There were many who mistrusted the stability of the treaty of Gundamuk.
Perhaps in his heart Sir Louis Cavagnari may have had his misgivings,
for he was gifted with shrewd insight, and no man knew the Afghan nature
better; but outwardly, in his quiet, resolute manner, he professed the
fullest confidence. Cavagnari was a remarkable man. Italian and Irish
blood commingled in his veins. Both strains carry the attributes of
vivacity and restlessness, but Cavagnari to the superficial observer
appeared as phlegmatic as he was habitually taciturn. This sententious
imperturbability was only on the surface; whether it was a natural
characteristic or an acquired manner is not easy to decide. Below the
surface of measured reticent composure there lay a temperament of ardent
enthusiasm, and not less ardent ambition. In subtlety he was a match for
the wiliest Oriental, whom face to face he dominated with a placid
dauntless masterfulness that was all his own. The wild hill tribes among
whom he went about escortless, carrying his life continually in his
hand, recognised the complex strength of his personal sway, and feared
at once and loved the quiet, firm man, the flash of whose eye was
sometimes ominous, but who could cow the fiercest hillman without losing
a tittle of his cool composure.
[Illustration: _From a Photograph by Bourne & Shepherd: Sir Louis
Cavagnari and Sirdars_]
Cavagnari had negotiated the treaty of Gundamuk, the real importance of
which consisted in the Afghan acceptance of a British Resident at Cabul.
The honour, the duty, and the danger naturally fell to him of being the
first occupant of a post created mainly by his own mingled tact and
strength. Many of his friends regarded him in the light of the leader of
a forlorn hope, and probably Cavagnari recognised with perfect clearness
the risks which encompassed his embassy; but apart from mayhap a little
added gravity in his leave-takings when he quitted Simla, he gave no
sign. It was not a very imposing mission at whose head he rode into the
Balla Hissar of Cabul on July 24th, 1879. His companions were his
secretary, Mr William Jenkins, a young Scotsman of the Punjaub Civil
Service, Dr Ambrose Kelly, the medical officer of the embassy, and the
gallant, stalwart young Lieutenant W. R. P. Hamilton, V.C., commanding
the modest escort of seventy-five soldiers of the Guides. It was held
that an escort so scanty was sufficient, since the Ameer had pledged
himself personally for the safety and protection of the mission. The
Envoy was received with high honour, and conducted to the roomy quarters
in the Balla Hissar which had been prepared as the Residency, within
easy distance of the Ameer's palace. Unquestionably the mission was
welcome neither to the Afghan ruler nor to the people, but Cavagnari,
writing to the Viceroy, made the best of things. The arrival at the
adjacent Sherpur cantonments of the Herat regiments in the beginning of
August was extremely unfortunate for the mission. Those troops had been
inspired by their commander Ayoub Khan with intense hatred to the
English, and they marched through the Cabul streets shouting
objurgations against the British Envoy, and picking quarrels with the
soldiers of his escort. A pensioned sepoy who had learned that the
Afghan troops had been ordered to abuse the Eltchi, warned Cavagnari of
the danger signals. Cavagnari's calm remark was, 'Dogs that bark don't
bite.' The old soldier earnestly urged, 'But these dogs do bite, and
there is danger.' 'Well,' said Cavagnari, 'they can only kill the
handful of us here, and our death will be avenged.' The days passed, and
it seemed that Cavagnari's diagnosis of the situation was the accurate
one. The last words of his last message to the Viceroy, despatched on
September 2d, were 'All well.' The writer of those words was a dead man,
and his mission had perished with him, almost as soon as the cheerful
message borne along the telegraph wires reached its destination.
In the morning of September 3d some Afghan regiments paraded without
arms in the Balla Hissar to receive their pay. An instalment was paid,
but the soldiers clamoured for arrears due. The demand was refused, a
riot began, and the shout rose that the British Eltchi might prove a
free-handed paymaster. There was a rush toward the Residency, and while
some of the Afghan soldiers resorted to stone-throwing, others ran for
arms to their quarters, and looted the Arsenal in the upper Balla
Hissar. The Residency gates had been closed on the first alarm, and fire
was promptly opened on the rabble. The place was never intended for
defence, commanded as it was at close range from the higher level of the
Arsenal, whence a heavy continuous fire was from the first poured down.
