BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION, AND PROHIBITIONS OF IMPORTATION.
A bounty on the exportation of corn tends to lower its price to the
foreign consumer, but it has no permanent effect on its price in the
home market.
Suppose that to afford the usual and general profits of stock, the price
of corn should in England be 4_l._ per quarter; it could not then be
exported to foreign countries where it sold for 3_l._ 15_s._ per
quarter. But if a bounty of 10_s._ per quarter were given on
exportation, it could be sold in the foreign market at 3_l._ 10_s._, and
consequently the same profit would be afforded to the corn grower,
whether he sold it at 3_l._ 10_s._ in the foreign, or at 4_l._ in the
home market.
A bounty then, which should lower the price of British corn in the
foreign country, below the cost of producing corn in that country, would
naturally extend the demand for British, and diminish the demand for
their own corn. This extension of demand for British corn could not fail
to raise its price for a time in the home market, and during that time
to prevent also its falling so low in the foreign market as the bounty
has a tendency to effect. But the causes which would thus operate on the
market price of corn in England would produce no effect whatever on its
natural price, on its real cost of production. To grow corn would
neither require more labour nor more capital, and, consequently, if the
profits of the farmer's stock were before only equal to the profits of
the stock of other traders, they will, after the rise of price, be
considerably above them. By raising the profits of the farmer's stock,
the bounty will operate as an encouragement to agriculture, and capital
will be withdrawn from manufactures to be employed on the land, till the
enlarged demand for the foreign market has been supplied, when the price
of corn will again fall in the home market to its natural and necessary
price, and profits will be again at their ordinary and accustomed level.
The increased supply of grain operating on the foreign market, will also
lower its price in the country to which it is exported, and will thereby
restrict the profits of the exporter to the lowest rate at which he can
afford to trade.
The ultimate effect then of a bounty on the exportation of corn, is not
to raise or to lower the price in the home market, but to lower the
price of corn to the foreign consumer--to the whole extent of the
bounty, if the price of corn had not before been lower in the foreign,
than in the home market--and in a less degree, if the price in the home
had been above the price in the foreign market.
A writer in the fifth vol. of the Edinburgh Review on the subject of a
bounty on the exportation of corn, has very clearly pointed out its
effects on the foreign and home demand. He has also justly remarked,
that it would not fail to give encouragement to agriculture in the
exporting country; but he appears to have imbibed the common error which
has misled Dr. Smith, and I believe most other writers on this subject.
He supposes, because the price of corn ultimately regulates wages, that
therefore it will regulate the price of all other commodities. He says
that the bounty, "by raising the profits of farming, will operate as an
encouragement to husbandry; by raising the price of corn to the
consumers at home, it will diminish for the time their power of
purchasing this necessary of life, and thus abridge their real wealth.
It is evident, however, that this last effect must be temporary: the
wages of the labouring consumers had been adjusted before by
competition, and the same principle will adjust them again to the same
rate, by raising the money price of labour, _and, through that, of other
commodities, to the money price of corn_. The bounty upon exportation,
therefore, will ultimately raise the money price of corn in the home
market; not directly, however, but through the medium of an extended
demand in the foreign market, and a consequent enhancement of the real
price at home: _and this rise of the money price, when it has once been
communicated to other commodities, will of course become fixed_."
If, however, I have succeeded in shewing that it is not the rise in the
money wages of labour which raises the price of commodities, but that
such rise always affects profits, it will follow that the prices of
commodities would not rise in consequence of a bounty.
But a temporary rise in the price of corn, produced by an increased
demand from abroad, would have no effect on the money price of wages.
The rise of corn is occasioned by a competition for that supply which
was before exclusively appropriated to the home market. By raising
profits, additional capital is employed in agriculture, and the
increased supply is obtained; but till it be obtained, the high price is
absolutely necessary to proportion the consumption to the supply, which
would be counteracted by a rise of wages. The rise of corn is the
consequence of its scarcity, and is the means by which the demand of the
home purchasers is diminished. If wages were increased, the competition
would increase, and a further rise of the price of corn would become
necessary. In this account of the effects of a bounty, nothing has been
supposed to occur to raise the natural price of corn, by which its
market price is ultimately governed; for it has not been supposed that
any additional labour would be required on the land to insure a given
production, and this alone can raise natural price. If the natural price
of cloth were 20_s._ per yard, a great increase in the foreign demand
might raise the price to 25_s._, or more, but the profits which would
then be made by the clothier would not fail to attract capital in that
direction, and although the demand should be doubled, trebled, or
quadrupled, the supply would ultimately be obtained, and cloth would
fall to its natural price of 20_s._ So in the supply of corn, although
we should export 2, 3, or 800,000 quarters, annually, it would
ultimately be produced at its natural price, which never varies unless a
different quantity of labour becomes necessary to production.
