AN EXPERIMENT IN ADMINISTRATION
In the preceding chapters, we have tried to show the comprehensive
nature of that expansion of Europe which, with ever-accelerating
swiftness, has been in operation since the age of discovery, and to
indicate that, however great an importance any single colony, English or
other, might attribute to itself, its contemporary significance could be
measured relatively only to the interests of that empire of which it
formed a part. For more or less obvious reasons, this great movement of
expansion has usually been treated from the geographical standpoint. We
think, for example, of England acquiring a foothold in the Far East or a
post in Africa, the island of Jamaica or that section of America known
as Virginia, rather than of her adding to her empire spices, slaves,
sugar, or tobacco. Columbus, however, did not sail in search of a new
land, but only of a new way to a market; and throughout the whole of the
earlier expansion of Europe, we shall miss much of its significance,
fail to understand its motives and methods, and misjudge its political
ethics and standards, if we allow ourselves to fall into the way of
thinking in geographical units, with their localized governments,
instead of imperially and in terms of commodities and trade.
In the struggle of nations, not for land, but for materials and markets,
on a world-scale, it has been necessary that each contending empire
should be as economically self-contained, as closely united politically,
and as militarily formidable as possible. Toward the close of the
seventeenth century, the conditions of successful competition were
beginning to stand out in somewhat clearer relief, as a result of the
blind gropings and fortuitous groupings of a century of experiment, in a
world whose economic possibilities had been but little known. In view of
these requirements, and of the way in which the local New England policy
ran counter to them, there is no need to invoke any malignant spirit, or
even any very deeply selfish aim, on the part of the later Stuarts, to
account for their attempt to unify and consolidate the Empire. Their
policy may have been shaped only gradually in their own minds, and, in
any case, could assume tangible form only by overcoming the obstacles of
existing conditions and institutions, and by the use of such instruments
as the times, fate, and their own natures allowed to them. The remainder
of this volume will be occupied with the efforts of themselves and their
successors to bring back the New England colonies into the general life
of the Empire, and to establish those political relations which were to
subsist for another century.
The first opportunity for putting into practice the new policy of
consolidated administration and royal control was offered by New
Hampshire when Massachusetts canceled the commissions of her officials
there, in accordance with the King's orders, in February, 1680.
Unfortunately for the colonists, and for any possible chance of success
for the new order, the question was complicated by the entirely
extraneous one of Mason's title to the land.[991] Technically legal as
that may have been, and not wholly without its points even on the ground
of abstract justice, it was not likely that squatters, who had enjoyed
all the rights of possession for two generations, and who had put their
labor into their property, would be willing to yield, even on nominal
terms, unless forced to do so. Juries would certainly have to be packed
if decisions so inimical to the pocket-books of the colonists were to be
obtained in courts upon the spot; and nothing but ill-feeling and a
travesty of justice could be anticipated, whichever way the verdicts
went; and the King had no intention of spending his hard-won income to
establish Mason's claims by force.
Footnote 991:
The story of the Masonian Proprietors is given by O. G. Hammond, _The
Mason Title and its relations to New Hampshire and Massachusetts_;
American Antiquarian Society, 1916.
Indeed, the royal policy at first was wholly conciliatory. The
government provided consisted of a President and council, appointed by
the King, and a popularly elected assembly, which latter was to make the
laws and levy the taxes, legislation being subject to veto by the
president and council in the colony, and by the King in Council in
England.[992] John Cutt, the first President, and Martyn, Vaughan,
Daniel, Gilman, and Waldron, of the Council, were all prominent men in
the colony; some of them had been officials under Massachusetts. In
fact, under this first royal government in New England, there was but
little change; and the code of laws enacted by the Assembly was
virtually a reënactment of the Massachusetts code, including some of the
characteristic Puritanical criminal legislation already objected to by
the English judges.[993] The laws which were passed confirming the
land-titles of towns and individuals, and providing that, in
controversies over lands, the juries should be “chosen by the freemen of
each town,” were, of course, aimed at the Mason menace, while the method
of selecting juries was inconsistent with English law in the matter.
Footnote 992:
The commission is given in _N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, pp. 373
_ff._, and _Laws of New Hampshire Provincial Period_ (ed. A. S.
Batchellor, 1904), vol. I, pp. 72 _ff._ The government is described in
Osgood, _American Colonies_, vol. III, pp. 337 _f._, and Fry, _New
Hampshire_, pp. 66 _ff._
Footnote 993:
The so-called “Cutt Code” is in _Laws of N. H._, vol. I, pp. 11 _ff._,
and _N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, pp. 382 _ff._
Having foreseen trouble over the land-question, the King had required
Mason to agree not to demand any compensation for his property prior to
June 12, 1680, and to confirm any individual in possession of his title
forever, subject to a quit-rent of not over sixpence in the pound,
reserving for his own disposition only the lands not already taken
up.[994] In December, Mason and his friend Richard Chamberlain, an
English lawyer, who had been appointed Secretary to the province,
arrived in New Hampshire, and, in compliance with royal orders, Mason
was given a seat in the Council.[995] In view, both of the difficulties
which had been experienced, for fifty years, with the colony's neighbor
on the south, and of the fact that the King had appointed local men to
all the government offices, the necessity of having at least one
official who could be relied upon for information was obvious, and
Chamberlain was instructed to transmit regularly reports of matters
transacted in his office.[996]
Footnote 994:
These conditions are given in Cutt's commission.
Footnote 995:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1677-80_, pp. 592, 608; _Ibid._, _1681-85_, p.
44; _N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, pp. 420 _f._
Footnote 996:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1677-80_, p. 608.
The Council, however, not only made trouble about accepting him as
Secretary, but endeavored to bind him by an oath of secrecy, which would
have prevented the English government from obtaining information as to
events in that part of the Empire, and have brought about the same
absurd and impossible state of affairs, from an administrative
standpoint, which Massachusetts was trying to perpetuate. Indeed, the
attempt to govern the province by local officials broke down all along
the line. Perhaps the least serious of the difficulties was that Mason
was said to have “no more right to land in New Hampshire than Robin
Hood,” and that he was thwarted at every turn. So far as that was
concerned, he had already had but scant encouragement in England, where,
although his claims had to be acknowledged as having possible legal
validity, they seem to have been recognized, by a government anxious to
avoid trouble, as being likely to create a great deal more of it than it
cared to find on its hands. Had the local government shown any
inclination to meet the imperial one half-way in its endeavor to bring
about some sort of administrative connection between the two, and
observance of the Navigation Acts, it is probable that otherwise it
would have been left fairly free, and that the home officials would have
been glad enough to rid themselves of Mason by abandoning him and his
trouble-breeding claims to the local courts.[997] This, however, the
colonists refused to do. Complaints, some of them well-founded, began to
pour in to the authorities in England, not merely in regard to the
treatment of Mason, but as to the loyalty of the province, the
recognition of the King's authority, the character of the laws, the
refusal to observe the Navigation Acts, and other matters, which
indicated that the local government as organized could not cope with the
situation.[998] The Lords of Trade, therefore, reported that it would be
better to reorganize the government and appoint a governor from home,
both as a military and as an administrative measure. Aside from other
questions, there was evident danger in having a disloyal and
disorganized province on the French frontier in America.
Footnote 997:
_Ibid._, _1681-85_, pp. 27, 49 _ff._, 62 _ff._
Footnote 998:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85_, pp. 49 _f._, 52 _f._, 138 _f._, 140
_f._
Amply justified as the English government might have been in its
appointment of a home official to the post of governor, its choice of
the individual selected was most unfortunate. It might be said, indeed,
to have been inexcusable, did not the memory of our own happenings
during the reconstruction of the South, for example, after the Civil
War, preclude too free a use of vivid but satisfying adjectives. Edward
Cranfield, however, whose commission was dated May 9, 1682,[999] was,
perhaps, the most sordid and reckless character who ever served the
Crown as a provincial governor, and might have sat as a model to any
“carpet-bagger” of our post-bellum period; and his three years in New
Hampshire are but mildly characterized as “an unbroken record of vulgar
oppression and extortion.”[1000]
Footnote 999:
_N. H. Laws_, vol. I, pp. 48 _ff._ His instructions, in part, are on
pp. 56 _ff._ _Cf._ _N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, pp. 433 _ff._
Footnote 1000:
Osgood, _American Colonies_, vol. III, p. 348.
