"A Refutation of an Article in the Edinburgh Review (No.
CII.) entitled, 'Sadler's Law of Population, and disproof of
Human Superfecundity;' containing also Additional Proofs of
the Principle enunciated in that Treatise, founded on the
Censuses of different Countries recently published." By
Michael Thomas Sadler, M.P. 8vo. London: 1830.
"Before anything came out against my Essay, I was told I must prepare
myself for a storm coming against it, it being resolved by some men
that it was necessary that book of mine should, as it is phrased, be run
down."--John Locke.
We have, in violation of our usual practice, transcribed Mr Sadler's
title-page from top to bottom, motto and all. The parallel implied
between the Essay on the Human Understanding and the Essay on
Superfecundity is exquisitely laughable. We can match it, however, with
mottoes as ludicrous. We remember to have heard of a dramatic piece,
entitled "News from Camperdown," written soon after Lord Duncan's
victory, by a man once as much in his own good graces as Mr Sadler is,
and now as much forgotten as Mr Sadler will soon be, Robert Heron. His
piece was brought upon the stage, and damned, "as it is phrased," in
the second act; but the author, thinking that it had been unfairly and
unjustly "run down," published it, in order to put his critics to shame,
with this motto from Swift: "When a true genius appears in the world,
you may know him by this mark--that the dunces are all in confederacy
against him." We remember another anecdote, which may perhaps be
acceptable to so zealous a churchman as Mr Sadler. A certain Antinomian
preacher, the oracle of a barn, in a county of which we do not think it
proper to mention the name, finding that divinity was not by itself a
sufficiently lucrative profession, resolved to combine with it that of
dog-stealing. He was, by ill-fortune, detected in several offences of
this description, and was in consequence brought before two justices,
who, in virtue of the powers given them by an act of parliament,
sentenced him to a whipping for each theft. The degrading punishment
inflicted on the pastor naturally thinned the flock; and the poor man
was in danger of wanting bread. He accordingly put forth a handbill
solemnly protesting his innocence, describing his sufferings, and
appealing to the Christian charity of the public; and to his pathetic
address he prefixed this most appropriate text: "Thrice was I beaten
with rods.--St Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians." He did not perceive
that, though St Paul had been scourged, no number of whippings, however
severe, will of themselves entitle a man to be considered as an apostle.
Mr Sadler seems to us to have fallen into a somewhat similar error. He
should remember that, though Locke may have been laughed at, so has Sir
Claudius Hunter; and that it takes something more than the laughter of
all the world to make a Locke.
The body of this pamphlet by no means justifies the parallel so modestly
insinuated on the title-page. Yet we must own that, though Mr Sadler
has not risen to the level of Locke, he has done what was almost as
difficult, if not as honourable--he has fallen below his own. He is at
best a bad writer. His arrangement is an elaborate confusion. His style
has been constructed, with great care, in such a manner as to produce
the least possible effect by means of the greatest possible number of
words. Aspiring to the exalted character of a Christian philosopher, he
can never preserve through a single paragraph either the calmness of a
philosopher or the meekness of a Christian. His ill-nature would make a
very little wit formidable. But, happily, his efforts to wound resemble
those of a juggler's snake. The bags of poison are full, but the fang is
wanting. In this foolish pamphlet, all the unpleasant peculiarities of
his style and temper are brought out in the strongest manner. He is from
the beginning to the end in a paroxysm of rage, and would certainly do
us some mischief if he knew how. We will give a single instance for the
present. Others will present themselves as we proceed. We laughed at
some doggerel verses which he cited, and which we, never having seen
them before, suspected to be his own. We are now sure that if the
principle on which Solomon decided a famous case of filiation were
correct, there can be no doubt as to the justice of our suspicion. Mr
Sadler, who, whatever elements of the poetical character he may lack,
possesses the poetical irritability in an abundance which might have
sufficed for Homer himself, resolved to retaliate on the person, who,
as he supposed, had reviewed him. He has, accordingly, ransacked
some collection of college verses, in the hope of finding, among the
performances of his supposed antagonist, something as bad as his own.
