THE REASSERTION OF IMPERIAL CONTROL
The Puritan Revolution in England had failed to establish a permanent
government, which should provide for the liberty of the individual, and
be consonant with the genius of the English race. The ensuing
restoration of the monarchy was not the return of a king crushing
rebellion by force of arms. It was the peaceful reëstablishment of an
institution demanded by large and important elements among the people,
who considered it as essential to the welfare of the state, and who
believed that the individuals who might occupy the throne had been
taught sufficiently by the events of the preceding two decades not to
attempt to overstep the position that had come to be assigned to them in
the popular view of the constitution. But if, in the sphere of practical
politics, the Revolution had merely shattered the political edifice
without having been able to build another, in the domain of political
thought it had left a rich legacy of ideas, which were to mould into
modern form the institutions now reëstablished by the will of the
people. We have already seen how quickly the anti-English party in
Massachusetts had seized upon one of the most revolutionary of the
Commonwealth doctrines, and proclaimed for themselves, as taught by
Parliament, that “_salus populi_ is _suprema lex_.” These ideas,
however, were not to bear their full fruit until detached from their
theological origin and divested of their religious associations. This
secularization of politics, by the substitution of parties for churches
as political forces, was necessary before further advances could be made
either in religious toleration or in civil liberty; and it was in the
years following the Restoration that the transition occurred both in old
England and in New.[769]
Footnote 769:
_Cf._ Lord Acton, _Modern History_, pp. 205 _f._
In the latter, and more particularly in Massachusetts, theology and
politics had been more closely intertwined than anywhere else in the
Empire, and the earlier course of the struggle to break them asunder has
been indicated in the preceding chapters. As we have there pointed out,
the fundamental idea of theocracy was such as to preclude the
possibility of either civil or religious freedom. The latter was too
evidently fatal to the maintenance of that peculiar form of government
to be allowed, if it could possibly be suppressed; and the former could
not exist in a state in which the entire political power was to be
permanently wielded by a small minority, whose essential qualification
was its assent to an unique form of ecclesiastical organization. To what
lengths the theocratical party in Massachusetts were willing to go in
their efforts to remain in power had been shown by their contest with
the Quakers. Although they were defeated in that struggle, amid many
evidences that religion and politics were becoming more and more
distinct in the minds of the people, the struggle was by no means ended,
nor the transition complete. The political contest with the
mother-country, which was now to begin in earnest, and which has often
been made to seem a struggle for liberty against tyranny, was in large
part, in this early stage, merely a continuance, under another guise, of
the attempt of the theocracy to maintain its position and to defy all
efforts, either from within or without, to interfere with its
unrestricted exercise of power.
The early years of the Restoration mark, in many respects, the beginning
of the modern period of English history; and this is as true of the
Empire as a whole as of the constitutional developments at home. The
far-seeing colonial policy of Clarendon sought to take advantage of the
new outburst of energy which marked the people at that time, in order to
round out and consolidate the nation's colonial possessions; and the
main aspects of imperial policy became military and commercial. The Act
of Uniformity, passed in 1662, and aimed at the Puritans, did not
include the colonies in its operation; and the course of events proved
that the influence of the home authorities was thenceforth to be on the
side of toleration in so far as America was concerned.
When Clarendon entered office, the colonial dependencies of England in
the New World consisted in general of two isolated groups of settlements
on the continent, with island outposts at the extreme north and south. A
study of a map of the period reveals the essential weakness of the
English position from the standpoint both of trade and of imperial
defence. The two most important colonial events in Clarendon's
ministry—the great extension of English continental territory to the
south by the settlement of the Carolinas, and the acquisition of New
Netherland—added enormously to the strength and unity of the Empire. By
the elimination of the Dutch, Clarendon argued that not only would the
northern and southern colonies be relieved of the presence of a hostile
state lying between them, but the menace of a flank or rear attack by
the French would be largely removed from New England by securing the
important military advantages of the Hudson-Mohawk route, the Lake
Champlain gateway, and the friendship of the Iroquois. Moreover, so long
as Holland, which was England's most serious rival in the world's
carrying trade, should remain in possession of New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Delaware, it would obviously be almost impossible to
enforce the Navigation Acts, upon the observance of which, it was
rightly believed at that stage, that the Empire's commercial success and
power of defense almost wholly depended.
In this last respect, however, New England, although settled ostensibly
by loyal Englishmen, was almost as much of a danger as was New
Netherland, settled by the Empire's rivals. New England's foreign
commerce, which had amounted to very little before the English Civil
War, had grown rapidly with the prosperity of the West-Indian sugar
colonies, and by the time of the Restoration had assumed considerable
proportions, both with the other colonies and with foreign countries.
But New England merchants paid almost no attention to the laws of
trade.[770] In 1665, Captain Leverett, who had seized a Dutch vessel
from Amsterdam trading at Boston, was strongly censured by the
Massachusetts General Court, which announced that such seizures under
the Navigation Acts would not be permitted “without the consent or
allowance of authoritie heere established”; and the officer escaped
severer punishment only by apologies and by solemnly protesting his
fidelity to the local administration.[771] Two years later, and again in
1658, Rhode Island officially proclaimed free trade with the Dutch; and
in 1660, Connecticut, through her governor, denied that she had any laws
not permitting it.[772]
Footnote 770:
Hutchinson, _History_, vol. I, pp. 174, 179.
Footnote 771:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. i, p. 229.
Footnote 772:
_R. I. Records_, vol. I, pp. 356, 389; _New York Colonial Documents_,
vol. XIV, p. 459. In the same year, the directors of the Dutch West
India Company wrote to Stuyvesant that he should treat the English
frigate, “which lies at New Haven and has already threatened the
communication between the Manhattans and New England,” as a pirate.
_Ibid._, p. 458. _Cf._ _Ibid._, p. 453.
New England's flouting of imperial authority, and more particularly, the
pretensions of Massachusetts to what was virtually an independent
sovereignty, were becoming notorious throughout the Empire and in
foreign countries. If England should suffer herself to be defied with
impunity by her own subjects, the decline in her prestige could hardly
fail to result in the disintegration of the Empire, both from internal
revolts and from external aggression. It may be pointed out that such a
result, although serious for England, would have been fatal to the
colonies, which would have played the part of Red Riding Hood to the
French wolf.
The colonial policy of Clarendon was probably influenced, in the main,
by the above considerations in respect to North America. But, when the
new government came into power at the Restoration, there were other
reasons why its attention should immediately be turned to New England.
