The Duc de Rohan and the Huguenots of the South continue their
resistance--Opposition of Marie de’ Medici and the High Catholic
party to Richelieu’s Italian policy--The Cardinal’s memorial to
Louis XIII--_Monsieur_ appointed to the command of the army which
is to enter Italy--The King, jealous of his brother, decides to
command in person--Twelve thousand crowns for a dozen of
cider--Combat of the Pass of Susa--Treaty signed with Charles
Emmanuel of Savoy--Problem of the reception of the Genoese
Ambassadors--Anger of Louis XIII at a jest of Bassompierre--Peace
with England--Campaign against the Huguenots of Languedoc--Massacre
of the garrison of Privas--“_La Paix de Grâce_”--Surrender of
Montauban--Richelieu and d’Épernon--Bassompierre returns to Paris
with the Cardinal--Their frigid reception by the
Queen-Mother--Richelieu proposes to retire from affairs and the
Court, but an accommodation is effected.
Although the great bulwark of Protestantism had fallen, Richelieu did
not have his hands entirely free. The obstinate Rohan, by great
exertions, prevented the Huguenot party from dissolving beneath this
staggering blow; and it was decided by a General Assembly which met at
Nîmes not to submit unless their rights were preserved to them by a
treaty guaranteed by the King of England. However, the continued
resistance of the Huguenots of the South was not a matter of urgent
importance, since the Royal troops already engaged there were well able
to hold Rohan in check, until such time as the Cardinal was at leisure
to undertake a vigorous offensive against him; and he therefore decided
to bend all his energies to the more pressing task of relieving Casale.
The duchy of Mantua had not been seriously attacked, the Spaniards and
the Piedmontese having concentrated their efforts on the conquest of
Montferrato. Charles Emmanuel had promptly seized upon his share of the
spoil; but the governor of Milan, Don Gonzalez de Cordoba, had shown
little skill and less energy in the conduct of his operations, and had
been unable to prevent Casale, gallantly defended by the French
volunteers, from being revictualled on several occasions. However, the
town was now being closely besieged, and though the garrison, ably
seconded by the citizens, could be trusted to offer a stubborn
resistance, it was imperative that help should arrive with as little
delay as possible.
Richelieu had, however, to gain a new victory at the Court before being
able to go to the succour of the allies of France beyond the Alps. The
Queen-Mother, who hated the Gonzaga family, and had an old grudge
against the Duc de Nevers, now become Duke of Mantua, strenuously
opposed the intervention of France in the affairs of Italy. Indifferent
to the fact that neither the honour nor the interest of France would
permit the sacrifice of such old allies as the Gonzagas, she urged that
the King ought to permit the aggrandisement of the House of Savoy, the
heir of which was the husband of his sister. The High Catholic party in
the Council, indignant that Richelieu, instead of devoting himself to
crushing the remnant of the Huguenots, proposed to make war on the King
of Spain, supported her warmly; and it is not improbable that their
combined efforts might have been successful, had not the astute Cardinal
had recourse to an expedient which he had already employed with success
on more than one previous occasion.
First, he presented to the King a memorial, in which he outlined the
policy, foreign and domestic, which he considered it essential that his
Majesty should follow for his own glory and the welfare of his realm.
Then, in his character of priest, he pointed out, with audacious
frankness, the grave defects in his Majesty’s character: his idleness,
his inconstancy, his neglect of even his most faithful and devoted
servants, and so forth, which it was most necessary he should endeavour
to remedy if he
[Illustration: MARIE DE’ MÉDICISÎle, QUEEN OF FRANCE.
From an old print.]
desired to be a great king. And, finally, he tendered his resignation,
on the pretext that his health was no longer equal to the cares of
office.
Richelieu had little doubt what the answer would be. Louis, aware of his
personal incapacity, and unwilling to renounce the power and glory which
his great Minister had promised him, and which, as he well knew, he
alone was capable of securing for him, accepted his advice and refused
his resignation.
