1. Infantry squares are usually charged in _open column_; the distance
between the subdivisions being a subdivision front and a few yards over;
in order that each subdivision may have time to break into the square,
or, if unsuccessful, to disengage itself and retire.
But the distances should never be so great as to allow the square to
reload after firing a volley at the next preceding subdivision.
2. The leading subdivision will usually _draw the fire_ of the square.
If this is delivered at very short range, say at twenty paces, it will
raise up a rampart of dead and wounded men and horses which will
probably suffice to check the following subdivisions, and so repulse the
charge. But an infantry square rarely reserves its fire so long; and if
the fire is delivered at any considerable distance, no such effect will
be produced.
3. A _good formation_ to attack a square is said to be a column of three
squadrons, with squadron front, at double distance; followed by a fourth
squadron, in column of divisions or platoons, to surround the square,
and make prisoners, if it is broken.
4. Before cavalry charges a square, it should be first shattered or
demoralized by _artillery fire_, when this is practicable. In the
absence of artillery, sharpshooting infantry skirmishers may, to a
certain extent, supply its place.
5. A square should be attacked at one of its angles, which are obviously
its weakest and most vulnerable points. But to cover a real attack on an
angle, cavalry sometimes makes a _false attack_ on the front of a
square.
6. When squares are formed checkerwise, cavalry must attack _a flank
square_, and not expose itself to a cross-fire by charging an interior
one.
7. Cavalry charging a square firing irregularly will usually break it.
But when the square reserves its fire, and pours in well-aimed volleys
at short range, the charge will rarely succeed. The cavalry should,
therefore, before charging, use every effort to _draw the fire_ of the
square, or of the fronts which threaten it. This is sometimes
accomplished by sending forward a few skirmishers to fire on the square.
8. When one square fires to assist another, the firing square should be
_instantly charged_, before it has time to reload.
9. To succeed, a cavalry charge should be made with a _desperate,
forlorn-hope recklessness_, and with reiterated attacks on one point. If
the fire has been delivered at very close range, though its effect has
probably been destructive, the smoke will momentarily shut out the line
of infantry from the horses' view, thus removing the chief obstacle to
their breaking through it. The survivors of the fire should therefore
rush desperately on.
If the French attacks on the British squares at Quatre Bras had been
made in this manner, instead of opening to the right and left, and
diverging to a flank at the moment of closing, they would probably have
succeeded.
But this sudden divergence is often the fault of the horses, which
instinctively recoil before a serried line of infantry, with bayonets at
the charge. Cavalry should, therefore, never be practised on the
drill-ground in charging a square, as the horses would thereby acquire
the habit of suddenly checking their course, or of diverging to a flank,
on arriving at the enemy. This would so strengthen their natural
instinct that they could never be got to break a square. Or, at least,
when this manoeuvre is practised for the purpose of instruction, the
horses used should never afterwards be taken into the field.
10. The cavalry most formidable to an infantry square are _Lancers_.
Their lances, which are from eleven to sixteen feet long, easily reach
and transfix the infantry soldier, while the sabres of the other cavalry
are too short to reach him over the horse's neck, and over the musket,
lengthened by the bayonet. But Lancers are usually no match against
other cavalry, who can parry and ripost before the lance can resume the
guard.
11. When cavalry has succeeded in completely breaking a body of
infantry, it may often inflict _fearful slaughter_ upon them.
At the battle of Rio Seco, in Spain, after Lasalle's twelve hundred
horse had broken the Spanish infantry, they galloped at will among
twenty-five thousand soldiers, some five thousand of whom they slew.
IX.--General Remarks.
1. Besides its uses on the field of battle, cavalry may render most
important service in completing the destruction of beaten corps, or
compelling their surrender, and so enable us to secure the great
strategic objects of the campaign. Thus, after the battle of Waterloo,
it was the Prussian cavalry that completed the dispersion of the French
army, and prevented it from rallying. And, but for Napoleon's ill
fortune in respect to Grouchy, in that battle, he would, to all
appearance, have succeeded in accomplishing his plan of campaign, which
was, to separate the English from the Prussians, beat them in detail,
and complete their destruction with his twenty thousand cavalry.