The mob of the city in their thousands hurried to co-operate with the
mutinied soldiers and share in the spoils of the sack, so that the
Residency was soon besieged. As soon as the outbreak manifested itself
Cavagnari had sent a message to the Ameer, and the communication
admittedly reached the latter's hands. He had more than 2000 troops in
the Balla Hissar, still at least nominally loyal; he had guaranteed the
protection of the mission, and it behoved him to do what in him lay to
fulfil his pledge. But the Ameer sat supine in his palace, doing no more
than send his General-in-Chief Daoud Shah to remonstrate with the
insurgents. Daoud Shah went on the errand, but it is questionable
whether he showed any energy, or indeed desired that the besiegers
should desist. It was claimed by and for him that he was maltreated and
indeed wounded by the mob, and it appears that he did ride into the
throng and was forcibly dismounted. He might perhaps have exerted
himself with greater determination if he had received more specific
orders from his master the Ameer. That feeble or treacherous prince
never stirred. To the frequent urgent messages sent him by Lieutenant
Hamilton, he replied vaguely: 'As God wills; I am making preparations.'
Meanwhile the little garrison maintained with gallant staunchness hour
after hour the all but hopeless defence.' While the fighting was going
on,' reported the pensioner who had previously warned Cavagnari, 'I
myself saw the four European officers charge out at the head of some
twenty-five of the garrison; they drove away a party holding some broken
ground. When chased, the Afghan soldiers ran like sheep before a wolf.
Later, another sally was made by a detachment, with but three officers
at their head. Cavagnari was not with them this time. A third sally was
made with only two officers leading, Hamilton and Jenkins; and the last
of the sallies was made by a Sikh Jemadar bravely leading. No more
sallies were made after this.' About noon the gates were forced, and the
Residency building was fired; but the defenders long maintained their
position on the roof and in a detached building. At length the fire did
its work, the walls and roof fell in, and soon the fell deed was
consummated by the slaughter of the last survivors of the ill-fated
garrison. Hamilton was said to have died sword in hand in a final
desperate charge. Tidings of the massacre were carried with great speed
to Massy's outposts in the Kuram valley. The news reached Simla by
telegraph early on the morning of the 5th. The authorities there rallied
from the shock with fine purposeful promptitude, and within a few hours
a telegram was on its way to General Massy's headquarters at Ali Khel
instructing him to occupy the crest of the Shutargurdan Pass with two
infantry regiments and a mountain battery, which force was to entrench
itself there and await orders.
The policy of which Lord Lytton was the figurehead had come down with a
bloody crash, and the 'masterly inactivity' of wise John Lawrence stood
vindicated in the eyes of Europe and of Asia. But if his policy had gone
to water, the Viceroy, although he was soon to default from the
constancy of his purpose, saw for the present clear before him the duty
that now in its stead lay upon him of inflicting summary punishment on a
people who had ruthlessly violated the sacred immunity from harm that
shields alike among civilised and barbarous communities the person and
suite of an ambassador accepted under the provisions of a deliberate
treaty. Burnes and Macnaghten had met their fate because they had gone
to Cabul the supporters of a detested intruder and the unwelcome
representatives of a hated power. But Cavagnari had been slaughtered
notwithstanding that he dwelt in the Balla Hissar Residency in virtue of
a solemn treaty between the Empress of India and the Ameer of
Afghanistan, notwithstanding that the latter had guaranteed him safety
and protection, notwithstanding that Britain and Afghanistan had
ratified a pledge of mutual friendship and reciprocal good offices. Lord
Lytton recognised, at least for the moment, that no consideration of
present expediency or of ulterior policy could intervene to deter him
from the urgent imperative duty which now suddenly confronted him. The
task, it was true, was beset with difficulties and dangers. The forces
on the north-western frontier had been reduced to a peace footing, and
the transport for economical reasons had been severely cut down. The
bitter Afghan winter season was approaching, during which military
operations could be conducted only under extremely arduous conditions,
and when the line of communications would be liable to serious
interruptions, The available troops for a prompt offensive did not
amount to more than 6500 men all told, and it was apparent that many
circumstances might postpone their reinforcement.