Perhaps in no part of Adam Smith's justly celebrated work are his
conclusions more liable to objection, than in the chapter on bounties.
In the first place, he speaks of corn as of a commodity of which the
production cannot be increased in consequence of a bounty on
exportation; he supposes invariably that it acts only on the quantity
actually produced, and is no stimulus to further production. "In years
of plenty," he says, "by occasioning an extraordinary exportation, it
necessarily keeps up the price of corn in the home market above what it
would naturally fall to. In years of scarcity, though the bounty is
frequently suspended, yet the great exportation which it occasions in
years of plenty, must frequently hinder, more or less, the plenty of one
year from relieving the scarcity of another. Both in the years of plenty
and in years of scarcity, therefore, the bounty necessarily tends to
raise the money price of corn somewhat higher than it otherwise would be
in the home market."[37]
Adam Smith appears to have been fully aware, that the correctness of
his argument entirely depended on the fact, whether the increase "of the
money price of corn, by rendering that commodity more profitable to the
farmer, would not necessarily encourage its production."
"I answer," he says, "that this might be the case, if the effect of the
bounty was to raise the real price of corn, or to enable the farmer,
with an equal quantity of it, to maintain a greater number of labourers
in the same manner, whether liberal, moderate, or scanty, as other
labourers are commonly maintained in his neighbourhood."
If nothing were consumed by the labourer but corn, and if the portion
which he received, was the very lowest which his sustenance required,
there might be some ground for supposing that the quantity paid to the
labourer could, under no circumstances, be reduced,--but the money wages
of labour sometimes do not rise at all, and never rise in proportion to
the rise in the money price of corn, because corn, though an important
part, is only a part of the consumption of the labourer. If half his
wages were expended on corn, and the other half on soap, candles, fuel,
tea, sugar, clothing, &c., commodities on which no rise is supposed to
take place, it is evident that he would be quite as well paid with a
bushel and a half of wheat, when it was 16_s._ a bushel, as he was with
two bushels, when the price was 8_s._ per bushel; or with 24_s._ in
money, as he was before with 16_s._ His wages would rise only 50 per
cent. though corn rose 100 per cent., and, consequently, there would be
sufficient motive to divert more capital to the land, if profits on
other trades continued the same as before. But such a rise of wages
would also induce manufacturers to withdraw their capitals from
manufactures, to employ them on the land; for whilst the farmer
increased the price of his commodity 100 per cent., and his wages only
50 per cent., the manufacturer would be obliged also to raise wages 50
per cent., whilst he had no compensation whatever, in the rise of his
manufactured commodity, for this increased charge of production; capital
would consequently flow from manufactures to agriculture, till the
supply would again lower the price of corn to 8_s._ per bushel, and
wages to 16_s._ per week; when the manufacturer would obtain the same
profits as the farmer, and the tide of capital would cease to set in
either direction. This is in fact the mode in which the cultivation of
corn is always extended, and the increased wants of the market supplied.
The funds for the maintenance of labour increase, and wages are raised.
The comfortable situation of the labourer induces him to
marry--population increases, and the demand for corn raises its price
relatively to other things,--more capital is profitably employed on
agriculture, and continues to flow towards it, till the supply is equal
to the demand, when the price again falls, and agricultural and
manufacturing profits are again brought to a level.
But whether wages were stationary after the rise in the price of corn,
or advanced moderately, or enormously, is of no importance to this
question, for wages are paid by the manufacturer as well as by the
farmer, and, therefore, in this respect they must be equally affected by
a rise in the price of corn. But they are unequally affected in their
profits, inasmuch as the farmer sells his commodity at an advanced
price, while the manufacturer sells his for the same price as before. It
is however the inequality of profit, which is always the inducement to
remove capital from one employment to another, and therefore more corn
would be produced, and fewer commodities manufactured. Manufactures
would not rise, because fewer were manufactured, for a supply of them
would be obtained in exchange for the exported corn.