And we must in fairness admit that he has succeeded pretty well. We must
admit that the gentleman in question sometimes put into his exercises,
at seventeen, almost as great nonsense as Mr Sadler is in the habit of
putting into his books at sixty.
Mr Sadler complains that we have devoted whole pages to mere abuse of
him. We deny the charge. We have, indeed, characterised, in terms of
just reprehension, that spirit which shows itself in every part of his
prolix work. Those terms of reprehension we are by no means inclined
to retract; and we conceive that we might have used much stronger
expressions, without the least offence either to truth or to decorum.
There is a limit prescribed to us by our sense of what is due to
ourselves. But we think that no indulgence is due to Mr Sadler. A writer
who distinctly announces that he has not conformed to the candour of the
age--who makes it his boast that he expresses himself throughout with
the greatest plainness and freedom--and whose constant practice proves
that by plainness and freedom he means coarseness and rancour--has
no right to expect that others shall remember courtesies which he has
forgotten, or shall respect one who has ceased to respect himself.
Mr Sadler declares that he has never vilified Mr Malthus personally,
and has confined himself to attacking the doctrines which that gentleman
maintains. We should wish to leave that point to the decision of all
who have read Mr Sadler's book, or any twenty pages of it. To quote
particular instances of a temper which penetrates and inspires the whole
work, is to weaken our charge. Yet, that we may not be suspected of
flinching, we will give two specimens,--the two first which occur to our
recollection. "Whose minister is it that speaks thus?" says Mr Sadler,
after misrepresenting in a most extraordinary manner, though, we are
willing to believe, unintentionally, one of the positions of Mr Malthus.
"Whose minister is it that speaks thus? That of the lover and avenger of
little children?" Again, Mr Malthus recommends, erroneously perhaps, but
assuredly from humane motives, that alms, when given, should be given
very sparingly. Mr Sadler quotes the recommendation, and adds the
following courteous comment:--"The tender mercies of the wicked are
cruel." We cannot think that a writer who indulges in these indecent and
unjust attacks on professional and personal character has any right to
complain of our sarcasms on his metaphors and rhymes.
We will now proceed to examine the reply which Mr Sadler has thought
fit to make to our arguments. He begins by attacking our remarks on the
origin of evil. They are, says he, too profound for common apprehension;
and he hopes that they are too profound for our own. That they seem
profound to him we can well believe. Profundity, in its secondary as in
its primary sense, is a relative term. When Grildrig was nearly drowned
in the Brobdingnagian cream-jug he doubtless thought it very deep. But
to common apprehension our reasoning would, we are persuaded, appear
perfectly simple.
The theory of Mr Malthus, says Mr Sadler, cannot be true, because it
asserts the existence of a great and terrible evil, and is therefore
inconsistent with the goodness of God. We answer thus. We know that
there are in the world great and terrible evils. In spite of these
evils, we believe in the goodness of God. Why may we not then continue
to believe in his goodness, though another evil should be added to the
list?
How does Mr Sadler answer this? Merely by telling us, that we are too
wicked to be reasoned with. He completely shrinks from the question; a
question, be it remembered, not raised by us--a question which we should
have felt strong objections to raising unnecessarily--a question put
forward by himself, as intimately connected with the subject of his
two ponderous volumes. He attempts to carp at detached parts of our
reasoning on the subject. With what success he carries on this guerilla
war after declining a general action with the main body of our argument
our readers shall see.
