Before charging, the infantry sometimes first seeks the shelter of
ground, using its sharpshooters to annoy it, and, if possible, to
silence its fire.
Or, when circumstances are favorable, as when it can get a position near
its flank, it attacks it vigorously, at once, with fire and bayonet.
But when infantry has to advance to the attack of a battery in front, it
should never be in any compact formation, but always deployed as
skirmishers. Otherwise, it would usually meet with a bloody repulse;
especially where any considerable space of ground is to be cleared.
At the battle of Malvern Hill, the rebel General Magruder's division was
sent, either in column or in line, to charge a powerful Union battery
just beyond an open field a mile and three-quarters in length. The
rebels rushed into the field at a full run, but encountered a murderous
fire from the guns they were sent to attack, which mowed them down by
hundreds. By the time they had cleared two-thirds of the ground, the
carnage was so dreadful as to drive them back to the woods from which
they had started. Twice more they were sent forward in the same manner,
but with the same result; when the undertaking was abandoned.
8. In attacking a battery, we may often secure its capture by a volley
_aimed at the horses_; the effect of which may prevent the enemy from
carrying it off. But this should be avoided when there is a good
prospect of capturing the battery without disabling the horses; since
then, if we succeed, we shall be able to immediately use the battery
against the enemy ourselves.
9. In the French Revolution, the Chouans of La Vendee attacked the
Republican batteries in _several single files_, of one or two hundred
men each, at intervals of fifty paces. Such a formation protects the
attacking columns, to a great extent, from the enemy's fire, but exposes
them to destruction by a charge from the battery supports. In the
absence of these, it would often be very advantageous; since, by proper
drilling, these columns in one rank could be made, on arriving near the
enemy, to rapidly double in two or four ranks, without halting, and
then, by filing to a flank and facing, to advance by the front in a
compact line.
The same formation would be useful for troops advancing to assault an
intrenchment; but, as in the case of a battery, subject to the risk of
being destroyed by a sudden sortie from the work.
10. Artillery is never without _supports_. One part of the infantry,
therefore, deployed as skirmishers, should attack the guns, circling
round them, and opening fire on the men and horses; while the other part
attacks the support in flank. On getting sufficiently near, the
assailants should try to draw the fire of the guns, and then rush on
them before they have time to reload.
If a battery gets into confusion, or there is any delay in unlimbering
or limbering up, then is the most favorable time to capture it by a
vigorous charge with the bayonet.
IV.--Bayonet Charges.
1. When made resolutely, and _without slackening the gait_, bayonet
charges have succeeded in nine cases out of ten.
2. The bayonet is usually more effective than _grape_, _canister_, or
_bullets_.
At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Kleist's Prussian division was sent
to carry the position of Probstheyda. For this purpose it was necessary
to advance up a long slope, the crest of which was occupied by Drouot's
artillery. The French allowed the Prussians to approach to within a
short distance, and then poured into them a most destructive shower of
grape, which drove them back for a moment in confusion. But they
immediately rallied, and rushed desperately on again. Marshal Victor
then charged them with the bayonet, and completely repulsed them.
Afterwards, having been re-enforced by Wittgenstein's Russian division,
they again advanced, under a constant shower of grape from Drouot. They,
nevertheless, kept advancing; and, in spite of the great loss they
suffered, were about carrying the position, when the French again
charged with the bayonet, forcing them down to the very foot of the
declivity; where, being once more covered with grape, their repulse was
complete and final.
So, at the battle of Mill Springs, in January, 1862, after the
combatants had been exchanging musketry fires for several hours without
any decisive result, the rebels' left was vigorously charged by the
Ninth Ohio with the bayonet. This charge broke the enemy's flank. His
whole line gave way in confusion, and the battle was won.
So, at Malvern Hill, in 1862, in several instances, columns of rebels
whom a storm of canister and shell had failed to repulse, were driven
back and routed by a dash with the bayonet, after a volley poured in at
a few yards from the muzzles of the guns.