We have already noted how the trampling upon private rights by
Massachusetts in her aggressive policy of annexation, the
dissatisfaction with her government on the part of many of her own
citizens, the persecution endured by the Quakers, and the various
disputes between the colonies over boundaries and other matters, had
occasioned complaints, increasing in number and seriousness. Owing
mainly to the extraordinary ability and persistence which the Bay Colony
had shown in the “gentle art of making enemies” for the past thirty
years, all of the above matters, and others, in their worst possible
light, were promptly brought to the attention of the restored King and
Council. Throughout the years 1660 and 1661, the ghosts of old wrongs
done by Massachusetts seem constantly to have haunted the meetings of
the Council, to plead their cause against that colony. The appeals of
the Quakers, and the effective but temporary succor afforded them, have
already been noted in an earlier chapter. Edward Godfrey, who had been
forced out of his government in Maine by the Massachusetts
Commissioners, filed long reports of his grievances and of “the
usurpations of the Bostoners.”[773] Robert Mason protested against the
annexation of New Hampshire, and disregard of his rights there, as did
Ferdinando Gorges, grandson of old Sir Ferdinando, in reference to his
Province of Maine.[774] Captain Breedon gave a description of the
political conditions in Massachusetts, emphasizing the distinction
between freemen and non-freemen, the pretensions of sovereignty, and the
refusal to use the oath of allegiance, and called attention to the
shelter then being given to Whalley and Goffe, two of the regicide
judges, who had been received with open friendliness by the colonial
authorities.[775] A group of English merchants, who had invested
£15,000—the equivalent of, perhaps, $300,000 to-day—in iron-works at
Lynn, claimed that, for alleged debts, their agents had been arrested,
their property seized, and that they were unable to gain satisfaction in
the colonial courts.[776]
Footnote 773:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 12, 18, 26.
Footnote 774:
_Ibid._, pp. 26, 22.
Footnote 775:
_Ibid._, pp. 15 _f._
Footnote 776:
_Ibid._, p. 17. The _Massachusetts Records_ say £13,000. The suit was
brought by Josiah Winslow and Robert Keaynes, the latter being the one
who was involved in the “sow case” and the La Tour episode.
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. i, p. 219.
A number of other petitions were, with one exception, directed against
Massachusetts, and complained mainly of the illegality or disloyalty of
that colony's actions. Giles Sylvester, of Shelter Island, in the
exception noted, asserted that New Haven had wrongfully confiscated
three thousand acres of his land, because he would not acknowledge
himself to be under its government.[777]
Footnote 777:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, p. 18. The _New Haven Records_ are
silent as to the case; but the Sylvesters were disliked by New Haven,
in part because they sheltered Quakers from persecution. For that
reason, and because he was said to have written a “blasphemous” letter
against the New England magistrates, New Haven seized £100 belonging
to Giles Sylvester until he should give satisfaction, if the charges,
which were noted as hearsay, should be proved. Considering that the
New Haven settlers were mere squatters without any legal rights, that
Sylvester properly denied their jurisdiction over him, and that the
amount, equivalent to about $2000 to-day, was illegally seized on
merely hearsay evidence that Sylvester had criticized them, the case
may be taken as showing the possibilities for strangers of Puritan
colonial justice. _New Haven Records_, vol. II, p. 364.
Of more interest, however, than these petitions for the righting of
individual wrongs, were the information and advice given by Samuel
Maverick, who happened to be in England at the return of Charles.
Maverick, as we have seen, had been living in Massachusetts some years
before John Endicott or John Winthrop had thought of going there. For
nearly forty years, since 1624, he had watched its development, and, as
he possessed considerable ability and a fairly sound judgment, in
addition to his almost unique personal knowledge of the colony's
history, his opinion would naturally carry weight with the English
authorities. He had steadily opposed the political and religious policy
of the Massachusetts leaders, and had been one of the signers of the
Child petition in 1646. In the letters which, for some years following
1660, he frequently wrote to Lord Clarendon, his complaints of the past
occupy a minor position, and his plans for the reorganization of the
colonies evidently either coincided with those of the minister or
largely helped to form them.
His suggestions embraced the elimination of the Dutch danger by the
taking of New Netherland, for which he rightly thought that a small
force would suffice. In view of the religious intolerance, the political
disabilities, the pronounced disloyalty, the encroachments and boundary
disputes, in evidence in New England, he also advised the strengthening
of the royal control. He suggested that the oath of allegiance be
insisted upon; that the colonial laws be revised so as to agree as
nearly as possible with those of England; that writs be issued in the
king's name; that liberty of conscience be allowed; that the franchise
be given to all freeholders, and the bounds of every patent accurately
determined.[778] As he estimated that three fourths of the people were
loyal, and that the greater part of the Massachusetts non-freemen would
favor the plan, he looked for no resistance; and although he suggested
sending out a commission, he thought that no force would be necessary
except for the capture of New Netherland. He certainly knew the colonies
well, and, in part at least, may have been right in his assumptions.
Outside of the government clique in Massachusetts there was undoubtedly
a party of substantial men who would have welcomed such a settlement of
matters, and the local authorities there were apparently doubtful as to
how far their course of opposition to England would be acquiesced in by
the country at large, should all the facts become known.
Footnote 778:
_Clarendon Papers_ (New York Historical Society), pp. 21, 27, 35 _f._,
43.
On the other hand, if the years following the Restoration marked the
beginning of modern England, no less did they embrace the actual
beginning of American history. The first settlers were in no real sense
Americans. They were Englishmen, with English associations, connections,
and habits of thought. Their natures were not altered fundamentally by
sailing to a land where the sun rose five hours later. The remoteness of
that land from the mother-country, and the frontier conditions which
prevailed in it did, indeed, change, gradually but profoundly, the
attitude of the settlers toward many matters. But that took time, and it
was only with the rise of the second generation, which knew nothing of
England by personal experience; which had no close ties with the
home-land; whose minds and characters, for the worse as well as for the
better, were wholly the products of the frontier, and whose interests
and outlook were entirely provincial, that an American, as distinct from
an English, strain may be said to appear in the history of our common
race. New England had been settled for approximately a generation when
the Restoration occurred, and there must have been, by then, a
considerable element of native-born colonials from twenty to thirty
years old. If, however, the ties which bound these younger citizens to
England were looser, their education was poorer, their religious
feelings weaker, and their opposition to the old theocratic policy
stronger.