"The Reviewer sends me to Paley, who is, I confess, rather more
intelligible on the subject, and who, fortunately, has decided the very
point in dispute. I will first give the words of the Reviewer, who, when
speaking of my general argument regarding the magnitude of the evils,
moral and physical, implied in the theory I oppose, sums up his ideas
thus:--'Mr Sadler says, that it is not a light or transient evil, but a
great and permanent evil. What then? The question of the origin of evil
is a question of aye or no,--not a question of MORE or LESS.' But what
says Paley? His express rule is this, that 'when we cannot resolve all
appearances into benevolence of design, we make the FEW give place to
the MANY, the LITTLE to the GREAT; that we take our judgment from a
large and decided preponderancy.' Now in weighing these two authorities,
directly at issue on this point, I think there will be little trouble
in determining which we shall make 'to give place;' or, if we 'look to
a large and decided preponderancy' of either talent, learning, or
benevolence, from whom we shall 'take our judgment.' The effrontery, or,
to speak more charitably, the ignorance of a reference to Paley on this
subject, and in this instance, is really marvellous."
Now, does not Mr Sadler see that the very words which he quotes from
Paley contain in themselves a refutation of his whole argument? Paley
says, indeed, as every man in his senses would say, that in a certain
case, which he has specified, the more and the less come into question.
But in what case? "When we CANNOT resolve all appearances into the
benevolence of design." It is better that there should be a little
evil than a great deal of evil. This is self-evident. But it is also
self-evident, that no evil is better than a little evil. Why, then, is
there any evil? It is a mystery which we cannot solve. It is a mystery
which Paley, by the very words which Mr Sadler has quoted, acknowledges
himself unable to solve; and it is because he cannot solve that mystery
that he proceeds to take into consideration the more and the less.
Believing in the divine goodness, we must necessarily believe that the
evils which exist are necessary to avert greater evils. But what those
greater evils are, we do not know. How the happiness of any part of the
sentient creation would be in any respect diminished if, for example,
children cut their teeth without pain, we cannot understand. The case
is exactly the same with the principle of Mr Malthus. If superfecundity
exists, it exists, no doubt, because it is a less evil than some other
evil which otherwise would exist. Can Mr Sadler prove that this is an
impossibility?
One single expression which Mr Sadler employs on this subject is
sufficient to show how utterly incompetent he is to discuss it. "On the
Christian hypothesis," says he, "no doubt exists as to the origin of
evil." He does not, we think, understand what is meant by the origin
of evil. The Christian Scriptures profess to give no solution of that
mystery. They relate facts: but they leave the metaphysical question
undetermined. They tell us that man fell; but why he was not so
constituted as to be incapable of falling, or why the Supreme Being has
not mitigated the consequences of the Fall more than they actually have
been mitigated, the Scriptures did not tell us, and, it may without
presumption be said, could not tell us, unless we had been creatures
different from what we are. There is something, either in the nature of
our faculties or in the nature of the machinery employed by us for the
purpose of reasoning, which condemns us, on this and similar subjects,
to hopeless ignorance. Man can understand these high matters only by
ceasing to be man, just as a fly can understand a lemma of Newton only
by ceasing to be a fly. To make it an objection to the Christian system
that it gives us no solution of these difficulties, is to make it an
objection to the Christian system that it is a system formed for human
beings. Of the puzzles of the Academy, there is not one which does not
apply as strongly to Deism as to Christianity, and to Atheism as to
Deism. There are difficulties in everything. Yet we are sure that
something must be true.
If revelation speaks on the subject of the origin of evil it speaks
only to discourage dogmatism and temerity. In the most ancient, the most
beautiful, and the most profound of all works on the subject, the Book
of Job, both the sufferer who complains of the divine government, and
the injudicious advisers who attempt to defend it on wrong principles,
are silenced by the voice of supreme wisdom, and reminded that the
question is beyond the reach of the human intellect. St Paul silences
the supposed objector, who strives to force him into controversy, in
the same manner. The church has been, ever since the apostolic times,
agitated by this question, and by a question which is inseparable from
it, the question of fate and free-will. The greatest theologians and
philosophers have acknowledged that these things were too high for them,
and have contended themselves with hinting at what seemed to be the most
probable solution. What says Johnson? "All our effort ends in belief
that for the evils of life there is some good reason, and in confession
that the reason cannot be found." What says Paley? "Of the origin of
evil no universal solution has been discovered. I mean no solution which
reaches to all cases of complaint.--The consideration of general laws,
although it may concern the question of the origin of evil very nearly,
which I think it does, rests in views disproportionate to our faculties,
and in a knowledge which we do not possess. It serves rather to account
for the obscurity of the subject, than to supply us with distinct
answers to our difficulties." What says presumptuous ignorance? "No
doubt whatever exists as to the origin of evil." It is remarkable that
Mr Sadler does not tell us what his solution is. The world, we suspect,
will lose little by his silence.
