(1.) When preparing for a charge in line.
(2.) When preparing for any attack requiring the utmost possible width
of front; as where the enemy is to be suddenly surrounded.
(3.) When it becomes necessary in order to prevent our troops from being
outflanked by the enemy's.
(4.) When exposed to continued artillery fire, which is much less
destructive on a line than on a column.
6. Cavalry should always present _a front at least equal to the
enemy's_; otherwise, its flank, which is cavalry's weak point, will be
exposed to attack. When inferior in numbers, we may extend our line by
leaving intervals, more or less wide, between its different corps. Any
hostile squadrons that may attempt to pass through these intervals to
take the line in rear, could be taken care of by the second line.
7. The best formation in respect to _mobility_ is a line of regiments in
columns by squadrons, doubled on the centre; corresponding to infantry
double columns.
8. The _mixed formation_ of lines and columns is more manageable than
simple lines. Which of these two is preferable depends upon the ground,
and upon all the other circumstances of the case.
9. The order _in echelons_ is as good in attack as in retreat; since the
echelons mutually support each other.
10. Decidedly the most objectionable of all cavalry formations is that
in _deep columns_:
(1.) From the almost entire loss which it involves of its sabres, which
are cavalry's peculiar and most effective weapon.
(2.) From the long flanks which it exposes to attack.
11. The formation in _one rank_, instead of two, has been introduced by
the new Cavalry Tactics, though it has been as yet but partially adopted
in the field.
This innovation has two advantages. It doubles the number of sabres to
be used against the enemy; and it enables the cavalry to cover double
the ground; thus doubling, also, its power to outflank, which is a
valuable advantage, especially when opposed to cavalry.
Its disadvantage is, that it must, more or less seriously, impair the
solidity and vigor of the cavalry charge proper; in which a whole line,
with "boot to boot" compactness, comes at once to the shock, like some
terrific mechanical engine; and in which the riders in the front rank
are compelled to dash on with full speed to the last; knowing that if
they slacken rein, even for a moment, they would be ridden over by the
rear-rank men one yard behind them. From there being no rear-rank to
fill up the gaps caused, during the charge, by the enemy's missiles, or
by casualties occasioned by obstacles of the ground, the charging line
must generally arrive on the enemy broken and disunited, or as foragers.
The moral effect of such a charge on our own men will be unfavorable, as
they will not realize the certainty of mutual support at the critical
moment; and its moral effect on the enemy must be decidedly inferior to
that produced by a charge that is at once swift, solid, and compact.
But the force of this objection is somewhat weakened, by the
consideration that the compact charge of "cavalry of the line" must
hereafter be comparatively rare, in consequence of the introduction of
rifled artillery and infantry weapons, with their greatly increased
accuracy and range; which ought to cause such slaughter in a line or
column of charging cavalry, that, if it arrive at all to the shock, it
would generally be only in scattered groups.
12. In advancing over wooded, or other obstructed ground, it may be
necessary to break the line into _company columns of fours_, as in the
infantry manoeuvre of advancing by the flanks of companies.
As the cavalry column of fours corresponds to the march of infantry by
the flank, the use of this formation in action is open to the same
objections that have been already pointed out as applying to flank
marches by infantry.
II.--Its Strong and its Weak Points.
1. The value of cavalry on the battle-field consists chiefly in its
velocity and mobility. Its strength is in the _sabre-point and spurs_.
2. Its charge is accompanied with a _powerful moral effect_, especially
upon inexperienced troops. But,
3. Cavalry has but _little solidity_, and cannot defend a position
against good infantry. For, if it remain passive on the ground it is to
hold, the infantry will soon destroy it by its fire, to which it cannot,
with any effect, reply; and if it attack at close quarters, the
infantry, by means of its defensive formations, will be able, at least,
to hold its ground, and probably repulse its charges by a reserved
fire. So that the cavalry will finally have no alternative but to
retire.
4. It is exposed and helpless _during a change of formation_; like
artillery limbering up, or coming into action.
5. _On its flanks_, it is the weakest of all arms. A single squadron
attacking it suddenly in flank, will break and rout cavalry of ten times
its number.
At the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon kept a few squadrons in rear of
either flank, which, on his line being charged by a formidable body of
Mamelukes, vastly superior to his own cavalry in numbers, horses, and
equipments, nevertheless suddenly fell on their flanks and destroyed
them.
6. Cavalry is never so weak as directly _after a successful charge_;
being then exhausted, and in more or less disorder.