So, at the battle of Seven Pines, according to General Heintzelman's
report, whenever our troops used the bayonet, their loss was
comparatively light, and the enemy was driven back, suffering heavily.
3. The bayonet charge, when made from any considerable distance, should
be _in column_; the only formation in which order can be combined with
sufficient speed. But, at a short distance, a bayonet charge by a line,
instantly after firing a volley to repel an attack, will be very
effective, and usually successful.
4. In ordinary cases, the charge should be _prepared_ by first
shattering the hostile masses, or, at least, wearying and demoralizing
them by artillery, or by skirmishers' fire.
5. The more _vigorous and resolute_ the charge, the greater the chance
of success. The enemy never retires before a moderate advance.
6. Where the enemy is _forced into a defile_, a charge with the bayonet,
preceded by a few rounds of grape, will complete his destruction.
7. When the enemy is _behind cover_, the best way to drive him from it
is with the bayonet. This will cause less loss of life than to attempt
to return his fire. But, in such case, the charge should be prepared,
when possible, by a few shells, or rounds of canister.
8. Shots up or down a declivity usually miss. A _height_ should,
therefore, be carried with the bayonet, without firing.
The moral effect, moreover, of a steady charge of infantry up a hill,
without stopping to fire, is very great; and such a charge is usually
successful. Prince Czartoryski, Alexander's most experienced general at
Austerlitz, admitted that he lost all confidence in the result on seeing
the French infantry ascending the plateau of Pratzen, the key to the
Allies' position, with a firm and decided step, without once stopping to
fire.
So, at Chattanooga, in November, 1863, Thomas's troops carried the
height of Missionary Ridge by a similar steady and determined ascent, in
spite of the volleys of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of
artillery, and of musketry from the rebels' rifle-pits at the summit.
General Grant attributed the small number of casualties our troops
sustained in the attack to the rebels' surprise at its audacity, causing
"confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces."
V.--Defence against Infantry.
1. The defence of infantry is by its fire, and therefore its proper
defensive formation is in _deployed lines_.
2. Avoid a _premature commencement_ of the fire. Long firing exhausts
the men's energy, expends the ammunition, fouls the pieces, destroys the
soldier's confidence in his weapon, and emboldens the enemy.
3. So, a fire upon an enemy while _under cover_, as in a wood, would be
virtually thrown away. If his fire from such a position causes us any
loss, he had better be shelled, or driven away by skirmishers, according
to circumstances.
4. The practice of hostile regiments exchanging for a considerable time
a _musketry fire at a distance_, is highly objectionable, as it causes a
great sacrifice of life without corresponding results. Instead of
standing in line for ten minutes, receiving and returning fire at a
distance of three hundred yards, it would be much better to clear this
space at double quick in two or three minutes, and close with the enemy;
for, in returning his fire, we can do him no more harm than we receive,
while nothing decisive is accomplished. The case is, of course,
different where our own troops are behind cover, while the enemy's are
exposed.
5. But in _special cases_, as where we have to cover a flank movement of
our second line, or of the reserve, or to await a force coming to our
support, it may be necessary to keep up an incessant fusillade, without
regard to losses received.
6. Fire in action is of two kinds: the fire at will, and the fire by
volleys; the former kind being the rule, the latter the exception.
Although the fire at will is the one principally used, there are _very
strong objections_ to it.
(1.) The men load and fire as individuals, and generally with great
rapidity, and under more or less excitement, rarely stopping to take a
deliberate aim. The consequence is, that very few shots take effect, and
the fire is, for the greater part, wasted, as is shown by the
well-established fact that, in every engagement, for every man killed or
disabled, there have been from three to ten thousand musket or rifle
bullets fired.
(2.) Except on windy days, a cloud of smoke soon collects in front of a
line firing at will, hiding, more or less completely, the enemy from
view. The fire being then at random, it is, of course, unreliable.