He falls on the reviewer again.
"Though I have shown," says he, "and on authorities from which none can
lightly differ, not only the cruelty and immorality which this system
necessarily involves, but its most revolting feature, its gross
partiality, he has wholly suppressed this, the most important part of my
argument; as even the bare notice of it would have instantly exposed
the sophistry to which he has had recourse. If, however, he would fairly
meet the whole question, let him show me that 'hydrophobia,' which he
gives as an example of the laws of God and nature, is a calamity to
which the poor alone are liable; or that 'malaria,' which, with singular
infelicity, he has chosen as an illustration of the fancied evils of
population, is a respecter of persons."
We said nothing about this argument, as Mr Sadler calls it, merely
because we did not think it worth while: and we are half ashamed to say
anything about it now. But, since Mr Sadler is so urgent for an answer,
he shall have one. If there is evil, it must be either partial or
universal. Which is the better of the two? Hydrophobia, says this great
philosopher, is no argument against the divine goodness, because mad
dogs bite rich and poor alike; but if the rich were exempted, and
only nine people suffered for ten who suffer now, hydrophobia would
forthwith, simply because it would produce less evil than at present,
become an argument against the divine goodness! To state such a
proposition, is to refute it. And is not the malaria a respecter of
persons? It infests Rome. Does it infest London? There are complaints
peculiar to the tropical countries. There are others which are found
only in mountainous districts; others which are confined to marshy
regions; others again which run in particular families. Is not this
partiality? Why is it more inconsistent with the divine goodness that
poor men should suffer an evil from which rich men are exempt, than that
a particular portion of the community should inherit gout, scrofula,
insanity, and other maladies? And are there no miseries under which, in
fact, the poor alone are suffering? Mr Sadler himself acknowledges, in
this very paragraph, that there are such; but he tells us that these
calamities are the effects of misgovernment, and that this misgovernment
is the effect of political economy. Be it so. But does he not see that
he is only removing the difficulty one step further? Why does Providence
suffer men, whose minds are filled with false and pernicious notions, to
have power in the state? For good ends, we doubt not, if the fact be so;
but for ends inscrutable to us, who see only a small part of the vast
scheme, and who see that small part only for a short period. Does Mr
Sadler doubt that the Supreme Being has power as absolute over the
revolutions of political as over the organisation of natural bodies?
Surely not: and, if not, we do not see that he vindicates the ways
of Providence by attributing the distresses, which the poor, as he
confesses, endure, to an error in legislation rather than to a law of
physiology. Turn the question as we may, disguise it as we may, we shall
find that it at last resolves itself into the same great enigma,--the
origin of physical and moral evil: an enigma which the highest human
intellects have given up in despair, but which Mr Sadler thinks himself
perfectly able to solve.
He next accuses us of having paused long on verbal criticism. We
certainly did object to his improper use of the words "inverse
variation." Mr Sadler complains of this with his usual bitterness.
"Now what is the Reviewer's quarrel with me on this occasion? That he
does not understand the meaning of my terms? No. He acknowledges the
contrary. That I have not fully explained the sense in which I have used
them? No. An explanation, he knows, is immediately subjoined, though
he has carefully suppressed it. That I have varied the sense in which I
have applied them? No. I challenge him to show it. But he nevertheless
goes on for many pages together in arguing against what he knows, and,
in fact, acknowledges, I did not mean; and then turns round and argues
again, though much more feebly, indeed, against what he says I did mean!
Now, even had I been in error as to the use of a word, I appeal to the
reader whether such an unworthy and disingenuous course would not, if
generally pursued, make controversy on all subjects, however important,
that into which, in such hands, it always degenerates--a dispute about
words."