He had been but a short time in his new office when he began to have
dazzling visions of the wealth to be made by fishing in the troubled
colonial waters. He wrote to Secretary Blathwayt that, if he and his
friend Guinn would further his schemes in England, they should share
equally with himself in the plunder; and there seems good ground for
assuming that Blathwayt consented, and that the disgraceful
administration which followed lasted as long as it did by virtue of the
complicity of the bribed secretary in England.[1001] Cranfield's
astonishingly cool letter asking for a frigate, much as a highway man
might undertake to supply himself with a pistol, on the ground that it
would not only assist His Majesty's affairs, but would let himself and
his accomplices “in to other advantages,” is one of the most
delightfully frank state papers on record. He estimated that the
troubles in Maine might be brought to yield £3000; that, as both parties
to the Narraganset dispute had money, £3000 or £4000 would “not be
felt”; that selling pardons in Boston might yield £10,000; while,
besides other possibilities, the £5000 “collected for the Evangelizing
of Indians” might be “inspected into and regulated”—a suggestion
delicately veiled, but sufficiently obvious. While these enterprises,
fortunately, proved beyond his powers, no amount was too small to
attract him, and he showed an amazing adroitness in turning every
incident of his administration into money for himself, however remote
the possibility of doing so would have seemed to the casual observer.
Footnote 1001:
_Cf._ Cranfield's letters to Blathwayt in _Randolph Papers_, vol. VI,
pp. 124, 138 _ff._, 145. From the last it would seem that Blathwayt's
customary share was a third.
Besides the disreputable deal with Blathwayt, which had probably helped
to procure his appointment, Cranfield had also made one with Mason, by
which the latter agreed to pay him £150 a year, mortgaging the whole
province to him as security.[1002] It was, therefore, to the advantage
of the new Governor to force the people to accede to Mason's demands.
Although on his arrival, he expressed himself as friendly to the
colony,[1003] and had little difficulty with his first Assembly, he fell
out with it in its second session, and dissolved it, determined to rule
without one.[1004] As a result of the feeling over this action, a
disturbance, too insignificant to be called a revolt, was started by one
Edward Gove, who was claimed to be of unsound mind. However, he was
condemned to death by Cranfield, who confiscated his estate,—of which he
promised one third to Blathwayt,—and shipped the offender to England,
where, after a short stay in the Tower, he was released, in part owing
to appeals by Randolph.[1005]
Footnote 1002:
Belknap (_History_, vol. I, p. 153) states that he found the “Mss. in
the files.” I have never seen the paper, but there is a contemporary
reference to it in _N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, p. 517.
Footnote 1003:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85_, pp. 312 _f._
Footnote 1004:
_Ibid._, pp. 373 _f._
Footnote 1005:
_Ibid._, pp. 379, 389; _Randolph Papers_, vol. VI, p. 145, and
_passim_; _N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, pp. 458 _ff._
It is needless to follow Cranfield's disreputable course in detail. It
was that of a petty but thoroughly unscrupulous tyrant, who had no
thought for the rights of the people whom he governed, or for the
interests of the Empire, and whose whole mind was concentrated on
picking pockets.[1006] Although the Assembly was twice convened again,
the deadlock between it and the executive was complete. Finally, after
an effort to collect taxes illegally, it became evident that the people
would stand no more, and Cranfield, who, somewhat unnecessarily, seems
to have been in fear of his life, wrote home asking for recall on the
score of his health and the difficult climate.[1007] Meanwhile, however,
the unfortunate inhabitants of the colony had succeeded in getting their
case before the Lords of Trade in England, who at once took
action.[1008] They wrote a sharp letter to Cranfield, demanding
explanations; and upon receipt of his defense, which they did not
consider satisfactory, reported to the King that he had exceeded his
authority, committed illegal acts, and failed to carry out his
instructions.[1009] They also requested that the King allow an immediate
appeal in the case of one Vaughan against Mason, in the matter of his
land-title, and that all proceedings in similar cases be suspended until
His Majesty's decision was known. Unfortunately, Vaughan lost the
appeal, the King deciding in favor of Mason; but at least Cranfield was
removed as governor, and his commission revoked, at the end of
1684.[1010] In order to get rid of the troublesome private claims of
Mason, a plan seems also to have been proposed by the English
government, the following year, by which he was to surrender all his
rights to the Crown in exchange for an annuity and the governorship of
Bermuda, as it was thought the people might more willingly recognize the
claims of the Crown than those of an individual.[1011] Nothing, however,
came of it, and, like a family curse, the Mason claims continued to
plague everyone concerned, including the proprietor himself.
Footnote 1006:
_Cf._ Vaughan's Journal, in _N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, pp. 519
_ff._
Footnote 1007:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85_, p. 649; _Randolph Papers_, vol. VI,
p. 150.
Footnote 1008:
_N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, pp. 515, 557; _Cal. State Pap., Col.,
1681-85_, pp. 666 _ff._
Footnote 1009:
_N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, pp. 562 _f._, 569 _ff._, 572; _Cal.
State Pap., Col., 1681-85_, pp. 670, 697 _ff._
Footnote 1010:
_N. H. Prov. Papers_, vol. I, pp. 570 _f._, 574; _Cal. State Pap.,
Col., 1681-85_, p. 739.
Footnote 1011:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, pp. 59 _f._
That at this crisis in New England affairs, when the attempt was being
made to alter the relations of the colonies to the Crown, and to make
sweeping administrative changes, such a man as Cranfield could be chosen
to be the first representative of a royal executive, boded ill for the
practical success of any plans, however statesmanlike they might be in
conception. There would seem to be no room for doubt that his
appointment had been due to corruption and jobbery, which were likely to
be the stumbling-blocks in the way of any real improvement in imperial
government under the Stuarts. The Lords of Trade, indeed, as well as
Randolph, both realized and protested against the dangers of Mason's
claim, legal as it might be, and of the harm to be done by such an
appointee as Cranfield.[1012] Back-stairs intrigues and sordid
schemings, however, were too strong to be overcome in the court of
Charles, nor had there yet developed that powerful tradition of
integrity and honor, which has been so marked a quality in the civil
service of later England, although the foundations of such a tradition
were being laid at this very time by the excellent work being done by a
number of royal officials in other colonies.
Footnote 1012:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, p. 17.
Nor must it be forgotten that there was little or nothing to attract a
man of first-rate ability, of high integrity, or of statesmanlike
quality, in the post of royal governor in the seventeenth century. Owing
to the remoteness of the colonies, their small populations, their lack
of culture and social life, the pettiness of their problems, and the
proneness of their inhabitants to quarrel with any royal official simply
as such, the office of governor could mean only exile, without prestige
or adequate pay, for any man to whom, from ability or position, a public
career was open in England. As for the hungry schools of smaller fish
who swam in their wake, eager to pick up a living in minor officialdom,
it may be said that they were wont to apply all too thoroughly our later
American maxim, “to the victor belong the spoils.” They were of the
universal type, transcending time or party, place or race.
In respect to the higher officials, the new policy of the Stuarts,
which, by the time Cranfield was removed, had become clearly marked,
might indeed, have brought an advantage. None of the New England
colonies—which ranged in population from the four thousand of Rhode
Island or New Hampshire, to perhaps ten times that number in
Massachusetts—could offer a problem, or a legitimate recompense,
sufficient to attract an able man as governor; but a dominion extending
from Virginia to New France, impossible as it was for other reasons,
might have done so. Nor were there less apparent advantages to be gained
from the administrative point of view, in a dominion which should
embrace all New England, such as was now being planned. After the fall
of the Massachusetts charter, and the dismissal of Cranfield, there were
seven jurisdictions in New England, some with settled governments and
some without: Connecticut, the King's Province, Rhode Island, Plymouth,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine. To provide seven complete sets
of administrative machinery for the seventy thousand persons included in
these seven districts naturally seemed to the government in England to
be not only a waste of money and energy, but likely to interfere with
the best interests of the colonists themselves. The tariff wars, the
constant bickering over boundaries, and the lack of unity in military
affairs, which latter might easily prove fatal when opposed by a
unified, centralized power like France, all seemed to point to a
consolidation of the colonies as being a distinct step forward. New
England, at least, formed a geographical unit, with a population fairly
homogeneous in character; and a general government might be expected to
work with not more friction than had been developed from the absorption
of New Hampshire and Maine by Massachusetts.