It is impossible, from these conflicting factors, and with only the
evidence at hand, to say how nearly right was Maverick's estimate of the
people's loyalty; but he was certainly wrong in believing that it would
stand the test of taxes imposed from above, or of blundering and
tactless officials. He was right, however, in urging that comprehensive
reforms be undertaken in colonial management, and that the case was
urgent in that it would become more difficult year by year. Something,
indeed, required to be done, for the good of the colonies as well as of
the Empire; and could it have been done wisely and tactfully, this was
undoubtedly the moment to have accomplished it.
All those interested in New England could not fail to recognize, with
varying emotions, that the situation had altered. The possibility that
England might at last be able to exercise authority over her
dependencies could bode nothing but evil to the rulers of Massachusetts,
in view of their record, theological beliefs, and political aspirations.
To the proprietors of Maine and New Hampshire, on the other hand, it
meant the possibility of recovering their properties, which, in turn,
portended unsettlement and trouble for the inhabitants of those
provinces. For, although the course of Massachusetts in annexing the
eastern settlements had been overbearing, illegal, and unscrupulous, the
inhabitants were undoubtedly better off than they would have been under
absentee proprietors, whose main interest would be in land-titles and
taxes. Connecticut and New Haven, which were not possessed of any
charters, and were exercising the powers of government without any
warrant, could not but be anxious for the future; and Rhode Island,
hoping, perhaps, for aid against her selfish and aggressive neighbors,
hastened to proclaim the King within her borders.[779]
Footnote 779:
_R. I. Records_, vol. I, p. 432 (October 18, 1660).
In 1661, John Winthrop the younger, then, and for fifteen years
following, Governor of Connecticut,[780] was appointed as agent to go to
England, in order to present his colony's address to the King and, if
possible, to procure a charter.[781] He was instructed to try to secure
one as nearly like that of Massachusetts as might be, though this seems
to have been considered improbable of attainment. He was also to have
the bounds extended southward to Delaware Bay, and eastward to Plymouth,
thus cynically ignoring the rights, legal or not, of New Netherland, New
Haven, and Rhode Island. This conscienceless imperialism, which the
colonists would have denounced as tyranny and usurpation if indulged in
by England, was oddly balanced by New England conservatism in money
matters; for Connecticut's agent was instructed, in case he should be
unable to acquire all of the coast to Virginia, to content himself with
reaching the Hudson River, as the colony did “not judge it requisite to
expend money upon a Pattent.”[782]
Footnote 780:
The law against serving two successive terms was repealed May 17,
1660. _Conn. Col. Records_, vol. I, p. 347.
Footnote 781:
_Ibid._, pp. 367 _ff._, 582.
Footnote 782:
_Ibid._, pp. 580 _f._, 581 _n._
As a matter of fact, however, an expenditure was made of about £500;
and, possibly as a result of the judicious disposal of this sum among
the needy courtiers about the throne, Winthrop secured a charter so
liberal in its terms as to serve as the constitution of colony and state
until 1818.[783] It created a corporation upon the place, provided for
exactly the form of government which the colonists already enjoyed,
permitted them to erect courts and make laws, and defined their bounds
as extending from “Narragansett river, commonly called Narragansett
Bay,” to the Pacific Ocean.[784] These new limits not only included a
large strip of Dutch territory and almost the whole of Rhode Island, but
wiped out New Haven entirely.
Footnote 783:
_Ibid._, p. 369. _Cf._ A. Johnston, _Connecticut_ (Boston, 1887), pp.
17 _ff._
Footnote 784:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 87 _f._ (April 23, 1662).
The latter colony had made no effort to secure a patent since 1645, when
the agent dispatched for that purpose had been drowned in the ill-fated
and mysterious ship that had carried down with it, not only the
political hopes, but the financial fortunes, of the colonists.[785]
There had been a growing element in the colony, as in Massachusetts,
which was opposed to its theocratical government, and about the time of
the Restoration, this opposition was giving Davenport and his followers
much trouble. To the demand of sundry non-freemen that the franchise be
extended, the New Haven Court had replied that they could not commit
“weighty civill or military trusts into the hands of either a crafty
Achitophell or a bloody Joab,” and that any one who should make such
suggestions would be considered “troublers of our peace and disturbers
of our Israell.” They asserted that to grant a voice in the government
to any but church members would be to defeat the main end of the
plantation, from “which we cannot be perswaded to divert.”[786] This was
exactly the stand and reasoning persisted in by the Massachusetts
leaders at the same time. Both groups stood stubbornly with their backs
toward the future, and their eyes on Judea, attempting to block the path
to individual liberty with the whole strength of civil power and
religious prejudice. They as little understood the new day which was
dawning as did the restored Stuarts in England; and the New England
theocrats and the English monarchs were at one in their resistance to
the forces of freedom.
Footnote 785:
_New Haven Records_, vols. I, pp. 149, 211, and II, p. 519. The early
references to the real and phantom ships are gathered in Atwater, _New
Haven_, pp. 537 _ff._
Footnote 786:
_New Haven Records_, vol. II, p. 404; _cf._ pp. 429 _ff._
The disaffected element in New Haven, however, was large and important;
and when Connecticut's imperialistic ambitions were gratified, and she
obtained a charter which gave her all her neighbor's territory, a very
large proportion of New Haven's inhabitants indicated that they
preferred the “Christless rule” of Connecticut, with its property
qualification for the franchise, to that of the New Haven churches.
Throughout the whole process of absorption of the smaller colony by its
now aggrandized neighbor, both the action and the manner of Connecticut
are difficult to defend. New Haven, however, could not have stood alone
much longer. Her commercial hopes had been proved without foundation;
she had unnecessarily, but seriously, offended the English Crown; her
theocratic government was inflexible; and her annexation by the more
democratic and progressive commonwealth was wholly an advantage, then
and later.[787]
Footnote 787:
For the events connected with the transfer, _vide_ _New Haven
Records_, vol. II, pp. 513 _ff._; _Acts United Colonies_, vol. II, pp.