III.--How Posted.
1. A part of our cavalry must be so posted as to _secure our flanks_;
remaining in column behind the wings, till the enemy's movements require
its deployment.
If one wing is covered by natural obstacles, give the cavalry to the
uncovered wing; posting it in rear of the flank battalion of the second
line.
2. When cavalry is posted on the flanks, it should _not usually be on
the first line of infantry_. If it is to be used for attack, it is
better to keep it retired from view till the last moment, in order to
strengthen its attack by the powerful moral effect of a surprise. And,
used defensively, it will be best posted on the flanks of the second
line; since, in advancing to charge, it must have a clear space in its
front of at least two hundred or three hundred yards, to enable it to
act with freedom and vigor.
3. But if a position can be found for cavalry in front, where it would
not be too much exposed, this may sometimes enable it to exercise an
important moral effect, by _threatening the flank_ of such of the
enemy's troops as may be sent forward to attack.
At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, the Wurtemburg cavalry was launched
against Blucher's Prussian cavalry. But, seeing the Prussians drawn up
not only in front, but opposite their flank, they lost confidence,
charged feebly, and too late. They were consequently repulsed and
driven back on the Marine Battalion, which they threw into confusion.
So, at the battle of Prairie Grove, in December, 1862, the First Iowa
Cavalry, which was held in reserve, by its mere presence, caused every
attempt of the rebels' flanking regiments to be abandoned.
4. In order not to impede the manoeuvres of the infantry, cavalry
should not _fill intervals_ in the lines, or be placed between the
lines.
It is dangerous when the ground is such as to require the cavalry in the
centre of the first line; for, if it is beaten, a gap is left through
which the enemy may penetrate. At the battle of Blenheim, in 1704,
Marlborough owed his victory, in great measure, to the Allies' forcing
back the cavalry forming the centre of the French army; thus turning the
whole of its right wing, and compelling the infantry posted at Blenheim
to surrender.
5. Yet cavalry should always be near enough to the infantry to take
immediate part in the combat; and although it should not be posted in
the intervals between infantry corps, it may _debouch through them_, in
order to attack more promptly.
At the battle of Friedland, the Russian cavalry charged a French
infantry division. Latour Maubourg's dragoons and the Dutch cuirassiers,
riding through the battalion intervals, charged the Russians in turn,
and drove them back on their infantry, throwing many of them into the
river.
6. When _both wings are uncovered_, the best place for the cavalry will
usually be in rear of the centre of the second line; whence it can be
sent in the shortest time to either wing.
7. Cavalry should not be _scattered over the field_ in small
detachments, but be kept massed at one or more suitable points; as
behind the centre, or behind one wing, or both wings. A small cavalry
force should be kept entire; or it will have very little chance of
effecting any thing whatever.
Cavalry of the line, to produce its decisive effects, must be used in
heavy masses. In the beginning of the Napoleonic wars, the French
cavalry was distributed among the divisions. Napoleon's subsequent
experience led him to give it more concentration, by uniting in one mass
all the cavalry belonging to each army corps; and, finally, these masses
were again concentrated into independent cavalry corps; leaving to each
army corps only cavalry enough to guard it.
8. For tactical operations in the field, cavalry insufficient in number
is _scarcely better than none at all_, as it can never show itself in
presence of the enemy's cavalry, which would immediately outflank and
destroy it, and must keep close behind its infantry.
At the opening of Napoleon's campaign of 1813, he had but very little
cavalry to oppose to the overwhelming masses of this arm possessed by
the Allies. In consequence of this, he could make no use of it whatever;
and the tactical results of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen were far
inferior to those habitually obtained in his former victories, and were
purchased with much greater loss.
9. Small bodies of cavalry threatened by the enemy's cavalry in greatly
superior force, may sometimes be saved by taking refuge _in an infantry
square_, as practised by Napoleon at the battle of the Pyramids.
10. Cavalry should _remain masked_ as long as possible; for it produces
most effect when its position and movements are hidden, so that a strong
force may suddenly be brought upon a weak point.
For this reason, a flat, open country is less favorable for this arm
than plains with undulations, hills with gentle slopes, woods,
villages, and farms; all these being so many facilities for screening
cavalry from view.
11. Cavalry should never be brought to the front, _except to engage_. It
is unfortunate when the ground is such as to prevent this; for cavalry,
compelled to remain inactive under fire, is in great danger of becoming
demoralized.