Marie de’ Medici, finding herself unable to prevent the Italian
expedition, demanded for _Monsieur_ the command of the army, under the
pretext of saving the King from the hardships and dangers of a winter
campaign in the Alps. Richelieu did not see his way to oppose the
Queen-Mother’s request, and Louis consented; but his jealousy of his
brother soon asserted itself, and, to the intense mortification of Marie
and _Monsieur_, the arrangement was cancelled.
“After the King had given him [_Monsieur_] this command,” writes
Bassompierre, “he fancied that the glory which _Monsieur_ his
brother was going to acquire in this expedition would be
detrimental to his own (so much power has jealousy amongst near
relations), and his head, or more properly his heart, was so full
of this idea that he could not rest. On the 3rd of January he came
to Chaillot, where by chance I had come to see the Cardinal, who
was then staying there, and, being closeted with him, began to tell
him that he could not suffer his brother to go to command his army
beyond the mountains. The Cardinal said that there was only one way
of cancelling the appointment, which was for the King to go
himself, and that, if he resolved upon this step, he must set out
in a week at the furthest. To this he cordially assented and, at
the same time, turned round and called me from the other end of the
room. As I approached, he said: ‘Here is a man who will go with me
and serve me well.’ I asked him where. ‘Into Italy,’ said he,
‘where I am going in a week to make them raise the siege of Casale.
Get ready to go and to serve me as my lieutenant-general, under my
brother, if he chooses to go.’ Upon this the King returned to Paris
and informed the Queen-Mother, and she informed _Monsieur_, who was
not best pleased at the arrangement. Nevertheless, he affected to
be so and got ready to depart.”
On January 15, 1629, Louis XIII, having entrusted to Marie de’ Medici
the task of pursuing the negotiations for peace with England, left Paris
for Grenoble, where the army with which he proposed to enter Italy was
assembled.
“The evening before the King set out,” says Bassompierre, “he asked
me for some cider, as I had been in the habit of giving him some
very good, which my friends sent me from Normandy, knowing that I
liked it. I sent him a dozen bottles, and in the evening when I
went to him for the password he said: ‘Betstein, you have given me
twelve bottles of cider, and now I give you 12,000 crowns. Go and
find Effiat, who will give you the money.’ ‘Sire,’ said I, ‘I have
the whole case at home, which, if it please you, I will let you
have at the same price.’ He, however, was satisfied with the dozen
bottles, and I with his liberality.”
This might seem an act of great munificence on the part of Louis XIII,
did we not remember that the royal donor had been the guest of the
recipient of his bounty for several weeks during the siege of La
Rochelle, and had thereby put the latter to an expense which must have
far exceeded the cost of the cider.
At Grenoble the King remained for some three weeks to negotiate with the
Duke of Savoy. Charles Emmanuel was unable to believe that Louis really
intended to cross the Alps while the Huguenots of the South were still
unsubdued, and, esteeming himself the arbiter between France and Spain,
he refused to abandon the Spaniards, unless the King would undertake to
assist him to conquer the Milanese or Genoa or sacrifice to him Geneva.
The King and the Cardinal thereupon resolved to descend into Piedmont
by way of Mont-Genèvre and Susa. The Duc de Guise, Governor of Provence,
was directed to create a diversion by way of Nice and Liguria, an
operation which he executed very slowly and inefficiently. At Grenoble,
however, the utmost activity prevailed, and though, when Richelieu
arrived there, the army was deficient in artillery, munitions, transport
and, in short, nearly everything required for a campaign, thanks to his
unwearying exertions, in a surprisingly short time it was ready to take
the field, and on February 22 the advance began. On March 1 the army
passed Mont-Genèvre, notwithstanding the severity of the weather, and on
the 3rd the advance-guard, some 10,000 to 12,000 strong, under
Bassompierre and Créquy, encamped at Chaumont, the last village on the
French side of the frontier, at the entrance to the Pass of Susa.
Two or three days were occupied in _pourparlers_ between Richelieu, who
had left the King at Oulx, and the Prince of Piedmont, who had hurried
to Susa on receiving the news that the French had crossed the mountains.