Nor was the scheme confined solely to the minds of English Statesmen, or
to Randolph, who had urged it as early as 1681.[1013] Not to mention
others, so staunch an upholder of the old order as Samuel Sewall could
write to Increase Mather, then engaged in trying to obtain a new
charter, after the downfall of Andros, that, on account of the lack of
voluntary cohesion on the part of the colonies in the face of the French
danger, “it seems necessary that in the most convenient way as can be
procured, these lesser Governments be firmly compacted into one.”[1014]
The difficulties in the way of the plan, however, were great. The local
feeling of loyalty, on the part of the colonists, to their particular
colony, and distrust of the others, was amazingly strong in these little
commonwealths, the total population of any one of which was not greater
than that of a town or village of to-day. Although the inhabitants were
all Englishmen, of much the same faith, and engaged in the same
pursuits, the corporate and community life of the various colonies had,
in the short space of two generations, become differentiated to a degree
which is truly astonishing, and which the contemporary English
government may well be forgiven for not having been able to realize.
Moreover, the extent of territory and inadequacy of communication made a
centralized government peculiarly difficult for those governing, and
inconvenient for the governed. Lastly, the want of the right sort of men
for officials, and their probable lack of tact, and of sympathy with the
New Englanders at any time, and, particularly, in this one of
transition, would seem to have doomed the dominion to failure from the
start.
Footnote 1013:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. VI, p. 90.
Footnote 1014:
Sewall, _Letter Book_, vol. I, p. 115.
Fortunately, however, New England was saved, largely by Randolph, from
the presence of a governor who would have been far worse than Cranfield,
in the person of the subsequently notorious Colonel Percy Kirke, who had
been appointed by Charles.[1015] The death of the King made the
commission void; and Randolph's wise and persistent opposition carried
the day, so that James II found other work for the brutal colonel.[1016]
Randolph, indeed, had not hesitated to write that “whoever goes over
Governor with expectation to make his fortunes, will dis-serve his
Majesty, disappoint himself and utterly ruine that Country”; and that
there was “more need of a prudent man to reconcile then of a hot heady,
passionate Souldier to force.”[1017]
Footnote 1015:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85_, pp. 718, 731 _f._
Footnote 1016:
Randolph wrote that nothing could be done if the people “be condemned
to that misery to have Coll. Kerk to be their Govr.”; and that he
himself would “rather have 100 lb. a yeare in New Engd. under a quiet
prudent Govr. then 500 lb.” under Kirke. _Randolph Papers_, vol. IV,
pp. 29, 3, 6, 18, 40, 88.
Footnote 1017:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, pp. 16, 18.
In August, 1685, he suggested, in view of the inevitable delay in
settling New England matters, resulting from the death of the King, that
a temporary government be installed; and, a week later, the Lords of
Trade recommended the plan to James.[1018] It had been Randolph's wish,
as well as that of those citizens in the colony who saw that a change
was inevitable, that the governor and other officials, during the
transition period, should, as far as possible, be local men; and to this
the English government agreed, appointing Joseph Dudley as
Governor.[1019] It was well for Massachusetts in this critical time that
some, at least, of her leading men were not fanatically irreconcilable,
and that, in spite of the opposition of the clergy, so able an
administrator as Dudley was willing to take the hated office, and serve
at once both his colony and England.[1020] If the colonists preferred,
as they undoubtedly did, an administration formed from their own
citizens rather than from strangers, then the question before them was
similar to that put by General Lee to those irreconcilables in Virginia,
in 1867, who refused to vote for the Constitutional Convention. “The
question is,” wrote the general, “shall the members of the convention be
selected from the best available men in the State or from the worst?
Shall the machinery of the State government be arranged and set in
motion by the former or by the latter?”[1021] The colonists, indeed,
were given no choice as to the fundamental frame of their government;
but the powers given to the governor and council made the character of
those who held those offices, particularly the former, of vital
importance.
Footnote 1018:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1687-88_, pp. 77, 80.
Footnote 1019:
_Randolph Papers_, vols. III, pp. 317, 325, and IV, p. 13.
Footnote 1020:
Sewall, _Diary_, vol. I, p. 139. The old view of Dudley as a traitor,
which was held by the strong defenders of Puritanism and theocracy, is
largely passing. _Cf._ Osgood, _American Colonies_, vol. III, pp. 385
_f._
Footnote 1021:
J. F. Rhodes, _History of the United States_, vol. VI, p. 86.
Dudley's commission, which appointed him Governor of New Hampshire and
the King's Province, as well as of Massachusetts, and was thus the first
constructive step taken toward consolidation, also named the members of
his Council.[1022] With two exceptions, they were all New Englanders,
representative of the several districts, and included such men as the
Bradstreets, father and son, the two Winthrops (Wait and Fitz-John),
Stoughton, Bulkley, Pynchon, and Tyng, although the Bradstreets and
Saltonstall refused to serve.[1023] The exceptions were Mason and
Randolph; and when the latter heard that Mason had been named, he
hurriedly wrote to Sir Robert Southwell, begging that the New Hampshire
proprietor be advised “to moderation” or that he would “putt all in a
ferment.”[1024]
Footnote 1022:
The commission is in _Colonial Society of Massachusetts Publications_,
vol. II, pp. 37 _ff._
Footnote 1023:
_Randolph Papers_, vols. VI, p. 171, and IV, p. 86.
Footnote 1024:
_Ibid._, vol. IV, p. 48.
Although the Dudley government was avowedly temporary, its organization
foreshadowed the more permanent one soon to be provided, with Andros as
head. All executive and judicial power was placed in the hands of the
Governor and Council, except that appeals to England were provided for
in cases involving not less than £300. There was no provision for the
laying of new taxes or for passing laws, and the refusal to allow a
popular assembly was a serious administrative blunder. In spite of the
restricted franchise and the great influence of the clergy and a few
families in the public life of Massachusetts, the representative
assembly was the foundation of her political liberties, actual or
potential; and after being accustomed to it for fifty years, the people
could be counted upon not to submit willingly to a form of
administration in which they were deprived of all voice. Randolph,
Andros, and the Lords of Trade all seem to have been in favor of such an
assembly for purposes of legislation and taxation; and the new
government under Dudley recommended that it be granted.[1025] In spite
of this, however, and of the opinion of the Attorney-General that, even
after the forfeiture of the charter, the inhabitants of Massachusetts
still had the right to be directly represented in the making of their
local laws and levying of taxes, the King refused his consent.[1026]
While the refusal was a stupid error, which was certain to provoke the
people without any material advantage to the imperial organization, it
may be doubted whether, in truth, it was illegal. The whole matter of
the legal position of the residents in the dominions, as compared with
the dwellers in the realm, was an anomalous one. The situation resulting
from the expansion of England was unprovided for in the theory of the
constitution, much as the acquisition of dependencies by the United
States was unforeseen; and it is difficult to prove what legal rights an
Englishman may or may not have carried with him in emigrating beyond
seas in the seventeenth century. Although, largely as a result of the
so-called tyranny of Andros, New Englanders from this time onward began
to praise, and claim rights under, the common law of England, the force
of that law had previously been denied by themselves in statement and
practice.[1027] In similar case, it may be noted, our own Congress has
laid down the principle that constitutional rights do not of themselves
apply to the citizens of dependent territories, but only when expressly
extended by statute.[1028]
Footnote 1025:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88_, pp. 81, 87 _f._; _Randolph Papers_,
vol. V, p. 3; “Records of Council Meetings under Dudley,” in _Mass.
Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, Series II, vol. XIII, p. 244 (hereafter cited
as _Dudley Records_).
Footnote 1026:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88_, pp. 9, 81, 89.
Footnote 1027:
P. S. Reinsch, _English Common Law in the Early American Colonies_
(Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 31, 1899), pp. 8, 23.
Footnote 1028:
Willoughby, _Territories and Dependencies_, p. 51.
Randolph arrived with Dudley's commission in May, 1686, and on the 17th
the new government assumed office at a meeting of the General Court. The
members of that body unanimously protested against the legality of
Dudley's commission, but there was no forcible opposition, though, as
Sewall records, there were “many tears shed in prayer and at
parting.”[1029] The actions of the new government showed so much
moderation that Randolph soon began to chafe under restraint, and
complained that “twas still but the Govr & Company,” and that the
Navigation Acts were no more enforced than formerly.[1030] Sewall,
indeed, in his diary, dwells only on such minor imperial events as the
reintroduction of the cross in the ensign (which led him to resign his
commission), the drinking of healths, the desecration of Saturday
evening (considered in New England as part of the Sabbath), the increase
of periwigs, and the holding of services by an Anglican clergyman, in
accordance with the religious toleration insisted upon by the
King.[1031] Randolph, however, who perhaps understood the colonies
better than any other Englishman of the day, probably represented the
feeling more truly when he wrote that the people were dissatisfied for
want of an assembly, and that otherwise their main desires were for a
general pardon, for the confirmation of their land-titles, and for the
legal establishment of Congregationalism.[1032] We also get a glimpse of
the fire smouldering beneath the surface, in the refusal of the Council
to permit Captain St. Loe, Commander of H. M. frigate Dartmouth, to have
a celebration and bonfire ashore, not only, as the Council declared,
because the town was built of wood, but because “the spirits of some
people are so royled and disturbed that inconveniency beyond your
expectation may happen.”[1033]
Footnote 1029:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. V, p. 516; Sewall, Diary, vol. I, p.
140; _Dudley Records_, p. 237.
Footnote 1030:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, pp. 92, 114 _f._, 120 _ff._; _Dudley
Records_, pp. 227 _f._
Footnote 1031:
Sewall, _Diary_, vol. I, pp. 147 _f._, 156, 151, 142.
Footnote 1032:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, p. 118. He was presumably speaking of the
voters.
Footnote 1033:
_Dudley Records_, pp. 270 _f._
With the appointment of Sir Edmund Andros, who arrived in December,
after Dudley had been in office about seven months, the Stuart policy
was advanced another step, and the Dominion of New England was soon to
receive a larger extension. The appointment also marked a distinct
advance in the quality of royal official; for Andros was of a type far
superior to the burglarizing Cranfield or the bureaucratic Randolph. He
had already served with honesty and ability as Governor of New York;
and, as the plans for colonial consolidation called for the eventual
union of that province with New England, his previous service in the
former naturally recommended him for the higher post. It is probable
that he had already been considered, even before the appointment of
Dudley.[1034]
Footnote 1034:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, p. 13.
Although his commission of 1686 added only the small, now unimportant,
colony of Plymouth to the three already combined under Dudley, the plan
for uniting all those north of the Delaware had been definitely
formulated, and, as part of the process of reorganization, steps had
been taken to cancel the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut.[1035]
After some consideration by the Lords of Trade in the previous year, it
had been determined not to await the organization of a permanent
government before proceeding against the two charter colonies, and
Randolph had brought writs of _Quo Warranto_ against each when he came
over with Dudley's commission.[1036] Before they could be served, the
time for the return of each had expired; but, nevertheless, Randolph
presented both of the “superannuated summons,” as he termed them, and
Rhode Island made an immediate surrender, precluding the necessity of
forcing the matter to a legal issue.[1037] That colony was thereupon
placed under the jurisdiction of Andros.[1038]
Footnote 1035:
The commission of 1686 is printed in _R. I. Records_, vol. III, pp.
212 _ff._; _Colonial Society Massachusetts Publications_, vol. II, pp.
44 _ff._; and _New Hampshire Laws_, vol. I, pp. 146 _ff._ The
instructions of that year are in the latter only, pp. 155 _ff._
Footnote 1036:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88_, pp. 65, 67, 77, 87, 173, 182; _Conn.
Col. Records_, vol. III, pp. 347 _ff._, 356 _ff._
Footnote 1037:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88_, p. 211; _Randolph Papers_, vols. IV,
pp. 97, 100, and VI, pp. 173, 178; _R. I. Records_, vol. III, pp. 193
_ff._
Footnote 1038:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88_, p. 242; _New Hampshire Laws_, vol.
I, p. 168; _Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, p. 134.
Connecticut presented greater difficulties, and, owing to delays, a
second writ of _Quo Warranto_, served by Randolph, also became legally
void before service. Governor Dongan, of New York, who had hopes that
his province, and not Massachusetts, might be made the nucleus around
which the larger administrative unit would be built, was also making
efforts to annex Connecticut, either in whole or in part. Although twice
saved by delay, that colony realized that the tendency of the time
toward consolidation would probably prove too strong for her to remain
permanently isolated.[1039] Not only were her social and religious
affinities far closer with New England than with New York, but so, also,
were her economic ties. After some triangular fencing, therefore, with
Dongan, Randolph, and the home authorities, and the service of a third
writ, the General Court wrote to the English Secretary of State, that,
though the colony would prefer to remain independent, yet, if the King's
pleasure were otherwise, she would rather be placed under the
administration of Andros than joined with any other province.[1040] This
was taken to mean acceptance of the royal wishes, the _Quo Warranto_
proceedings were dropped, and Andros was ordered to add Connecticut to
the Dominion, which, six months later, was extended to embrace New York
and the two Jerseys.[1041]
Footnote 1039:
_N. Y. Col. Docts._, vol. III, pp. 385 _ff._; _Conn. Col. Records_,
vol. III, pp. 366 _f._; _Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, p. 78.
Footnote 1040:
_Conn. Col. Records_, vol. III, pp. 377 _f._
Footnote 1041:
_Ibid._, pp. 379 _ff._; _New Hampshire Laws_, vol. I, pp. 171 _ff._;
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85_, pp. 382, 387, 463, 472.
The difficulties involved in attempting to administer so vast a
territory, possessed of wholly inadequate means of communication, and
embracing such a variety of social, religious, and economic communities,
were virtually insuperable in the seventeenth century. Difficult as the
task would have been in any case, it was rendered hopeless from the
outset by the opposition of all the colonies involved, and by the lack
of properly qualified men to administer the government, as well as by
those faults of the Stuarts which, it was now evident, could be counted
upon to wreck any administrative policy.
The choice of Andros, however, as the man to be entrusted with bringing
about the enormous changes incident to the new policy, while not
altogether happy, was probably as good a one as the circumstances of the
case allowed. The task of making the new government successful from the
standpoint of the King, and acceptable to the inhabitants, was beyond
the power of any man; and under James few were available for foreign
administrative posts who would be likely to be sympathetically inclined
toward the peculiarities of New Englanders. In an exceedingly difficult
position, with his choice of subordinates mainly limited to greedy
place-seekers from home and honestly disaffected colonials, Andros seems
to have carried out his orders with loyalty and probity, though not
always with tact or discretion.[1042]
Footnote 1042:
Of the modern scientific historians, Professor Channing is, perhaps,
the one who takes the most unfavorable view of Andros. _History_, vol.
II, pp. 180 _ff._ _Cf._, however, Osgood, _American Colonies_, vol.
III, pp. 394 _ff._, and Kimball, _Dudley_, pp. 43 _f._ The change in
attitude toward Andros, which dates from the publication of the
_Andros Tracts_ in 1868, does not seem to me to be as much invalidated
by the later publication of the _Andros Records_ as Professor Channing
considers.