A bounty, if it raises the price of corn, either raises it in comparison
with the price of other commodities, or it does not. If the affirmative
be true, it is impossible to deny the greater profits of the farmer, and
the temptation to the removal of capital, till its price is again
lowered by an abundant supply. If it does not raise it in comparison
with other commodities, where is the injury to the home consumer, beyond
the inconvenience of paying the tax? If the manufacturer pays a greater
price for his corn, he is compensated by the greater price at which he
sells his commodity, with which his corn is ultimately purchased.
The error of Adam Smith proceeds precisely from the same source as that
of the writer in the Edinburgh Review; for they both think "that the
money price of corn regulates that of all other home-made
commodities."[38] "It regulates," says Adam Smith, "the money price of
labour, which must always be such as to enable the labourer to purchase
a quantity of corn sufficient to maintain him and his family, either in
the liberal, moderate, or scanty manner, in which the advancing,
stationary, or declining circumstances of the society oblige his
employers to maintain him. By regulating the money price of all the
other parts of the rude produce of land, it regulates that of the
materials of almost all manufactures. By regulating the money price of
labour, it regulates that of manufacturing art, and industry; and by
regulating both, it regulates that of the complete manufacture. _The
money price of labour, and of every thing that is the produce either of
land and labour, must necessarily rise or fall in proportion to the
money price of corn._"
This opinion of Adam Smith, I have before attempted to refute. In
considering a rise in the price of commodities as a necessary
consequence of a rise in the price of corn, he reasons as though there
were no other fund from which the increased charge could be paid. He has
wholly neglected the consideration of profits, the diminution of which
forms that fund, without raising the price of commodities. If this
opinion of Dr. Smith were well founded, profits could never really fall,
whatever accumulation of capital there might be. If when wages rose, the
farmer could raise the price of his corn, and the clothier, the hatter,
the shoemaker, and every other manufacturer, could also raise the price
of their goods in proportion to the advance, although estimated in
money, they might be all raised, they would continue to bear the same
value relatively to each other. Each of these trades could command the
same quantity as before of the goods of the others, which, since it is
goods, and not money, which constitute wealth, is the only circumstance
that could be of importance to them; and the whole rise in the price of
raw produce and of goods, would be injurious to no other persons but to
those whose property consisted of gold and silver, or whose annual
income was paid in a contributed quantity of those metals, whether in
the form of bullion or of money. Suppose the use of money to be wholly
laid aside, and all trade to be carried on by barter. Under such
circumstances, could corn rise in exchangeable value with other things?
If it could, then it is not true that the value of corn regulates the
value of all other commodities; for to do that, it should not vary in
relative value to them. If it could not, then it must be maintained,
that whether corn be obtained on rich, or on poor land, with much
labour, or with little, with the aid of machinery, or without, it would
always exchange for an equal quantity of all other commodities.
I cannot, however, but remark that, though Adam Smith's general
doctrines correspond with this which I have just quoted, yet in one part
of his work he appears to have given a correct account of the nature of
value. "The proportion between the value of gold and silver, and that of
goods of any other kind, _depends in all cases_," he says, "_upon the
proportion between the quantity of labour which is necessary in order to
bring a certain quantity of gold and silver to market, and that which is
necessary to bring thither a certain quantity of any other sort of
goods_." Does he not here fully acknowledge that if any increase takes
place in the quantity of labour, required to bring one sort of goods to
market, whilst no such increase takes place in bringing another sort
thither, those goods will rise in relative value. If no more labour be
required to bring cloth and gold to market, they will not vary in
relative value, but if more labour be required to bring corn and shoes
to market, will not corn and shoes rise in value relatively to cloth,
and money made of gold?
Adam Smith again considers that the effect of the bounty is to cause a
partial degradation in the value of money. "That degradation," says he
"in the value of silver, which is the effect of the fertility of the
mines, and which operates equally, or very nearly equally, through the
greater part of the commercial world, is a matter of very little
consequence to any particular country. The consequent rise of all money
prices, though it does not make those who receive them really richer,
does not make them really poorer. A service of plate becomes really
cheaper, and every thing else remains precisely of the same real value
as before." This observation is most correct.