The Cardinal, however, recognised that the prince and his father sought
only to gain time to enable them to fortify the Pass of Susa and to
allow of the arrival of the Piedmontese and Spanish troops whom they had
summoned in all haste. The negotiations were accordingly broken off, and
at two o’clock in the morning of the 6th the King arrived from Oulx,
accompanied by Longueville, Soissons, the Comte de Moret, Henri IV’s son
by Jacqueline de Beuil, and Schomberg, and the army crossed the frontier
and advanced towards the head of the pass.
The Pass of Susa was a defile about a quarter of a league in length and
in places less than twenty paces wide, obstructed here and there by
fallen rocks. The enemy had not been idle and had erected three
formidable barricades, strengthened by earthworks and ditches, while the
rocky heights on either side were crowned with soldiers and protected
by small redoubts. On a neighbouring mountain stood a fort called by the
French the Fort de Gelasse, from the name of a little watercourse hard
by, and the cannon of this fort commanded the open space between
Chaumont and the entrance to the pass. It was one of those positions
which a handful of resolute men might successfully defend against an
entire army; and, as the Piedmontese had already between 3,000 and 4,000
men there, the probability of the invaders being able to force a passage
through the defile, unless at a heavy sacrifice of life, seemed very
slight.
The French troops before the pass consisted of seven companies of French
Guards, six of the Swiss, the greater part of the Regiments of Navarre,
the Baron d’Estissac and the Comte de Sault, and the Musketeers of the
Guard. The Musketeers, who had dismounted from their horses, were under
command of the Seigneur de Tréville, the erstwhile private soldier of
the French Guards who, it will be remembered, had so distinguished
himself at the siege of Montauban.[120] The Comte de Sault’s regiment
was detached from the main body, and, guided by peasants of the
neighbourhood, sent to make a _détour_ through the mountains, which
would bring it to a spot overlooking the town of Susa, whence it could
descend and take the enemy in the rear; while the rest of the troops
were drawn up just out of range of the guns of Fort de Gelasse.
At dawn the Sieur de Cominges was sent forward with a trumpeter to
demand, in the name of the King, passage for his Majesty’s person and
army from the Duke of Savoy. To his request the Count of Verrua, who
commanded the Piedmontese, replied that the French did not come as
people who desired to pass as friends; that he was fully prepared to
resist them, and that if they endeavoured to force a passage, “they
would gain nothing but blows.”
The three marshals of France, Créquy, Bassompierre, and Schomberg, had
come to an arrangement by which each in turn commanded the army for
three days at a time; and, when Cominges returned with this bellicose
answer, Bassompierre, who happened to be in command that day, approached
the King, who had taken up his position a little way behind the storm
troops, and said to him: “Sire, Sire, the company is ready; the
musicians have come in to demand permission to begin the _fête_; the
masks are at the door. When it pleases your Majesty, we will dance the
ballet.” The King replied sharply that the marshal knew very well that
they had only light guns with them, which would have no effect upon the
barricades, and that they must wait until their heavy artillery came up.
“I said to him,” continues Bassompierre: “‘It is too late now to
think of that. Must we abandon the ballet because one of the masks
does not happen to be ready? Allow us to dance it, Sire, and all
will go well.’ ‘Will you answer to me for it?’ said he. ‘It would
be very rash for me to guarantee a thing so doubtful,’ I replied,
‘but I will answer to you that we shall perform it to the end with
honour, or I shall be dead or a prisoner.’ ‘Yes,’ said he, ‘but if
we fail, I shall reproach you.’ ‘You may call me anything if we
fail,’ I replied, ‘except the Marquis d’Uxelles (for he had failed
to pass at Saint-Pierre). But I shall take good care. Only allow us
to do it, Sire.’ ‘Let us go, Sire,’ said the Cardinal to him. ‘From
the demeanour of the marshal, I augur that all will be well. Be
assured of it.’”