The powers given to him in his commission and instructions were very
broad, and, under the conditions existing in the colonies, had he, in
truth, been the “tyrannical Bajazet” which he was proclaimed by the
Reverend Mr. Mather, the story of his brief rule would have been very
different from what it was in reality. As had been the case in the
temporary government of Dudley, there was no provision made for a
popular assembly, although Andros himself had no objection to such a
body, and had even tried to secure one for the inhabitants of New York
when Governor of that colony.[1043] The King, however, had steadily
opposed it in both provinces; and instead, the Governor, “by and with
the advice and consent of” the Council, or the majority of them, was
empowered to make all laws—which, it may be noted, was the exact wording
of the Act passed by Congress in 1804 for the government of Louisiana
after its purchase from France.[1044] The judicial and taxing functions
of the government were bestowed under the same conditions, though the
laws passed were to be approved in England, and appeals were allowed in
cases involving over £300. Although, apparently, the consent of the
Council was required in the above matters, the further power granted the
Governor, to suspend summarily any member of it “from sitting voteing
and Assisting therein,” if he should find “just cause,” gave him
virtually sole authority in the event of disagreement between them and
himself, in any case which he considered just.
Footnote 1043:
_N. Y. Col. Docts._, vol. III, p. 235.
Footnote 1044:
_Colonial Society Massachusetts Publications_, vol. II, p. 46;
_Organic Acts for the Territories of the United States_ (Senate Doct.
No. 148, 56th Congress, 1st Sess.), p. 18.
Such clauses in his instructions as those which required that, except in
cases of extraordinary necessity, he was to act with not less than seven
members of his Council, although his commission placed the limit at
five, and that, further, he was to permit the members to “enjoy freedom
of Debate and Votes in all things,” would seem to indicate that the
English authorities intended the Council to occupy a position of
importance in the scheme of government. But the scheme was one which
could hardly be workable. If the Council were, in reality, a body of
representatives of various sections and parties, it would necessarily
contain a large number of irreconcilables, who would constantly be
outvoted, as the Crown could not be expected to appoint a majority from
the opposition. Had the Governor, as was the case in many of the royal
colonies, possessed the executive power, and an elected assembly the
legislative, then the struggle between them would have taken the course
with which the student of colonial history is so familiar. In the scheme
of government which Andros was supposed to carry out, however, as in
that temporarily provided for Louisiana, the usual rôles of governor and
legislature were reversed, and Andros could quite legitimately consider
himself the sole legislative power, his acts being merely subject to
approval by a body the members of which were, in the first instance, at
least, removable by him. For a half-century, the one policy of the
leaders of Massachusetts, in their effort to balk England's efforts at
control, had been to “avoid or protract,” and it is not likely that that
policy would be suddenly laid aside. The complaints made in general
terms by five of the later accusers of Andros, that in legislation he
did not give sufficient opportunity for debate, that laws were passed
with only a bare quorum, and that, sometimes, the votes were not
counted, cannot, even if true, be taken as very serious charges,
considering his actual powers, and the practical difficulties which
beset him.[1045]
An attempt was, indeed, made to have the Council, which at first
comprised twenty-seven members, roughly representative of the various
parts of the Dominion; and, as other provinces were added, the
membership was enlarged to permit the seating of members from them. Nor
were prominent names wanting in the list, which included Dudley, the two
Winthrops, Stoughton, Hinckley, William Bradford, Arnold, Tyng, Pynchon,
Treat, and Allyn.[1046] Under the circumstances, however, such an
attempt was bound to break down, for important men from other parts of
the Dominion could not be expected to remain permanently in Boston, or
to make frequent and long journeys thither, in order to attend meetings
of a body whose only powers were those of advice and veto, and even
those of none too strong a character. It was entirely natural,
therefore, that, during the brief rule of Andros, the actual conduct of
affairs should tend, more and more, to be guided by his own will and
that of a clique among the councillors, and that attendance at the
meetings should have steadily dwindled.
Footnote 1045:
_Andros Tracts_, vol. I, pp. 140 _ff._
Footnote 1046:
_Andros Records_, in _American Antiquarian Society Proceedings_, N.
S., vol. XIII, pp. 239, 483.
As in the case of New Hampshire, the question of the establishment of a
new administrative machinery was complicated by the distinct one of
titles to the land. In the former case the unhappy complication had been
forced upon the English government, as the question in that province had
not been as to the rights of the Crown against those of its subjects,
but as to the legal claims of one subject against those of others. In
Massachusetts, the case was entirely different; and although the
colonists were technically at fault in not having taken out valid titles
when they might readily have done so, nevertheless, the course of the
English government was both stupid and unjust.
Throughout all the colonies in the early period, there was a general and
rather likeable prejudice against professional lawyers. But,
unfortunately, that prejudice, if indulged in too rashly in civilized
society, is apt to entail some _mauvais quarts d'heures_ on occasion. In
New England, not only was there an almost total absence of professional
lawyers, but there seems to have been very little legal knowledge among
any class in the community. The most marked difference between the
libraries of that section and those of Virginia, in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, is the rapidly increasing number of law-books to
be found on the shelves as we journey southward. In New England, not
only was the whole administration of justice in the hands of laymen who
had little or no knowledge of law, but the most important legal
questions with reference to the charter were, in virtually every case,
referred to the clergy, who seem to have been delightfully ignorant of
legal theory and practice, as evidenced both by their decisions and by
the fairly complete absence of any books on the subject in their
studies. They had proved but blind leaders of the blind, and the
insistence upon popular, but erroneous, interpretations of charter
rights, which had necessitated the voiding of that instrument, now
threatened an overwhelming disaster, which might easily have been
averted had the leaders been possessed of better legal training.
As we saw in an earlier chapter, virtually all the land granted in
Massachusetts, as well as in those other New England colonies which
possessed charters, had been bestowed upon towns in their corporate
capacity, and by them granted to individuals. But as the original
company had had no power to create other corporations, the towns, as
such, had no legal existence, and could not, therefore, give valid title
to land. Moreover, a company could not act except under its seal; which
the Massachusetts Company had rarely used in giving title. It may well
be that Randolph was far nearer the truth than usual in his figures,
when he wrote to Blathwayt that he did not believe that “10 men hold of
better Title then Town Grants or Indian Purchase and not Three have a
Grant legally executed.”[1047] Just as the substitution of Exodus,
Deuteronomy, and the discretion of the magistrate for the common law of
England could continue workable only so long as too many alien elements,
which would naturally find such a system “uncongenial and oppressive,”
were not added to the population, so a land-title, as derived by the
Reverend Mr. Higginson from “the Grand Charter in Genesis 1st. and 9th.
Chapters,” from Adam through Noah, could remain satisfactory only until
questioned by purchasers more used to modern forms.[1048] One of the
last acts of Connecticut under her charter, before submitting, had been
to validate land-titles by confirming under seal, to individuals, all
lands previously granted through towns; thus there was no land question
in Connecticut.[1049]
Footnote 1047:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. VI, p. 218.
Footnote 1048:
Reinsch, _English Common Law_, p. 11; _Andros Tracts_, vol. I, p. 88.
Footnote 1049:
_Conn. Col. Records_, vol. III, pp. 177 _f._ _Cf._ C. J. Hoadly,
_Hiding of the Charter_ (Acorn Club, 1900), pp. 14 _f._
But, aside from land in individual possession, there were, in most of
the colonies, very large amounts as yet ungranted at all, or still
possessed and used by towns in the then essential form of “commons” for
wood and pasture. Andros, in his instructions, had been directed to
dispose of all lands “yet undisposed of,” and others “for which Our
Royall Confirmation may be wanting,” for a moderate quit-rent, not under
two shillings and sixpence for every hundred acres. He was also
instructed that no man's “Freehold or Goods” were to “be taken away or
harmed,” but by laws agreeable to those of England.[1050] How far it may
have been the considered policy of the home government to take advantage
of the technical invalidity of title to allotted land, and how far such
attempts as were made may have been due to Andros's own reading, correct
though it was, of his orders, it is impossible to say. That the Crown
came into possession of the unallotted lands could be disputed by no
one. In regard to those that had been improved, the only statesmanlike
action would have been to confirm existing titles without rent. They
were, to a great extent, in the hands of innocent holders, who had
naturally believed that the colony's leaders, lay and clerical, who for
two generations had constituted the government, would have known enough
to give a valid title when they granted land.
