I.--ITS ATTACK, GENERALLY.
II.--FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK.
III.--THE ATTACK, HOW MADE.
IV.--BAYONET CHARGES.
V.--DEFENCE AGAINST INFANTRY.
VI.--DEFENCE AGAINST ARTILLERY.
VII.--DEFENCE AGAINST CAVALRY.
VIII.--SQUARES.
IX.--SKIRMISHERS.
I.--Its Attack, generally.
Infantry attacks with its fire, or with the bayonet. Which of these is
the more effective?
1. The _object_ of an attack is to destroy or capture the hostile force,
or, at least, to drive it from the field.
Capturing the enemy, or driving him from the field, cannot usually be
effected by merely firing upon him.
True, a mere fire at a distance may finally destroy him. But an
insuperable objection to this mode of attack is, that while we are
killing or disabling his men, he is killing or disabling as many of our
own.
2. If we fire from _behind cover_, our loss may be comparatively small.
But, in that case, the enemy will never remain for any length of time
exposed to our fire. He will either attack and rout us from our cover,
or retire. And even if he did neither, his actual and complete
destruction, capture, or rout, would still require an attack with the
bayonet.
3. It follows that the proper mode of attack by infantry on infantry is
with the _bayonet_.
The Russian Suwarrow's victories and reputation were won chiefly by his
fierce bayonet attacks, which often effected great results, in spite of
his ignorance of the art of war.
4. But there are _exceptional cases_ where infantry may properly use
only its fire; as--
(1.) When acting as a support to artillery, it should rarely, if ever,
leave its position to use the bayonet; thereby endangering the safety of
the guns which it is its first duty to guard. Its function, in this
case, being purely defensive, it should act by its fire alone.
(2.) Against a line of skirmishers deployed, a well-directed fire will
usually be sufficiently effective.
(3.) In mountain warfare, its only practicable mode of attack will
sometimes be by its fire.
5. When both sides are _equally exposed_, the actual attack with the
bayonet should not be preceded by a distant musketry fire; for, as in
that case, our loss will generally be equal to the enemy's, this fire
will give us no superiority in the charge, and the loss we have
sustained will be therefore entirely thrown away.
6. Nevertheless, our actual attack should be _prepared_, when possible,
by the infliction of such a loss on the enemy as will make him inferior
to us at the decisive moment. In war, the object is not to test the
comparative courage of the combatants, but to beat the enemy. We must
never, therefore, when it can be avoided, fight him on equal terms; and
so, never close with him without such a superiority in numbers,
position, or spirit, as will make the chances decidedly in our favor.
If, without exposing ourselves to much loss, we can inflict a
considerable loss upon him, we shall render him inferior to us, both by
the number of his men we have disabled, and by the demoralization
thereby caused in his ranks.
7. This preparatory loss can be most effectually inflicted by the _fire
of artillery_; as, from its great superiority of range, it can suffer
but little, meanwhile, from the enemy's infantry fire. Our attacking
infantry are thus enabled to keep out of the range of the fire of the
infantry they are to attack, till the moment of advancing to close.
8. When we have no artillery disposable for the purpose, the preparatory
effect may be produced by a _well-sustained fire of infantry_, provided
it can find a sheltered position to deliver it from; or, by the fire of
a heavy line of skirmishers.
9. If we can make the infantry we wish to attack _engage in a prolonged
fire_, this will exhaust them, and thus render them inferior to us in
strength and in spirit, even if we inflict on them but little loss. But
as our attacking infantry should, in the mean time, be kept fresh, the
preparatory fire, in such case, should not devolve on the troops that
are to close with the enemy.
10. One cause of the _indecisiveness of the results_ obtained in many of
the battles of the late war, as compared with the great loss of life on
both sides, has been, that the opposing battalions were too often kept
firing at each other at a distance, both sustaining nearly equal loss,
until the ranks were so weakened as to disable either party from making
a vigorous and decisive charge. Or else, charges were made on the
enemy's battalions before they had been shattered by artillery; so that
the attacking troops were easily repulsed, sometimes with great
slaughter.