Somewhat reluctantly Louis XIII yielded, and Bassompierre forthwith gave
the order for the troops to advance. He and Créquy dismounted and, sword
in hand, led the French Guards and the regiments of Navarre and
d’Estissac against the barricades. At the same time, with irresistible
_élan_, the Musketeers, under Tréville, and the Swiss, under Valençay,
escaladed the heights on either side of the gorge, dislodged the enemy,
gained the top of the rocks, poured a withering flanking-fire into the
defenders of the barricades, and then charged down upon them. Finding
themselves attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, the
Piedmontese were seized with panic; the three barricades were carried
almost without resistance, and the enemy pursued almost to the gates of
Susa, being badly cut up on the way by Sault’s regiment, who fell upon
them as they were retreating. The Duke of Savoy and the Prince of
Piedmont were within an ace of being made prisoners, and only contrived
to escape through the bravery of a Spanish officer, who, with a small
body of men, threw himself between them and the Musketeers who were
about to seize them and was wounded and taken.[121] The victory only
cost the French some fifty men. Amongst the wounded were Valençay and
Schomberg. The latter received a musket-shot in the abdomen, but the
wound was not a dangerous one, and the marshal was soon convalescent.
As the pursuing French came within range of the cannon of the citadel of
Susa, they were heavily fired upon. “But,” says Bassompierre, “we were
so excited by the combat and so joyous at having obtained the victory,
that we paid no attention to these cannon-shots.”
“I saw,” he continues, “an incident which pleased me very much with
the French nobles who were with the army;[122] for we had M. de
Longueville, M. de Moret, M. Aluin and the First Equerry[123] and
more than sixty others with us. A cannon-shot struck the ground
close to our feet, covering us with earth. My long acquaintance
with cannon-shots had taught me that so soon as the ball struck
the earth there was no more danger; so that I was at liberty to
cast my eyes on the countenance of each of them in turn, to see
what effect the shot had upon them. I did not perceive any sign of
astonishment, nor even of surprise. Another shot killed one of M.
de Créquy’s gentlemen, who was amongst them, and they did not
appear to take any notice of it.”
In the course of the day the King sent to felicitate Bassompierre and
Créquy on the victory they had won, but blamed them for having charged
at the head of the troops, since, if they had been killed, not only
would he have been deprived of the services of two of his most
distinguished officers, but the army would have lost its leaders, and
the effect on its morale might have been disastrous. The marshals
replied that they had judged this to be an occasion when it was
necessary to stake everything on a single cast, and to inspire their men
to the utmost courage and resolution by placing themselves at their
head, since if the first attack had been repulsed, it was most
improbable that subsequent attempts would have succeeded.
The town of Susa surrendered the next day, and the King and the Cardinal
established themselves there; while Bassompierre and Créquy, pushing on
with the advance-guard of the army, took Bussolongo and were about to
attack Avigliana, a town situated only four leagues from Turin, when
they received orders to halt, as negotiations for peace had begun.
On the 11th Charles Emmanuel sent the Prince of Piedmont to Susa, where
he signed with the Cardinal a treaty whereby the Duke of Savoy engaged
to revictual Casale and promised, in the name of the governor of the
Milanese, to evacuate Montferrato and cease all hostile operations
against the Duke of Mantua. The ratification of Philip IV was to be
obtained within six weeks, and his Catholic Majesty was to undertake to
secure for the Duke of Mantua the Imperial investiture. In case of the
contravention of this treaty by Spain, the Duke of Savoy was to join his
forces to those of France. On March 18 the Spaniards raised the siege of
Casale; and thus at a single blow France triumphantly reasserted her
position in Italy.
Richelieu subsequently proposed a defensive league between France,
Venice, Savoy, and Mantua against the House of Austria. It was hoped to
secure the adhesion of the Papacy, as Urban VIII had been much
displeased by the invasion of Mantua and Montferrato.
Charles Emmanuel, eager to compensate himself on one side for what he
had failed to gain on the other, pressed Louis XIII to invade the
Milanese, and Venice warmly seconded his efforts. But, though the moment
certainly appeared favourable for such an enterprise, Richelieu resisted
the temptation and did not alter his plans. He was resolved to put an
end to the civil strife in France before embarking on any further
foreign enterprise.