Footnote 1050:
_New Hampshire Laws_, vol. I, pp. 159 _f._, 162.
Not only had the people for a long period enjoyed undisturbed
possession, but, to a considerable extent, as we have already pointed
out, New England had been settled by emigrants to whom such possession
of land in fee simple had been the main attraction. In fact, in respect
to land, the New England migration had accomplished what the English
Revolution had failed to do, and had virtually redistributed property.
It has often been said—not quite truly, perhaps—that the English
movement did not succeed because it left the injustices and inequalities
of the English property system untouched. To have done otherwise would
have meant the expropriation of a large and powerful class. In the
wilderness of America, the unlimited fund of free land could be drawn
upon for the purpose, and an economic leveling be accomplished with no
disturbance of existing rights. It was another of the results of the
influence of the frontier, to which, in the story of America, we have to
come back over and over again; for it was in this free and abundant land
that were sown the seeds of democracy and revolution. In New England,
owing in part to social and in part to geographic factors, the
equalizing of economic status had proceeded further, perhaps, than
anywhere else at that time; and the resultant wide distribution of small
holdings would there cause the maximum, both of dissatisfaction with any
policy attacking titles, and of difficulty in enforcing it.
It is, perhaps, only fair to say that the English government may not
have realized the full extent of the popular feeling, and that they
probably thought that the sum asked, which was less than a third of a
penny per acre, would be willingly paid as a means of permanently
validating the imperfect titles. All those residents of Boston
interested in the Narragansett country had voluntarily offered, a year
previously, to pay such a quit-rent as the amount asked later, and the
government of Massachusetts itself had collected quit-rents from its own
citizens in Maine.[1051] The policy of questioning all titles
constituted a typical example of Stuart injustice and ineptitude; and
the few test cases which Andros brought were handled in a way to afford
the greatest degree of apprehension and irritation. The needy and
ill-paid minor officials, upon whom he had to depend in large part for
the details of his administration, immediately scented plunder, and
sought recklessly to profit by it. Although the actual number of cases
in which titles were attacked individually was very small, the theory on
which the cases were based threatened virtually every individual outside
of Connecticut; and it is hard to conceive of any other blunder that the
government could have made which would, so instantly, have arrayed an
entire population in opposition. It is unnecessary to go into the
details of the cases, for there is but one answer to the question, “What
people that had the spirits of Englishmen could endure this?”[1052]
Footnote 1051:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1681-85_, pp. 22, 386, 527; _supra_, chap. XV;
_Dudley Records_, p. 276.
Footnote 1052:
_Andros Tracts_, vol. I, p. 87. The cases are given on pp. 88 _ff._
_Cf._ Palmer's defence, _Ibid._, pp. 49 _ff._; Also, Sewall, _Letter
Book_, vol. I, p. 68 _n._; Bond, _Quit-rent System_, pp. 42 _ff._
Cranfield, who had had hopes of getting the governorship of
Massachusetts for himself, had predicted that all might go well there,
“provided that Religion and Tertenancy doe not hinder”; and, at least,
had thus shown himself capable of picking out two of the probable rocks
on which the Dominion policy might founder.[1053] The fact that the new
government was pledged to allow liberty of conscience to all persons
would, in itself, have been sufficiently obnoxious to the clergy and old
church party, even had not the clause been added that the Church of
England was to be especially encouraged.[1054] Andros had been preceded
in his arrival by the Reverend Mr. Ratcliffe, a minister of that church,
and “extraordinary good preacher,”[1055] and Randolph and Mason had
petitioned for the use of one of the three Boston meeting-houses in
which to hold services. This, quite naturally, had been refused, and the
services were being held in the Town-house when the new Governor reached
Boston. Andros repeated the request, and was again refused, the
Town-house continuing to be used until the following March, when the
Governor once more reopened the question. Having no better success than
before, he obtained the key of the South Meeting-house from the sexton,
and forced the issue.[1056] From that time forward, the two
congregations held services there on Sunday mornings, the one following
the other. The sermons of the Puritan divines were of such inordinate
length that even the late Dudley government, though firm in the faith
and New England bred, had to pass a resolution that “the minister that
preaches on Thursday next be prayed from this Court to hasten his Sermon
because of the short days”;[1057] and one Sabbath morning was scarcely
long enough for two clergymen. Moreover, the wholly warranted sense of
injustice felt by the Congregationalists would not tend toward easing a
situation which, in the best of cases, would have been likely to breed
constant ill-feeling. Ecclesiastical quarrels are never lacking in
venom, and the intensity of the friction developed in the present case
was naturally intense. Within the year, however, the Episcopalians made
an effort to build a church of their own, though not without difficulty,
for Sewall, who was one of those who complained of their using the
Meeting-house, refused to sell them land upon which “to set up that
which the People of N. E. came over to avoid.”[1058] But a new church
was at last built, although Andros never worshiped in the King's Chapel,
as it was called, the Revolution occurring before its completion. His
religious sincerity is witnessed by the fact that, when he sailed for
England, virtually a prisoner, he left £30 as a gift toward the
building.[1059]
Footnote 1053:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. VI, p. 123.
Footnote 1054:
_Colonial Society Massachusetts Publications_, vol. II, p. 54; _New
Hampshire Laws_, vol. I, p. 161.
Footnote 1055:
_John Dunton's Letters_, p. 138.
Footnote 1056:
Sewall, _Diary_, vol. I, pp. 141, 162, 171 _f._
Footnote 1057:
_Dudley Records_, p. 277.
Footnote 1058:
Sewall, _Diary_, vol. I, p. 207. Sewall's remark was evidently made to
work off his spleen, for he adds, laconically, “besides 'twas
Entail'd.”
Footnote 1059:
H. W. Foote, _Annals of King's Chapel_ (Boston, 1882), vol. I, p. 90.
Arbitrary and unnecessarily irritating as was the Governor's course in
the matter, it must be confessed to have been a very mild form of
religious tyranny, as compared with that customarily indulged in by the
Puritans themselves. But in various minor ways he gave additional
offense to the clergy and more bigoted laymen, whose Puritanism had at
this time reached its narrowest point. On Christmas Day, the observance
of which was punishable by fine under the colony's laws, Sewall sadly
observes that the “governor goes to the Town-House to Service Forenoon
and Afternoon”; though he takes some heart by noting that “shops open
today generally and persons about their occasions.”[1060] A little
later, Increase Mather writes in his diary, that “this Sabbath
[Saturday] night was greatly profaned by bonfires &c. under pretence of
honor to the King's Coronation.” A sort of secondary Sabbath had been
developed by the clergy about the mid-week “lecture,” and on one of
these days, Mather notes that “Sword playing was this day openly
practised on a Stage in Boston & that immediately after the Lecture, so
the Devil has begun a Lecture in Boston on a Lecture day which was set
up for Christ.”[1061] Happily, the old order was changing, and the
community was gradually loosening the shackles of what, for most, had
become merely a dreary formalism.
Footnote 1060:
Sewall, _Diary_, vol. I, p. 163.
Footnote 1061:
_Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, Series II, vol. XIII, pp. 410 _f._
In an earlier chapter, we attempted to show what a change was wrought in
the attitude of the Puritans when they passed from opposition to the
government in England to the control of that in the colony. Under
Andros, they now once more found themselves in opposition; and it is
instructive to note in how many particulars they again proclaimed as
tyranny what they had themselves been practising. We have seen how laws
had been passed prohibiting anyone from settling in the colony, or
leaving it without the consent of the rulers. These laws had never been
repealed by the colonial authorities, but it was now complained that
“whereas by constant usage any person might remove out of the countrey
at his pleasure, a Law was made that no man should do so without the
Governours leave.” In view of the continuous refusal of the Puritan
government, when in power, to permit any dissatisfied citizen to go to
England to lodge complaint against their arbitrary acts, of which
refusal many examples have been cited, the complaints against Andros in
the matter are an amusing instance of immediate change of feeling upon
discovering whose ox was being gored. There is nothing to indicate that
Andros had any intention of preventing anyone from carrying an appeal;
but the same writer who complained of the above act goes on to say, with
an entire lack of humor, considering the past history of the colony,
“how should any dissatisfied persons ever obtain liberty to go to
England to complain of their being oppressed by Arbitrary
Governours?”[1062] As a matter of fact, dissatisfied persons now
possessed that liberty for the first time in the history of
Massachusetts.