308 _ff._, 318, 324 _f._; _Conn. Col. Records_, vol. II, pp. 407, 415,
437, 586 _ff._
In the ill-defined bounds of the Connecticut charter lay the seeds of
many a future contest; but the effect upon Rhode Island was as immediate
as upon New Haven. As we have already seen, the Narragansett country had
for some time been a matter of controversy between the three adjoining
colonies. As Connecticut now extended to the Bay, by royal grant,
Massachusetts was seemingly excluded, and the contest lay between Rhode
Island's patent rights and those conferred in her neighbor's new
charter. John Clarke, in England at the same time as Winthrop,
immediately petitioned the King for a new charter for Rhode Island.[788]
This was granted, its governmental provisions being virtually the same
as those of the Connecticut patent, except for the notable clause that,
as the Rhode Islanders were then holding forth the “livelie experiment
that a most flourishing civell state may stand and best bee maintained
... with a full libertie in religious concernments,” therefore no person
in the colony should ever be “molested, punished, disquieted, or called
in question, for any differences in opinione in matters of religion,”
any law enacted in England notwithstanding.[789] This patent, like the
Connecticut one, was so liberal, and so well drawn, that it remained the
constitution of colony and state for one hundred and eighty years.[790]
Footnote 788:
_R. I. Records_, vol. I, pp. 485 _ff._, 489 _ff._
Footnote 789:
_Ibid._, vol. II, pp. 4 _ff._; _Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp.
148 _ff._
Footnote 790:
For the theory that these exceptionally liberal charters were granted
as part of a policy to alienate the southern colonies from
Massachusetts, _vide_ Kaye, _Colonial Administration under Clarendon_,
pp. 75 _ff._ His arguments for placing the important paper, 706, in
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_ under date 1666-67, instead of 1664,
seem conclusive.
While the issue of the charter was pending, Clarke and Winthrop had
submitted the matter of the boundary between their two colonies to
arbitration; and as a result, it had been agreed between them that the
dividing line should be the Pawcatuck River, henceforth to be called the
Narragansett.[791] In the Rhode Island charter, therefore, that colony's
western boundary was made as agreed upon, the “clause in a late grant”
to Connecticut notwithstanding.[792] Connecticut, however, which had now
become even more reckless in its career of land-grabbing than
Massachusetts, repudiated its agent's act, and undertook to enforce its
claims to Rhode Island's richest territory.[793] Not only was
Connecticut's attitude selfish and unjust, but the dispute could not
fail to add another legitimate reason for the exercise of imperial
control by England. As Sir Thomas Holdich points out, “It was the man
with the spade,—the agriculturist,—who first found the necessity for
definite boundaries”;[794] and while the fur trade or other activities
of rival colonizing nations, or of separate colonies of the same nation,
might give rise to disputes over frontiers, the extreme frequency and
bitterness of such quarrels in New England were largely due to the type
of political and economic life developed there. Without question, their
adjustment demanded the intervention of the higher power of the home
country.
Footnote 791:
Agreement in _R. I. Records_, vol. I, p. 518; _Cal. State Pap., Col.,
1661-68_, pp. 148 _ff._
Footnote 792:
_R. I. Records_, vol. II, pp. 18 _ff._
Footnote 793:
_Conn. Col. Records_, vol. I, pp. 407, 435; Bowen, _Boundary
Disputes_, 33 _ff._
Footnote 794:
_Political Frontiers and Boundary Making_ (London, 1916), p. 10.
At the time of Charles's return, Massachusetts was represented in
England by John Leverett, as her agent, who immediately sent word of the
complaints beginning to pour in against the colony. As a result, the
General Court dispatched addresses both to the King and to Parliament,
and appointed Richard Saltonstall and Henry Ashurst to assist Leverett
in the controversy now imminent.[795] In the letter to Charles, the
Court prayed that monarch, now “King over your British Israel, to cast a
favorable eye upon your poore Mephibbosheth”; and defended themselves
against sundry charges, particularly those concerning the killing of the
Quakers. “Such was theire daingerous, impetuous and desperat
turbulency,” the writers affirmed, that the magistrates had perforce had
“to keepe the passage with the point of the sword held towards them”;
and the Court unblushingly added that, had the Quakers not been
restrained, “there was too much cause to feare that wee ourselves must
quickly have died.”[796]
Footnote 795:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. i, pp. 449 _ff._
Footnote 796:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. i, p. 451.
In the private instructions to the colony's agents, they were ordered to
gain the interest of as many in Parliament and near the King as
possible, to secure the renewal of the charter, to see that no superior
power should be imposed, or appeals admitted, and even, if possible, to
have the colony free from the English customs duties. If called upon to
answer any charges embarrassing to the colony, they were instructed to
plead lack of authority.[797] The agents seem, however, to have done
nothing in England to aid the colony; and Leverett's remark that, if
forced to admit appeals to the home country, the colonists would deliver
New England to the Spaniards, although stupid enough, could hardly add
to the government's idea of the colonists' loyalty or discretion.[798]
Footnote 797:
_Ibid._, pp. 455 _f._
Footnote 798:
Maverick, in _Clarendon Papers_, p. 30.
Although the King's answer to the address was conciliatory, the
Massachusetts Court, upon its receipt, appointed a committee to
determine what, in its opinion, were the legal relations between the
colony and England. Their report, which we have already discussed in the
preceding chapter, considered Massachusetts to be virtually an
independent sovereign state, with the right to defend itself by force of
arms against any “annoyance.”[799] The following spring, a thousand
acres of land were granted to the Artillery Company of Middlesex, orders
were issued for the better accommodation of the troopers of Essex, and
work was ordered rushed in order to complete the fortifications on
Castle Island.[800]
Footnote 799:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. i, p. 25; _cf._ Hutchinson,
_History_, vol. I, pp. 230 _f._
Footnote 800:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. i, pp. 45, 44, 42 _f._
Meanwhile, “considering the weight of theire occasions in England,” the
Court appointed Simon Bradstreet and the Reverend John Norton to present
a second address to the King, and to “indeavor to take off all scandal
and objections” against the colony.[801] Although their work in England
was bitterly denounced as a failure, by some of the oligarchy, they
seem, in reality, to have done fairly well, and the letter which the
King next dispatched to the General Court was mild in tone and required
nothing that did not make for the greater liberty of the individual
colonist. After expressing himself as well pleased with the colony's
agents, the monarch confirmed the charter, and granted pardon to all who
had infringed its terms in the past, as well as to any in the colony who
had committed offenses against him in the late Civil War. Although he
partially withdrew his protection from the Quakers, he required that any
person wishing to worship according to the Book of Common Prayer be
allowed to do so, and that persons of good and honest lives be admitted
to the Communion, and their children to baptism. The franchise was to be
granted to all those of competent estate, orthodox in religion, and not
vicious in their lives. He also required that the oath of allegiance be
taken, and that justice be administered in his name.[802]
Footnote 801:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. i, p. 37.