When men are in earnest, difficulties and dangers are recognised only to
be coped with and overcome. When the Simla council of war broke up on
the afternoon of September 5th the plan of campaign had been settled,
and the leader of the enterprise had been chosen. Sir Frederick Roberts
was already deservedly esteemed one of the most brilliant soldiers of
the British army. He had fought with distinction all through the Great
Mutiny, earning the Victoria Cross and rapid promotion; he had served in
the Abyssinian campaign of 1868, and been chosen by Napier to carry home
his final despatches; and he had worthily shared in the toil, fighting,
and honours of the Umbeyla and Looshai expeditions. In his command of
the Kuram field force during the winter of 1878-9 he had proved himself
a skilful, resolute, and vigorous leader. The officers and men who
served under him believed in him enthusiastically, and, what with
soldiers is the convincing assurance of whole-souled confidence, they
had bestowed on him an affectionate nickname--they knew him among
themselves as 'little Bobs.' His administrative capacity he had proved
in the post of Quartermaster-General in India. Ripe in experience of
war, Roberts at the age of forty-seven was in the full vigour of
manhood, alert in mind, and of tough and enduring physique. He was a
very junior Major-General, but even among his seniors the conviction was
general that Lord Lytton the Viceroy, and Sir F. Haines the
Commander-in-Chief, acted wisely in entrusting to him the most active
command in the impending campaign.
Our retention of the Kuram valley was to prove very useful in the
emergency which had suddenly occurred. Its occupation enabled Massy to
seize and hold the Shutargurdan, and the force in the valley was to
constitute the nucleus of the little army of invasion and retribution to
the command of which Sir Frederick Roberts was appointed. The apex at
the Shutargurdan of the salient angle into Afghanistan which our
possession of the Kuram valley furnished was within little more than
fifty miles of Cabul, whereas the distance of that city from Lundi
Kotul, our advanced position at the head of the Khyber Pass, was about
140 miles, and the route exceptionally difficult. Roberts' column of
invasion was to consist of a cavalry brigade commanded by
Brigadier-General Dunham-Massy, and of two infantry brigades, the first
commanded by Brigadier-General Macpherson, the second by
Brigadier-General Baker, three batteries of artillery, a company of
sappers and miners, and two Gatling guns. The Kuram valley between the
Shutargurdan and the base was to be garrisoned adequately by a force
about 4000 strong, in protection of Roberts' communications by that line
until snow should close it, by which time it was anticipated that
communication by the Khyber-Jellalabad-Gundamuk line would be opened up,
for gaining and maintaining which a force of about 6600 men was to be
detailed under the command of Major-General Bright, which was to furnish
a movable column to establish communications onward to Cabul. A strong
reserve force was to be gathered between Peshawur and Rawal Pindi under
the command of Major-General Ross, to move forward as occasion might
require, in the south-west Sir Donald Stewart was to recall to Candahar
his troops, which, having begun their march toward India, were now
mainly echeloned along the route to Quetta, when that General would have
about 9000 men at his disposition to dominate the Candahar province,
reoccupy Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and threaten Ghuznee, his communications with
the Indus being kept open by a brigade of Bombay troops commanded by
Brigadier-General Phayre.
Sir Frederick Roberts left Simla on ET September along with Colonel
Charles Macgregor, C.B., the brilliant and daring soldier whom he had
chosen as chief of staff, and travelling night and day they reached Ali
Khel on the 12th. The transport and supply difficulty had to be promptly
met, and this was effected only by making a clean sweep of all the
resources of the Peshawur district, greatly but unavoidably to the
hindrance of the advance of the Khyber column, and by procuring carriage
and supplies from the friendly tribes of the Kuram. Notwithstanding the
most strenuous exertions it was not until the 1st October that Roberts'
little army, having crossed the Shutargurdan by detachments, was
rendezvoused at and about the village of Kushi in the Logur plain,
within forty-eight miles of Cabul. Some sharp skirmishes had been fought
as the troops traversed the rugged ground between Ali Khel and the
Shutargurdan, but the losses were trivial, although the General himself
had a narrow escape. A couple of regiments and four guns under the
command of Colonel Money were left in an entrenched camp to hold the
Shutargurdan.
