CHAPTER VII

STEADFAST SOUTH AFRICA

When Germany struck at the heart of France through Belgium simultaneous

action was undertaken by the German Command in Southwest Africa through

propaganda and mobilization of the available German troops. Insidiously

and by the use of money systematic propaganda was instituted to corrupt

the Boers against their allegiance to the Union of South Africa. One

great character stood like a rock against all their efforts. It was the

character of General Louis Botha, formerly arrayed in battle against

the British during the Boer uprising.

With characteristic determination he formulated plans for the invasion

of German Southwest Africa without asking permission of the citizens

of the South African Union or of the British Foreign Office. His

vision comprehended an invasion that would have as its culmination a

British-Boer colony where the German colony had been, and that from

Cable Bay to the source of the Nile there would be one mighty union,

with a great trunk railway feeding Egypt, the Soudan, Rhodesia, Uganda,

and the Union of South Africa. An able lieutenant to Botha was General

Smuts. He co-operated with his chief in a campaign of education. They

pointed out the absolute necessity for deafness to the German tempters,

and succeeded in obtaining full co-operation for the Botha plan of

invasion from the British Imperial Government and the South African

Union. Concerning this agreement General Botha said:

“To forget their loyalty to the empire in this hour of trial would

be scandalous and shameful, and would blacken South Africa in the

eyes of the whole world. Of this South Africans were incapable. They

had endured some of the greatest sacrifices that could be demanded

of a people, but they had always kept before them ideals, founded on

Christianity, and never in their darkest days had they sought to gain

their ends by treasonable means. The path of treason was an unknown

path to Dutch and English alike.

“Their duty and their conscience alike bade them be faithful and true

to the Imperial Government in all respects in this hour of darkness and

trouble. That was the attitude of the Union Government; that was the

attitude of the people of South Africa. The government had cabled to

the Imperial Government at the outbreak of war, offering to undertake

the defense of South Africa, thereby releasing the Imperial troops for

service elsewhere. This was accepted, and the Union Defense Force was

mobilized.”

Preliminary to the invasion of German Southwest Africa, General

Botha proclaimed martial law throughout the Union. The first act

in consequence of this proclamation was the arrest of a number of

conspirators who were planning sedition throughout the Union. The head

of this conspiracy was Lieutenant-Colonel S. G. Maritz. General Beyers

and General De Wet, both Boer officers of high standing, co-operated

with Maritz in an abortive rebellion. The situation was most trying

for the native Boers and, to their credit be it recorded, the great

majority of them stood out strongly against the Germans. Vigorous

action by Botha and Smuts smashed the rebellion in the fall of 1914. A

force acting under General Botha in person attacked the troops under

General Beyers at Rustemburg on October 27th, and on the next day

General Beyers sought refuge in flight. A smaller force acting under

General Kemp was also routed on November 5th.

General De Wet opened his campaign of rebellion on November 7th in

an action at Wimburg, where he defeated a smaller force of Loyalists

under General Cronje. The decisive battle at Marquard occurred on

November 12th, Botha commanding the Loyalist forces in person and De

Wet the rebels. The victory of Botha in this fierce engagement was

complete. De Wet was routed and was captured on December 1st with a

rear-guard of fifty-two men. General Beyers was drowned on December

9th while attempting to escape from the Vall into the Transvaal. This

virtually ended all opposition to General Botha. The invasion of German

Southwest Africa began on January 5, 1915, and was one uninterrupted

chapter of successes. Through jungle and swamp, swept by torrential

rains and encountering obstacles that would have disheartened any but

the stoutest heart, the little force of invasion swept forward. Most

of the engagements by the enemy were in the nature of guerrilla and

rear-guard actions. The backbone of the German command was broken and

the remaining forces capitulated in July, 1915.

With the capitulation came the story of the German mismanagement in

Southwest Africa, and particularly their horrible treatment of the

Hereros and Hottentots in the country misgoverned by them. An official

report fully authenticated was made and none of its essential details

were refuted.

