, good-fellowship, is the last quality
we look for in a judge. The self-seeker and self-advertiser is seldom
qualified by temperament or character for judicial office. It requires
the most thorough investigation as to the professional learning, career
and conduct of a candidate and the most sifting exchange of views
before a judicial candidate can be intelligently and wisely selected.
For want of adequate means of acquiring information, the public in
such large constituencies as the whole state of New York (in the case
of judges of the Court of Appeals) and the various judicial districts
(in the case of justices of the Supreme Court) cannot intelligently
estimate the qualifications of judicial candidates. It seems to me
nonsense to argue that in parties composed of hundreds of thousands
of enrolled electors dispersed throughout the state, the voters can
investigate, or exchange views, or intelligently act in regard to the
qualifications of lawyers who are proposed as candidates for judicial
office--almost as preposterous as if we were to select judicial
candidates by lot from the names placed on the official primary list.
The test of fitness for judicial office should indisputably be
higher and more technical than for other offices. That test should
require special capacity and character, to be ascertained by careful
investigation, exchange of views, open discussion and comparison of
merits by responsible delegates or representatives charged with that
particular duty and acting in public and personally accountable for
mistake, perversion, or corruption. This test can be best secured by
the convention system; practically it cannot be secured at all by any
system of secret direct primaries.
Reform in the selection of judges, if their selection is to be by
election, lies not in schemes to reform human nature by legislative
nostrums and to destroy publicity and responsibility, but in making the
voters appreciate that the government is theirs, that political power
is theirs, that theirs is the duty to send competent representatives
to conventions, that theirs is the responsibility of electing
competent men, and that they are vitally interested in having a
competent, impartial and independent judiciary. Political conventions
will be reliable and responsive if the people will only see to it
that competent, honest and patriotic men are elected to represent
them. There is no other course unless we uproot our whole system of
republican government.
Ten years of experimenting with our Election Law have produced the
present hodge-podge under which no election is conducted without error
and without inviting a lawsuit and from which all but experts and
professional politicians turn away in irritation and disgust. The net
result has been to complicate our elections and make them less and less
responsive to the best public opinion, and more and more subject to the
control of professional politicians, wire-pullers and bosses.
In conclusion, though repeating myself, I earnestly submit that
there can be no greater menace to our political institutions and
to government by the people than the prevailing tendency to weaken
and impair the representative principle in our state governments by
nominating executive and judicial officers through direct secret
primaries instead of through public conventions composed of delegates
or representatives duly chosen by the enrolled voters of the parties
and charged with the duty of selecting competent and honest candidates
and directly accountable to the locality they represent for the failure
to perform that duty. These delegates represent the people of the
various districts of the state; they come together in public; they
exchange and discuss views, or at any rate have full opportunity for
debate and criticism; they vote in public for this or that candidate,
and then they return to their neighbors, to those who sent them and for
whom they spoke and voted, and face accountability and responsibility.
Is not such a proceeding much more likely to secure competent and
honest candidates than the present system of leaving the voter at
large to slip into a dimly lighted booth and secretly place a cross on
an unidentifiable ballot? The convention system is sound and should
be preserved; it alone will perpetuate our parties and our form of
government, and in casting the representative principle aside, as is
necessarily done in the direct primary system of nominations for state
and judicial office, we are beginning a process which, if not checked,
will end in what Lincoln called political suicide.