"But that degradation in the value of silver, which being the effect
either of the peculiar situation, or of the political institutions of a
particular country, takes place only in that country, is a matter of
very great consequence, which, far from tending to make any body really
richer, tends to make every body really poorer. The rise in the money
price of all commodities, which is in this case peculiar to that
country, tends to discourage more or less every sort of industry which
is carried on within it, and to enable foreign nations, by furnishing
almost all sorts of goods for a smaller quantity of silver than its own
workmen can afford to do, to undersell them, not only in the foreign,
but even in the home market."
I have elsewhere attempted to shew that a partial degradation in the
value of money, which shall affect both agricultural produce, and
manufactured commodities, cannot possibly be permanent. To say that
money is partially degraded, in this sense, is to say that all
commodities are at a high price; but while gold and silver are at
liberty to make purchases in the cheapest market, they will be exported
for the cheaper goods of other countries, and the reduction of their
quantity will increase their value at home; commodities will regain
their usual level, and those fitted for foreign markets will be
exported, as before.
A bounty therefore cannot, I think, be objected to on this ground.
If then, a bounty raises the price of corn in comparison with all other
things, the farmer will be benefited, and more land will be cultivated;
but if the bounty do not raise the value of corn relatively to other
things, then no other inconvenience will attend it, than that of paying
the bounty; one which I neither wish to conceal nor underrate.
Dr. Smith states, that "by establishing high duties on the importation,
and bounties on the exportation of corn, the country gentlemen seemed to
have imitated the conduct of the manufacturers." By the same means both
had endeavoured to raise the value of their commodities. "They did not
perhaps attend to the great and essential difference which nature has
established between corn, and almost every other sort of goods. When by
either of the above means, you enable our manufacturers to sell their
goods for somewhat a better price than they otherwise could get for
them, you raise not only the nominal, but the real price of those goods.
You increase not only the nominal, but the real profit, the real wealth
and revenue of those manufacturers--you really encourage those
manufactures. But when, by the like institutions, you raise the nominal
or money price of corn, you do not raise its real value, you do not
increase the real wealth of our farmers or country gentlemen, you do not
encourage the growth of corn. The nature of things has stamped upon corn
a real value, which cannot be altered by merely altering its money
price. Through the world in general, that value is equal to the quantity
of labour which it can maintain."
I have already attempted to shew, that the market price of corn, would,
under an increased demand from the effects of a bounty, exceed its
natural price, till the requisite additional supply was obtained, and
that then it would again fall to its natural price. But the natural
price of corn is not so fixed as the natural price of commodities;
because, with any great additional demand for corn, land of a worse
quality must be taken into cultivation, on which more labour will be
required to produce a given quantity, and the natural price of corn
would be raised. By a continued bounty, therefore, on the exportation of
corn, there would be created a tendency to a permanent rise in the price
of corn, and this, as I have shewn elsewhere,[39] never fails to raise
rent. Country gentlemen then have not only a temporary but a permanent
interest in prohibitions of the importation of corn, and in bounties on
its exportation; but manufacturers have no permanent interest in a
bounty on the exportation of commodities, their interest is wholly
temporary.
A bounty on the exportation of manufactures will undoubtedly, as Dr.
Smith contends, raise the market price of manufactures, but it will not
raise their natural price. The labour of 200 men will produce double the
quantity of these goods that 100 could produce before; and
consequently, when the requisite quantity of capital was employed in
supplying the requisite quantity of manufactures, they would again fall
to their natural price. It is then only during the interval after the
rise in the market price of commodities, and before the additional
supply is obtained, that the manufacturers will enjoy high profits; for
as soon as prices had subsided, their profits would sink to the general
level.
Instead of agreeing, therefore, with Adam Smith, that the country
gentlemen had not so great an interest in prohibiting the importation of
corn, as the manufacturer had in prohibiting the importation of
manufactured goods, I contend that they have a much superior interest;
for their advantage is permanent, while that of the manufacturer is only
temporary. Dr. Smith observes, that nature has established a great and
essential difference between corn and other goods, but the proper
inference from that circumstance is directly the reverse of that which
he draws from it; for it is on account of this difference that rent is
created, and that country gentlemen have an interest in the rise of the
natural price of corn. Instead of comparing the interest of the
manufacturer with the interest of the country gentleman, Dr. Smith
should have compared it with the interest of the farmer, which is very
distinct from that of his landlord. Manufacturers have no interest in
the rise of the natural price of their commodities, nor have farmers any
interest in the rise of the natural price of corn, or other raw produce,
though both these classes are benefited while the market price of their
productions exceeds their natural price. On the contrary, landlords have
a most decided interest in the rise of the natural price of corn; for
the rise of rent is the inevitable consequence of the difficulty of
producing raw produce, without which its natural price could not rise.
