DUTIES TOWARD THE STATE.
SUMMARY.
=Three groups of societies among men:= _Humanity_, _the family_, _the
country_, _or the State_.
=Analysis of patriotism.=
_Foundation of the State._--Law and rights. Public authority:
distinction between society and the State. The three powers.
Sovereignty. The right of punishment.
=Duties toward the State:= 1. _Obedience to the laws._--The _Crito_ of
Plato. Pretended exceptions to this principle. Criticising the laws is
not disobedience.
2. _Respect to magistrates._--The magistrates being the
representatives of the laws, to respect them is to respect the law
itself; to insult them is to insult the law.
3. _The ballot._--Obligation to vote. The character of the ballot: 1,
_disinterested_; 2, _free_; 3, _enlightened_.
4. _Taxes._--Immorality of frauds against the State.
5. _Military service._--Legal and moral obligation. Attempts to escape
it: 1, by mutilations; 2, by simulated infirmities; 3, by desertion;
want of discipline.
6. _Educational obligation._
=Civil courage.=--Noted example: Boissy d'Anglas.
=75. Three groups of societies.=--Cicero and Fenelon remark that there are
three sorts of societies among men: the first comprises the whole of
_humanity_; the last, which is the most circumscribed, is what is called
the _family_. But between the family and the human race in general, there
is an intermediate society, larger than the one and more circumscribed
than the other, and this is what is called the _country_.
=76. Patriotism.=--The sentiment which binds us to the country, and which,
articulated, becomes a _duty_, is what is called _patriotism_. We have
already given elsewhere,[59] an analysis of patriotism. Let us repeat what
we have said:
Patriotism is one of our most complex sentiments: it is in fact
composed of many distinct elements: it is, in the first place, the
_love of the soil_ where we were born; and this soil is at first the
narrow territory where our youth passed, and which we embraced entire
with the eyes and recollections: it is the native village, the native
city. But if this is the first sense of country, it falls far short of
embracing the whole country. The love for the native church steeple is
not patriotism: it is even its opposite often. The soil must extend,
widen, and from the natal house, must gradually embrace, by successive
additions, the village, the town, the county, the province, the whole
country. But what is to determine the extent of this territory? Who is
to decide that it shall go so far and no farther? There enter into it
many elements: first, the inhabitants, the fellow-citizens,
fellow-countrymen; a soil deserted would not be a country; to the love
of the territory there must be added the love of those who inhabit it
with us, or of our _fellow-countrymen_; to the nomadic people the
country is only their tribe. Conversely, the citizens without the soil
are not the country either, for exile in common is not the less exile.
Finally, the union of soil and fellow-citizens may still not be the
country, at least not all the country; a conquered nation may preserve
its soil and its inhabitants, and have lost the country: as Poland,
for instance. What, then, are the ties to determine the existence of a
country? There are a large number of them, such as _the unity of
language_, _the unity of laws_, _the unity of the flag_, _historic
tradition_, and, finally, above all, the _unity of government_ and of
an accepted government. A country exists only where there is an
independent political state. This political unity does not suffice
when the other ties are wanting; when it is a constraint, when peoples
united under the same government have different manners, customs,
traditions; conversely, unity of language and community of habits,
will neither be sufficient when the political unity or a certain form
of political unity is wanting. But what, before everything else,
constitutes the country, is a common spirit, a common soul, in short,
a common name, which fuses into one all these separate facts of which
no single one is absolutely necessary, but of which each forms an
additional element to the strength of the country. Finally, as a last
condition, the association which is to become a country must not, as
was the case with the Roman empire, extend over too much territory;
for beyond certain limits, patriotism relaxes.
Nature has endowed us with this sentiment of patriotism. There is no one
that does not love his country better than other countries, that is not
flattered by national glory, that does not suffer from the humiliations
and miseries of his native country. But this sentiment is more or less
strong, according to temperaments. Often it is nothing more than a
sentiment, and does not express itself in actions. It is the reflective
faculties which make of patriotism a duty, which duty demands that
sentiment pass into action; demands of all the citizens the same acts,
whatever be the personal inclinations of each.
The duties imposed on each man in regard to the particular society of
which he is a member, are called _civil_ duties. He, himself, in regard to
this society, is what is called a _citizen_; finally, the society itself,
considered as one and the same person, of which the citizens are the
members, is what is called the _State_ or the _city_.
