=Source.=—_Report on the Affairs of British North America._
By Lord Durham. Printed for the House of Commons, 1839.
Such are the lamentable results of the political and social evils which
have so long agitated the Canadas, and such is their condition, that
at the present moment we are called on to take immediate precautions
against dangers so alarming as those of rebellion, foreign invasion,
and utter exhaustion and depopulation. When I look on the various and
deep-rooted causes of mischief which the past inquiry has pointed
out as existing in every institution, in the constitutions, and in
the very composition of society throughout a great part of these
provinces, I almost shrink from the apparent presumption of grappling
with these gigantic difficulties. Nor shall I attempt to do so in
detail. I rely on the efficacy of reform in the constitutional system
by which these colonies are governed, for the removal of every abuse
in their administration which defective institutions have engendered.
If a system can be devised which shall lay in these countries the
foundation of an efficient and popular government, ensure harmony, in
place of collision, between the various powers of the State, and bring
the influence of a vigorous public opinion to bear on every detail of
public affairs, we may rely on sufficient remedies being found for the
present vices of the administrative system.
It is not by weakening but strengthening the influence of the people
on its government; by confining within much narrower bounds than those
hitherto allotted to it, and not by extending the interference of the
Imperial authorities in the details of colonial affairs, that I believe
that harmony is to be restored where dissension has so long prevailed,
and a regularity and vigour hitherto unknown introduced into the
administration of these Provinces. It needs no change in the principles
of government, no invention of a new constitutional theory, to supply
the remedy which would, in my opinion, completely remove the existing
political disorders. It needs but to follow out consistently the
principles of the British Constitution, and introduce into the
government of these great Colonies those wise provisions, by which
alone the working of the representative system can in any country be
rendered harmonious and efficient. We are not now to consider the
policy of establishing representative government in the North American
Colonies. That has been irrevocably done, and the experiment of
depriving the people of their present constitutional power is not to
be thought of. To conduct their Government harmoniously, in accordance
with its established principles, is now the business of its rulers, and
I know not how it is possible to secure that harmony in any other way
than by administering the Government on those principles which have
been found perfectly efficacious in Great Britain. I would not impair
a single prerogative of the Crown; on the contrary, I believe that
the interests of the people of these Colonies require the protection
of prerogatives which have not hitherto been exercised. But the Crown
must, on the other hand, submit to the necessary consequences of
representative institutions; and if it has to carry on the Government
in unison with a representative body, it must consent to carry it on by
means of those in whom that representative body has confidence.
In England this principle has so long been considered an indisputable
and essential part of our constitution that it has really hardly ever
been found necessary to inquire into the means by which its observance
is enforced. When a Ministry ceases to command a majority in Parliament
on great questions or policy, its doom is immediately sealed; and it
would appear to us as strange to attempt for any time to carry on a
Government by means of ministers perpetually in a minority, as it
would be to pass laws with a majority of votes against them.... If
Colonial Legislatures have frequently stopped the supplies, if they
have harassed public servants by unjust or harsh impeachments, it
was because the removal of an unpopular administration could not be
effected in the Colonies by those milder indications of a want of
confidence which have always sufficed to attain the end in the mother
country.
The means which have occasionally been proposed in the Colonies
themselves appear to me by no means calculated to attain the desired
end in the best way. An elective executive council would not only be
utterly inconsistent with monarchical government, but would really,
under the nominal authority of the Crown, deprive the community of one
of the great advantages of an hereditary monarchy. Every purpose of
popular control might be combined with every advantage of vesting the
immediate choice of advisers in the Crown, were the Colonial Governor
to be instructed to secure the co-operation of the Assembly in his
policy, by entrusting its administration to such men as could command
a majority; and if he were given to understand that he need count on
no aid from home in any difference with the Assembly, that should not
directly involve the relations between the mother country and the
Colony....
I know that it has been urged that the principles which are productive
of harmony and good government in the mother country, are by no means
applicable to a colonial dependency. It is said that it is necessary
that the administration of a colony should be carried on by persons
nominated without any reference to the wishes of its people; that they
have to carry into effect the policy, not of that people, but of the
authorities at home; and that a colony which should name all its own
administrative functionaries, would, in fact, cease to be dependent.
I admit that the system which I propose would, in fact, place the
internal government of the colony in the hands of the colonists
themselves; and that we should thus leave to them the execution of
the laws, of which we have long entrusted the making solely to them.
Perfectly aware of the value of our colonial possessions, and strongly
impressed with the necessity of maintaining our connexion with them, I
know not in what respect it can be desirable that we should interfere
with their internal legislation in matters which do not affect their
relations with the mother country. The matters which so concern us are
very few. The constitution of the form of government—the regulation
of foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the other
British Colonies, and foreign nations—and the disposal of the public
lands, are the only points on which the mother country requires a
control. This control is now sufficiently secured by the authority
of the Imperial Legislature; by the protection which the colony
derives from us against foreign enemies; by the beneficial terms which
our laws secure to its trade; and by its share of the reciprocal
benefits which would be conferred by a wise system of colonization.