Now as bounties on exportation and prohibitions of the importation of
corn increase the demand, and drive us to the cultivation of poorer
lands, they necessarily occasion an increased difficulty of production.
The sole effect of the bounty either on the exportation of manufactures,
or of corn, is to divert a portion of capital to an employment, which it
would not naturally seek. It causes a pernicious distribution of the
general funds of the society--it bribes a manufacturer to commence or
continue in a comparatively less profitable employment. It is the worst
species of taxation, for it does not give to the foreign country all
that it takes away from the home country, the balance of loss being made
up by the less advantageous distribution of the general capital. Thus,
if the price of corn is in England 4_l._, and in France 3_l._ 15_s._ a
bounty of 10_s._ will ultimately reduce it to 3_l._ 10_s._ in France,
and maintain it at the same price of 4_l._ in England. For every quarter
exported, England pays a tax of 10_s._ For every quarter imported into
France, France gains only 5_s._, so that the value of 5_s._ per quarter
is absolutely lost to the world, by such a distribution of its funds as
to cause diminished production, probably not of corn, but of some other
object of necessity or enjoyment.
Mr. Buchanan appears to have seen the fallacy of Dr. Smith's arguments
respecting bounties, and on the last passage which I have quoted, very
judiciously remarks: "In asserting that nature has stamped a real value
on corn, which cannot be altered by merely altering its money price, Dr.
Smith confounds its value in use, with its value in exchange. A bushel
of wheat will not feed more people during scarcity than during plenty;
but a bushel of wheat will exchange for a greater quantity of luxuries
and conveniences when it is scarce, than when it is abundant; and the
landed proprietors, who have a surplus of food to dispose of, will
therefore, in times of scarcity, be richer men; they will exchange their
surplus for a greater value of other enjoyments, than when corn is in
greater plenty. It is vain to argue, therefore, that if the bounty
occasions a forced exportation of corn, it will not also occasion a real
rise of price." The whole of Mr. Buchanan's arguments on this part of
the subject of bounties, appear to me to be perfectly clear and
satisfactory.
Mr. Buchanan however has not, I think, any more than Dr. Smith, or the
writer in the Edinburgh Review, correct opinions as to the influence of
a rise in the price of labour on manufactured commodities. From his
peculiar views, which I have elsewhere noticed, he thinks that the
price of labour has no connexion with the price of corn, and therefore
that the real value of corn might and would rise without affecting the
price of labour; but if labour were affected, he would maintain with
Adam Smith and the writer in the Edinburgh Review, that the price of
manufactured commodities would also rise; and then I do not see how he
would distinguish such a rise of corn, from a fall in the value of
money, or how he could come to any other conclusion than that of Dr.
Smith. In a note to page 276, vol. i. of the Wealth of Nations, Mr.
Buchanan observes, "but the price of corn does not regulate the money
price of all the other parts of the rude produce of land. It regulates
the price neither of metals, nor of various other useful substances,
such as coals, wood, stones, &c.; _and as it does not regulate the price
of labour, it does not regulate the price of manufactures_; so that the
bounty, in so far as it raises the price of corn, is undoubtedly a real
benefit to the farmer. It is not on this ground, therefore, that its
policy must be argued. Its encouragement to agriculture, by raising the
price of corn, must be admitted; and the question then comes to be,
whether agriculture ought to be thus encouraged?"--It is then,
according to Mr. Buchanan, a real benefit to the farmer, because it does
not raise the price of labour; but if it did, it would raise the price
of all things in proportion, and then it would afford no particular
encouragement to agriculture.
It must, however, be conceded, that the tendency of a bounty on the
exportation of any commodity is to lower in a small degree the value of
money. Whatever facilitates exportation, tends to accumulate money in a
country; and on the contrary, whatever impedes exportation, tends to
diminish it. The general effect of taxation, by raising the prices of
the commodities taxed, tends to diminish exportation, and therefore to
check the influx of money; and on the same principle, a bounty
encourages the influx of money. This is more fully explained in the
general observations on taxation.
