THE RETREAT OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY--THE CZAR PLACES HIMSELF AT THE HEAD OF
HIS ARMY--THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE CZARINA
(FEBRUARY-SEPTEMBER, 1915)
In spite of the successes gained by the Russians in Galicia in the
autumn, the situation was very uncertain in the spring of 1915. On both
sides preparations were being made for a fierce renewal of the struggle
to which the fighting of January and February was only the prelude. On
the Russian side it looked as if everything possible had been done to
strengthen the army’s fighting power and assure the normal flow of
supplies. The Czar, at any rate, believed that it was so, on the faith
of the reports he had received. He had placed all his hopes on the
success of this spring campaign.
The Austrians were the first to take the offensive, but the Russians
counter-attacked vigorously, and their superiority was soon made
manifest all along the front. In the first fortnight of March their
successes were continued. On the 19th they captured the fortress of
Przemysl. The whole garrison and considerable booty in war material fell
into their hands. There was tremendous excitement in the country. The
Czar returned from G.H.Q. on March 24th. He was in high spirits. Were
the fortunes of war at length going to turn in favour of Russia?
In the middle of April Russian divisions stood on the crest of the
Carpathians and menaced the rich plains of Hungary. The Austrian army
was at the end of its tether. But these successes had been bought at the
price of enormous losses, and the mountain fighting continued under
conditions which were extremely trying even for the victor. The
prolongation of the war was also beginning to show effects on the
population at home. It had begun to feel the high cost of food and the
poverty of communications was paralysing all economic life. There must
be no delay in finding a solution.
But Germany could not remain indifferent to the dissolution of the
Austrian army, and as soon as she clearly appreciated the danger she
made up her mind to avert it by taking every step in her power. Several
German army corps had been massed east of Cracow and placed under the
command of General Mackensen, who was to take the offensive against the
flank of the Russian army and try to cut the communications of the
troops operating in the Carpathians. The onslaught began in the first
days of May, and under the pressure of the Germans the Russian army of
Western Galicia was obliged to retreat rapidly to the east. It had to
accept the loss of the Carpathians, the capture of which had cost so
much blood and effort, and descend into the plains. The troops fought
with remarkable courage and endurance, but they were cruelly short of
arms and ammunition.
The retreat continued. On June 5th Przemysl was lost, and on June 22nd
Lemberg. By the end of the month all Galicia--that Slav land the
conquest of which had filled all Russian hearts with joy--had been
evacuated.
[Illustration: THE CZAR.]
[Illustration: THE CZAREVITCH.
_Facing page 134._]
Meanwhile the Germans had begun a vigorous offensive in Poland and made
rapid progress in spite of the fierce resistance of the Russians. It was
a grave moment. The whole Russian front had been shaken and given way
under the pressure of the Austro-German armies. Men wished to know who
was responsible for these disasters. They called for the guilty and
demanded their punishment.
The development of events had been a terrible blow to the Czar. It had
been a shock, especially as he had certainly not expected anything of
the kind. But he set his teeth against adversity. On June 25th he
dismissed the Minister of War, General Sukhomlinoff, whose criminal
negligence seemed to have been responsible for the fact that it was
impossible to secure the army’s supplies. He replaced him by General
Polivanoff. On the 27th he summoned a conference at G.H.Q., at which all
the Ministers were present. It was a question of rousing all the
energies of the country, of mobilising all its forces and resources for
the life-and-death struggle with the hated foe.
It was decided to summon the Duma. The first sitting took place on
August 1st, the anniversary of the declaration of war by Germany on
Russia. The firm and courageous attitude of the Assembly did a good deal
to calm the public agitation. But while calling on the whole nation to
co-operate in the defence of the Fatherland, the Duma demanded that the
guilty should be discovered and punished. A few days later the Czar
appointed a “Commission of Enquiry” with a view to fixing responsibility
for the nation’s misfortunes.
Meanwhile the German offensive in Poland had made further progress. On
August 5th Warsaw was abandoned by the Russians, who withdrew to the
right bank of the Vistula. On the 17th Kovno was lost. One after the
other all the Russian fortresses fell before the onslaught of the enemy,
whose advance no obstacle seemed capable of staying. By the end of
August the whole of the Government of Poland was in the hands of the
Germans.
The reverses assumed the proportions of a catastrophe which endangered
the very existence of the country. Should we be able to stop the
invading hordes or should we have to follow the precedent of 1812 and
withdraw into the interior, thus abandoning Russian soil to the enemy?
Had all our willing sacrifices brought us nothing?
The country was suffering from the incessant withdrawals of men and from
requisitions. Agriculture was short of labour and horses. In the towns
the cost of living was rising with the disorganisation of the railways
and the influx of refugees. The most pessimistic news passed from mouth
to mouth. There was talk of sabotage, treason, etc. Russian public
opinion, so changeable and prone to exaggeration whether in joy or
sorrow, indulged in the most gloomy forebodings.