Footnote 802:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 93 _f._
The results of an increase in religious liberty were as much dreaded by
the leaders and their followers in the theocracy as was any limitation
placed by England upon those powers which they had endeavored to make
absolute. At a meeting of the General Court in October, at which the
letter was read, the atrociously brutal law against the Quakers was
immediately put in force again, and the only compliances with the King's
requirements were the order that legal processes should run in his name,
and the issuing of directions that his letter be published. Other action
toward complying with its terms was postponed until the next meeting of
the Court. At that meeting, seven months later, the letter was merely
referred to a committee, which was to report again at the next meeting,
five months later still; at which, again, nothing was done. It was the
old policy, advised by the clergy nearly thirty years earlier, of “avoid
or protract,” of ignoring and obstructing. However such a policy might
fit an emergency under peculiar conditions, it obviously could not form
the basis of permanent relations between organic parts of an
empire.[803]
Footnote 803:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. i, pp. 58 _f._, 74.
Trouble also arose for the colony from another direction. It was
impossible, in ordinary justice, that England should ignore the
complaints of the heirs of the original Gorges and Mason regarding the
illegal encroachments of Massachusetts upon the lands claimed by them.
Mason's petition was referred to a committee of seven. Of these Mason
was one, although obviously the English government should not have
permitted him to be at once plaintiff and judge. But, aside from
irrelevant strictures upon the policy of Massachusetts, the committee
made a reasonable report, finding that Mason had inherited a good title
from his grandfather, and that for many years Massachusetts had publicly
recognized the line three miles north of the Merrimac as her true
boundary.[804]
Footnote 804:
The report is in Belknap _(History of New Hampshire_, vol. I, pp. 300
_f._), who reprinted it from a copy in the Recorder's office of
Rockingham County. Doyle states that there is no copy among the State
Papers. _Puritan Colonies_, vol. II, p. 139 _n._ That given in _Cal.
State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, p. 75, however, while differing in a few
minor particulars from that given by Belknap, is evidently the same
document. For references to the “bound-house,” _cf._ _Massachusetts
Records_, vol. I, p. 167; _New Hampshire Provincial Papers_, vol. I,
pp. 146, 249, 330; _Clarendon Papers_, p. 71; J. Dow, _History of Town
of Hampton_, vol. I, pp. 7 _f._
Meanwhile, Gorges, who had petitioned the King in April, 1661, for
possession of his province, did not wait for the process of law, but
appointed commissioners to go to Maine, proclaim the King, collect the
quit-rents, and establish a government, notifying Massachusetts of their
actions.[805] That colony promptly ordered that all the inhabitants
should yield obedience only to herself and sent commissioners into the
province with instructions to suppress any disobedience by the use of
force, as they should see fit.[806] Under this conflict of authorities,
the affairs of Maine, the inhabitants of which province were scattered
and somewhat unruly, were bound to drift into anarchy. Daniel Gookin, of
Boston, wrote a conciliatory letter to Gorges, explaining the conditions
from the standpoint of the good of the people; but, a year later, the
King, upon a report of the technical legal aspects of the case, and
apparently taking into consideration the losses of Gorges's royalist
grandfather, ordered the inhabitants to submit to Gorges, or to give
reasons to the contrary without delay.[807]
Footnote 805:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 22, 63 _f._
Footnote 806:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. i, pp. 70, 76 _f._
Footnote 807:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 145, 214.
The conditions in New England, in 1663, thus clearly necessitated the
sending out of a Royal Commission. The legal disputes between
Massachusetts and the English heirs of Gorges and Mason could not fairly
be left to the decision of Massachusetts courts. Nor was the question
one of technical legal title alone; for, as the committee reporting on
the Mason claims had themselves pointed out, “publique interest and
goverment” were “much intermixt and concerned with the private interest
of the peticioners.”[808] Moreover, for nearly thirty years, not only
had boundary disputes between all the New England colonies been growing
steadily more complicated and serious, but the colonies had proved
themselves incapable, in practically every case, of settling them
permanently and amicably. The contests could evidently be determined, in
the absence of any superior power, only by the use of force by the
claimants; and with the consistent attitude of Massachusetts and the now
rapidly increasing aggressiveness of Connecticut, peace was seriously
imperiled, and the fate of the smaller colonies practically sealed.
Rhode Island, at once the most loyal and the most devoted to liberty of
thought and action, was already in imminent danger of annihilation. In
the disputed Narragansett country, the Atherton Company claimed rights
which could not be justly adjudicated by any of the three colonies
pretending jurisdiction, and prayed the King for intervention.[809]
Footnote 808:
Belknap, _New Hampshire_, vol. I, p. 301.
Footnote 809:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 143 _f._
The accounts of practically every observer agreed as to the disloyalty
of Massachusetts and her assumption of sovereignty, which were obviously
confirmed by her official acts. In addition, the attitude of all the
colonies to the English leaders during the Revolution, the neglect of
all, except Rhode Island, promptly to proclaim the King, their
protection of the regicide judges, and the refusal to observe the
Navigation Acts, raised suspicions against them all. There was, besides,
the religious discrimination by Massachusetts, depriving her citizens of
rights which they would otherwise have enjoyed as Englishmen, and the
cases of alleged injustice in colonial courts affecting English citizens
with property rights in the colonies. In the absence of a royal
governor, or any other means by which the home government could secure
first-hand information, there was no course to follow except to appoint
a Commission to go out and secure it, if the exceedingly complicated
situation was to be handled intelligently. The government had shown
itself more than willing to treat with the colonies through their
agents; but Massachusetts purposely denied to them any authority, so as
to obstruct and delay any action—an outworn policy which had now become
transparently clear to the home government.
The attitude of Massachusetts was, in fact, the crux of the whole
problem. The theocratical party there had developed a theory,—based
apparently upon an extension of the church-covenant idea through the
plantation covenant,—that the charter itself was a covenant which
reserved no rights to the king and imperial government save those
specifically mentioned. From this she deduced that her obligation to the
Empire was so tenuous as to be virtually non-existent.[810] However
satisfactorily to themselves the leaders and their followers might spin
such theories, they did not agree with either the economic, political,
or legal facts. At this stage, the economic welfare of the New England
colonies was, of necessity, bound up with that of the Empire, from the
trade of which they would be excluded if they ceased to be parts of it.
Politically, they had to be considered as either in it or out of it,
and, obviously, from the standpoint of abstract justice as well as of
practical administration, they could not consider themselves as now one
and now the other, according to their local interests at a given moment.