The massacre of the British mission had no sooner been perpetrated than
Yakoub Khan found himself in a very bad way. The Cabul Sirdars sided
with the disaffected soldiery, and urged the Ameer to raise his banner
for a _jehad_ or religious war, a measure for which he had no nerve. Nor
had he the nerve to remain in Cabul until Roberts should camp under the
Balla Hissar and demand of him an account of the stewardship he had
undertaken on behalf of the ill-fated Cavagnari. What reasons actuated
the anxious and bewildered man cannot precisely be known; whether he was
simply solicitous for his own wretched skin, whether he acted from a
wish to save Cabul from destruction, or whether he hoped that his
entreaties for delay might stay the British advance until the tribesmen
should gather to bar the road to the capital. He resolved to fly from
Cabul, and commit himself to the protection of General Roberts and his
army. The day before General Roberts arrived at Kushi the Ameer
presented himself in Baker's camp, accompanied by his eldest son and
some of his Sirdars, among whom was Daoud Shah the Commander-in-Chief of
his army. Sir Frederick on his arrival at Kushi paid a formal visit to
the Ameer, which the latter returned the same afternoon and took
occasion to plead that the General should delay his advance. The reply
was that not even for a single day would Sir Frederick defer his march
on Cabul. The Ameer remained in camp, his personal safety carefully
protected, but under a species of honourable surveillance, until it
should be ascertained judicially whether or not he was implicated in the
massacre of the mission.
Yakoub had intimated his intention of presenting himself in the British
camp some days in advance of his arrival, and as telegraphic
communication with headquarters was open, his acceptance in the
character of an honoured guest was presumably in accordance with
instructions from Simla. The man who had made himself personally
responsible for the safety of Cavagnari's mission was a strange guest
with an army whose avowed errand was to exact retribution for the crime
of its destruction. It might seem not unreasonable to expect that, as an
indispensable preliminary to his entertainment, he should have at least
afforded some _prima facie_ evidence that he had been zealous to avert
the fate which had befallen the mission, and stern in the punishment of
an atrocity which touched him so nearly. But instead, he was taken on
trust so fully that Afghans resisting the British advance were not so
much regarded as enemies resisting an invasion and as constructive
vindicators of the massacre, as they were held traitors to their
sovereign harbouring in the British camp.
On the morning of October 2d the whole force marched from Kushi toward
Cabul, temporarily cutting loose from communication with the
Shutargurdan, to avoid diminishing the strength of the column by leaving
detachments to keep the road open. All told, Roberts' army was the
reverse of a mighty host. Its strength was little greater than that of a
Prussian brigade on a war footing. Its fate was in its own hands, for
befall it what might it could hope for no timely reinforcement. It was a
mere detachment marching against a nation of fighting men plentifully
supplied with artillery, no longer shooting laboriously with jezails,
but carrying arms of precision equal or little inferior to those in the
hands of our own soldiery. But the men, Europeans and Easterns, hillmen
of Scotland and hillmen of Nepaul, plainmen of Hampshire and plainmen of
the Punjaub, strode along buoyant with confidence and with health,
believing in their leader, in their discipline, in themselves. Of varied
race, no soldier who followed Roberts but came of fighting stock; ever
blithely rejoicing in the combat, one and all burned for the strife now
before them with more than wonted ardour, because of the opportunity it
promised to exact vengeance for a deed of foul treachery.
The soldiers had not long to wait for the first fight of the campaign.