It was just when Russia was passing through this acute crisis that
Nicholas II. decided to take the command of his armies in person.
For several months the Czarina had been urging the Czar to take this
step, but he had stood out against her suggestion as he did not like the
idea of relieving the Grand-Duke Nicholas of the post he had given him.
When the war broke out his first impulse had been to put himself at the
head of his army, but, yielding to the representations of his Ministers,
he had abandoned an idea which was very close to his heart. He had
always regretted it, and now that the Germans had conquered all Poland
and were advancing on Russian soil, he considered it nothing less than
criminal to remain away from the front and not take a more active part
in the defence of his country.
The Czar had returned from G.H.Q. on July 11th, and spent two months at
Tsarskoïe-Selo before making up his mind to this new step. I will relate
a conversation I had with him on July 16th, as it shows quite clearly
what were the ideas that inspired him at that time. On that day he had
joined Alexis Nicolaïevitch and myself in the park, and had just been
telling his son something about his recent visit to the army. Turning to
me, he added:
“You have no idea how depressing it is to be away from the front. It
seems as if everything here saps energy and enfeebles resolution. The
most pessimistic rumours and the most ridiculous stories are accepted
and get about everywhere. Folk here care nothing except for intrigues
and cabals, and regard low personal interests only. Out at the front men
fight and die for their country. At the front there is only one
thought--the determination to conquer. All else is forgotten, and, in
spite of our losses and our reverses, everyone remains confident. Any
man fit to bear arms should be in the army. Speaking for myself, I can
never be in too much of a hurry to be with my troops.”[38]
The Czarina was able to take advantage of this great ambition. She set
herself to overcome the scruples which considerations of another
character inspired. She desired the removal of the Grand-Duke Nicholas,
whom she accused of secretly working for the ruin of the Czar’s
reputation and prestige and for a palace revolution which would further
his own ends. On the strength of certain information she had received
from Madame Wyroubova, she was also persuaded that G.H.Q. was the centre
of a plot, the object of which was to seize her daring the absence of
her husband and confine her in a convent.
The Czar, on the other hand, had full confidence in the loyalty of the
Grand-Duke Nicholas. He considered him incapable of any criminal action,
but he was compelled to admit his complicity in the intrigue against the
Czarina. Yet he did not give way until the imperious instinct urging him
to put himself at the head of his army had become an obligation of
conscience. By intervening personally in the struggle he hoped to show
the world that the war would be fought out to the bitter end and prove
his own unshakable faith in ultimate victory. In this tragic hour he
thought it was his duty to stake his own person, and as head of the
state to assume the full burden of responsibility. By his presence among
the troops he wished to restore their confidence, for their _morale_ had
been shaken by the long series of reverses, and they were tired of
fighting against an enemy whose strength consisted principally in the
superiority of his armament.
In spite of the recent retreats, the prestige of the Grand-Duke Nicholas
was still considerable in Russia. During this first twelve months of the
war he had given proof of resolution and an iron will. The fact that he
was deprived of his command in times of defeat indicated that he was
held responsible, and was bound to be interpreted as a punishment, as
unjust on the merits as insulting to his honour. The Czar fully realised
all this, and only decided as he did much against his will. His first
idea had been to keep the Grand-Duke with him at G.H.Q., but that would
have made the position of the ex-Generalissimo somewhat delicate. The
Czar decided to appoint him Lieutenant-General of the Caucasus and
Commander-in-Chief of the army operating against the Turks.
The Czar communicated his decision to take over the Supreme Command to
his Ministers at a council which took place at Tsarskoïe-Selo a few days
before his departure for G.H.Q. The news threw most of those present
into utter consternation, and they did their best to dissuade him from
his project. They pointed to the grave difficulties in the way of public
business if the head of the state was to spend practically all his time
at G.H.Q., more than five hundred miles from the seat of government.
They referred to his innumerable duties and asked him not to take new
and crushing responsibilities upon himself. In the last resort they
begged him not to place himself at the head of his troops at a moment so
critical. In case of failure he was running a risk of exposing himself
to attacks which would undermine his prestige and authority.
Yet the Czar was not to be moved. Several members of his immediate
_entourage_ made several further attempts to convince him, but these
failed also, and on the evening of September 4th he left for Mohileff,
where G.H.Q. was established at that time. The next day he signed the
_Prikase_, in which he announced to the troops that he was taking
command in person, and at the foot he added in his own hand:
“With unshakable faith in the goodness of God and firm confidence in
final victory we shall accomplish our sacred duty in defending our
Fatherland to the end, and we shall never let the soil of Russia be
outraged.”
He was repeating the oath he had taken at the outset of the war and
casting his crown into the arena.
