In the comparison of these two, first, if we compare the estate
of Nicias with that of Crassus, we must acknowledge Nicias's to
have been more honestly got. In itself, indeed, one cannot much
approve of gaining riches by working mines, the greatest part of
which is done by malefactors and barbarians, some of them, too,
bound, and perishing in those close and unwholesome places. But
if we compare this with the sequestrations of Sylla, and the
contracts for houses ruined by fire, we shall then think Nicias
came very honestly by his money. For Crassus publicly and
avowedly made use of these arts, as other men do of husbandry,
and putting out money to interest; while as for other matters
which he used to deny, when taxed with them, as, namely, selling
his voice in the senate for gain's sake, and injuring allies,
and courting women, and conniving at criminals, these are things
which Nicias was never so much as falsely accused of; nay, he
was rather laughed at for giving money to those who made a trade
of impeachments, merely out of timorousness, a course, indeed,
that would by no means become Pericles and Aristides, but
necessary for him who by nature was wanting in assurance, even
as Lycurgus, the orator, frankly acknowledged to the people; for
when he was accused for buying off an evidence, he said that he
was very much pleased that having administered their affairs for
some time, he was at last accused, rather for giving, than
receiving. Again, Nicias, in his expenses, was of a more public
spirit than Crassus, priding himself much on the dedication of
gifts in temples, on presiding at gymnastic games, and
furnishing choruses for the plays, and adorning processions,
while the expenses of Crassus, in feasting and afterwards
providing food for so many myriads of people, were much greater
than all that Nicias possessed as well as spent, put together.
So that one might wonder at anyone's failing to see that vice
is a certain inconsistency and incongruity of habit, after such
an example of money dishonorably obtained, and wastefully
lavished away.
Let so much be said of their estates; as for their management of
public affairs, I see not that any dishonesty, injustice, or
arbitrary action can be objected to Nicias, who was rather the
victim of Alcibiades's tricks, and was always careful and
scrupulous in his dealings with the people. But Crassus is very
generally blamed for his changeableness in his friendships and
enmities, for his unfaithfulness, and his mean and underhand
proceedings; since he himself could not deny that to compass the
consulship, he hired men to lay violent hands upon Domitius and
Cato. Then at the assembly held for assigning the provinces,
many were wounded and four actually killed, and he himself,
which I had omitted in the narrative of his life, struck with
his fist one Lucius Analius, a senator, for contradicting him,
so that he left the place bleeding. But as Crassus was to be
blamed for his violent and arbitrary courses, so is Nicias no
less to be blamed for his timorousness and meanness of spirit,
which made him submit and give in to the basest people, whereas
in this respect Crassus showed himself lofty spirited and
magnanimous, who having to do not with such as Cleon or
Hyperbolus, but with the splendid acts of Caesar and the three
triumphs of Pompey, would not stoop, but bravely bore up against
their joint interests, and in obtaining the office of censor,
surpassed even Pompey himself For a statesman ought not to
regard how invidious the thing is, but how noble, and by his
greatness to overpower envy; but if he will be always aiming at
security and quiet, and dread Alcibiades upon the hustings, and
the Lacedaemonians at Pylos, and Perdiccas in Thrace, there is
room and opportunity enough for retirement, and he may sit out
of the noise of business, and weave himself, as one of the
sophists says, his triumphal garland of inactivity. His desire
of peace, indeed, and of finishing the war, was a divine and
truly Grecian ambition, nor in this respect would Crassus
deserve to be compared to him, though he had enlarged the Roman
empire to the Caspian Sea or the Indian Ocean.