2. The battles of the late War of the Rebellion, the earlier ones, at
least, were mostly indecisive. One chief cause of this was, that neither
side had a sufficient force of true cavalry to enable it to complete a
victory, to turn a defeat into a rout, and drive the enemy effectually
from the field. The cavalry charges were generally such as mounted
infantry could have just as well made; charges in which the pistol and
carbine played the principal part, instead of the spur and sabre. It was
not until the fight at Brandy Station, in June, 1863, that sabres were
used, to any extent, at close quarters. Thus, neither of the contending
armies was able to break up and disperse, destroy, or capture its
enemy's infantry masses, in the manner practised in Napoleon's great
wars, not having, to any considerable extent, that description of force
called Cavalry of the Line, which alone is capable of effecting these
results by its solid and compact formations, its skilful, yet rapid
manoeuvring, and its crashing charges.
3. European cavalry of the line is divided into Heavy and Light. Heavy
cavalry is heavily armed; that is, their weapons are larger and heavier
than those of light cavalry, and to these weapons, carbines, in most of
the corps, are added. Some of the corps wear steel or brass cuirasses;
and the men and horses are of the largest size.
In Light cavalry, the only weapons are the sabre and pistol; and the men
and horses are light and active, rather than strong and large.
Lancers are considered a medium between Heavy and Light cavalry.
4. Great as may be the advantages of a large force of regular cavalry of
the line, there were serious objections to its being raised at the
opening of the late war.
(1.) The theatre of war presented nowhere any of those wide and level
plains so common in Europe, and on which cavalry masses are able to
produce such decisive effects in battle. On the contrary, the ground was
almost everywhere so rugged and mountainous, or else so densely wooded,
as to be extremely unfavorable to the movements of cavalry of this
description.
(2.) Since the introduction of the new rifled arms, exposing cavalry
masses to a deadly fire at far greater distances than ever before known,
a fire often reaching to the reserves, it seemed doubtful whether the
manoeuvring and charging in heavy, compact masses, which formerly
rendered cavalry of the line so formidable, would any longer be
practicable.
(3.) The comparative cost of this kind of force is so great, that, if it
had been raised and kept up on the scale required, the expense of this
war, enormous as it has been, would have been vastly augmented. Three
years are required for the thorough training and instruction of the men
and horses; so that it would not have been until the fourth year of the
war that we could begin, even, to reap the fruits of so enormous an
outlay.
5. But to carry on any war successfully, what is needed, and is, in
fact, indispensable, is an ample force of light cavalry, of a kind
requiring comparatively but little time and training to fit it for the
various and important duties devolving upon it in the field, and
therefore far less expensive than cavalry of the line; and having all
the discipline of this latter kind of force, though wanting its
perfection of manoeuvre. Every army, or considerable detachment, must
have enough of this kind of force with it to furnish what is requisite
for Outpost duty, Patrols offensive and defensive, Escorts to trains,
Foraging parties, Reconnoissances, and the various other purposes
necessarily incidental to operations in the field; and in marches, all
Advanced, Rear, and Flank guards should consist, in part, at least, of
cavalry. Finally, this description of force is needed for the
performance of those arduous, but most valuable, services often rendered
by the quasi-independent bodies called Partisan Corps; services usually
requiring great celerity of movement.
6. This kind of force being "the eyes and ears of an army," it often
contributes powerfully to the success of strategic operations.
In the campaign of 1813, Napoleon complained that, for want of light
cavalry, he could get no intelligence of the enemy's movements.
So, in the rebel campaign of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, General
Lee attributed his ignorance of our position and movements, which led to
the failure of his operations, to his being destitute of this arm;
Stuart's cavalry, on which he depended for information, having got too
far away from him.
In Pope's campaign in 1862, the rebels, by their cavalry raid on
Catlett's Station, obtained possession of the commanding general's
correspondence, plans, and orders from Washington.
On the other hand, whilst keeping us informed of the enemy's movements,
an abundant light cavalry, active and well commanded, may be so used as
to constitute an impenetrable screen of our own movements from the
enemy, as effectual as would be a lofty and impassable mountain range.
Again, if we are greatly inferior to the enemy in cavalry, our own
cavalry will have to keep itself within our infantry lines; and the
consequence will be that the enemy will obtain control of the entire
country around us, and so deprive us of all the supplies it contains.
As, besides this, cavalry is absolutely necessary for the protection of
convoys, and, from its celerity of movement, is the kind of force best
fitted for guarding our communications, it is evident that the
subsistence of an army is dependent, to a great extent, upon this arm.