The report told the story of how the German authorities exterminated

the native Hereros. When Germany annexed the country in 1890 they

were believed to possess well over 150,000 head of cattle. After the

rinderpest scourge of 1897 they still owned something like 90,000

head. By 1902, less than ten years after the arrival of the first

German settlers, the Hereros had only 45,898 head of cattle, while the

1,051 German traders and farmers then in the country owned 44,487. The

policy of robbing and killing the natives had by that time received the

sanction of Berlin. By the end of 1905 the surviving Hereros had been

reduced to pauperism and possessed nothing at all. In 1907 the Imperial

German Government by ordinance prohibited the natives of Southwest

Africa from possessing live stock.

The wholesale theft of the natives’ cattle, their only wealth, with

the direct connivance and approval of the Berlin Government, was one

of the primary causes of the Herero rebellion of 1904. The revolt was

suppressed with characteristic German ruthlessness. But the Germans

were not content with a mere suppression of the rising; they had

decided upon the practical extinction of the whole tribe. For this

purpose Leutwein, who was apparently regarded as too lenient, was

superseded by von Trotha, noted for his merciless severity. He had

played a notorious part in the Chinese Boxer rebellion, and had just

suppressed the Arab rising in German East Africa by the wholesale

massacre of men, women, and children. As a preliminary von Trotha

invited the Herero chiefs to come in and make peace, “as the war was

now over,” and promptly shot them in cold blood. Then he issued his

notorious “extermination order,” in terms of which no Herero--man,

woman, child, or babe--was to receive mercy or quarter. “Kill every one

of them,” he said, “and take no prisoners.”

The hanging of natives was a common occurrence. A German officer

had the right to order a native to be hanged. No trial or court was

necessary. Many were hanged merely on suspicion.

The Hereros were far more humane in the field than the Germans. They

were once a fine race. Now there is only a miserable remnant left.

This is amply proved by official German statistics. Out of between

80,000 and 90,000 souls, only about 15,000 starving and fugitive

Hereros were alive at the end of 1905, when von Trotha relinquished

his task. In 1911, after all rebellions had been suppressed and

tranquillity restored, the government had a census taken. The figures,

reproduced below, speak for themselves:

Hereros 80,000 15,130 64,870

Hottentots 20,000 9,781 10,219

Berg-Damaras 30,000 12,831 17,169

-------- ------ ------

130,000 37,742 92,258

In other words, eighty per cent of the Herero people disappeared, and

more than half of the Hottentot and Berg-Damara races shared the same

fate. Dr. Paul Rohrbach’s dictum, “It is applicable to a nation in the

same way as to the individual that the right of existence is primarily

justified in the degree that such existence is useful for progress

and general development,” comes forcibly to mind. These natives of

Southwest Africa had been weighed in the German balance and had been

found wanting.

Germany lost more than a million square miles of territory in Africa as

a direct consequence of General Botha’s bold action. These are divided

in four great regions, Southwest Africa, Kamerun, Togo and East Africa.

Togoland as this region is popularly known extends from the north

shore of the Gulf of Guinea into the interior and is bounded by French

and British colonies. By a joint attack of French and British forces,

beginning the second week in August, 1914, the German power in this

rich domain was completely broken, and the conquest of Togoland was

complete on August 26, 1914. The military operation was of a desultory

nature, and the losses negligible in view of the area of 33,000 square

miles of highly productive land passed from German control.

The fighting in the great region of Kamerun was somewhat more stubborn

than that in Togoland. The villages of Bonaberi and Duala were

particularly well defended. The British and French fought through

swamps and jungle under the handicap of terrific heat, and always with

victory at the end of the engagement. The conquest of the Kamerun was

complete by the end of June, 1915. In addition to the operations by the

British and French a combined Belgian and French force captured Molundu

and Ngaundera in the German Congo.