(3.) The fire at will leads to a rapid and enormous consumption of
ammunition. To show how serious is this objection also, it is only
necessary to consider in how many instances victory has been turned into
defeat by the premature exhaustion, by one or more regiments, of their
ammunition.
(4.) As a necessary consequence of this rapid consumption of ammunition,
the pieces soon become fouled, and thus, to a great extent, useless.
(5.) Troops under a musketry fire at will, soon become accustomed to it,
and its incessant din produces on them a stunning effect, which deadens,
in no small degree, their sensibility to danger.
7. On the other hand, _volley firing_ has often been attended with
decisive results, especially when it has been reserved to the proper
moment, and delivered at short range. Instances of this have occurred in
almost every great battle we read of in history, as also in the late War
of the Rebellion. For example: at the battle of South Mountain,
Doubleday's brigade was engaged with a heavy force of rebels at some
thirty or forty paces in its front. Our men were behind a fence, firing
at will; but their fire made little or no impression on the enemy, who
attempted to charge at the least cessation of the fire. Our troops were
then made to cease firing, to lie down behind the fence, and, on the
enemy's approach to within fifteen paces, to spring up and pour in a
volley. This was so deadly, that the rebels fled in disorder, leaving
their dead and wounded, and could not be rallied again.
At Chickamauga, in 1863, the regiments of Hazen's brigade fired only by
volleys; every one of which, it is officially reported, was powerfully
effective in checking the enemy's attacks.
8. Nevertheless, it has been a common military saying, and supported
even by high authority, that the fire at will is _the only one possible
in action_. This assertion implies that the rank and file are not
sufficiently cool to reserve their fire, and that they must be kept
constantly occupied by the excitement, noise, and smoke of their own
fire, in order to make them remain steady in their ranks under that of
the enemy.
As applied to raw, undisciplined, or demoralized troops, the proposition
may be, to a great extent, true. But in reference to disciplined or
veteran troops, whose _morale_ has not been impaired, it will be found
disproved on almost every page of military history; from which a few
examples will be cited hereafter. For the present, one instance will
suffice; that of Colonel Willich's regiment of Thirty-second Indiana
Volunteers, at the battle of Shiloh, in April, 1862. While under fire,
their commander, perceiving their own fire to have become "a little
wild," caused them to cease firing, and then drilled them in the manual
of arms, which they went through as if on parade; after which, they
again opened on the enemy a fire, which is reported to have been
"deliberate, steady, and effective."
It may be here observed that, whenever troops lose their presence of
mind, there is no surer way of restoring it than by the repetition, by
their officers, in their usual tone, of any words of command they have
learned instinctively to obey on the drill-ground.
9. Infantry, when charged in position, should reserve its fire till it
can be made _with deadly effect_, as at the distance of fifty paces; and
the volleys should be instantly followed up by a countercharge with the
bayonet on the charging enemy. For, if our fire has staggered him, a
vigorous charge will complete his repulse; and if it has not, our only
chance of success is in suddenly taking the offensive ourselves.
Whilst awaiting his charge, we shall incur but little, if any, loss
from the enemy's fire; for the fire of troops advancing to attack is
usually of very little account.
The only disadvantage attending a volley just before we charge is, that,
as the smoke veils us from the enemy's view, it will rob us, to some
extent, of the moral effect of our swift advance.
But, in many cases, if the enemy see us awaiting his bayonet attack, and
reserving our fire to the very last, he loses resolution, relaxes his
speed, and then stops short, or retires.
At Cowpens, Colonel Howard broke and routed the British line which was
advancing to attack him, by reserving his fire to within thirty yards,
and then charging with the bayonet.
At the battle of Friedland, the Russian Imperial Guard charged on
Dupont's division with the bayonet. The French did not wait for them to
close, but rushed on with the bayonet themselves, and completely routed
them.