On the whole, there is no difference between _country_ and _State_.
Country is at the same time _Society_ and _soil_. It is called by that
name (State) when looked upon in the light of a family of which the
citizens are the children, and also when considered in its relations with
other nations and other societies. The State is that same society
considered interiorly and in itself, not as to its soil and territory, but
as to the members that compose it, and in as far as these members form one
and the same body and are governed by laws. The country is a more concrete
and more vivid expression, which appeals more to the feelings; the State
is a more abstract expression, which addresses itself to reason. Besides,
we shall understand better what is meant by the State, when we shall have
explained the nature of public authority and the laws.
=77. Foundation of the State--Rights.=--To understand the nature of the
State and what is called _authority_, _sovereignty_, _magistracy_, _law_,
one must begin with the notion of rights and of the different kinds of
rights.
Duty is the law which imposes on us obligations either toward ourselves or
toward others; it is a _moral necessity_ (p. 11). _Rights_ is the _power_
we have to exercise and develop our faculties conformably to our destiny,
provided we allow other men the same power: it is a _moral power_
(Leibnitz). Each man, by reason of his enjoying liberty and intelligence,
is a _person_, and should not be treated as a _thing_. "Man is a thing
sacred to man," said the ancients. He is inviolable in his personality and
in all that constitutes the development of his personality.
Thence follows an immediate consequence: it is, that every man being man
by the same title, no one can claim for himself a right which he is not
willing to recognize at the same time in another; hence the _equality of
rights_. Besides, the liberty of one cannot, without contradiction,
suppress the liberty of another, whence this other definition: Right is
the _accord of liberties_.
=78. The rights of man.=--What are the principal rights of man? They are:
the right of _self-preservation_; the right of going and coming, or
_individual liberty_; the _liberty of work_; the _right of property_; the
_liberty of thought_; the _liberty of conscience_; the _right of family_,
etc.
We have also seen that man (p. 52) has a final right which is the guaranty
and the sanction of all others; it is the right of preventing by force
every attempt at his rights; to _constrain_ others to respect his rights,
and lastly, to _punish_ every violation of his rights. This is what is
called the _right of self-defense_.
=79. Public authority.=--Man having, as we have just seen, the right of
self-defense by opposing force to any attack, possesses, when alone, and
far from all human help, this right in all its plenitude. But it is easy
to see the dangers and inexpediency of such a right in a society. Each
man, in fact, when he meets with opposition to his will and desires,
always thinks himself injured in his rights. If every one were free to
defend himself in all circumstances, the right of self-defense would keep
men constantly under arms; and society, without a regulating power to
check their doings, would soon, as the philosopher Hobbes expressed it, be
"_the war of all against all_." Hence the necessity of the State--that is
to say, of a _disinterested power_--taking in hand the defense of all, and
insuring the proper exercise of the right of self-defense by suppressing
its abuses. This is what is called _public authority_.
=80. Society and the State.=--We must distinguish between _society_ and the
_State_, or _natural_ society and _civil_ society.
Society is the union which exists between men, without distinction of
frontiers--without exterior restraint--and for the sole reason that they
are men. An Englishman and an Indian, as Locke says, meeting in the waste
forests of America (Robinson and Friday), are, from the fact alone of
their common nature, in a state of society.
The _civil society_ or _State_ is an assemblage of men subject to a common
_authority_, to common _laws_--that is to say, a society whose members may
be constrained by public force to respect their reciprocal rights.
=81. The three powers.=--There results from that, that two necessary
elements enter into the idea of the State: _laws_ and _force_. The laws
are the general rules which establish beforehand and fix after
deliberation, and abstractly, the rights of each; force is the physical
restraint the public power is armed with to have the laws executed. Hence
two _powers_ in the State, the _legislative_ power and the _executive_
power--one that makes the law; the other that executes it, and to which
may generally be added a third, namely, _judiciary_ power, which, on its
part, is empowered to apply and interpret the law.[60]
=82. Sovereignty.=--These three powers emanate from a common source which
is called _sovereign_. In all States, the sovereign is the authority which
is in possession of the three preceding powers and delegates them. In an
absolute monarchy, the sovereign is the monarch, who of himself exercises
the legislative and executive power, sometimes even the judicial power. In
a democracy, the sovereign is the universality of the citizens, or the
_people_, which delegates the three powers, and even in some cases
exercises them.