In France and England this announcement came as a surprise which was
not without a certain element of apprehension, but this action was
regarded as a pledge which irrevocably associated the Russian Empire, in
the person of its Czar, with the fortunes of the Entente, and this at a
moment when a series of defeats would have been grounds for fearing
separatist tendencies. All the great newspapers of the Allied countries
emphasised the importance of this decision. It was hoped that it would
have a considerable effect on the _morale_ of the Russian army and
contribute to further the cause of final victory. In Russia the whole
Press raised a shout of triumph, but in sober reality opinion about the
wisdom of changing the command was sharply divided at first. In the army
itself we shall see that the presence of the Czar helped to raise the
spirits and courage of the men and gave the campaign a new impetus.
History will some day reveal the political and military consequences of
this step, which was certainly an act of courage and faith on the part
of the Czar himself.
* * * * *
As I had feared, the apparent indifference with which Rasputin had been
treated during the winter had only been temporary, and at the time of
the disasters in May there was a revival of his influence, which grew
steadily stronger. The change is easily explained. At the beginning of
the war the Czar and Czarina were utterly obsessed by the greatness of
their task, and had passed through hours of exaltation in the knowledge
of the love they bore their people, a love they felt was reciprocated.
That fervent communion had filled them with hope. They believed that
they were really the centre of that great national movement which swept
over the whole of Russia. The military events of the following months
had not shaken their courage. They had maintained their ardent faith
[Illustration: THE CZARINA.]
[Illustration: THE FOUR GRAND-DUCHESSES.
{_Facing page 140._]
in that spring offensive which was to bring about the final success of
the Russian armies.
When the great catastrophe followed they passed through a time of
unspeakable anguish. In her sorrow the Czarina was bound to feel
impelled to seek moral support from him whom she already regarded not
only as the saviour of her son, but as the representative of the people,
sent by God to save Russia and her husband also.
It is not true that personal ambition or a thirst for power induced the
Czarina to intervene in political affairs. Her motive was purely
sentimental. She worshipped her husband as she worshipped her children,
and there was no limit to her devotion for those she loved. Her only
desire was to be useful to the Czar in his heavy task and to help him
with her counsel.
Convinced that autocracy was the only form of government suited to the
needs of Russia, the Czarina believed that any great concessions to
liberal demands were premature. In her view the uneducated masses of the
Russian people could be galvanised into action only by a Czar in whose
person all power was centralised. She was certain that to the _moujik_
the Czar was the symbol of the unity, greatness, and glory of Russia,
the head of the state and the Lord’s Anointed. To encroach on his
prerogatives was to undermine the faith of the Russian peasant and to
risk precipitating the worst disasters for the country. The Czar must
not merely rule: he must govern the state with a firm and mighty hand.
To the new task the Czarina brought the same devotion, courage, and,
alas! blindness she had shown in her fight for the life of her son. She
was at any rate logical in her errors. Persuaded, as she was, that the
only support for the dynasty was the nation, and that Rasputin was God’s
elect (had she not witnessed the efficacy of his prayers during her
son’s illness?), she was absolutely convinced that this lowly peasant
could use his supernatural powers to help him who held in his hands the
fate of the empire of the Czars.
Cunning and astute as he was, Rasputin never advised in political
matters except with the most extreme caution. He always took the
greatest care to be very well informed as to what was going on at Court
and as to the private feelings of the Czar and his wife. As a rule,
therefore, his prophecies only confirmed the secret wishes of the
Czarina. In fact, it was almost impossible to doubt that it was she who
inspired the “inspired,” but as her desires were interpreted by
Rasputin, they seemed in her eyes to have the sanction and authority of
a revelation.
Before the war the influence of the Czarina in political affairs had
been but intermittent. It was usually confined to procuring the
dismissal of anyone who declared his hostility to the _staretz_. In the
first months of the war there had been no change in that respect, but
after the great reverses in the spring of 1915, and more particularly
after the Czar had assumed command of the army, the Czarina played an
ever-increasing part in affairs of state because she wished to help her
husband, who was overwhelmed with the burden of his growing
responsibilities. She was worn out, and desired nothing more than peace
and rest, but she willingly sacrificed her personal comfort to what she
believed was a sacred duty.
Very reserved and yet very impulsive, the Czarina, first and foremost
the wife and mother, was never happy except in the bosom of her family.
She was artistic and well-educated, and liked reading and the arts. She
was fond of meditation, and often became wholly absorbed in her own
inward thoughts and feelings, an absorption from which she would only
emerge when danger threatened. She would throw herself at the obstacle
with all the ardour of a passionate nature. She was endowed with the
finest moral qualities, and was always inspired by the highest ideals.
But her sorrows had broken her. She was but the shadow of her former
self, and she often had periods of mystic ecstasy in which she lost all
sense of reality. Her faith in Rasputin proves it beyond a doubt.
It was thus that in her desire to save her husband and son, whom she
loved more than life itself, she forged with her own hands the
instrument of their undoing.