The Duke of Savoy, irritated by this refusal, determined to violate the
new treaty so soon as he could do so without danger. On one pretext or
another, he delayed the evacuation of Montferrato by his troops, and the
Spaniards followed his example. The King and the Cardinal, however, did
not allow themselves to be tricked by the Duke; they sent Toiras with
between 3,000 and 4,000 men to relieve the Spanish garrisons of
Montferrato, and Louis XIII announced his intention of remaining at Susa
until the treaty was fully executed.
Towards the end of April the Republic of Genoa sent an Embassy
Extraordinary to Louis XIII, and the momentous question arose as to
whether the Genoese ambassadors were or were not to be permitted to
present themselves covered before his Majesty. The privilege of the hat
was accorded by the King of France to the representatives of all the
princes and republics of Italy, though until recent years those of
Ferrara, Mantua, and Urbino had been excepted. But the later Valois
kings had claimed sovereignty over Genoa, and this claim had never been
formally renounced. Consequently, if Louis XIII were to allow the
Genoese ambassadors to come into his presence covered, it would be
tantamount to an admission that France had abandoned her pretensions in
regard to the republic.
The King, much exercised in his mind over this matter, sent for
Bassompierre and demanded his advice. The marshal replied that, as his
Majesty now accorded the privilege of the hat to the ambassadors of
Ferrara, Mantua, and Urbino, he ought certainly to accord it to the
representatives of Genoa, a republic which yielded little or nothing in
importance to Venice, and that, in point of fact, an ambassador whom
Genoa had sent to his Court some years before had been covered during
his audience. At that moment, the Secretary of State Châteauneuf, whom
the King had also sent for, came in and Louis asked for his opinion.
Châteauneuf took a different view of the matter from Bassompierre, and
strongly advised the King not to admit the Genoese to his presence
covered, declaring that they were his subjects and that, by this
concession, he “would destroy the right which he had over this
republic.” Thereupon, Louis, always very tenacious of his prerogatives,
declared that he should refuse to receive the ambassadors unless they
were uncovered, and directed that they should be informed of his
decision.
Next day Bassompierre received a visit from the Nuncio, Cardinal Bagni,
who came to invoke his good offices on behalf of the Genoese
ambassadors. The Nuncio told him that he had been charged by the Pope to
take particular care that they were well received; that it was against
all equity and reason that they should be denied the privilege which had
been accorded to the last ambassador whom the republic had sent to the
King of France; that, at the Papal Court, Genoa, together with Venice,
took precedence of all the princes of Italy; and that he could assure
the marshal that he would be performing an action very pleasing to the
Holy Father if he were able to persuade the King to receive them
covered.
Bassompierre replied that he should esteem it a great honour to render
this trifling service to his Holiness and the Republic of Genoa, but
that the King had already refused to follow his advice, and that his
Majesty was very obstinate when he had once taken a thing into his head
and easily irritated against those who opposed him. However, he would go
and consult the Cardinal de Richelieu and see what could be done.
Richelieu, who was naturally very anxious to oblige the Pope, told
Bassompierre that he would propose to the King that he should take the
advice of the Council on the matter, and promised that he would warmly
support the marshal’s opinion and would arrange that the other members
should do the same, with the exception of Châteauneuf, whom he would
instruct to offer some half-hearted objections, for form’s sake.
The Council met, but the King, who had been informed that the Genoese
ambassadors had decided to return whence they came without demanding
audience of him, if they were to be refused the right of being covered,
was in a particularly obstinate mood, and after demanding Bassompierre’s
advice, he added: “I ask you for it, but I shall not follow it, for I
know beforehand that it will be in favour of their being covered, and
that what you are doing is on the recommendation of Don Augustine
Fiesco, who is staying with you.” Don Augustino Fiesco, it should be
mentioned, was a Genoese noble and an old friend of Bassompierre.