The best way to avoid controversies about words is to use words in their
proper senses. Mr Sadler may think our objection captious; but how
he can think it disingenuous we do not well understand. If we had
represented him as meaning what we knew that he did not mean, we should
have acted in a disgraceful manner. But we did not represent him, and he
allows that we did not represent him, as meaning what he did not mean.
We blamed him, and with perfect justice and propriety, for saying what
he did not mean. Every man has in one sense a right to define his own
terms; that is to say, if he chooses to call one two, and two seven,
it would be absurd to charge him with false arithmetic for saying that
seven is the double of one. But it would be perfectly fair to blame
him for changing the established sense of words. The words, "inverse
variation," in matters not purely scientific, have often been used
in the loose way in which Mr Sadler has used them. But we shall be
surprised if he can find a single instance of their having been so used
in a matter of pure arithmetic.
We will illustrate our meaning thus. Lord Thurlow, in one of his
speeches about Indian affairs, said that one Hastings was worth twenty
Macartneys. He might, with equal propriety, have said ten Macartneys, or
a hundred Macartneys. Nor would there have been the least inconsistency
in his using all the three expressions in one speech. But would this be
an excuse for a financier who, in a matter of account, should reason as
if ten, twenty, and a hundred were the same number?
Mr Sadler tells us that he purposely avoided the use of the word
proportion in stating his principle. He seems, therefore, to allow that
the word proportion would have been improper. Yet he did in fact employ
it in explaining his principle, accompanied with an awkward explanation
intended to signify that, though he said proportion, he meant something
quite different from proportion. We should not have said so much on this
subject either in our former article, or at present, but that there is
in all Mr Sadler's writings an air of scientific pedantry, which renders
his errors fair game. We will now let the matter rest; and, instead
of assailing Mr Sadler with our verbal criticism, proceed to defend
ourselves against his literal criticism.
"The Reviewer promised his readers that some curious results should
follow from his shuffling. We will enable him to keep his word.
"'In two English counties,' says he, 'which contain from 50 to 100
inhabitants on the square mile, the births to 100 marriages are,
according to Mr Sadler, 420; but in 44 departments of France, in which
there are from one to two hecatares [hectares] to each inhabitant, that
is to say, in which the population is from 125 to 250, or rather more,
to the square mile, the number of births to one hundred marriages is 423
and a fraction.'
"The first curious result is, that our Reviewer is ignorant, not only of
the name, but of the extent, of a French hectare; otherwise he is guilty
of a practice which, even if transferred to the gambling-table, would,
I presume, prevent him from being allowed ever to shuffle, even there,
again. He was most ready to pronounce upon a mistake of one per cent. in
a calculation of mine, the difference in no wise affecting the argument
in hand; but here I must inform him, that his error, whether wilfully or
ignorantly put forth, involves his entire argument.
"The French hectare I had calculated to contain 107,708 67/100 English
square feet, or 2 47265/100000 acres; Dr Kelly takes it, on authority
which he gives, at 107,644 143923/1000000 English square feet, or 2
471169/1000000 acres. The last French "Annuaires", however, state it,
I perceive, as being equal to 2 473614/1000000 acres. The difference is
very trifling, and will not in the slightest degree cover our critic's
error. The first calculation gives about 258 83/100 hectares to an
English square mile; the second, 258 73/100; the last, or French
calculation 258 98/100. When, therefore, the Reviewer calculates the
population of the departments of France thus: 'from one to two hectares
to each inhabitant, that is to say, in which the population is from 125
to 250, or rather more, to the square mile; his 'that is to say,' is
that which he ought not to have said--no rare case with him, as we shall
show throughout."
We must inform Mr Sadler, in the first place, that we inserted the vowel
which amuses him so much, not from ignorance or from carelessness, but
advisedly, and in conformity with the practice of several respectable
writers. He will find the word hecatare in Ree's Cyclopaedia. He will
find it also in Dr Young. We prefer the form which we have employed,
because it is etymologically correct. Mr Sadler seems not to know that a
hecatare is so-called, because it contains a hundred ares.