Footnote 810:
_Cf._ Hutchinson, _History_, vol. I, pp. 230 _ff._
Nor could it be conceded that, by the granting of the charters, England
had relinquished all rights of control, or the power to determine
whether or not their terms were being complied with. That would have
opened the way to the grossest misuse of power by any of the local
administrations thus created, and would have been against public policy.
Moreover, in practically every charter, including that of Massachusetts,
the clause had appeared that no laws should be passed repugnant to those
of England. Massachusetts had already passed many such, carrying with
them, in some cases, the penalty of capital punishment. The clause
obviously implied that there must be an authority somewhere, which could
decide whether the colonial laws were repugnant or not; and it could
hardly be claimed that the colonial courts which passed them were
intended to be the sole judges of their conformity.[811] This would have
meant that not only the inhabitants of any chartered colony, but the
citizens of all the rest of the Empire having relations with it,
directly or as potential emigrants, would be absolutely at the mercy of
the local government, no matter what that government might do, or
however criminally it might disregard the rights that the charters had
specifically safeguarded. It must not be lost to sight that the
contemporary merchant in England or the West Indies had as legitimate a
right to require that England should protect his legal interests in
Massachusetts or Connecticut as any citizen of the United States to-day
has to expect that his rights will be assured to him in New Mexico or
Alaska. It must also be recalled that America was the heritage of the
English people, much as our West was the heritage of our citizens; and
the Englishman, both for himself and for his children, had as legitimate
an interest in the nature of the government erected in any part of the
Empire as we have in that set up in any part of our territorial domains.
There was little more reason why a group of settlers should preëmpt
Massachusetts, pass laws repugnant to those of England, and hang any
Englishman whose political or religious views were obnoxious to them,
than there would be for the stockholders and officers of a business
corporation in Alaska, who might have been granted land and some minor
police powers, to do the same thing to-day.
Footnote 811:
_Cf._ E. B. Russell, _Review of American Colonial Legislation by the
King in Council_ (Columbia University, 1915), pp. 17 _ff._
If the contentions of Massachusetts were to be allowed,—that she might
pass any laws she chose and be sole judge of them; that she might
trample upon the colonial rights of Englishmen at home, quarrel with her
neighbors, determine her own bounds, be the sole interpreter of the
terms of her charter, and sole judge of whether they had been complied
with; deny that the king's writ passed beyond England, or that the home
country had any right to pass laws affecting the colonies even in their
intercolonial and imperial relations,—then, it must be confessed, there
was no empire. There was merely an imperial anarchy of conflicting local
interests and warring elements, whose only common bond was their claim
that England should protect them against the aggression of foreign and
land-hungry powers.
If the rule of England in the seventeenth century had become tyrannical
and oppressive to the extent that revolution had become justifiable, and
if the colonies had become strong enough, in the state of the world as
it then was, to stand alone, nothing could be said against their openly
throwing off the imperial yoke. The full development of the forces
already at work was, a century later, to bring about that very
consummation, the discussion of which belongs to a later period. That,
however, was not the case as yet, and the position which Massachusetts
assumed was untenable and could eventually lead only to the loss of her
charter, and not to independence. Nor could she profess loyalty in the
most obsequious terms, claim all the military and commercial advantages
of being a part of the Empire, and, at the same time, act as an
independent state. It was a policy which, however unjustifiable, might
be successful, perhaps, when essayed by her as the most powerful member
in a New England confederacy. It could be neither, when the part was
attempted to be played by that same colony in its rôle of an unimportant
dependency in a great empire.
Nor had individual liberty anything to gain in the contest. The only
possible outcome would be the loss of the charter, with all the
possibilities involved in the then immediate dependence upon a Stuart
monarch. At this stage, the real struggle for freedom, intellectual and
political, was against the theocracy. If its leaders lost the game they
were playing, as was practically inevitable, then the liberties of the
colony, as embodied in the charter and related to England, would also be
lost. If, on the other hand, they should by any chance win against the
Crown, then their own power would be greatly strengthened and the
struggle against them increased in difficulty. In either event,
therefore, the liberal element in the colony had everything to fear from
the policy pursued by the leaders. That policy, however, from the
standpoint of the latter, found its justification in the fact that the
suggested alterations in the franchise, and other religious matters,
would end the power of the theocracy, which would surely go down before
liberty of opinion. As the leaders had already hesitated at nothing, not
even the blood of their victims, to maintain their theory of the
church-state, so now they preferred to risk the practically certain loss
of the charter and all its civil privileges, rather than yield to the
claim of individual freedom. Fortunately, in spite of an apparent
temporary success, they were to lose, and England win; and, owing to the
people of England itself, the real cause of liberty was eventually to
gain.
The chaotic state of New England had engaged the attention of the
Council for Plantations and the Privy Council almost from the moment of
the Restoration; while the sending of Commissioners to adjust
differences, and to report on conditions, had been under consideration
since early in 1662.[812] Two years later, action regarding the matters
which had been considered as of prime importance was taken at last, and
a commission was actually sent to New England; and New Netherland, with
little trouble, was wrested from the Dutch. The two objects—of which the
latter was considered the more important—were closely connected, and the
most influential member of the Commission, Colonel Richard Nicolls, was
appointed Governor of the new province of New York. Of the other three
Commissioners, Samuel Maverick was undoubtedly useful, from his great
knowledge of Massachusetts affairs, although otherwise unfitted, from
his strong partisanship; but neither Sir Robert Carr nor George
Cartwright possessed the qualifications to ensure successful results,
although the latter was able and conscientious in his work.[813]
Footnote 812:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 22, 24 _f._, 30, 32, 110, 128;
_Acts Privy Council, Colonial, 1613-80_, pp. 308, 338; _Clarendon
Papers_, p. 43. _Cf._ Kaye, _English Colonial Administration under
Clarendon_, pp. 75 _ff._
Footnote 813:
Professor Osgood considered that, “taken as a whole, the appointments
were as wise as under the circumstances could reasonably be expected.”
_American Colonies_, vol. III, p. 172. For the opposition to
Maverick's appointment, _vide_ _Clarendon Papers_, pp. 48 _ff._
Two series of instructions were issued to the Commissioners for their
guidance, the one public and the other confidential, as was also the
custom of Massachusetts in sending agents to England. In the first, it
was ordered that the Commission should consider the best means for
reducing the Dutch, investigate the condition of the Indians and of
public education, and see that the Navigation Acts were observed, and
that, according to the laws of England, no one was debarred from the
free exercise of his religion. In the confidential instructions, these
points were repeated with additional details, the Commissioners being
further required to examine the various charters and the laws passed; to
have, if possible, a General Assembly elected in Massachusetts, in which
the members would be favorably inclined toward the King, and to have an
acceptable governor and commander of the militia appointed or elected.
