OBJECTION II.

A promise to do an immoral act is not binding: therefore an oath to

support the Constitution of the United States, does not bind one to

support any provisions of that instrument which are repugnant to his

ideas of right. And an abolitionist, thinking it wrong to return

slaves, may as an office-holder, innocently and properly take an

oath to support a Constitution which commands such return.

ANSWER. Observe that this objection allows the Constitution to be

pro-slavery, and admits that there are clauses in it which no

abolitionist ought to carry out or support.

And observe, further, that we all agree, that a bad promise is

better broken than kept--that every abolitionist, who has before now

taken the oath to the Constitution, is bound to break it, and

disobey the pro-slavery clauses of that instrument. So far there is

no difference between us. But the point in dispute now is, whether a

man, having found out that certain requirements of the Constitution

are wrong, can, after that, innocently swear to support and obey them,

_all the while meaning not to do so_.

Now I contend that such loose construction of our promises is

contrary alike to honor, to fair dealing, and to truthfulness--that

it tends to destroy utterly that confidence between man and man

which binds society together, and leads, in matters of government,

to absolute tyranny.

The Constitution is a series of contracts made by each individual

with every other of the fourteen millions. A man's oath is evidence

of his assent to this contract. If I offer a man the copy of an

agreement, and he, after reading, swears to perform it, have I not a

right to infer from his oath that he assents to the _rightfulness_

of the articles of that paper? What more solemn form of expressing

his assent could he select? A man's oath expresses his conviction of

the rightfulness of the actions he promises to do, as well as his

determination to do them. If this be not so, I can have no trust in

any man's word. He may take my money, promise to do what I wish in

return, and yet, keeping my money, tell me, on the morrow, that he

shall not keep his promise, and never meant to, because the act, his

conscience tells him, is wrong. Who would trust property to such men,

or such maxims in the common affairs of life? Shall we not be as

honest in the Senate House as on 'Change? The North makes a contract

with the South by which she receives certain benefits, and agrees to

render certain services. The benefits she carefully keeps--but the

services she refuses to render, because immoral contracts are not

binding! Is this fair dealing? It is the rule alike of law and

common sense, that if we are not able, from _any cause_, to furnish

the article we have agreed to, we ought to return the pay we have

received. If power is put into our hands on certain conditions, and

we find ourselves unable to comply with those conditions, we ought

to surrender the power back to those who gave it.

Immoral laws are doubtless void, and should not be obeyed. But the

question is here, whether one knowing a law to be immoral, may

innocently promise to obey it in order to get into office? The

people have settled the conditions on which one may take office. The

first is, that he assent to their Constitution. Is it honest to

accept power with the intention at the time of not keeping the

conditions?--The rightfulness of those conditions is not here the

question.

The Anti-Slavery Examiner, Part 4 of 4 · 第 49 / 76 题