10. A volley concentrated upon the enemy's _regimental colors_ will
usually disable the color-guard and the men near it; and, if promptly
followed up by a charge, may enable us to capture the colors. This is
always an important advantage; for, by the loss of its colors, a
regiment is not only dispirited, but in danger of disorganization;
these being its proper rallying-point.
11. When infantry is acting as a _support to artillery_ which is
attacked, it should throw out sharpshooters to reply to the enemy's
skirmishers that are firing at the gunners and horses, whilst it engages
the compact mass by which it is itself attacked.
If the enemy should commit the blunder of attacking the battery with his
entire force, without detaching to engage the support, we should profit
by it by instantly charging him in flank; but taking care not to be led
away to any distance from the battery we are protecting.
12. Infantry, surrounded by the enemy, will often be able to _cut its
way through_ and escape. For this purpose, as the highest degree of
concentration is required, its formation should be in close column.
VI.--Defence against Artillery.
1. The best defence of infantry against artillery is by the fire of
_sharpshooters_ deployed as skirmishers, to pick off the gunners and the
horses; the main body, meanwhile, occupying the most sheltered locality
it can find.
2. Where no shelter is afforded by any natural obstacles, or by
irregularities of ground, it may be sometimes necessary to make the men
_lie down_.
But this expedient should be used as rarely as possible, on account of
its demoralizing tendency. Troops that have become accustomed to it
cannot be expected to bravely face the enemy; and the habit is very
rapidly formed. At Bull Run, in July, 1861, a whole company was seen to
grovel in the dust at the mere snapping of a percussion-cap of one of
their own muskets.
This demoralizing tendency does not exist, however, where troops lie
down only to enable their own artillery to fire over them. This was
shown at the battle of Pea Ridge, where several of our regiments lay on
the ground for two hours or more, while thirty of our guns were firing
over them. When, at last, this fire had silenced the enemy's guns, our
infantry then rose, charged him in a compact line, and drove him from
the field.
3. A line of infantry may _avoid_ cannon-shot by advancing or retiring
fifty paces. A column or a square would have to move this distance, or
more, according to its depth.
Ricochet shots may be avoided by moving fifty paces to the right or
left.
This shifting of position is but a temporary expedient, it is true, for
the enemy's guns will soon obtain the exact range again. But for this,
several trial-shots will be requisite, thus making the enemy lose time;
and, in battle, a few minutes lost or gained have often decided between
victory and defeat.
4. When the enemy opens an artillery fire on a square, _preparatory to a
cavalry charge_, his fire must cease when his cavalry approaches the
square; say, on its arriving within one hundred and fifty yards. To
avoid the artillery fire, the square may safely remain lying down until
the hostile cavalry has reached this point. For, as they will require
about half a minute to clear the intervening ground, the square will
still have time enough left to rise, align its ranks, and deliver a
volley before the cavalry reaches it.
VII.--Defence against Cavalry.
1. The discipline of infantry is never put to a severer test than when
it is required to resist a _charge of cavalry_, properly made. The moral
effect of a charge of a body of horse at full speed, on the troops
waiting to receive it, is like that caused by the swift approach of a
locomotive under full steam, seeming quite as irresistible. It would be
so in reality, but for the counter effect produced both on the horses
and their riders by the sight of the infantry standing firm and
reserving its fire. I have been told by an old cuirassier officer, who
served through the campaigns of Napoleon with distinguished bravery,
that there was no operation that his regiment so much dreaded as a
charge upon well-disciplined infantry.
2. This counter moral effect on the charging cavalry is the greater,
_the longer the infantry reserve their fire_; since, the less the
distance at which it is delivered, the more fatal will be its effects. A
volley at long range is not destructive enough to check the cavalry's
advance; while this effect has often been produced by the infantry
merely withholding its fire till the cavalry has approached very near;
and a volley delivered at the very last moment has, in by far the
greater number of instances, effectually repulsed the charge.
Infantry should, therefore, let cavalry approach to within forty paces,
or nearer still, and then give them a general volley.