The injurious effects of the mercantile system have been fully exposed
by Dr. Smith; the whole aim of that system was to raise the price of
commodities, in the home market, by prohibiting foreign competition;
but this system was no more injurious to the agricultural classes than
to any other part of the community. By forcing capital into channels
where it would not otherwise flow, it diminished the whole amount of
commodities produced. The price, though permanently higher, was not
sustained by scarcity, but by difficulty of production; and therefore,
though the sellers of such commodities sold them for a higher price,
they did not sell them, after the requisite quantity of capital was
employed in producing them, at higher profits.[40]
The manufacturers themselves, as consumers, had to pay an additional
price for such commodities, and therefore it cannot be correctly said,
that "the enhancement of price occasioned by both, (corporation laws and
high duties on the importation of foreign commodities,) is every where
finally paid by the landlords, farmers, and labourers of the country."
It is the more necessary, to make this remark, as in the present day the
authority of Adam Smith is quoted by country gentlemen for imposing
similar high duties on the importation of foreign corn. Because the cost
of production, and therefore the prices of various manufactured
commodities, are raised to the consumer by one error in legislation, the
country has been called upon, on the plea of justice, quietly to submit
to fresh exactions. Because we all pay an additional price for our
linen, muslin, and cottons, it is thought just that we should pay also
an additional price for our corn. Because, in the general distribution
of the labour of the world, we have prevented the greatest amount of
productions from being obtained by that labour in manufactured
commodities; we should further punish ourselves by diminishing the
productive powers of the general labour in the supply of raw produce. It
would be much wiser to acknowledge the errors which a mistaken policy
has induced us to adopt, and immediately to commence a gradual
recurrence to the sound principles of an universally free trade.
"I have already had occasion to remark," observes M. Say, "in speaking
of what is improperly called the balance of trade, that if it suits a
merchant better to export the precious metals to a foreign country than
any other goods, it is also the interest of the state that he should
export them, because the state only gains or loses through the channel
of its citizens; and in what concerns foreign trade, that which best
suits the individual, best suits also the state; therefore, by opposing
obstacles to the exportation which individuals would be inclined to
make of the precious metals, nothing more is done, than to force them to
substitute some other commodity less profitable to themselves, and to
the state. It must however be remarked, that I say only _in what
concerns foreign trade_; because the profits which merchants make by
their dealings with their countrymen, as well as those which are made in
the exclusive commerce with colonies, are not entirely gains for the
state. In the trade between individuals of the same country, there is no
other gain but the value of an utility produced; _Que la valeur d'une
utilite produite_."[41] Vol. i. p. 401. I cannot see the distinction
here made between the profits of the home and foreign trade. The object
of all trade is to increase productions. If for the purchase of a pipe
of wine, I had it in my power to export bullion, which was bought with
the value of the produce of 100 days' labour, but Government, by
prohibiting the exportation of bullion, should oblige me to purchase my
wine with a commodity bought with the value of the produce of one
hundred and five days' labour, the produce of five days' labour is lost
to me, and, through me, to the state. But if these transactions took
place between individuals, in different provinces of the same country,
the same advantage would accrue both to the individual, and, through
him, to the country, if he were unfettered in his choice of the
commodities, with which he made his purchases; and the same
disadvantage, if he were obliged by Government to purchase with the
least beneficial commodity. If a manufacturer could work up with the
same capital, more iron where coals are plentiful, than he could where
coals are scarce, the country would be benefited by the difference. But
if coals were no where plentiful, and he imported iron, and could get
this additional quantity, by the manufacture of a commodity, with the
same capital and labour, he would in like manner benefit his country by
the additional quantity of iron. In the 6th Chap. of this work, I have
endeavoured to shew that all trade, whether foreign or domestic, is
beneficial, by increasing the quantity, and not by increasing the value
of productions. We shall have no greater value, whether we carry on the
most beneficial home and foreign trade, or in consequence of being
fettered by prohibitory laws, we are obliged to content ourselves with
the least advantageous. The rate of profits, and the value produced,
will be the same. The advantage always resolves itself into that which
M. Say appears to confine to the home trade; in both cases there is no
other gain but that of the value of an _utilite produite_.