Bassompierre, indignant at such an insinuation, protested that he had no
relations with the Republic of Genoa and was under no obligations to Don
Augustine Fiesco, who, in point of fact, was under considerable
obligations to him; and that, even if such had been the case, it would
not prevent him from discharging his duty to his sovereign.
“‘Finally, Sire,’ said I, ‘the oath which I have taken at your
Council obliges me to give you my advice in accordance with my
judgment and my conscience; but, since you hold so bad an opinion
of my integrity, I will abstain, if it please you, from giving my
advice.’
“‘And I,’ said the King, in a violent passion, ‘I will force you to
give it me, since you are one of my Counsellors and draw the salary
of a Counsellor.’
“The Cardinal, who sat above me, said to me: ‘Give it, in God’s
name, and do not argue any longer.’ Upon which I said to the
King:--
“‘Sire, since you absolutely insist on my giving my opinion, it is
that your rights and those of your crown would be utterly destroyed
if, by this act, you renounce the sovereignty you claim over the
Genoese, and that you ought to receive them bareheaded as your
subjects, and not covered as republicans.’
“Then the King rose up in great anger and told me that I was
laughing at him, and that he would teach me that he was my king and
my master; and other things of the same kind. As for me, I did not
open my mouth to utter a single word. The Cardinal pacified him and
persuaded him to follow the general opinion, which was that the
Genoese ambassadors should be covered at the audience. In the
evening we went to the King’s concert; he did not say a word to the
others, from fear of speaking to me, and did nothing but find
fault.”
A day or two afterwards the King had repented of this childish display
of temper, and, by way of making his peace with Bassompierre, sent him
nine boxes of Italian sweetmeats.
* * * * *
On April 4 peace with England was signed at Paris. Charles I had vainly
endeavoured in the negotiations which preceded it to exercise in favour
of Rohan and the Huguenots the intervention which Richelieu had refused
to permit at La Rochelle. But the French Government was inexorable, and
he was constrained to abandon the Protestants, notwithstanding their
complaints and imprecations.
On the side of Italy matters were less satisfactory. The defensive
league against Spain which Richelieu had planned did not materialise;
while Philip IV’s ratification of the treaty for the evacuation of
Mantua and Montferrato did not arrive; and it was evident that he and
Charles Emmanuel intended to evade its stipulations. The King and
Richelieu therefore determined to crush the Huguenot rebellion by a
single vigorous blow, and then to resume, if need be, the offensive in
Italy. On April 28 the King left Susa to return to France; and on May 11
the Cardinal followed, accompanied by Bassompierre, leaving Créquy at
Susa with 6,000 men. The Duke of Savoy was warned that the French would
remain in occupation until the treaty had been formally ratified by
Philip IV.
The bulk of the Royal army had already crossed the Rhône, and 50,000 men
were overrunning Languedoc and Upper Guienne. Richelieu’s plan of
campaign was to send four corps to lay waste the country around
Montauban, Castries, Nîmes and Uzès, the principal towns which the
Protestants still held, so as to render these places incapable of
sustaining a siege, while the King in person, with the rest of the army,
was to march from the Rhône to the Tarn across the Cévennes, reducing on
their way the smaller Huguenot strongholds in that part of the country.
To this powerful combined attack Rohan was only able to oppose forces
weakened by a war which had already lasted eighteen months and
disheartened by the news that England had abandoned them. Not knowing
where else to turn for assistance, the successor of Coligny applied to
the successor of Philip II, and on May 3, 1629, a treaty was signed at
Madrid by which Spain promised the Huguenots a yearly subsidy of 300,000
ducats, and Rohan undertook “to continue the war so long as it might
please his Catholic Majesty.” The duke further undertook, in the event
of his being successful in establishing a Protestant republic in the
South of France, to permit liberty of worship to all Catholics within
its boundaries. “This strange compact, however, came too late; probably,
before the first instalment of the subsidy had reached Rohan’s hands,
his dreams of a Huguenot republic had been rudely dissipated.”