II.--Formations for Attack.
1. Infantry may advance to attack in either of _three ways_: in column;
in line, marching by the front; and by the flank; that is, in line, but
faced to a flank.
2. Of these three formations, the last is undoubtedly the _worst
possible_; for--
(1.) On arriving at the enemy, the troops are not concentrated at the
point where the struggle is to be. As they must come up successively,
they will be crushed in detail by superior numbers.
(2.) Advancing in such a formation, they would be exposed to a
destructive raking fire from the enemy's guns; especially since the
adoption of the new flank march by fours, which gives to rifled
artillery a tolerable mark.
3. The question is, then, between an attack in column and an attack in
line. _Which is the better_ of the two?
The decisive effect of infantry is produced by a rush on the enemy with
the bayonet. The chief elements of success in this attack at close
quarters are, the physical momentum of the charge, and the powerful
moral effect caused by the swift approach of a compact and orderly
hostile mass. A charge in line does not admit of both these elements.
The advance of a line of one or more battalions, to be united and
orderly, cannot be rapid, and thus has no impetus. Such a line,
advancing swiftly, especially over uneven ground, would soon become so
broken and disunited as to destroy, in a great measure, the effect, both
moral and physical, of its charge, and, at the same time, to deprive the
attacking troops of that confidence which is inspired by the
consciousness of moving together in one compact, formidable mass, in
which every soldier feels himself fortified by the support of his
comrades.
4. On the other hand, _a column_ can move rapidly without losing its
compactness and order.
In attacking the enemy's line, a close column concentrates successively,
but rapidly, a force superior to the enemy at the decisive point, and
can hardly fail to pierce the line attacked, if it arrive with its
momentum unchecked.
In a close column, there is a real force created by the pressure of the
mass behind on the leading subdivision, pushing it on the enemy, and
preventing it from drawing back or stopping; thus imparting to it
somewhat of the actual physical momentum of a mechanical engine.
A close column shelters raw troops, and carries them irresistibly along
with it.
A close column, in case of need, can rapidly extend its front by
deploying.
It can promptly make itself impenetrable to cavalry.
Finally, in a column, the officers being seen by the men, the benefit of
their example is not lost.
The close column would, therefore, seem to be the best formation for
attack.
5. Movements in line requiring that high degree of perfection in drill
which can rarely be attained by any but regular troops, they were
accordingly abandoned by the raw and undisciplined masses of French
soldiers that so successfully defended the French Republic from invasion
against the veteran armies of Europe; some of which were led by generals
who had served under Frederick the Great. Conscious of their military
inferiority to the enemy, they instinctively clustered together in
close and heavy columns; then rushed down on the enemy's line with the
force of an avalanche, often carrying every thing before them. Thus was
inaugurated that system of attack in _deep and solid columns_, which was
afterwards so successfully used by Napoleon.
6. Close columns have two defects. One is, that they are _oppressive and
exhausting_ to the men, especially in hot weather.
But this is not a very serious objection; for they are, or should be,
formed only when about to be used, and then their work is generally soon
over.
7. The other defect, however, is of so grave a nature as, in the opinion
of some, to more than outweigh their advantages; and this is, the
_terribly destructive effect_ upon them of the enemy's artillery fire,
or of that of his sharpshooters; for the solid mass is an easy target,
into which every shot is sure to penetrate. Many of the missiles which
would fly over an advancing line, are sure to fall, somewhere or other,
in a deep column.
This destructive effect was strikingly illustrated in Macdonald's charge
on the Allied centre at Wagram. The eleven thousand men (some accounts
say fifteen thousand) composing that famous column, advanced under the
fire of one hundred and eighty hostile guns. After being driven back
twice, they succeeded, in a third attack, in breaking the enemy's
centre. But of the entire column, only eleven hundred men, it is said,
were left standing.