The raids by General Botha on German Southwest Africa commenced on

September 27, 1914. A series of brilliant strategic actions resulted in

the conquest of a region once and a half the size of the German Empire

at the time the Great War began. A British description of the operation

states:

The occupation of Windhoek was effected by General Botha’s North

Damaraland forces working along the railway from Swakopmund. At the

former place General Vanderventer joined up with General Botha’s

forces. The force from Swakopmund met with considerable opposition,

first at Tretskopje, a small township in the great Namib Desert fifty

miles to the northeast of Swakopmund, and secondly at Otjimbingwe,

on the Swakop River, sixty miles northwest of Windhoek. Apart from

these two determined stands, however, little other opposition was

encountered, and Karibib was occupied on May 5th and Okahandja and

Windhoek on May 12th. With the fall of the latter place, 3,000

Europeans and 12,000 natives became prisoners.

The wireless station--one of Germany’s most valuable high-power

stations, which was able to communicate with one relay only, with

Berlin--was captured almost intact, and much rolling stock also fell

into the hands of the Union forces.

The advance from the south along the Luderitzbucht-Seeheim-Keetmanshoop

Railway, approximately 500 miles in length, was made by two forces

which joined hands at Keetmanshoop. The advance from Aus (captured on

April 10th) was made by General Smuts’s forces. Colonel (afterward

General) Vanderventer, moving up from the direction of Warmbad

and Kalkfontein, around the flanks of Karas Mountain, pushed on

after reaching Keetmanshoop in the direction of Gibeon. Bethany had

previously been occupied during the advance to Seeheim. At Kabus,

twenty miles to the north of Keetmanshoop, and at Gibeon pitched

battles were fought between General Vanderventer’s forces and the

enemy. No other opposition of importance was encountered, and the

operations were brought to a successful conclusion.

The stiffest fighting in all Africa came in German East Africa. It

began in late September, 1914, and continued until mid-June, 1915.

The Germans, curiously enough, commenced the offensive here with an

attack upon Monbasa, the terminus of the Uganda railway and the capital

of British East Africa. The attack was planned as a joint naval and

military operation, the German cruiser Koenigsburg being assigned to

move into the harbor and bombard the town simultaneously with the

assault by land. The plan went awry when the presence of British

warships frightened off the Koenigsburg. The land attack was easily

checked by a detachment of the King’s African Rifles and native Arabian

troops until the detachments of Indian Regulars arrived upon the scene.

The enemy thereupon retreated to his original plans.

British reprisals came early in November, when the towns of Tanga

and Gassin were attacked by British troops. The troops selected for

this adventure numbered 6,000 and carried only food, water, guns and

munitions. No protection of any kind nor any other equipment was taken

by the soldiers. Reinforcements to the German forces delayed the

capture of Gassin until January. A garrison of three hundred men was

left there and this in turn was besieged by three thousand Germans.

After a stubborn defense the Germans recaptured the town. A union of

two British forces was accomplished early in June, 1915. One of these

cut through German East Africa along the Kagera River and the other

advanced on steamers from Kisumu. They met the enemy on June 22d and

defeated it with heavy casualties. Later General Tighe, commanding the

combined British forces, was congratulated on the completeness of his

victory on June 28th, by General Kitchener.

The territory acquired by the British as a consequence of the invasion

of Germany’s African possessions, possesses formidable natural

barriers, but once these are past the traveller finds lands of

wonderful fertility and great natural resources. Approaching German

Southwest Africa from the east, access is across the Kalahari Desert.

This in its trackless desolation, its frequent sand-storms and torrid

heat through which only the hardiest and best provisioned caravans

may penetrate is worse than the worst that Sahara can show. There is

not a sign of life. Approached from the sea the principal port is

Walfish Bay, a fair harbor that was improved by the British when they

occupied it. Near Walfish some of the largest diamonds in the history

of the world have been found and gold fields of considerable richness

have been worked. The climate of German Southwest Africa, after the

torrential storms of the seacoast and the terrific heat of the desert

have been passed, is one of the most salubrious in the world. It is

unique among African regions in the opportunities it affords for

colonization by white men. Great Britain possessed large holdings of

this land before Germany came into possession, but abandoned them under

the belief that the region was comparatively worthless. There was no

misapprehension on this score when all of the lands came into the

possession of England as the result of the war.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES:

Italicized text is surrounded by underscores: _italics_.

Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.

Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been standardized.

Archaic or variant spelling has been retained.

New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the

public domain.

History of the World War, Volume 2 (of 7) · 第 7 / 7 章