Footnote 1062:
_Andros Tracts_, vol. I, pp. 80, 142. The act is given in vol. III,
pp. 92 _f._
Under the former régime, the right to organize churches, the regulation
of the schools, and the licensing of printing, had all been kept rigidly
under the control of the government, which meant the representatives of
the minority of the population constituting the Congregational church.
But a loud cry of tyranny was raised when the new government passed an
act that no schools should be kept except “such as shall be allowed,”
and established Dudley as censor of the press, which Hutchinson admits
merely changed its keeper.[1063]
Footnote 1063:
_Andros Records_, pp. 467, 249; Hutchinson, _History_, vol. I, p. 318.
Andros was required by his instructions not to allow unlicensed
printing. _New Hampshire Laws_, vol. I, p. 166.
The order that all records of the former governments should be lodged at
Boston undoubtedly entailed hardship for anyone who wished to examine
them; and the requirement that final action in the probating of wills or
granting letters of administration, in estates of the value of over £50,
must take place in Boston was also an unpractical attempt at
bureaucratic centralization.[1064] Moreover, West, to whom Randolph had
farmed out the office of Secretary, was a peculating subordinate, of
whom Randolph later wrote that he “extorts what fees he pleases, to the
great oppression of the people, and renders the present government
grievous.”[1065] The legal fees, as enacted in 1687, were fair and
moderate,—that for the probate of a will, for example, being ten
shillings,—and there is only questionable evidence for Hutchinson's
statement, inaccurate in another respect, that the usual charge was
fifty shillings.[1066] But there is some evidence that West and some of
the minor officials attempted extortion even after the establishment of
an official scale; and Randolph complained that two of them, West being
one, were insubordinate in Maine, where they “were as arbitrary as the
great Turke,” and were upsetting matters already settled by
Andros.[1067] How far Andros might have been able to organize the
enormous and administratively unwieldy dominion, and rid himself of
unreliable subordinates, had he been given time, cannot be known, as he
was to have only a few months in which to do so after the addition of
the southern provinces.
Footnote 1064:
_Andros Records_, p. 467; _Cal. State Pap., Col., 1689-92_, p. 202;
_Randolph Papers_, vol. VI, p. 271; _Conn. Col. Records_, vol. III,
pp. 423 _f._
Footnote 1065:
_Randolph Papers_, vols. VI, p. 223, and IV, p. 198.
Footnote 1066:
Hutchinson, _History_, vol. I, pp. 320 _f._ For the legal fees under
the Dudley and Andros administrations _vide_ _Dudley Records_, pp.
242, 245, 283; _Andros Records_, pp. 266, 467; _Randolph Papers_, vol.
IV, pp. 147 _ff._
Footnote 1067:
_Ibid._, pp. 226, 228.
Aside from these and other difficulties, his administration would
undoubtedly have been wrecked on the question of taxation, whether the
Revolution had occurred in England or not. He himself, and every one
else apparently, except the King, realized the necessity for an elected
assembly; but it had been denied, and there was, therefore, nothing to
do but to levy the taxes without the direct consent of the people. Under
his commission, Andros, “by and with the advice and consent” of a
majority of his Council, had been given power to levy such taxes as
might be necessary for the support of the government;[1068] and at the
session of March 1, 1687, a general bill, embodying some former ones,
was presented for consideration. It aroused warm discussion over
details, and both the records, and the long subsequent complaint of
Stoughton and others that Andros had “held the Council together
unreasonably a very long time about it,” would indicate that on that
day, at least, there had been no suppression of freedom of debate.[1069]
After a second reading, and a lapse of two days, it was passed on the
third day, _nemine contradicente_, according to the records, though the
complainants, several years later, claimed that the vote had not been
counted, and that many of the councilors had remained silent, under
“great discouragement and discountenance.”[1070]
Footnote 1068:
_Colonial Society Massachusetts Publications_, vol. II, pp. 46 _f._
Footnote 1069:
_Andros Records_, pp. 256; _Andros Tracts_, vol. I, pp. 139 _f._
Footnote 1070:
_Andros Records_, p. 258; _Andros Tracts_, vol. I, p. 140. Part of the
complaint is disproved by the written record.
The attempt to levy the tax met with immediate resistance in Essex
County, and particularly in the town of Ipswich, where the men assembled
in town-meeting refused to elect an assessor. Under the leadership of
John Wise, certain of the inhabitants drew up a protest, stating that
their liberties as Englishmen had been infringed, and refusing to pay
any taxes not levied by an elected assembly.[1071] Twenty-eight were at
once arrested, of whom a number, “appearing more ingenuous and less
culpable,” were promptly released.[1072] Six, however, supposed to be
the ringleaders, were thrown into prison at Boston, a writ of _habeas
corpus_ having been denied.[1073] When they were later brought to trial,
Dudley was the presiding judge, and Wise claimed that the jury was
packed for the occasion. The six were fined, in all, £185, and forced to
pay heavy charges in court fees, while Wise was suspended from his
ministerial functions. The fines were large, but the offense naturally
was serious in the eyes of Andros, who had, perforce, to carry out a
policy not of his own making; and it may not be unfair to recall that,
in the days when the “saddle was upon the Bay mare,” the Puritans had
levied fines of £750 upon Dr. Child and his fewer associates.
Although the towns, as has been stated, had never had legal standing as
corporations, and, with the overthrow of the charter, had ceased to have
a political one, the new government had, nevertheless, allowed them to
continue functioning much as usual. As a result of the attitude of those
in Essex on the tax-matter, however, the Council passed a law limiting
town-meetings to one a year for the purpose of electing local officers,
and thus struck at the very root of popular government in the
colony.[1074]
Footnote 1071:
_Ibid._, pp. 83 _ff._; _Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, pp. 171 _ff._
Footnote 1072:
_Andros Records_, pp. 477 _f._
Footnote 1073:
The right of _habeas corpus_ under the Statute of Charles II, 1679,
did not apply to the colonies. It is questionable whether our rights
to it depend upon that statute or the common law. _Cf._ A. H.
Carpenter, “Habeas Corpus in the Colonies,” _American Historical
Review_, vol. VIII, pp. 19 _f._ In spite of the charges against
Andros, the leaders apparently took the ground, before his arrival,
that the right did not extend to the colony. _Cf._ Mather Papers,
_Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll_., Series IV, vol. VIII, p. 390.
Footnote 1074:
_Andros Records_, p. 494; _Conn. Col. Records_, vol. III, pp. 427
_ff._
The addition of one colony after another, in rapid succession, to the
province for which Andros was responsible, raised administrative
problems of the gravest sort, and had necessitated journeys from Boston
to Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York. When the last-named had been
placed under his rule, in 1688, he had also been given the main control
over Indian affairs for nearly all English North America, and had also
had to journey to Albany for a conference with the Mohawks. With wholly
inadequate assistance from the greedy office-seekers, who in large part
formed his staff, his position was certainly an unenviable one. It was
not long before the Indian question on the eastern frontier, with the
larger danger of the French lurking in the background, also arose, to
add to the difficulties of the harassed Governor. It was,
unquestionably, a wise policy to unite the Indian affairs of all the
colonies under one head; for the French in the valleys of the St.
Lawrence and the Mississippi now threatened the entire rear of the
English empire on the continent, and in the impending struggle between
the two, the allegiance of the Indian tribes dwelling between them would
become a factor of supreme importance. The disunited English colonies,
quarreling among themselves, and wholly selfish in the various policies
pursued by them in relation to the natives, offered a contrast, palpable
enough to the savages, to the unified control of the French.