8. The recent improvements in fire-arms must render the fire on a close
column of infantry, both by artillery and sharpshooters, still more
destructive than it was before. But this sacrifice of life can be
prevented, to a great extent, by using the columns at a proper time and
in a proper manner. They should, like storming parties (which they
really are), never be launched against the enemy's line till the fire by
which they would suffer has been _quite or nearly silenced_ by our
batteries. Sometimes this may be impracticable; but this precaution has
often been neglected when it was perfectly feasible, thus causing a
great and useless slaughter.
9. But destructive as may be artillery fire on close columns, on troops
advancing in line grape and canister _begin to be equally so_ on their
arriving within four hundred yards of the enemy's batteries; and are
certainly quite as destructive, and more so, at the distance of two
hundred yards. So that, within this distance, at least, the superiority
of lines over columns ceases; and, probably, much sooner.
10. The _desideratum_ is to preserve the advantages of the column, while
saving the attacking troops from the almost total destruction which
would now seem to threaten them, when marching in such a formation, from
the new rifled artillery, which is said to fire with accuracy at two
thousand yards, and from the new infantry rifles, said to be reliable,
in the hands of sharpshooters, at five hundred yards.
11. Perhaps this object might be attained by the advance of the
attacking troops in line, but _in loose order_, and at double quick, to
about two hundred paces from the enemy, a halt, a prompt alignment on
the colors, a rapid ployment into close column doubled on the centre,
followed by a swift and resolute charge with the bayonet.
This method, while giving the rapid clearing of the intervening ground,
to within two hundred paces of the enemy, and afterwards the impetus,
and other advantages of the column, would, at the same time, afford that
comparative immunity from a destructive fire which is the chief
advantage of an advance in line.
To guard against the danger, in the use of this method, of the troops
stopping to fire, instead of ploying into a column of attack, they
should commence their advance with pieces unloaded. Their boxes might
even be previously emptied of their ammunition. Why should not a battle,
as well as an assault on a fortress, have its "forlorn hope?"
12. This mode of attack would be open, it is true, to _two
objections_:--
First. It would require for its successful execution under fire great
coolness, and much previous instruction in the manoeuvre, to enable
the troops to perform it promptly and accurately.
Secondly. In presence of a bold and active enemy, it would expose the
attacking troops to the danger of being charged and routed while
manoeuvring.
13. In the late War of the Rebellion, in lieu of close columns, attacks
have been sometimes made in _several lines_, following each other at
distances of three hundred paces or more. Although these attacks have
sometimes succeeded, they are objectionable in principle; for each line
is in danger of being repulsed successively, before the arrival of the
one in its rear; and there is wanting that great superiority of force at
the decisive point which is the most important element of success in a
battle.
Such formations are essentially defensive in their nature, and not
suitable for attack. A line in position, against which the enemy is
advancing, is strong in its fire, which will usually preserve it from
absolute defeat till a second line, posted at one hundred and fifty, or
even three hundred paces in its rear, has had time to come up in
support. But even these distances Napoleon's experience appears to have
taught him to be much too great; for in his last battle, at Waterloo, he
posted his second line, both infantry and cavalry, at only sixty paces
behind the first; thus sacrificing, to a great extent, the advantage of
keeping the second line out of fire, in order to secure the more
important one of concentration of force. But this was only his formation
for defence; for, in the same battle, his formations for attack were
always in close columns.
14. Our present Infantry Tactics have adopted two new expedients to
accelerate the advance of battalions, and diminish the loss to which
columns of attack are liable--Division Columns and Advancing by the
Flank of Subdivisions.
As _Division Columns_ break the battalion line into several columns,
each of two or three subdivisions deep, as a substitute for a single
column four or five subdivisions deep, they undoubtedly diminish the
loss from the enemy's artillery fire in corresponding proportion. But in
compensation for this partial advantage, they have three defects:--
(1.) In moving rapidly for any distance, especially over broken or
obstructed ground, both the alignment and the proper intervals between
the columns will usually be lost; thus causing, in the deployment, a
dangerous loss of time in re-establishing the alignment and the correct
intervals.
(2.) In advancing in line of division columns, there is no means of
forming square, except by passing through an intermediate formation.
(3.) The intervals between the columns are so many gaps, through which
cavalry could easily penetrate, and take the columns in rear.