We were perfectly acquainted with the extent as well as with the name of
a hecatare. Is it at all strange that we should use the words "250,
or rather more," in speaking of 258 and a fraction? Do not people
constantly employ round numbers with still greater looseness, in
translating foreign distances and foreign money? If indeed, as Mr Sadler
says, the difference which he chooses to call an error involved the
entire argument, or any part of the argument, we should have been guilty
of gross unfairness. But it is not so. The difference between 258 and
250, as even Mr Sadler would see if he were not blind with fury, was
a difference to his advantage. Our point was this. The fecundity of a
dense population in certain departments of France is greater than that
of a thinly scattered population in certain counties of England. The
more dense, therefore, the population in those departments of
France, the stronger was our case. By putting 250, instead of 258, we
understated our case. Mr Sadler's correction of our orthography leads us
to suspect that he knows very little of Greek; and his correction of our
calculation quite satisfies us that he knows very little of logic.
But, to come to the gist of the controversy. Our argument, drawn from
Mr Sadler's own tables, remains absolutely untouched. He makes excuses
indeed; for an excuse is the last thing that Mr Sadler will ever want.
There is something half laughable and half provoking in the facility
with which he asserts and retracts, says and unsays, exactly as suits
his argument. Sometimes the register of baptisms is imperfect, and
sometimes the register of burials. Then again these registers become all
at once exact almost to an unit. He brings forward a census of Prussia
in proof of his theory. We show that it directly confutes his theory;
and it forthwith becomes "notoriously and grossly defective." The census
of the Netherlands is not to be easily dealt with; and the census of the
Netherlands is therefore pronounced inaccurate. In his book on the Law
of Population, he tells us that "in the slave-holding States of America,
the male slaves constitute a decided majority of that unfortunate
class." This fact we turned against him; and, forgetting that he had
himself stated it, he tells us that "it is as erroneous as many other
ideas which we entertain," and that "he will venture to assert that the
female slaves were, at the nubile age, as numerous as the males." The
increase of the negroes in the United States puzzles him; and he creates
a vast slave-trade to solve it. He confounds together things perfectly
different; the slave-trade carried on under the American flag, and
the slave-trade carried on for the supply of the American soil,--the
slave-trade with Africa, and the internal slave-trade between the
different States. He exaggerates a few occasional acts of smuggling into
an immense and regular importation, and makes his escape as well as he
can under cover of this hubbub of words. Documents are authentic and
facts true precisely in proportion to the support which they afford
to his theory. This is one way, undoubtedly, of making books; but we
question much whether it be the way to make discoveries.
As to the inconsistencies which we pointed out between his theory and
his own tables, he finds no difficulty in explaining them away or facing
them out. In one case there would have been no contradiction if, instead
of taking one of his tables, we had multiplied the number of three
tables together, and taken the average. Another would never have existed
if there had not been a great migration of people into Lancashire.
Another is not to be got over by any device. But then it is very small,
and of no consequence to the argument.
Here, indeed, he is perhaps right. The inconsistencies which we noticed,
were, in themselves, of little moment. We give them as samples,--as
mere hints, to caution those of our readers who might also happen to be
readers of Mr Sadler against being deceived by his packing. He complains
of the word packing. We repeat it; and, since he has defied us to the
proof, we will go fully into the question which, in our last article, we
only glanced at, and prove, in such a manner as shall not leave even to
Mr Sadler any shadow of excuse, that his theory owes its speciousness to
packing, and to packing alone.
That our readers may fully understand our reasoning, we will again state
what Mr Sadler's proposition is. He asserts that, on a given space, the
number of children to a marriage becomes less and less as the population
becomes more and more numerous.
We will begin with the census of France given by Mr Sadler. By joining
the departments together in combinations which suit his purpose, he has
contrived to produce three tables, which he presents as decisive proofs
of his theory.