In a State where there is a sense of virtue, a powerful man
ought not to give way to the ill-affected, or expose the
government to those that are incapable of it, nor suffer high
trusts to be committed to those who want common honesty. Yet
Nicias, by his connivance, raised Cleon, a fellow remarkable for
nothing but his loud voice and brazen face, to the command of an
army. Indeed, I do not commend Crassus, who in the war with
Spartacus was more forward to fight than became a discreet
general, though he was urged into it by a point of honor, lest
Pompey by his coming should rob him of the glory of the action,
as Mummius did Metellus at the taking of Corinth, but Nicias's
proceedings are inexcusable. For he did not yield up a mere
opportunity of getting honor and advantage to his competitor,
but believing that the expedition would be very hazardous, was
thankful to take care of himself, and left the Commonwealth to
shift for itself. And whereas Themistocles, lest a mean and
incapable fellow should ruin the State by holding command in the
Persian war, bought him off, and Cato, in a most dangerous and
critical conjuncture, stood for the tribuneship for the sake of
his country, Nicias, reserving himself for trifling expeditions
against Minoa and Cythera, and the miserable Melians, if there
be occasion to come to blows with the Lacedaemonians, slips off
his general's cloak and hands over to the unskillfulness and
rashness of Cleon, fleet, men, and arms, and the whole command,
where the utmost possible skill was called for. Such conduct, I
say, is not to be thought so much carelessness of his own fame,
as of the interest and preservation of his country. By this
means it came to pass he was compelled to the Sicilian war, men
generally believing that he was not so much honestly convinced
of the difficulty of the enterprise, as ready out of mere love
of ease and cowardice to lose the city the conquest of Sicily.
But yet it is a great sign of his integrity, that though he was
always averse from war, and unwilling to command, yet they
always continued to appoint him as the best experienced and
ablest general they had. On the other hand Crassus, though
always ambitious of command, never attained to it, except by
mere necessity in the servile war, Pompey and Metellus and the
two brothers Lucullus being absent, although at that time he was
at his highest pitch of interest and reputation. Even those who
thought most of him seem to have thought him, as the comic poet
says:
A brave man anywhere but in the field.
There was no help, however, for the Romans, against his passion
for command and for distinction. The Athenians sent out Nicias
against his will to the war, and Crassus led out the Romans
against theirs; Crassus brought misfortune on Rome, as Athens
brought it on Nicias.
Still this is rather ground for praising Nicias, than for
finding fault with Crassus. His experience and sound judgment
as a general saved him from being carried away by the delusive
hopes of his fellow-citizens, and made him refuse to entertain
any prospect of conquering Sicily. Crassus, on the other hand,
mistook, in entering on a Parthian war as an easy matter. He
was eager, while Caesar was subduing the west, Gaul, Germany,
and Britain, to advance for his part to the east and the Indian
Sea, by the conquest of Asia, to complete the incursions of
Pompey and the attempts of Lucullus, men of prudent temper and
of unimpeachable worth, who, nevertheless, entertained the same
projects as Crassus, and acted under the same convictions. When
Pompey was appointed to the like command, the senate was opposed
to it; and after Caesar had routed three hundred thousand
Germans, Cato recommended that he should be surrendered to the
defeated enemy, to expiate in his own person the guilt of breach
of faith. The people, meantime, (their service to Cato!) kept
holiday for fifteen days, and were overjoyed. What would have
been their feelings, and how many holidays would they have
celebrated, if Crassus had sent news from Babylon of victory,
and thence marching onward had converted Media and Persia, the
Hyrcanians, Susa, and Bactra, into Roman provinces?
If wrong we must do, as Euripides says, and cannot be content
with peace and present good things, let it not be for such
results as destroying Mende or Scandea, or beating up the exiled
Aeginetans in the coverts to which like hunted birds they had
fled, when expelled from their homes, but let it be for some
really great remuneration; nor let us part with justice, like a
cheap and common thing, for a small and trifling price. Those
who praise Alexander's enterprise and blame that of Crassus,
judge of the beginning unfairly by the results.
In actual service, Nicias did much that deserves high praise.
He frequently defeated the enemy in battle, and was on the very
point of capturing Syracuse; nor should he bear the whole blame
of the disaster, which may fairly be ascribed in part to his
want of health and to the jealousy entertained of him at home.
Crassus, on the other hand, committed so many errors as not to
leave fortune room to show him favor. It is no surprise to find
such imbecility fall a victim to the power of Parthia; the only
wonder is to see it prevailing over the wonted good-fortune of
Rome. One scrupulously observed, the other entirely slighted
the arts of divination; and as both equally perished, it is
difficult to see what inference we should draw. Yet the fault
of over-caution, supported by old and general opinion, better
deserves forgiveness than that of self-willed and lawless
transgression.
In his death, however, Crassus has the advantage, as he did not
surrender himself, nor submit to bondage, or let himself be
taken in by trickery, but was the victim only of the entreaties
of his friends and the perfidy of his enemies; whereas Nicias
enhanced the shame of his death by yielding himself up in the
hope of a disgraceful and inglorious escape.