As to the basis of sovereignty, two systems face each other: the _divine
right_ and the _sovereignty of the people_. In the first, the authority
emanates from God, who transmits it to chosen families; in the second,
societies, like individuals, are free arbiters, and belong to themselves;
they are answerable for their destinies; and this can only be true of the
entire society; for why should certain classes rather than others have the
privilege to decide about the fate of each? The sovereignty of the people
is then nothing else than the right of each to participate in public
power, either of himself or through his representatives. This principle
tends more and more to predominate in civilized States.
=83. Political liberty.=--Political liberty means all the guaranties which
insure to every citizen the legitimate exercise of his natural rights;
political liberty is, then, the sanction of civil liberty.
The principal of these guaranties are: 1, the _right of suffrage_, which
insures to every one his share of sovereignty; 2, the _separation of
powers_, which puts into different hands the _executive_, _legislative_,
and _judicial_ powers; 3, the _liberty of the press_, which insures the
right of minorities, and allows them to employ argument to change or
modify the ideas and opinions of the majority.
=84. The right of punishment.=--The right of punishment in a State is
nothing else than the right of restraint, which, as we have already seen,
is inherent in the very idea of the State; for the State only exists to
insure to each the exercise of his rights, and it can only do so by
restraint and the use of force. How far can this right of force go? Can
it, for example, go so far as the taking of life even? This is a mooted
question between publicists, and upon which we have, moreover, already
expressed ourselves (p. 55 _et seq._).
After having in these summary views resolved the principle upon which the
State rests,[61] and the essential elements which enter into the idea, we
are better prepared to approach what constitutes the object proper of
civil morality, namely, the duties of citizens toward the country or the
State.
=85. Civil duties.=--These duties are the following: _Obedience to the
laws_; _respect of magistrates_; _the ballot_; _military service_;
_educational obligations_.
=86. Obedience to the laws.=--The first of the civil duties, is _obedience
to the laws_. The reason is evident. The State rests on the law. It is the
law which substitutes, for the will of individuals, always more or less
carried away by passion or governed by self-interest, a general,
impartial, and disinterested rule. The law is the guaranty of all: it
opposes itself to force, or rather puts force in the service of justice,
instead of making of justice the slave of force. Pascal says: "Not being
able to make that which is just, strong, men have wished that what is
strong should be just." This is the jest of a misanthrope. Certainly the
laws are not always as just as they might be, despite the efforts made to
render them so: the reason of it is, the extreme complexity of interests
between which it is difficult to find a true balance and just equilibrium;
but such as they are, they are infinitely more just than the right of the
strongest, which would alone reign if there were no laws.
The empire of the laws is then that which secures _order_ in a society,
and consequently procures for each of its members security and peace, and
through these, the means of devoting himself to his work, whether
intellectual or material, and of reaping the fruits thereof.
At the same time that the law guarantees order within, it also insures the
independence of the nation from without. For a nation without laws, or
which no longer obeys its laws, falls into anarchy and becomes the prey of
the first conqueror who presents himself, as is shown by the history of
Poland.
It is especially in democratic or republican states, that obedience to the
laws is necessary, as it is there the most difficult.
Montesquieu has shown with great sagacity the difficulty and thereby the
necessity of obedience to the laws in a democracy; in fact, what in other
governments is obtained by constraint, in a democracy depends only upon
the will of the citizens.
"It is clear," says Montesquieu, "that in a monarchy, where he who
causes the laws to be executed is above the laws, there is less virtue
requisite than in a popular government, where he who causes the laws
to be executed, feels that he is himself subject to them, and will
have to bear the consequence of their violation.
"It is further clear that a monarch who, through bad advice or
negligence, ceases to have the laws executed, may easily repair the
evil; he has but to change counselors or correct himself of his
negligence. But when in a popular government, the laws have ceased to
be executed, as this can only happen through the corruption of the
republic, the State is already lost."
Montesquieu then describes, in the strongest and liveliest colors, a
republican state where the laws have ceased to be enforced.
"They were free with the laws; they wish to be free without them. Each
citizen is as a slave escaped from the house of his master. What
before was called _maxim_, is now called _severity_; what was _rule_
is now annoying _restraint_; what was _attention_, is now _fear_. The
republic has become booty, and its strength is no longer anything more
than the power of a few and the license of all."