They were to try to secure the coöperation of the other four colonies,
and, in both sets of orders, were instructed to avoid giving
offense.[814] The King also wrote a conciliatory letter to each of the
colonies, in which he spoke of the calumnies against them, the
difficulty of settling boundary disputes among themselves, and other
matters requiring investigation and settlement.[815] In the commissions
issued to Nicolls and the others, they were empowered to hear complaints
and appeals, and to take measures for settling the peace of the
country.[816]
Footnote 814:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 200 _ff._; _N. Y. Col. Docts._,
vol. III, pp. 51 _f._
Footnote 815:
_Ibid._, pp. 61 _ff._
Footnote 816:
_Ibid._, pp. 64 _f._
In Massachusetts the news of the sending of the Commissioners created
considerable alarm, and the General Court passed orders that none of
their force of under-officers or soldiers should be allowed to land,
except unarmed and in small numbers. The fort on Castle Island was
ordered to be manned and prepared, sentries posted, and the charter
hidden.[817]
Footnote 817:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. ii, pp. 101, 102, 110.
In July, the Commissioners arrived at Boston, and presented their
commissions and the King's letter to the Court, together with that part
of their instructions which related to raising a force against the
Dutch. The request was complied with, and the Court also hastily passed
a new election law, which ostensibly made the franchise independent of a
religious test, but which in practice could have no such effect.
According to the new law, all church members, regardless of property
qualifications, were given the franchise, as before, but non-church
members were required to be freeholders and householders, to present
certificates signed by ministers that they were orthodox in belief and
not vicious in their lives, to be elected as freemen by the General
Court, and to possess an estate which paid a tax of ten shillings in a
single levy. There were other requirements, also; but the fact that not
one man in a hundred was said to have the property qualification
required only from non-church members showed the farcical nature of the
law. The enactment has sometimes been called “shrewd”; but, in reality,
it deceived no one, least of all the Commissioners, and its obvious
disingenuousness served only to prejudice the case of the colony still
further. Yet, in writing to the King, the colonial government stated
that, in passing this law, they had applied themselves “to the utmost to
sattisfy” him in “so farr as doth consist with conscience of our duty
towards God, and the just liberties and priviledges” of their
patent.[818]
Footnote 818:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. ii, pp. 118, 205, 130. _Cf._
McKinley, _Suffrage Franchise_, pp. 324 _ff._; _Clarendon Papers_, pp.
83 _ff._
Nor was the character of the rest of the petition, or of the letters
which they wrote, asking aid, to Boyle, the head of the Society for
Propagating the Gospel, and to Lord Clarendon, of a sort likely to
improve the opinion held regarding the colony. It was obviously
impossible to comply with their request to withdraw the Commission. In a
just and temperate reply, the King pointed out that investigation by
such a body had been the only method left to the English government to
inform itself as to conditions in the colonies. Nor did Boyle take any
different view of the matter; and Clarendon wrote of the petition: “I am
so much a friend to your colony, that if it had been communicated to
nobody but myself, I should have disswaded the presenting the same to
his Majesty”; and pointed out the impossible character of the complaints
and demands.[819]
Footnote 819:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, p. 282; Hutchinson, _History_, vol.
I, pp. 464 _f._
The double nature of the Commissioners' duties now served to interrupt
their work in Massachusetts; and until the beginning of the following
year, they were occupied at New Amsterdam, and on the Delaware, in
settling matters in the conquered Dutch colony—among others, the
adjustment of its boundary with Connecticut. The case of the boundary
between that colony and Rhode Island also came up; and although the
final disposition was left for the home government, it was settled, in
so far as the colonies were concerned, by erecting the disputed
territory into a separate province, to be known as the King's Province.
The jurisdiction was given to Rhode Island, while the claims of
Massachusetts and the Atherton Land Company were properly declared
invalid.[820]
Footnote 820:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. ii, pp. 175 _ff._; _Clarendon
Papers_, pp. 90 _ff._; _Cal. State Pap., Col. 1661-68_, pp. 202, 286.
[Illustration:
Letter from the Earl of Clarendon to the Governor of Connecticut
Original in Massachusetts Historical Society
]
Throughout their dealings with Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Plymouth,
the Commissioners had met with little or no opposition; and it was only
upon their reassembling at Boston, about the first of May, 1665, that
the real struggle began.[821] Endicott had recently died, and Bellingham
had been elected governor. The negotiations between the new government
and the Commissioners, however, were entered upon with some bad feeling
upon both sides. The Commissioners had previously asked that all the
inhabitants be summoned to attend the Court, in order that the King's
views might be made known to them directly; but this somewhat impossible
plan had been discouraged, if not secretly hindered, by the colonial
government, and many false statements regarding the Commission had also
been circulated, tending to throw discredit upon them—all of which they
naturally resented.[822]
Footnote 821:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. ii, pp. 177.
Footnote 822:
_Ibid._, pp. 173, 179-184.