On May 19 the Cardinal and Bassompierre rejoined Louis XIII in the Royal
camp before Privas, the capital of the Protestant Vivarais. On their
arrival the King proposed to hold a meeting of the Council, but as the
Duc de Montmorency, who was with the army, claimed to take precedence of
the marshals of France, and Bassompierre declared that he refused to
suffer him to do so, his Majesty was obliged to postpone it until the
dispute between these great personages could be adjudicated upon.
Privas was garrisoned by 500 picked soldiers, commanded by a brave
Huguenot noble, the Marquis de Saint-André de Montbrun, supported by a
regiment of the Vivarais militia and a population animated by fierce
religious zeal. The resistance at first was very stubborn, but by May 27
the outworks had been captured, and during the following night the
garrison and the majority of the inhabitants evacuated the town and
retired into the Fort de Toulon, situated on a hill to the south-east of
Privas. The rest of the townsfolk endeavoured to escape into the woods
and mountains, but most of them were either killed or captured. The
prisoners were hanged or sent to the galleys. While the greater part of
the Royal army was engaged in the congenial task of pillaging the town,
which they afterwards set on fire, Bassompierre, with 1,200 Swiss,
invested the fort, and at midday the garrison offered to capitulate.
Louis XIII, however, was greatly incensed against the people of Privas,
who had treated the Catholics of the surrounding country with much
cruelty, and he insisted that they should surrender at discretion.[124]
This they refused to do, but, a little later, Saint-André came out alone
and surrendered at discretion to Bassompierre.[125] At the request of
the King, Saint-André then wrote to those in the fort urging them to
follow his example; but, fearful of the fate which awaited them, they
could not bring themselves to do so. Towards evening a terrific storm
came on and continued most of the night, and had the Huguenots
endeavoured to effect their escape under cover of it, they would
probably have succeeded. Unhappily for themselves, they made no attempt.
“On Tuesday, the 29th, our soldiers who had invested the Fort of
Toulon cried out to the besieged that Saint-André had been hanged,
which threw them into despair. The King sent me to show him to
them, and they were content to surrender at discretion. But, at the
same time, our soldiers, without orders, came from all parts to the
assault, and took the fort, killing all whom they encountered. Some
fifty of those who were made prisoners were hanged and two hundred
others were sent to the galleys. The fort was also set on fire.
Some two hundred escaped, but were met by the Swiss who were
escorting the cannon to Vivas, by whom some of them were
killed.”[126]
The Protestants of the Vivarais, terrified by the fate of Privas, laid
down their arms. Alais offered some resistance, but Rohan’s attempt to
throw reinforcements into the town failed, and, after a siege of a week,
it capitulated. Rohan felt that his cause was lost, and endeavoured to
negotiate a peace for the whole party. But, though Richelieu authorised
the convocation of a General Assembly at Anduze, it was only to impose
his conditions. He refused to treat with the Protestants as though they
were a hostile state, as had hitherto been the custom. Peace--_la Paix
de Grâce_, as it was called--was concluded at Alais on June 29. A
general amnesty was granted, and the Edict of Nantes re-established; but
the fortifications of all the towns which had risen in rebellion were to
be razed to the ground.
The King and the Cardinal visited Nîmes, Uzès and Montpellier, where
they were well received; but Montauban refused to accept the peace,
except on condition of preserving its fortifications. Richelieu
despatched the Sieur de Guron, a gentleman with a very persuasive
tongue, to try and induce the inhabitants to reconsider their
determination, and Bassompierre, with the greater part of the Royal
army, after him, with orders to resort to force and lay siege to the
town should persuasion fail.
The marshal arrived before Montauban on August 10, and, learning that
Guron’s eloquence had so far been without effect, began to make
preparations to invest the place. But, on the following morning, Guron
came to inform him that, as the result of a great oration which he had
delivered before the council of the town the previous day, it had been
decided to ratify the peace.
A few days later all was satisfactorily arranged; and on the 20th the
Cardinal--for Louis XIII was now on his way back to Paris--made a
triumphal entry into Montauban, escorted by 600 gentlemen, with
Bassompierre riding before him, as he would have done before the King.
