(1.) In line; but this only on even ground, and at short distances;
(2.) In column; and
(3.) As foragers, or in dispersed order. But this kind of charge is
exceptional. It can rarely be used with safety against any but an
uncivilized or an undisciplined foe.
3. A charge in _one long continuous line_ should never be attempted.
Such a charge will be usually indecisive, as it cannot be made with the
necessary _ensemble_ or unity. The success of a charge in line depends
on the preservation of a well-regulated speed and of a perfect
alignment; by means of which the whole line reaches the enemy at once.
At the charging gait, this is rarely attainable; so that the charge in
line, except at short distances, and over very even ground, usually
degenerates into a charge by groups, or individual troopers, arriving
successively. The most dashing riders, or those mounted on the swiftest
horses, will naturally arrive first, and be overpowered by numbers.
4. A charge _in deep column_ is also objectionable; its long flank
exposing it too much to artillery fire and to the enemy's cavalry.
But when cavalry is surprised, it must charge at once, in whatever order
it happens to be, rather than hesitate or attempt to manoeuvre, for
this would expose it to destruction.
5. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to the command to charge, without
regard to the circumstances under which it is given, may sometimes lead
to results _unexpected even to the charging troops themselves_.
One instance of this was related to me by an old officer of Napoleon's
favorite Fifth Cuirassiers. The regiment was on the left of the line of
battle. Directly in front of it was an extensive marsh; beyond which
rose an eminence, abrupt in front, but sloping gently towards the rear,
the crest of which was crowned by formidable Austrian batteries. For two
hours the cuirassiers had been standing in line, listening to the roar
of battle on the right, and eagerly expecting a summons to go
_somewhere_ to engage the enemy. The very horses were neighing and
pawing the ground, in their impatience to be off. Just then galloped up
one of the Emperor's aids, saying, "Colonel, the Emperor desires you to
charge directly on the enemy's batteries opposite your position." The
brave colonel, who was one of Napoleon's personal favorites, though
chafing at the prolonged inaction of his command, pointed to the marsh,
and requested the officer to inform the Emperor of the obstacle in his
front, with the existence of which his majesty, he said, was probably
unacquainted. In a few minutes the officer came riding furiously back
with a message to the colonel, that "if he did not immediately charge,
the Emperor would come and lead the regiment himself." Stung by this
reproof, the colonel plunged his spurs into his horse's flanks, and
giving the command "Forward," led his regiment, at full gallop, directly
through the marsh upon the point that had been indicated.
The charge itself was, of course, a failure. The regiment finally
struggled its way through the marsh to the opposite side, but leaving
behind it a large number of gallant officers and men, who had sunk to
rise no more; my informant being of the number who escaped.
But the result of this demonstration was most decisive. Seeing that the
height on which the Austrians had planted their heavy batteries, and
which commanded the entire ground, was the key of the battle, Napoleon
had determined to wrest it from them, together with the batteries which
crowned it. Accordingly, the evening before, he had dispatched a body of
light infantry by a very circuitous route, to turn the position and
attack the batteries in rear. He had accurately calculated the time the
detachment would require to reach its destination; and when the moment
arrived at which it should be ready to commence its attack, he ordered
the cuirassiers to charge directly upon the position in front. The
Austrian artillery, suddenly attacked in rear, and, at the same time,
threatened with a cavalry charge in front, where it had deemed itself
perfectly secure, tried to change the position of its pieces, so as to
get a fire on its assailants from both directions. But it was too late;
the temporary confusion into which it was thrown enabled the French
infantry to carry all before it, and the height was won, with all its
batteries.
So, at Waterloo, Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade of Light Cavalry, which was
marching in column by half squadrons, left in front, had begun to form
up into line on the leading half squadron, when an order arrived from
Wellington to charge. Instantly the charge was made, and, of course, in
echelons of half squadrons, extending to the right. The effect of this
was that a body of French cavalry on its right, then attacking the
British line, was suddenly taken in flank and completely routed.
6. A charge in deep column may sometimes be made necessary by _the
nature of the ground_, which, at the same time, protects its long
flanks: as where, in our pursuit of the rebels after the battle of
Nashville, in 1864, the Fourth United States Cavalry, approaching them
over a narrow turnpike, made a vigorous charge in column of fours, which
broke their centre, and, with the help of infantry skirmishers on the
flanks, drove them from the ground.
7. When the ground is rugged, in order to lessen the number of falls,
the rear-rank, in the charge, should _open out six paces_, closing up
again at the last moment.
8. Cavalry advances to charge at a _trot_, or at a _gallop_. A fast trot
is better than a gallop, as alignments are not easily kept at great
speed. Experience has shown that the best distance from the enemy to
begin the gallop, is about two hundred and sixty yards; thence steadily
increasing to the maximum of speed. This gradual increase of speed is
very important, to prevent the horses from being completely blown on
reaching the enemy.
9. Cavalry should not charge by _a wood_, till it has been carried by
our own infantry, if it can possibly be avoided.
At the battle of Kollin, in 1756, Frederick's cavalry, pursuing the
Austrians, was taken in flank by some Austrian infantry posted in a
wood, and made to retire with great loss.
10. When cavalry is required to charge over unknown ground, it should be
preceded by a few men thrown out to the front as skirmishers, in order
to _scout the ground_ to be passed over. The neglect of this precaution
has sometimes led to great disaster.
At Talavera, two cavalry regiments, the First German Hussars and the
Twenty-third Light Dragoons, were ordered to charge the head of some
French infantry columns. When near the top of their speed they came
suddenly upon a deep ravine, with steep sides. Colonel Arentschild
commanding the Hussars, who was in front, at once reined up, and halted
his regiment, saying: "I vill not kill my young mensch!" But the other
regiment, commanded by Colonel Seymour, which was on its left, not
seeing the obstacle in time, plunged down it, men and horses rolling
over on each other in frightful confusion. Of the survivors, who
arrived on the other side by twos and threes, many were killed or
taken; and only one-half of the regiment ever returned.
So, at the battle of Courtrai, in 1302, from the French cavalry's
omitting to scout the ground they charged over, the Flemings won a great
victory. All the _elite_ of the French nobility and chivalry was
destroyed, and gold spurs were collected by bushels on the field. It was
the French Cannae. The Flemings were drawn up behind a canal, flowing
between high banks, and hidden from view. The French rushing on at full
gallop, all the leading ranks were plunged into the canal. The entire
cavalry was thereby checked and thrown into irretrievable disorder,
which extended to the infantry, in their rear. The Flemings, profiting
by their confusion, crossed the canal at two points simultaneously,
attacked them in flank, and completed their rout.
So, at the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Murat, in his great cavalry
charge on the Allied centre, had captured twenty-six guns, and was
carrying all before him, when he pushed on to the village of Gulden
Gossa, where the ground had not been reconnoitred, and could not be
distinctly seen from a distance. Here the French found their career
suddenly checked by a great hollow, full of buildings, pools of water,
and clusters of trees; while the Allied infantry, from behind the
various covers afforded by the ground, opened upon them a destructive
fire. Being then suddenly charged in flank by the Russian cavalry, they
were driven back with heavy loss; the Allies recapturing twenty of the
twenty-six guns they had lost.
The troopers employed to scout the ground before a charge would not be
in much danger from the enemy, who would hardly fire on a horseman or
two, especially when expecting a charge.