At the battle of Neerwinden, in 1793, the Austrian cavalry was repulsed
by the French infantry under Dumouriez, by a volley poured in at the
very muzzles of the pieces.
At Austerlitz, a Russian cavalry charge on French infantry in line was
repulsed by a volley delivered so near, that it stretched four hundred
troopers on the ground. The rest dispersed in disorder to the right and
left.
3. The armor of cuirassiers is bullet-proof. To repel a charge of these
troops, therefore, it will be necessary to _aim at the horses_. Their
armor is so heavy, that the mere fall of the riders on the ground is
usually sufficient to disable them, as was the case with the French
cuirassiers at Waterloo.
4. Infantry in line, in two ranks even, may withstand cavalry, if in
compact order, and attacked _in front_. But the slightest cavalry charge
on the flank of a line will rout it.
At Quatre Bras, a French infantry line, advancing, repulsed a charge of
the Brunswicker Lancers under the Duke of Brunswick, by receiving it in
steadiness and good order, and then pouring in a destructive fire.
But, in the same battle, the Sixty-ninth British Regiment was instantly
rolled up and destroyed by a charge of French cuirassiers on its flank.
5. Where infantry is well disciplined, and its commander is cool and
prompt, it may sometimes _avoid the effect_ of a cavalry charge by other
means than its fire, or formation in square. At Talavera, a French
infantry division, drawn up in close column, seeing an English cavalry
regiment charging down upon them, avoided the shock by simply stepping
aside, thus allowing the cavalry to pass by them. A portion of the
charging troops wheeled round to follow them; but, by the cross-fire of
another division, and the charge of other cavalry, which fell upon it in
its confusion, it was completely annihilated.
6. A line of infantry charged by cavalry in flank, and so suddenly as to
allow no time to form square, could hardly escape destruction. It would
seem that the best course to be adopted in such a case would be to _open
the ranks_ by a rapid and simultaneous movement of both of them, thus
compelling the charging cavalry to ride between them. If the front rank
should then face about, this would bring the cavalry between two fires,
which might be poured in with most destructive effect.
But where the cavalry charges with a very wide front, or in line, this
manoeuvre might be difficult, or impossible.
7. Whenever an infantry line is charged by cavalry in front, and it is
doubtful whether it will stand the shock, the wisest course would seem
to be to make the men lie down, and let the charging cavalry _leap over
them_. This the horses will instinctively do, with but little risk of
injury to the men, provided they lie in a position parallel to the line
of battle, thus presenting the least possible depth. It is said that the
British infantry has sometimes done this, and risen up again immediately
after the cavalry had passed. The cavalry could thus be promptly taken
in rear.
8. In retreating, when threatened by cavalry, if there be a _long plain_
in our rear, we must retire slowly. But if cover, or ground unfavorable
to cavalry, be near, we must reach it as soon as possible.
VIII.--Squares.
1. In 1813, France was nearly exhausted of soldiers, so that Napoleon,
on hastily preparing for his campaign of that year, was obliged to
incorporate into his army a large number of raw conscripts, who had
scarcely begun their elementary drill. On the route to their respective
points of concentration, he accordingly ordered his columns to halt each
day, to practise _the three movements_ which he considered to be the
most important for infantry to be familiar with. These were, forming
battalions in square, deploying in line, and re-forming in column of
attack.
2. In the Austrian service, squares formed by a _column in mass_ are
considered preferable to hollow ones, on the supposition that though
horses will recoil from a dense mass, they may be easily brought to
break through a shallow formation, over which they can see the open
ground. But this theory seems to be refuted by numerous facts. A large
proportion of the formations that have successfully repulsed cavalry,
since the beginning of this century, have been hollow squares.