Andros had already made one trip to the eastward, in the spring of 1688,
for the purpose of restoring the fort at Pemaquid; and while there, had
despoiled the home of St. Castine, an intruding French trader, who was
living a half-savage life with an assorted selection of Indian wives,
more notable for number than for virtue.[1075] The Governor called
together the sachems of the local tribes, endeavored to bind them to the
English cause, and then had to proceed to New York. While he was
detained there, several minor Indian attacks occurred at New Haven, up
the Connecticut River, and in Maine, resulting in the killing, in all,
of some twenty-six whites.[1076] After a proclamation ordering the
Indians to restore their prisoners and surrender the murderers had
proved unavailing, Andros organized an expedition of several hundred
men, and himself marched with them into Maine, destroying many of the
Indian settlements, and capturing much of their ammunition and
supplies.[1077] Randolph claims, however, what is confirmed by other
documents, that Boston merchants sent the enemy a vessel of forty-two
tons loaded with powder, shot, and food, and so undid much of Andros's
work.[1078]
Footnote 1075:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, pp. 224 _ff._
Footnote 1076:
_Hutchinson Papers_, vol. II, p. 309; _Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, p.
276; _Andros Tracts_, vol. II, p. 207.
Footnote 1077:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1685-88_, p. 615; _Andros Tracts_, vol. III,
pp. 21 _f._
Footnote 1078:
_Randolph Papers_, vols. IV, p. 277, and VI, p. 294. This is confirmed
in _Cal. State Pap., Col., 1689-92_, pp. 212, 564, 585. _Cf._, also,
_Andros Tracts_, vol. III, p. 24.
The Indian troubles were made the basis for the spreading of alarming
rumors that Andros was intending to turn the colonies over to France,
and introduce popery, and even that the Mohawks were to be called in to
destroy Boston. All sorts of trumpery evidence was adduced to lend color
to these unfounded libels, to which even Increase Mather did not
hesitate to lend his influence.[1079] While they were utterly without
foundation so far as Andros was concerned, who treated them with
deserved contempt, they fitted in with both the religious and political
fears of Protestant Englishmen in the closing years of the Stuarts.
Moreover, recently published letters of Randolph now show that he, at
least, had begun to trim his sails to meet a possible breeze from Rome,
should James make England a Catholic country; and his suggestion as to
the superior usefulness of Jesuits, as instruments among the Indians,
and even of the possibility of establishing a monastery, may have been
noised abroad.[1080] As we have already noted, the mentality of the
Massachusetts of this period was peculiarly liable to panic and
fantastic fears; and whether or not the leaders believed the fables they
spread, they undoubtedly realized that the readiest way to organize a
revolution against Andros would be by religious prejudice.
Footnote 1079:
_Ibid._, vols. I, pp. 30, 101 _ff._, and II, pp. 50 _f._
Footnote 1080:
_Randolph Papers_, vol. VI, pp. 242 _f._, 246, 251.
It is probable that the fundamental weakness of the King's policy would
have borne its natural fruit, even had there been no Revolution in
England; but that event was to offer the most favorable opportunity for
the minor movement in the colony. Andros was still at Pemaquid when he
received what was probably his first intimation of the coming attempt to
overthrow the government in England, in the form of a proclamation,
which the King ordered to be published, calling upon all subjects to
show their loyalty in view of a threatened invasion from Holland.[1081]
By the end of March, 1689, the Governor was back in Boston, and, ten
days later, young John Winslow arrived from the island of Nevis, with
news of Prince William's landing in England and a copy of his
declaration.[1082] Rumors had also reached Andros, who requested Winslow
to show him the declaration as confirmation. On Winslow's refusal,
Andros told him he was “a saucy fellow,” and had him committed to jail
for overnight, releasing him in the morning, when he showed the paper to
the magistrate.[1083]
Footnote 1081:
_Andros Tracts_, vol. I, p. 75 _n._
Footnote 1082:
_Ibid._, pp. 77 _f._; _Randolph Papers_, vol. IV, p. 277; _N. Y. Col.
Docts._, vol. III, p. 581.
Footnote 1083:
_Andros Tracts_, vols. I, p. 78, and II, p. 209; _Randolph Papers_,
vol. V, p. 57.
Andros's position was a difficult one. Although not in sympathy with
much both in the religious position and in the absolutist tendencies of
his Stuart masters, he had to the full the soldierly qualities of
obedience and loyalty, and on the 16th of April, he wrote to Brockholls
in New York that there was “a general buzzing among the people,” and
warned the magistrates and officers to be on their guard against
probable trouble.[1084]
Footnote 1084:
Cited by Hutchinson, _History_, vol. I, pp. 332 _f._
Two days after, on the 18th, the storm broke in Boston. There is
evidence to indicate that the leaders had laid their plans some time in
advance, and that the staging of the events followed a preconcerted
arrangement, in spite of their feigned ignorance.[1085] Early in the
morning, armed crowds of men and boys proceeded to the centre of the
town from either end, captured Randolph, several of the justices, the
sheriff, a number of the captains, and others of the government, and
locked them in the jail. Andros had already taken refuge in the fort,
while Dudley was absent on Long Island. Bradstreet, Danforth, and others
of the popular leaders were escorted to the Town-house, and at noon a
lengthy, and certainly not hastily prepared, declaration was read to the
assembled people from a balcony.[1086] It was an able, but exceedingly
biased, indictment of the Andros government, while the art of the
demagogue was evident in the weaving in of old slanders as to the
Governor's pretended treachery with the French and Indians, the raking
up of the Popish Plot in England, and a passing tribute to the “Scarlet
Whore.” It ended with flattering references to the Prince of Orange, and
the statement that the persons of “those few Ill men,” who had been the
authors of the colony's misery, had been seized lest they should have
given the province “away to a Forreign Power,” before orders might be
received from the new Parliament. The wording would indicate that it had
been expected that Andros, and perhaps Dudley, who, with Randolph, were
certainly the chief of the “ill men” in popular estimation, would
already have been in custody by the time it was read. Andros's having
taken refuge in the fort probably upset the plans in that respect. The
paper contains every internal evidence, indeed, of having been prepared
some time before, and certainly not after, the mob had begun its work on
that eventful morning. Nevertheless, Winthrop, Bradstreet, Stoughton,
Danforth, and others of the leaders immediately drew up another, stating
that the action of the people was a surprise, of “the first motion
whereof” they had been entirely ignorant, and calling upon Andros to
surrender the government, and deliver up the fort, which otherwise would
be carried by storm.[1087]
Footnote 1085:
For the events of the revolution, _vide_, _Andros Tracts_, vols. I,
pp. 3 _ff._, II, pp. 191 _ff._, and III, pp. 22 _ff._, 145 _ff._;
Hutchinson, _History_, vol. I, pp. 334 _f._; _Randolph Papers_, vol.
IV, pp. 264 _ff._; _Cal. State Pap., Col., 1689-92_, pp. 33, 66 _ff._,
92 _ff._
Footnote 1086:
Given in _Andros Tracts_, vol. I, pp. 11 _ff._
Footnote 1087:
_Andros Tracts_, vols. I, p. 20, and III, p. 145 _n._; Osgood,
_American Colonies_, vol. III, p. 419.
To have held the little fort, or the defenses on Castle Island, for any
length of time, in the face of overwhelming odds, would have been
impossible. To have defended the fort temporarily against attack would
merely have caused useless bloodshed; and, fortunately for the
colonists, Andros, throughout his whole career, had never shown the
bloodthirsty vindictiveness of an Endicott or a Norton. That he was no
coward is shown by the fact that he abandoned the shelter of the fort,
and made his way through the tumultuous streets to a personal conference
with the revolutionary leaders gathered in the council chamber. The
meeting, however, effected no compromise; Andros was made prisoner, and,
through one of his subordinates, but apparently on his orders, the fort
was surrendered. The following day, the Castle also was yielded, and
possession taken of the frigate, though the latter, in order to save the
men's pay, was not required to be formally surrendered. Some days later,
Dudley was located in the Narragansett country, brought to Boston, and
placed in the common jail. In Europe, James II had dropped the Great
Seal of England in the Thames, and fled to France. In America, his
Dominion of New England lay shattered.
[Illustration:
Demand for Surrender of Sir Edmond Andros
Broadside in Massachusetts Archives, State House, Boston
]