In the republics of Athens and Rome, as long as they were prosperous and
great, the empire of the laws was admirable. Socrates, in his prison, gave
of this a sublime example. He was unjustly condemned by his
fellow-citizens to drink the hemlock, namely, to die by poison. Meanwhile,
his friends pressed him to resort to flight; and everything leads to the
belief that this would have been quite easy, as the judges themselves
almost wished to be relieved of the responsibility of his death. Yet
Socrates resisted, and refused to employ this means of safety. The
principal reason given by him was, that, having been condemned by the laws
of his country, he could save himself only by violating these laws.
This is what Plato has expressed in the dialogue entitled _Crito_. The
laws of the country are represented as addressing a speech to Socrates; it
is called the _Prosopopoeia[62] of Crito_:
"Socrates," they will say to me, "was that our agreement, or was it
not rather that thou shouldst submit to the judgments rendered by the
republic?... What cause of complaint hast thou against us that thou
shouldst try to destroy us? Dost thou not, in the first place, owe us
thy life? Was it not under our auspices that thy father took to
himself the companion that gave thee birth? If thou owest us thy birth
and education, canst thou deny that thou art our child and servant?
And if this be so, thinkest thou thy rights equal to ours; and that
thou art permitted to make us suffer for what we make thee suffer?
What! in the case of a father or a master, if thou hadst one, thou
wouldst not have the right to do to him what he would do to thee; to
speak to him insultingly if he insulted thee; to strike him, if he
struck thee, nor anything like it; and thou shouldst hold such a right
toward thy country! and if we had sentenced thee to death, thinking
the sentence just, thou shouldst undertake to destroy us!... Does not
thy wisdom teach thee that the country has a greater right to thy
respect and homage, that it is more august and more wise before the
gods and the sages, than father, mother, and all ancestors; that the
country in its anger must be respected, that one must convince it of
its error through persuasion, or obey its commands, suffer without
murmuring whatever it orders to be suffered, even to be beaten and
loaded with chains?... What else then dost thou do?" they would
proceed to say, "than violate the treaty that binds thee to us, and
trample under foot thy agreement?... In suffering thy sentence, thou
diest an honorable victim of the iniquity, not of the laws, but of
men; but if thou takest to flight, thou repellest unworthily injustice
by injustice, evil by evil, and thou violatest the treaty whereby thou
wert under obligation to us: thou imperilest those it was thy duty to
protect, thou imperilest thyself, thy friends, thy country, and us. We
shall be thy enemies all thy life; and when thou shalt descend to the
dead, our sisters, the laws of Hades, knowing that thou hast tried thy
best to destroy us here, will not receive thee very favorably."
_Pretended Exceptions._--The duty of obedience to the laws must then be
admitted as a principle; but is this duty absolute? is it not susceptible
of some exceptions? A learned theologian of the XVI. century, a Jesuit,
Suarez (_Traite des lois_, III., iv.), admits three exceptions to the
obedience due to the law: 1, if a law is unjust--for an unjust law is no
law--not only is one not obliged to accept, but even, when accepted, one
is not obliged to obey it; 2, if it is too hard; for then one may
reasonably presume that the law was not made by the prince with the
absolute intention that it should be obeyed, but rather as an experiment;
now, under this supposition one can always begin by not observing it;--3,
if, in fact, the majority of the people have ceased to observe it, even
though the first who had commenced should have sinned; the minority is not
obliged to observe what the majority has abandoned: for one cannot suppose
the prince to intend obliging such or such individuals to observe it, when
the community at large have ceased observing it.
These exceptions, proposed by Suarez, are inadmissible, at least the two
first. To authorize disobedience to unjust laws is introducing into
society an inward principle of destruction. All law is supposed to be
just, otherwise it is arbitrariness and not law. Every man finds always
the law that punishes him unjust. If there are unjust laws, which is
possible, we must ask their abrogation; and, in these our days, the
liberty of the press is ready to give satisfaction to the need of
criticism; but, in the meantime, we must obey. The second exception is not
tenable either. To say that it is permitted to disobey a law when it is
too hard, in supposing that the prince only made it for an experiment, is
to permit the eluding of all the laws: for every law is hard for somebody;
and there is, besides, no determining the hardness of laws. Such an
appreciation is, moreover, fictitious; a prince who makes a law is
supposed _a priori_ to wish it executed: to say that he only meant to try
us therewith is a wholly gratuitous invention. Certainly one may by such
conduct succeed in wearing a law out when the prince is feeble; but it is
not the less unjust, and no State could resist such a cause of
dissolution. As to the third exception, it can be admitted that there are
laws fallen into disuse, and which are no longer applied by any one
because they stand in contradiction to the manners, and are no longer of
any use; but, except in such case, it is nowise permitted to say that it
is sufficient for the majority to disobey to entitle the minority to do
the same. For instance, if it pleased the majority to engage in smuggling,
or to make false declarations in the matter of taxes, it would nowise
acquit the good citizens from continuing to fulfill their duty.