The Commissioners now made known all of their public instructions, and
the Court made answer to their various requests and accusations. In
regard to some of the minor matters, such as public education, there was
no difficulty; but in regard to the more important ones, except issuing
writs in the King's name, the colony virtually had no case. The new oath
of allegiance, which the Court had had drawn up, had been purposely
vitiated by the insertion of a clause referring to the charter, and can
be considered only as an attempt to deceive the Commissioners and the
home government, which it failed to do. As to ecclesiastical matters,
the Court stated merely that they followed “the word of the Lord,”
which, as they denied any interpretation of that word except their own,
meant that they followed their own opinions, and refused to allow any
one else to have any. Their statement, in a later paper, that “the
authority here have not imposed upon church or people any one particular
forme or order, for the restreijning or limiting them in the exercise of
their devotions towards God,” and their reference to “the great
freedome” in religious matters, is startling in its distortion of the
truth, in view of the laws then on their statute-books, and of their
consistent course of persecution, from the Brownes in 1628 to the last
Quaker hung in 1660. In response to another request of the English
government, at this very time, they flatly denied permission to any
law-abiding citizen to use his prayer-book, on the ground that “it will
disturbe our peace in our present enjoyments.” Referring to the
Navigation Acts, they could make no better defense than to say that they
were not conscious that they had “greatly violated the same,” and that
any laws apparently against them had been repealed.[823]
Footnote 823:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. ii, pp. 177 _ff._, 200 _f._, 202
_ff._, 220 _f._
It is needless to follow the details of the controversy, which
culminated in the struggle over the question of appeals. These had
already been heard in Rhode Island by the Commissioners, under the
authority of somewhat conflicting clauses in their instructions and
commissions; and it was now undertaken to hear two in Boston. One of
them concerned an individual, who seems to have been of a worthless
sort, and the other, a violation of the Navigation Act. The General
Court refused to allow the proceedings, claimed a breach of the charter,
and officially warned all citizens not to attend the hearings, which
were never held, as the Commissioners had no force to uphold their
authority, even had they cared to employ it.[824] Soon after this, the
Commission left Boston, both the colony and the King's officers making
long reports to the government in England.[825]
Footnote 824:
_Ibid._, pp. 209 _ff._, 216 _ff._
Footnote 825:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 341 _ff._; _Massachusetts
Records_, vol. IV, pt. ii, pp. 274 _ff._
The whole contest had now obviously reached the fundamental point of
sovereignty, which was clearly stated in a letter to Massachusetts, a
few weeks later, from Carr, Cartwright, and Maverick, who were then in
New Hampshire. “The King did not grant away his Soveraigntie over you,”
they wrote, “when he made you a Corporation. When His Majesty gave you
power to make wholesome laws and to administer Justice by them, he
parted not with his right of judging whether those laws were wholesom or
whether justice was administered accordingly or no. When His Majesty
gave you authority over such of his subjects as lived within the limits
of your jurisdiction, he made them not your subjects nor you their
supream authority.” Unpalatable as these words may have been to the
Massachusetts Court, there can be no doubt that they expressed the
truth, as did also the Commissioners' warning that “striveing to grasp
too much, may make you hold but a little.” The future was clearly
fore-shadowed. “'Tis possible that the Charter which you so much idolize
may be forfeited,” the Commissioners added, “until you have cleared
yourselves of those many injustices, oppressions, violences, and bloud
for which you are complained against, to which complaints you have
refused to answer.”[826] There was, indeed, to be no other course. If
Massachusetts under her charter should persist in considering herself
superior to the power which had granted it, that power would have no
option but to recognize her complete independence or to annul the
charter.
Footnote 826:
_N. Y. Col. Docts._, vol. III, p. 99.
In New Hampshire, the acts of the three Commissioners were ill-judged
and but little likely to reflect credit upon the King, or to secure the
adherence of the people, while Massachusetts by prompt and forceful
measures asserted her claims in the face of the royal agents.[827] In
Maine, the latter attempted to organize a temporary government, pending
the settlement of the dispute between Massachusetts and Gorges, and they
likewise endeavored, even more unsuccessfully, to set up administrative
machinery in the territory east of Pemaquid, which had been granted to
the Duke of York. Within less than three years, Massachusetts, assisted
by the desire of the inhabitants for a settled government, had once more
taken the province under her jurisdiction, although not without local
opposition.[828]
Footnote 827:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. ii, pp. 265 _ff._; _New
Hampshire Provincial Papers_, vol. I, pp. 270 _ff._; _N. Y. Col.
Docts._, vol. III, pp. 99 _ff._; _Clarendon Papers_, pp. 72 _ff._;
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 310 _f._, 314.
Footnote 828:
_N. Y. Col. Docts._, vol. III, p. 101; _Cal. State Pap., Col.,
1661-68_, pp. 191 _f._, 348, 569; _Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV,
pt. ii, pp. 370 _f._, 400 _f._
In what had been considered their most important work, the reduction of
the Dutch and the establishment of the English authority at New York,
the Commissioners had been entirely successful, as they had been also in
their relations with the three southern colonies in New England; and the
settlement of the dispute between Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, and the Atherton Company was of great benefit to the colonies.
In the matter of Massachusetts, however, they had completely failed.
Three of them advised taking away the charter, while Maverick made
several suggestions, including the prohibiting of trade with the
recalcitrant colony, as did Nicolls also.[829]
Footnote 829:
_N. Y. Col. Docts._, vol. III, p. 102; _Clarendon Papers_, p. 70;
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, p. 416.
In 1666, the King sent a circular letter to the various colonies,
expressing satisfaction with all except Massachusetts, whose claim of
independent sovereignty, he noted, was “a matter of such high
consequence as every man discerns where it must end”; and he commanded
the colony to send four or five agents to England, including Bellingham
and Hathorne, to answer the charges against her.[830] This the Court
flatly refused to do, and so notified the King, though they sent him
their prayers for his eternal happiness.[831] Their refusal, however, by
no means met with unanimous approval among the influential elements in
the colony. A petition was presented to the Court, signed by a hundred
and seventy-one individuals, including such names as Winslow, Brattle,
Gerrish, Hale, Coffin, Perkins, Hubbard, and others of note in Boston,
Salem, Newbury, and Ipswich, while most of the people of Hingham were
said to have signed also, although their deputy refused to deliver their
petition.[832] The signers pleaded that nothing further be done justly
to offend the home government, and that the agents asked for be sent.
They pointed out that “the doubtful interpretation of the words of a
patent, which there can be no reason should ever be construed to the
divesting of a sovereign prince of his royall power over his naturall
subjects and liege people, is too frail a foundation to build such a
transcendent immunity and privilege upon.”[833]
Footnote 830:
_Cal. State Pap., Col., 1661-68_, pp. 372 _f._
Footnote 831:
_Massachusetts Records_, vol. IV, pt. ii, p. 317.
Footnote 832:
_Clarendon Papers_, pp. 127, 132 _ff._; _Massachusetts Records_, vol.
IV, pt. ii, pp. 317 _f._; _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, Series II,
vol. VI, pp. 469 _ff._
Footnote 833:
_Clarendon Papers_, p. 133.
But those attempting to maintain the power of the theocracy would not be
turned from their course, though by it they made the eventual loss of
the charter both necessary and certain. Owing to the fact that England
was now at war with both Holland and France, neither time nor thought
could be given to a rebellious colony, and Massachusetts was to be
allowed to go her way for another decade. Her own rulers, however, had
definitely determined what her fate should be when the authorities in
England should once more be free to act. In a little more than that
period, she was to find herself, without a charter and without a friend,
defenseless before the last of the Stuarts; and it was only the final
revolt of the people of England against that dynasty which was to save
her from the full effects of the policy of her theocracy, and to secure
to all her citizens the same measure of political equality that was
enjoyed by their neighbors.