And so long as he was able to retain the uncertain favour of Louis XIII,
Richelieu was king, in all but the name, and the greatest nobles in
France trembled at his frown. A singular illustration of this is the way
in which the once haughty and all-powerful d’Épernon was obliged to
humble himself before him.
“M. d’Épernon,” says Bassompierre, “who had arrived at
Montech,[127] sent the Comte de Maillé[128] to me to request me to
ask the Cardinal at what place he might meet him on the road to pay
his respects to him, having heard that he was leaving on the morrow
to return to the Court. He explained that, for a man of his age,
the journey which he had performed that day was fatiguing, so that
it had prevented him coming so far as Montauban, besides which it
would have been difficult to find suitable accommodation there for
himself and his suite. I executed this embassy to the Cardinal, who
took it extremely ill and imagined that M. d’Épernon refused to
humble his pride to the point of coming to visit him in his
government of Guienne, in which the King had given the Cardinal
absolute power. He was exceedingly angry, and told me to send him
word that he declined to see him in the country or outside Guienne,
and that, although it had been his intention to travel by way of
Auvergne, he would travel by Bordeaux, for the express purpose of
making himself recognised and obeyed in accordance with the power
which had been conferred upon him, and that he would put matters on
such a footing that the authority which M. d’Épernon exercised
there would be curtailed. I softened these expressions in the
answer I made to the Comte de Maillé, and wrote to M. d’Épernon
begging him to come to Montauban, to avoid drawing upon himself the
enmity of this all-powerful man. The Comte de Maillé took his
departure, and in three hours’ time returned with an answer to the
effect that M. d’Épernon would come to Montauban on the morrow to
pay his respects to the Cardinal, since he had been assured that
the Cardinal was not leaving until after dinner.... I went that
evening to acquaint the Cardinal with M. d’Épernon’s approaching
arrival, which appeased his anger, and he consented that I should
go to meet him and that the infantry should be under arms when he
arrived.”
Bassompierre, from the above, would appear to have formed a pretty
correct idea of the danger of offending the great Minister; he lived to
know its full extent.
On August 22, Richelieu, accompanied by Bassompierre, left Montauban, to
the sound of mine and sap, which were destroying the redoubtable
fortifications of the last stronghold of French Protestantism, and
travelled by easy stages towards Fontainebleau, the Cardinal being
received in every town through which he passed with the highest honours;
in fact, his journey resembled a royal progress. At Nemours, where he
arrived on September 12, nearly all the most important personages of the
Court were awaiting him, and escorted him in triumph to Fontainebleau.
Here, however, his Eminence received an abrupt check, for when he went
to pay his respects to Marie de’ Medici, with whom were Anne of Austria
and the Princesses of the Blood, the Queen-Mother, whom the Cardinal’s
triumphs had only served to incense still more bitterly against him,
received him with studied coldness and refused to say so much as a word
to either Bassompierre or Schomberg, whom she now apparently regarded
as Richelieu’s creatures; though she spoke to Louis de Marillac, upon
whom the marshal’s bâton had recently been conferred. The King, however,
came in immediately afterwards and welcomed the Cardinal most warmly. He
then drew him into his mother’s cabinet, where Richelieu immediately
requested permission to retire from office and from the Court, on the
ground that his presence was distasteful to the Queen-Mother, and that
he did not wish to be the cause of friction between her and the King.
The King told him that he would reconcile them, and returning to Marie’s
chamber, spoke most graciously to Bassompierre, evidently with the
intention of atoning for her Majesty’s rudeness to the marshal, of which
Richelieu had, of course, informed him.
“On Friday, the 14th, the quarrel continued, and the Cardinal sent
for Madame de Combalet,[129] La Meilleraye[130] and other persons
belonging to the Queen-Mother’s Household who were his creatures,
and told them that they must prepare to retire from her service, as
it was his intention to retire from affairs and from the Court.
However, that evening there were so many comings and goings, and
the King testified so earnest a desire for an accommodation, that
it was effected on the Saturday, to the universal satisfaction of
the whole Court.”