Now, if it is an absolute duty to obey a law, we must, at the same time,
admit as a corrective, the right of criticising the law. This right is the
right of the minority, and it is recognized to-day in all civilized
countries. A law may, in fact, be unjust or erroneous: it may have been
introduced by passion, by party-spirit; even without having been
originally unjust, it may have become so in time through change in
manners; it may also be the work of ignorance, prejudice, etc.; and
thereby hurtful. Hence the necessity of what is called the _liberty of the
press_, the inviolable guaranty of the minorities. But the right of
_criticising_ the law is not the right of _insulting_ it. Discussion is
not _insult_. Every law is entitled to respect because it is a law; it is
the expression of the public reason, the public will, of sovereignty. One
may try to _persuade_ the sovereign by reasoning, and induce him to change
the law; one should not inspire _contempt_ which leads unavoidably to
disobedience.
=87. Respect for magistrates.=--Another duty, which is the corollary to
obedience to the laws, is the _respect for the magistrate_. The
magistrate--that is, the functionary, whoever he be, in charge of the
execution of the laws--should be obeyed, not only because he represents
force, but also because he is the expression of the law. For this reason,
he should be for all an object of respect. The person is nothing; it is
the authority itself that is entitled to respect, and not such or such an
individual. Many ignorant persons are always disposed to regard the
functionary as a tyrant, and every act of authority, an act of oppression.
This is a puerile and lamentable prejudice. The greatest oppression is
always that of individual passions, and the most dangerous of despotisms
is anarchy: for then it is the right of the strongest which alone
predominates. Authority, whatever it be, makes the maintenance of order
its special interest, and order is the guaranty of every one. The
magistrate is, moreover, entitled to respect, as he represents the
country; if the country be a family, the authority of the magistrate
should be regarded the same as that of the head of the family, an
authority entitled to respect even in its errors.
=88. The ballot.=--Of all the special obligations which we have enumerated,
the most important to point out is that of the _ballot_, because it is
free and left entirely at the will of the citizens.
In regard to the other obligations, constraint may, up to a certain point,
supply the good will; he who does not pay his taxes from a sense of duty,
is obliged to pay them from necessity; but the ballot is free; one may
vote or not vote; one may vote for whom he pleases: there is no other
restraint than the sense of duty; for this reason, it is necessary to
insist on this kind of obligation.
1. It is a duty to vote. What in fact the law demands, in granting to the
citizens the right of suffrage, is that the will of the citizens be made
manifest, and that the decisions about to be taken, be those of the
majority. This principle of the right of the majorities has often been
questioned: for, it is said, why might not the majority be mistaken?
Certainly, but why might not the minority be also mistaken? The majority
is a rule which puts an end to disputes and forestalls the appeal to
force. The minorities certainly may have cause for complaint, for no rule
is absolutely perfect; but they have the chance of becoming majorities in
their turn. This is seen in all free States, where the majority is
constantly being modified with the time. If such is the principle of
elective governments (whatever be the measure or extension of the
electoral right), it can be seen of what importance it is that the true
majority show itself; and this can only take place through the greatest
possible number of voters. If, for example, half of the citizens abstain,
and that of the half that vote, one-half alone, plus one, constitute the
majority, it follows that it is a fourth of the citizens that make the
law; which would seem to be reversing the principle of majorities. This is
certainly not absolutely unjust, for it may be said that those who do not
vote admit implicitly the result obtained; but this negative compliance
has not the same value as a positive compliance.
To abstain from voting may have two causes: either indifference, or
ignorance of the questions propounded, and consequently the impossibility
of deciding one way or another. In the first case, especially is the
abstaining culpable. No citizen has the right to be indifferent to public
affairs. Skepticism in this matter is want of patriotism. In the second
case, the question is a more delicate one. How can I vote? it may be said.