On the afternoon of the 5th Baker's brigade, with most of the cavalry
and artillery, and with the 92d Highlanders belonging to Macpherson's
brigade, camped on the plain to the south of the village of Charasiah,
Macpherson remaining one march in rear to escort the convoy of
ammunition and stores. North of Charasiah rises a semicircular curtain
of hills ascending in three successive tiers, the most distant and
loftiest range closing in the horizon and shutting out the view of
Cabul, distant only about eleven miles. The leftward projection of the
curtain, as one looks northward, comes down into the plain almost as far
as and somewhat to the left of Charasiah, dividing the valley of
Charasiah from the outer plain of Chardeh. To the right front of
Charasiah, distant from it about three miles, the range is cleft by the
rugged and narrow Sung-i-Nawishta Pass, through which run the Logur
river and the direct road to Cabul by Beni Hissar. Information had been
received that the Afghans were determined on a resolute attempt to
prevent the British force from reaching Cabul, and the position beyond
Charasiah seemed so tempting that it was regarded as surprising that
cavalry reconnaissances sent forward on three distinct roads detected no
evidences of any large hostile gathering.
But next morning 'showed another sight.' At dawn on the 6th General
Roberts, anxious to secure the Sung-i-Nawishta Pass and to render the
track through it passable for guns, sent forward his pioneer battalion
with a wing of the 92d and two mountain guns. That detachment had gone
out no great distance when the spectacle before it gave it pause. From
the Sung-i-Nawishta defile, both sides of which were held, the
semicircular sweep of the hill-crests was crowned by an Afghan host in
great strength and regular formation. According to subsequent
information no fewer than thirteen regiments of the Afghan regular army
took part in the combat, as well as large contingents of irregular
fighting men from Cabul and the adjoining villages, while the British
camp was threatened from the heights on either side by formidable bodies
of tribesmen, to thwart whose obviously intended attack on it a
considerable force had to be retained. The dispositions of the Afghan
commander Nek Mahomed Khan were made with some tactical skill. The
Sung-i-Nawishta Pass itself, the heights on either side, and a low
detached eminence further forward, were strongly held by Afghan
infantry; in the mouth of the pass were four Armstrong guns, and on the
flanking height twelve mountain guns were in position. The projecting
spur toward Charasiah which was the extreme right of the Afghan
position, was held in force, whence an effective fire would bear on the
left flank of a force advancing to a direct attack on the pass. But
Roberts was not the man to play into the hands of the Afghan tactician.
He humoured his conception so far as to send forward on his right toward
the pass, a small detachment of all arms under Major White of the 92d,
with instructions to maintain a threatening attitude in that direction,
and to seize the opportunity to co-operate with the flanking movement
entrusted to General Baker as soon as its development should have shaken
the constancy of the enemy. To Baker with about 2000 infantry and four
guns, was assigned the task of attacking the Afghan right on the
projecting spur and ridge, forcing back and dispersing that flank; and
then, having reached the right of the Afghan main position on the
farthest and loftiest range, he was to wheel to his right and sweep its
defenders from the chain of summits.