3. The rule laid down in the Tactics (Par. 143, Skirmishers), directing
the skirmishers, in rallying on the square, to "come to a ready without
command, and fire upon the enemy; which will also be done by the
reserve, as soon as it is unmasked by the skirmishers," is an unsound
one, for a compliance with it would be dangerous. A square cannot expect
to repulse cavalry by an irregular fire at will, but only by
well-directed _volleys_. If cavalry charge a square firing irregularly,
it will probably rout it. On the other hand, if a square wait coolly
till the cavalry is at twenty paces, its volley will be murderous. At
Waterloo, the Allied squares that reserved their fire till the French
cavalry had arrived at from twenty to forty paces, invariably repulsed
it. At that battle, Ney led eleven cavalry charges against the British
squares, every one of which failed.
At the opening of the campaign of 1813, Napoleon had, comparatively, but
a handful of cavalry; so few, that they had to keep close to their
infantry for protection. In crossing the plains of Lutzen, a large and
splendid cavalry force of the Allies, supported by infantry and by
horse-artillery, made an attack on Ney's corps, which consisted chiefly
of young and raw recruits, who saw an enemy for the first time. The
situation was extremely dangerous, and Ney and his principal generals
threw themselves into the squares to encourage them. By volleys
delivered at a signal, the enemy's charges were all repulsed, and the
conscripts acquired great confidence from the ease with which this was
done. Ney then broke up his squares, and, pursuing the enemy in columns,
completed their repulse.
At Auerstadt, in 1806, Davoust's French squares had to sustain a long
succession of charges from ten thousand Prussian horse. By reserving
their fire, each time, to within thirty or forty paces, its effect was
so deadly, that a rampart of dead and disabled men and horses was soon
formed around the squares, and the charges were all repulsed.
So, at Jena, on the same day, Ney, posted in a square, allowed the
Prussian cuirassiers to charge up to within fifteen or twenty paces,
when the front attacked, at his word of command, poured in a fire which
completely repulsed the charge, strewing the whole ground with dead and
wounded. The Prussian cavalry, in that battle, are said to have been
"terrified at the sight of a motionless infantry reserving its fire."
Again, at Mount Tabor, in 1798, General Kleber, marching with an
infantry division of only three thousand men, over an immense sandy
plain, was attacked by twelve thousand Turkish horse. The French squares
resisted their successive charges for six hours, by means of volleys
reserved till the enemy were at the very muzzles of their guns; which
soon built up a rampart around them of men and horses. Bonaparte then
arrived with another division. Dividing it into two squares, he rapidly
advanced them in such a manner as to enclose the Turks in a kind of
triangle; when, by a sudden fire upon them from three points at once, he
drove them upon each other in confusion, making them flee in every
direction.
It may be observed, that advancing or manoeuvring in squares is
practicable only on open and level plains, like the sandy deserts of
Egypt and Syria.
4. The best reliance of an infantry square being, therefore, on its fire
by volleys, the men should be instructed to come to a _charge bayonet_,
instead of a "ready," immediately on forming square. From this latter
position, there would be much greater danger of the volley being
prematurely delivered. The fire of a single excited man will usually be
followed by a general discharge.
5. It may be often advisable that the volley should be delivered by
_both ranks_ at once, and not by a single one. Par. 1191, School of the
Battalion, directing that "a battalion, in square, will never use any
other than the fire by file, or by rank," should therefore be amended.
6. Moreover, in view of what has been said as to volley-firing, and of
the examples that have been cited in confirmation, there is reason to
doubt the wisdom of the direction contained in Par. 67, School of the
Company: "The fire by file being that which is most frequently used
against an enemy, it is highly important that it be rendered perfectly
familiar to the troops. The instructor will, therefore, give it _almost
exclusive preference_."
The fire by file, after its commencement, becomes a mere individual fire
at will. Independently of the general ineffectiveness of this kind of
fire, one would have supposed that the instructor's attention should be
rather directed to accustoming the men to the more difficult reserved
fire by volleys, instead of practising them almost exclusively in a fire
which, once learned, they will use instinctively, and without any
practice at all.