I understand nothing about the question; I have no opinion; I have no
preference as to candidates. To combat this evil, it is, of course,
necessary that education gain a larger development, and that liberty enter
into customs and manners. There will be seen then a greater and greater
number of citizens understandingly interested in public affairs. But even
in the present state of things, a man may still fulfill his duty in
consulting enlightened men, in choosing some one in whom he may have
confidence; in short, in making every effort to gain information.
2. The vote should be _disinterested_. The question here is not only one
concerning the _venality_ of the vote, which is a shameful act,
punishable, moreover, by the laws; but it embraces disinterestedness in a
wider sense. One should in voting consider the interests of the country
alone, and in nowise, or at least, only secondarily, the interests of
localities, unless the question be precisely as to those latter interests,
when voting for municipal officers.
3. The vote should be _free_. The electors or representatives of an
assembly should obey their conscience alone: they should repel all
pressure, as well that from committees arrogating omnipotence, as from the
power itself.
4. In fine, the vote should be _enlightened_. Each voter should gather
information touching the matter in hand, the candidates, their morality,
their general fitness for their duty, their opinions. In order to vote
with knowledge of the facts, one must have some education. That, of
course, depends on our parents; but what depends on us, is to develop the
education already obtained; we must read the papers, but not one only, or
we may become the slaves of a watch word and of bigoted minds; we must
also gather information from men more enlightened, etc.
=89. Taxes.=--It is a duty to pay the taxes; for, without the contributions
of each citizen, the State would have no budget, and could not set the
offices it is commissioned with, to work.
How could justice be rendered, instruction be given, the territory be
defended, the roads kept up, without money? This money, besides, is voted
by the representatives of the country, elected for that purpose. But if
the State is not to tax the citizens without their consent and
supervision, they in their turn should not refuse it their money.
Certainly, this evil is not much to be feared, for in the absence of good
will, there is still the constraint which can be brought to bear upon
refractory citizens. Yet there are still means of defrauding the law. The
common people believe too readily that to deceive the State is not
deceiving; they do not scruple to make false declarations where
declarations are required, to pass prohibited goods over the frontier,
etc.; which are so many ways of refusing to pay the taxes.
=90. Military service=, as are the taxes, is obligatory by law, and
consequently does not depend on individual choice. But it is not enough to
do our duty because we are obliged to do it; we must also do it
conscientiously and heartily.
"It is not enough to pay out of one's purse," says a moralist;[63]
"one must also pay with one's person." Certainly, it is not for any
one's pleasure that he leaves his parents and friends, his work and
habits, to go to do military service in barracks, and, if needs be, to
fight on the frontiers. But who will defend the country in case of
attack if it be not its young and robust men? And must they not learn
the use of arms in order to be efficient on the day when the country
shall need them? This is why there are armies. Certainly, it would be
a thousand times better if there were no need of this, if all nations
were just enough never to make war with each other. But whilst this
ideal is being realized, the least any one can do is to hold himself
in readiness to defend his liberty, his honor.... Thanks to a good
army, one not only can remain quiet at home, but the humblest citizen
is respected wherever he goes, wherever his interests take him. In
looking carefully at the matter it can be seen that even in respect to
simple interests, the time spent in the service of the flag, is
nothing in comparison with the advantages derived from it. Is it not
because others have been there before us that we have been enabled to
grow up peacefully and happy to the age of manhood? Is it not just
that we should take their place and in our turn watch over the
country? And when we return, others will take our place, and we, in
our turn, shall be enabled to raise a family, attend to our business,
and lead a quiet and contented life.
Let us add to these judicious remarks that military service is a school of
discipline, order, obedience, courage, patience, and as such, contributes
to strengthening the mind and body, to developing personality, to forming
good citizens.
The principal infractions of the duty of military service are: 1,
_mutilations_ by which some render themselves improper for service; 2,
_simulated infirmities_ by which one tries to escape from the obligation;
3, _desertion_ in times of war, and what is more criminal still, _passing
over to the enemy_; 4, _insubordination_ or disobedience to superiors.