Baker moved out toward his left front against the eminences held by the
Afghan right wing, which Nek Mahomed, having discerned the character of
Roberts' tactics, was now reinforcing with great activity. The 72d
Highlanders led the attack, supported vigorously by the 5th Goorkhas and
the 5th Punjaub Infantry. The resistance of the Afghans was stubborn,
especially opposite our extreme left, whence from behind their sungahs
on a steep hill they poured a heavy fire on the assailants. A yet
heavier fire came from a detached knoll on Baker's right, which the
artillery fire gradually beat down. The Afghans continued to hold the
advanced ridge constituting their first position until two o'clock, when
a direct attack, accompanied by a double flanking fire, compelled their
withdrawal. They, however, fell back only to an intermediate loftier
position about 700 yards in rear of the ridge from which they had been
driven. Approached by successive rushes under cover of artillery fire,
they were then attacked vigorously and fell back in confusion. No rally
was permitted them, and by three o'clock the whole Afghan right was
shattered and in full flight along the edge of the Chardeh valley. Baker
unfortunately had no cavalry, else the fugitives would have suffered
severely. But the rout of the Afghan right had decided the fortune of
the day. Its defenders were already dribbling away from the main
position when Baker, wheeling to his right, marched along the lofty
crest, rolling up and sweeping away the Afghan defence as he moved
toward the Sung-i-Nawishta gorge. That defile had already been entered
by the cavalry of White's detachment, supported by some infantry. While
Baker had been turning the Afghan right, White and his little force had
been distinguishing themselves not a little. After an artillery
preparation the detached hill had been won as the result of a
hand-to-hand struggle. Later had fallen into the hands of White's people
all the Afghan guns, and the heights to the immediate right and left of
the gorge had been carried, the defenders driven away, and the pass
opened up. But the progress through it of the cavalry was arrested by a
strongly garrisoned fort completely commanding the road. On this fort
Baker directed his artillery fire, at the same time sending down two
infantry regiments to clear away the remnants of the Afghan army still
lingering in the pass. This accomplished, the fighting ceased. It had
been a satisfactory day. Less than half of Roberts' force had been
engaged, and this mere brigade had routed the army of Cabul and captured
the whole of the artillery it had brought into the field. The Afghan
loss was estimated at about 300 killed. The British loss was twenty
killed and sixty-seven wounded. On the night of the combat part of
Baker's troops bivouacked beyond the Sung-i-Nawishta, and on the
following day the whole division passed the defile and camped at Beni
Hissar, within sight of the Balla Hissar and the lofty ridge overhanging
Cabul.
On the afternoon of the 7th a violent explosion was heard in the Beni
Hissar camp from the direction of the Sherpur cantonment north of Cabul,
near the site of the British cantonments of 1839-41. Next morning
information came in that the Sherpur magazine had been blown up, and
that the cantonment had been abandoned by the Afghan regiments which had
garrisoned that vast unfinished structure. General Massy led out part of
his brigade on a reconnaissance, and took possession of the deserted
Sherpur cantonment, and of the seventy-five pieces of ordnance parked
within the walls. Massy had observed from the Siah Sung heights that the
Asmai heights, overhanging the Cabul suburb of Deh Afghan, were held by
a large body of Afghan soldiery, a force, it was afterwards learned,
composed of the remnants of the regiments defeated at Charasiah, three
fresh regiments from the Kohistan, and the rabble of the city and
adjacent villages, having a total strength of nearly 3000 men, with
twelve guns, under the leadership of Mahomed Jan, who later was to
figure prominently as the ablest of our Afghan enemies. Massy
heliographed his information to General Roberts, who sent Baker with a
force to drive the enemy from the heights; and Massy was instructed to
pass through a gap in the ridge and gain the Chardeh valley, where he
might find opportunity to intercept the Afghan retreat toward the west.
Massy pierced the ridge at the village of Aushar, and disposed his
troops on the roads crossing the Chardeh valley. Meanwhile Baker found
the ascent of the Sher Derwaza heights so steep that the afternoon was
far spent before his guns came into action, and it was still later
before part of his infantry effected their descent into the Chardeh
valley. Reinforcements necessary to enable him to act did not reach him
until dusk, when it would have been folly to commit himself to an
attack. A night patrol ascertained that the Afghans had evacuated the
position under cover of darkness, leaving behind their guns and camp
equipage. On the 9th the divisional camp moved forward to the Siah Sung
heights, a mile eastward from the Balla Hissar, and there it was joined
by Baker, and by Massy, who on his way to camp led his wearied troopers
through the city of Cabul without mishap or insult. The Goorkha regiment
was detached to hold the ridge commanding the Balla Hissar, and a
cavalry regiment was quartered in the Sherpur cantonment to protect it
from the ravages of the villagers.