The line of division columns appears to have been first suggested by
Marshal Marmont, who was a good artillery commander, but not
necessarily, for that reason, a weighty authority on a point of
Infantry Tactics.
15. The manoeuvre of _Advancing by the Flank of Subdivisions_ is
obnoxious to all the objections just pointed out in regard to Division
Columns. On being threatened by cavalry, though the troops would have no
intermediate formation to pass through to prepare for forming square,
they would have to face into column and close to half distance, which
there would often not be time to do.
In addition to this, the flank march being habitually by fours, the
subdivisions would offer a tolerable mark for the enemy's artillery, and
thus be exposed to a destructive enfilade.
And in forming into line, where the leading guides have not accurately
preserved both their alignment and their intervals, which must be the
usual case in the field, there must be more or less delay and confusion,
of which a prompt and active enemy would not fail to take fatal
advantage.
The mode prescribed by the Tactics (Par. 150, School of the Battalion),
for executing the manoeuvre of forming line while advancing by
subdivision flanks, seems also to call for remark; it being "by company
(or division) into line." In other words, each individual soldier
brings a shoulder forward, breaks off from his comrades, and hurries up,
not on a line with them, but detached from them, and moving
independently, to find his proper place. This destroys for the time
being, and at a critical moment, the unity of the subdivisions, and so
impairs the confidence soldiers derive from realizing that they form
part of a compact mass. In thus executing this manoeuvre under fire,
and near the enemy, there is danger of the men becoming confused and
bewildered. For this reason, a better method of forming line would seem
to be to re-form the column by a simple facing, and then to _wheel_ into
line by subdivisions.
16. The worst possible _order of marching_ in battle, for any
considerable number of men, as a battalion, for instance, is by the
flank. Such a line, advancing in what is really a column of fours, would
be rolled up and crushed, on the enemy's attacking its head; and would,
meanwhile, be exposed to enfilade. Marching _to_ a flank, it would be
running the gauntlet of the enemy's batteries and musketry fire. In
forming into line in either case, much time would be lost; as in flank
marching in the field, especially when the ground is ragged or
obstructed, distances cannot be preserved.
It may be here remarked, that marching to a flank in column also,
whether by division, company, or platoon, is highly objectionable, as it
constantly exposes the column to an enfilading fire, as well as to be
suddenly charged in flank by cavalry.
III.--The Attack, how made.
1. The speed of a column of attack must _never be checked_ for a moment,
to enable it to reply to the enemy's fire. The fire of the column will
be ineffective, for it will be the fire of excited men, and very limited
in extent, as it can proceed from the leading division only; and the
fire once begun, it will be hard to stop it. If, in order to fire, we
halt the column, re-forming it under the excitement of the fire will be
very difficult; and the enemy's least forward movement may then cause a
rout.
At Maida, in Calabria, in 1806, the French columns attacked the English
under General Stuart. When within thirty paces, the English gave them a
volley. The French, stunned, as it were, began, at once, to deploy. The
English fired again, and the French retreated.
At Waterloo, in the last grand attack by the French, the advance column
of the Imperial Guard was decisively repulsed by the British Guards.
These had been lying on the ground behind the crest of the slope until
the French appeared, when they suddenly rose up and poured in a
murderous volley at short range. Instead of instantly charging with the
bayonet, the French hesitated, then began to deploy. The British charged
at once, and drove them down the hill.
2. This dangerous halt and deployment is apt also to occur when the
column finds _sheltering objects by the way_. Therefore, hurry by these,
and hasten the step.
3. It will also tend to prevent such an untoward accident, if we furnish
the columns of attack, where several are employed, with _skirmishers_ in
their intervals, as well as on their outer flanks, to draw the enemy's
fire. Otherwise, the column fired into will be apt, in order to return
the fire, to halt instinctively and deploy into line, which breaks up
the attack.
4. From this it appears that the limited fire of a column of attack is,
in fact, _no defect_, the highest offensive power of infantry being in
the bayonet. Fire, in the attack, is generally ineffective, and
sometimes injurious. It should rarely be used till the enemy has turned
his back.