This latter vice is the most important to point out, the others being more
or less rare; but insubordination is an evil most frequent in our armies,
and a most dangerous evil. Military operations have become so complicated
and difficult in these days, that nothing is possible without the
strictest obedience on the part of soldiers. In times when individual
valor was almost everything, insubordination might have presented fewer
inconveniences; but in these days, all is done through masses, and if the
men do not obey, the armies are necessarily beaten because they cannot
oppose an equal force to the enemy. Suppose the enemy to be 50,000 men
strong in a certain place, that you yourself belong to a body of 50,000,
and that you all together reach the same place at the same time as the
enemy: you are equal in numbers, one against one, and you have at least as
many chances as they; and if, besides, you have other qualities which they
have not, you will have more chances. But if in the corps you belong to,
there is no discipline, if every one disobeys--if, for example, when the
order for marching is given, each starts when he pleases, and marches but
as he pleases, you will arrive too late, and the enemy will have taken the
best positions; there is then one chance lost. If, moreover, through the
disorder in your ranks, you do not all arrive together, if there are but
25,000 men in a line, the others remaining behind, these 25,000 will be
overwhelmed. As for those who do not reach the spot, think you they will
escape the consequences of the battle? By no means; the disorder will not
save them; it will deliver them defenseless into the hands of the pursuing
enemy. Now, all disorder is followed by similar consequences. On the other
hand, the obedience of the soldier being sure, the army is as one man who
lends himself to all the plans, all the combinations; who takes advantage
of all the happy chances, who runs less dangers because the business
proceeds more rapidly, and that with less means one obtains more results.
Such are the reasons for the punctilious discipline required of soldiers.
We are treated as machines, you will say. Yes; if you resist: for then
constraint becomes indispensable; but if you understand the necessity of
the discipline, if you submit to it on your own accord, then are you no
longer machines: you are men. The only way of not being a machine is then
precisely to obey freely.
It has often been asked, in these days, whether the soldier is always
obliged to obey, even such orders as his conscience disapproves of. These
are dangerous questions to raise, and they tend to imperil discipline
without much profit to morality. No doubt if a soldier were ordered to
commit a crime--as, for example, to go and kill a defenseless man--he
would have the right to refuse doing it. At the time of the massacre of
St. Bartholomew, an order was sent to all the provinces to follow the
example of Paris. One of the governors, the Viscount Orthez, replied that
his soldiers did not do executioner's service; and this answer was admired
by all the world. But these are very rare cases; and it is dangerous for
such uncertain eventualities to inspire mistrust against order and
discipline, which are the certain guaranties of the defense and
independence of a country.
=91. Educational obligation.=--The duty to instruct children results from
the natural relations between parents and children. The obligation to
raise children implies, in fact, the obligation to instruct them. There is
no more education without instruction than instruction without education.
To-day educational obligation is inserted in the law, and has its sanction
therein. But parents owe it to themselves to obey the law without
constraint.
=92. Civil courage.=--We have already spoken above of civil courage as
opposed to military courage. But here is the place to return to this
subject. Let us recall a fine page by J. Barni in his book on _Morality in
Democracy_:
The stoics defined courage admirably: _Virtue combating for equity_.
Civil courage might be defined: virtue defending the liberty and
rights of citizens against tyranny, whether this tyranny be that of
the masses or a despot's. As much courage, and perhaps more, is
demanded in the first case as in the second; it is less easy to resist
a crowd than a single man, were there nothing more to be feared than
_unpopularity_, one of the disadvantages hardest to brave. How much
more difficult when it comes to risking a popularity already acquired?
Yet must one, if necessary, be able to make the sacrifice. True civil
courage shows itself the same in all cases. Thus, Socrates, this type
of civil virtue, as he was of all other virtues, refused, at the peril
of his life, to obey the iniquitous orders of the tyrant Critias; and
he resisted with no less courage the people, who, contrary to justice
and law, asked for the death of the generals who conquered at
Arginusae. Another name presents itself to the memory, namely, that of
Boissy d'Anglas, immortalized for the heroism he showed as president
of the National Convention, the 1st Prairial, year II. (20 May, 1795).
Assailed by the clamors of the crowd which had invaded the Assembly,
threatened by the guns which were pointed at him, he remains
impassible; and without even appearing to be aware of the danger he is
running, he reminds the crowd of the respect due to national
representatives. They cry: "We do not want thy Assembly; the people is
here; thou art the president of the people; sign, says one, the decree
shall be good, or I kill thee!" He quietly replied: "Life to me is a
trifle; you speak of committing a great crime; I am a representative
of the people; I am president of the convention;" and he refused to
sign. The head of a representative of the people who had just been
massacred by the populace for having attempted to prevent the invasion
of the Convention, is presented to him on the end of a pike; he
salutes it and remains firm at his post. This is a great example of
civil courage.