A perfect subordination, on the part of the Colony, on these points,
is secured by the advantages which it finds in the continuance of
its connexion with the Empire. It certainly is not strengthened, but
greatly weakened, by a vexatious interference on the part of the Home
Government, with the enactment of laws for regulating the internal
concerns of the Colony, or in the selection of the persons entrusted
with their execution. The colonists may not always know what laws
are best for them, or which of their countrymen are the fittest for
conducting their affairs; but, at least, they have a greater interest
in coming to a right judgment on these points, and will take greater
pains to do so than those whose welfare is very remotely and slightly
affected by the good or bad legislation of these portions of the
Empire. If the colonists make bad laws, and select improper persons
to conduct their affairs, they will generally be the only, always the
greatest, sufferers; and, like the people of other countries, they
must bear the ills which they bring on themselves, until they choose
to apply the remedy. But it surely cannot be the duty or the interest
of Great Britain to keep a most expensive military possession of these
Colonies, in order that a Governor or Secretary of State may be able to
confer colonial appointments on one rather than another set of persons
in the Colonies.
(Lord Durham went on to assert that it was essential
to his scheme that the government of the colony
should be British, and that the numerical
superiority of the French in Lower Canada could
most peaceably be remedied by legislative union
of the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, which
would give an English majority; and he proceeds:)
I am inclined to go further, and inquire whether all these objects
would not more surely be attained by extending this legislative
union over all the British Provinces in North America; and whether
the advantages which I anticipate for two of them, might not, and
should not in justice be extended over all. Such an union would at
once decisively settle the question of races; it would enable all
the Provinces to co-operate for all common purposes; and, above all,
it would form a great and powerful people, possessing the means of
securing good and responsible government for itself, and which,
under the protection of the British Empire, might in some measure
counterbalance the preponderant and increasing influence of the United
States on the American continent. I do not anticipate that a Colonial
Legislature thus strong and thus self-governing would desire to
abandon the connexion with Great Britain. On the contrary, I believe
that the practical relief from undue interference, which would be
the result of such a change, would strengthen the present bond of
feelings and interests; and that the connexion would become more
durable and advantageous, by having more of equality, of freedom, and
of local independence. But at any rate, our first duty is to secure the
well-being of our colonial countrymen; and if in the hidden decrees
of that wisdom by which this world is ruled it is written that these
countries are not for ever to remain portions of the Empire, we owe it
to our honour to take good care that, when they separate from us, they
should not be the only countries on the American continent in which the
Anglo-Saxon race shall be found unfit to govern itself.
I am in truth so far from believing that the increased power and weight
that would be given to these Colonies by union would endanger their
connexion with the Empire, that I look to it as the only means of
fostering such a national feeling throughout them as would effectually
counterbalance whatever tendencies may now exist towards separation. No
large community of free and intelligent men will long feel contented
with a political system which places them, because it places their
country, in a position of inferiority to their neighbours. The colonist
of Great Britain is linked, it is true, to a mighty Empire; and the
glories of its history, the visible signs of its present power, and
the civilisation of its people, are calculated to raise and gratify
his national pride. But he feels also that his link to that Empire
is one of remote dependence; he catches but passing and inadequate
glimpses of its power and prosperity; he knows that in its government
he and his own countrymen have no voice. While his neighbour on the
other side of the frontier assumes importance, from the notion that his
vote exercises some influence on the councils, and that he himself has
some share in the progress, of a mighty nation, the colonist feels the
deadening influence of the narrow and subordinate community to which
he belongs.... If we wish to prevent the extension of this influence,
it can only be done by raising up for the colonist some nationality
of his own; by elevating these small and unimportant communities into
a society having some objects of a national importance; and by thus
giving their inhabitants a country which they will be unwilling to see
absorbed even into one more powerful.
While I believe that the establishment of a comprehensive system
of government, and of an effectual union between the different
Provinces, would produce this important effect on the feelings of their
inhabitants, I am inclined to attach very great importance to the
influence which it would have in giving greater scope and satisfaction
to the legitimate ambition of the most active and prominent persons
to be found in them. If, as it is commonly asserted, the disorders of
these colonies have, in great measure, been fomented by the influence
of designing and ambitious individuals, this evil will best be remedied
by allowing such a scope for the desires of such men as shall direct
their ambition into the legitimate channel of furthering, and not of
thwarting, their Government. By creating high prizes in a general
and responsible Government, we shall immediately afford the means of
pacifying the turbulent ambitions, and of employing in worthy and noble
occupations the talents which now are only exerted to foment disorder.