A melancholy interest attaches to the visit paid by Sir Frederick
Roberts to the Balla Hissar on the 11th. Through the dirt and squalor of
the lower portion he ascended the narrow lane leading to the ruin which
a few weeks earlier had been the British Residency. The commander of the
avenging army looked with sorrowful eyes on the scene of heroism and
slaughter, on the smoke-blackened walls, the blood splashes on the
whitewashed walls, the still smouldering debris, the half-burned skulls
and bones in the blood-dabbled chamber where apparently the final
struggle had been fought out. He stood in the great breach in the
quarters of the Guides where the gate had been blown in after the last
of the sorties made by the gallant Hamilton, and lingered in the
tattered wreck of poor Cavagnari's drawing-room, its walls dinted with
bullet-pits, its floor and walls brutally defiled. Next day he made a
formal entry into the Balla Hissar, his road lined with his staunch
troops, a royal salute greeting the banner of Britain as it rose on the
tall flagstaff above the gateway. He held a Durbar in the 'Audience
Chamber' in the garden of the Ameer's palace; in front and in flank of
him the pushing throng of obsequious Sirdars of Cabul arrayed in all the
colours of the rainbow; behind them, standing immobile at attention, the
guard of British infantry with fixed bayonets which the soldiers longed
to use. The General read the mild proclamation announcing the
disarmament of the Cabulese and the punishment of fine which was laid
upon the city, but which never was exacted. And then he summarily
dismissed the Sirdars, three only, the Mustaphi, Yahuja Khan the Ameer's
father-in-law, and Zakariah Khan his brother, being desired to remain.
Their smug complacency was suddenly changed into dismay when they were
abruptly told that they were prisoners.
Another ceremonial progress the General had to perform. On the 13th he
marched through the streets of Cabul at the head of his little army, the
bazaars and dead walls echoing to the music of the bands and the wild
scream of the bagpipes. In the Afghan quarter no salaams greeted the
conquering Feringhees, and scowling faces frowned on the spectacle from
windows and side-streets. Three days later occurred an event which might
have been a great catastrophe. Captain Shafto of the ordnance was
conducting an examination into the contents of the arsenal in the upper
Balla Hissar, and had already discovered millions of cartridges, and
about 150,000 lbs. of gunpowder. Daoud Shah, however, expressed his
belief that at least a million pounds were in store. Captain Shafto, a
very cautious man, was pursuing his researches; the Goorkhas were
quartered in the upper Balla Hissar near the magazine shed, and the 67th
occupied the Ameer's garden lower down. On the 16th a dull report was
heard in the Siah Sung camp, followed immediately by the rising above
the Balla Hissar of a huge column of grey smoke, which as it drifted
away disclosed flashes of flame and sudden jets of smoke telling of
repeated gunpowder explosions. The 67th, powdered with dust, escaped all
but scathless; but the Goorkha regiment had been heavily smitten. Twelve
poor fellows were killed, and seven wounded; among the former were five
principal Goorkha officers.
The Balla Hissar was promptly evacuated. Occasional explosions occurred
for several days, the heaviest of those on the afternoon of the 16th,
which threw on the city a great shower of stones, beams, and bullets. By
a jet of stones blown out through the Balla Hissar gate four Afghans
were killed, and two sowars and an Afghan badly hurt. Captain Shafto's
body and the remains of the Goorkhas were found later, and buried; and
the determination was formed to have no more to do with the Balla
Hissar, but to occupy the Sherpur cantonment. Meanwhile General Hugh
Gough was despatched with a small force of all arms to escort to Cabul
Money's gallant garrison of the Shutargurdan, and to close for the
winter the line of communication _via_ the Kuram valley. Colonel Money
had undergone with fine soldierly spirit and action not a few turbulent
experiences since Roberts had left him and his Sikhs on the lofty crest
of the Shutargurdan. The truculent Ghilzais gave him no peace; his
method of dealing with them was for the most part with the bayonet
point. The last attempt on him was made by a horde of Ghilzais some
17,000 strong, who completely invested his camp, and after the civility
of requesting him to surrender, a compliment which he answered by
bullets, made a close and determined attack on his position. This was on
the 18th October; on the following day Gough heliographed his arrival at
Kushi, whereupon Money took the offensive with vigour and scattered to
the winds his Ghilzai assailants. On 30th October the Shutargurdan
position was evacuated, and on the 3d November the Cabul force received
the welcome accession of headquarters and two squadrons 9th Lancers,
Money's 3d Sikhs, and four mountain guns.