7. Infantry _breech-loading weapons_ would be very useful to troops in
square, when charged by cavalry; since, being rapidly reloaded, they
would enable the square to repulse, with a volley, each subdivision
successively, where the charging column is formed at the usual
distances. But it is doubtful whether, on the whole, these weapons are
preferable to muzzle-loaders. Certain it is, that they exhaust the
ammunition much more rapidly, and so cause a suspension of fire, and a
withdrawal from the line of battle, till a new supply can arrive. And,
to obtain this new supply, a long time is generally required; infantry
ammunition being usually carried in the second, or more distant
ammunition train, instead of the first, or nearest one, as it ought to
be.
8. Although a reserved fire is much the most reliable in repulsing
cavalry, the men may sometimes be ordered to commence the fire at a
_considerable distance_. In such case, they should be instructed to aim
at the horses, instead of their riders, as affording a better mark.
9. European cavalry is often practised, on arriving within four hundred
yards, or effective grape-shot distance, of an infantry square, to halt,
and then open at the centre, unmasking a battery of horse-artillery,
which plays for a certain time on the square, when the cavalry closes
again, and charges.
A square, however, attacked in this manner, is _not in so much danger_
of being broken as might be imagined. The enemy's guns, after being
unmasked, would usually require several trial rounds to get the exact
range; and our sharpshooters, who could safely be thrown forward one
hundred yards, with the new rifled arms, ought, in the mean time, to
inflict such loss on the cavalry, as well as on the battery, as to cause
it either to retire, or to charge feebly, and, therefore, ineffectively.
At the very worst, the square would have ample time to re-form its
ranks, and deliver a deadly volley before the cavalry could reach it, as
it also would if this operation were attempted much nearer, say at two
hundred yards. In this last case, a few volleys from the square itself,
with the new arms, would probably be destructive enough to prevent the
charge altogether.
10. It is hardly necessary to observe, that troops formed in square,
when charged by cavalry, can secure their safety only by _standing
firm_. A single opening will suffice to let in the enemy, who will then
easily ride over the square, and cut it in pieces. Whereas, if the
square remain unbroken, cavalry can inflict upon it no loss, or but a
trifling one.
11. In repulsing a cavalry charge, coolness and presence of mind will
sometimes enable troops to accomplish _extraordinary results_.
At Quatre Bras, the square of the Forty-second Highlanders was not
completed, the companies still running in to form the rear face, when
the enemy's leading troop entered. But the square, nevertheless,
finished its formation; and the French cavalry, caught, as it were, in a
net, was soon destroyed by the concentrated fire of all the fronts,
which had faced inward.
In the same battle, the Forty-fourth British Regiment, standing in line
in two ranks, was suddenly charged in rear by the French Lancers, who
had dashed round one of their flanks for that purpose. The rear rank
suddenly faced about, and, at a very short distance, poured in a deadly
fire, which put them into confusion. On their way back to re-form, the
front rank, in its turn, gave them a volley, which destroyed great
numbers of them, and completed their rout.
12. Even when a square has been actually broken, it is _not necessarily
lost_. If the troops are brave and well disciplined, it may sometimes be
rallied again, re-formed, and made to repulse the attacking cavalry, as
was the case with some of the Allied squares at Waterloo.
So, at the battle of Pultusk, in 1806, a French battalion that had been
broken and overthrown by Russian cavalry, immediately rallied, fell on
the troopers floundering in the mud, and dispatched them.
So, at the battle of Krasnoe, in 1812, a large Russian square was
retreating before the French cavalry masses. Occasionally, in order to
pass a narrow defile, it was obliged, temporarily, to break the square.
At these times the French made furious charges, penetrated into the
column, and captured men and guns. But as soon as the defile was passed,
the Russians instantly re-formed the square, and continued their
retreat. They finally succeeded in reaching Korytnia, after killing and
wounding some four hundred or five hundred of the French; though with
the loss of eight guns, one thousand prisoners, and seven hundred or
eight hundred _hors de combat_, out of five thousand or six thousand
men.
IX.--Skirmishers.