The scene of the engagements of the second and third days shifted to the
south and southeast of Gettysburg. General Meade arrived on the field
from his headquarters at Taneytown, Md., at 1 A.M., July 2nd, and
established his headquarters at the Leister House, on the Taneytown
Road, in rear of the line of the 2nd Corps. As soon as it was light he
inspected the position already occupied and made arrangements for
posting the several corps as they should reach the ground.
The Union Line of Battle.
Starting on the right with Slocum’s 12th Corps, Williams’ Division
extended from Rock Creek by way of Spangler’s Spring to Culp’s Hill,
with Geary’s Division on the hill. The line between Culp’s Hill and
Cemetery Hill was held by Wadsworth’s Division of the 1st Corps.
Barlow’s Division of the 11th Corps under Ames was located at the foot
of East Cemetery Hill. Carman, Colgrove, Slocum, Geary, and Wainwright
avenues follow these lines of battle.
On Cemetery Hill, across the Baltimore Pike, the line was held by Schurz
and on his left Steinwehr, both of the 11th Corps. Robinson’s Division
of the 1st Corps extended across the Taneytown Road to Ziegler’s Grove.
Beyond lay Hancock’s 2nd Corps, with the Divisions of Hays, Gibbon, and
Caldwell from right to left. To the left of Hancock, Sickles’ 3rd Corps,
consisting of the Divisions of Humphreys and Birney, prolonged the line
to the vicinity of Little Round Top. Beginning at the Taneytown Road,
Hancock and Sedgwick avenues follow these lines of battle.
Arriving later in the day, the 5th Corps, under General Sykes, was
posted on the Baltimore Pike, at the Rock Creek crossing. Later it
occupied the ground about Round Top to the left of the 3rd Corps. The
6th Corps, under General Sedgwick, reaching the field still later after
a march of over 30 miles, was posted in reserve back of Round Top, from
which position portions were moved as circumstances demanded. The lines
held by the 5th and 6th Corps coincide with Sykes, Ayres, Wright, and
Howe Avenues.
[Illustration: Stevens’ Knoll.—Arriving on Stevens’ Knoll at the end
of the first day, General Slocum brought supporting troops. The
lunettes protecting the cannon remain intact.]
Gamble’s and Devin’s brigades of Buford’s Cavalry, which had had an
active part in the battle of the first day, were on the left between
Cemetery and Seminary Ridges until 10 A.M. when they were ordered, by
some mistake, to move to Westminster, Md., before the arrival of Gregg’s
Division on its way from Hanover, and Merritt’s brigade of Buford’s
Division from Mechanicsburg (now Thurmont), Md.
General Meade’s line, shaped like a fishhook, was about 3 miles long.
The right faced east, the center over Cemetery Hill, north, and the left
from Cemetery Hill to Round Top nearly west. The whole line was
supported by artillery brigades belonging to the different corps.
Confederate Line of Battle.
General Lee’s line was nearly the same shape as General Meade’s but,
being the outer line, was about 6 miles long. On the right, facing the
two Round Tops, were Hood’s and McLaws’ Divisions of Longstreet’s Corps.
On the left of McLaws, extending along the line of Seminary Ridge, were
the Divisions of Anderson and Pender of Hill’s Corps, with Heth’s
Division in the rear in reserve. On the left of Pender, extending
through the town along the line of West Middle Street, was Rodes’
Division of Ewell’s Corps, then Early’s and Johnson’s Divisions, the
latter reaching to Benner’s Hill, east of Rock Creek. Pickett’s Division
of Longstreet’s Corps was at Chambersburg, guarding trains, and Law’s
Brigade of Hood’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps at New Guilford,
guarding the rear. The latter arrived at noon on the 2nd in time to
participate in the day’s engagement. Pickett’s Division arrived later
and was not engaged until the afternoon of the 3rd. The artillery was
posted according to the different corps to which it was attached.
General Lee’s line coincides with the present West Confederate Avenue
along Seminary and Warfield or Snyder Ridges, west of the town, then
runs through the town to coincide with East Confederate Avenue. The
distance between the Union and Confederate lines is three-fourths of a
mile to a mile.
Military critics agree that General Meade held the stronger position.
Both flanks presented precipitous and rocky fronts, difficult to attack,
and it was possible to send reinforcements by short distances from point
to point.
Sickles’ Change of Line.
As already stated, General Sickles’ 3rd Corps was on the left of General
Hancock’s 2nd Corps on Cemetery Ridge, and Birney’s Division was near
the base of Little Round Top, replacing Geary’s Division after its
withdrawal to be posted on Culp’s Hill. Humphreys’ Division was on low
ground to the right between Cemetery Ridge and the Emmitsburg Road.
Anxious to know what was in his front, Sickles sent the Berdan
Sharpshooters and the 3rd Maine Infantry forward on a reconnaissance. On
reaching the Pitzer Woods, beyond the Emmitsburg Road, they found the
Confederates there in force, and after a sharp engagement with Wilcox’s
Brigade, withdrew and reported.
Believing that Lee planned a flank movement on his line, and that the
Emmitsburg Road afforded better positions for the artillery, Sickles
moved his Corps forward and posted Humphreys’ Division on the right
along the Emmitsburg Road and his left extending to the Peach Orchard.
Birney’s Division prolonged the line from the Peach Orchard across the
Wheatfield to Devil’s Den. This new line formed a salient at the Peach
Orchard and therefore presented two fronts, one to the west, the other
to the south.
About 3 P.M. Sickles was called to General Meade’s headquarters to a
conference of corps commanders. Upon the sound of artillery, the
conference adjourned, and Meade, Sickles, and Warren, Meade’s Chief
Engineer, rode to inspect Sickles’ change of line. The artillery was
already engaged, and believing it too late to make any changes since the
enemy was present, Meade decided to attempt to hold the new position by
sending in supports. After reviewing the new line, General Warren left
the other members of the party and rode up Little Round Top. He found
the height unoccupied except by the personnel of a signal station.
[Illustration: General Meade’s Statue.—General Meade viewed
Pickett’s Charge from the center of the Union line. This statue,
like those of Reynolds and Sedgwick, is the work of Henry K.
Bush-Brown.]
General Lee’s Plan.
Lee as well as Meade occupied the forenoon in the arrangement of his
line of battle. After a conference with Ewell, he decided to attack
Meade’s left. In his report, Lee says:
“_It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy’s
left, and endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought that
our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was
directed to place the division of McLaws and Hood on the right of
Hill, partially enveloping the enemy’s left, which he was to drive
in._
“_General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy’s center to prevent
reinforcements being drawn to either wing, and coöperate with his
right division in Longstreet’s attack._
“_General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration
upon the enemy’s right, to be converted into a real attack should
opportunity offer._”
When General Lee arranged this plan of attack he believed Meade’s left
terminated at the Peach Orchard; he did not know that Sickles’ advance
line extended to the left from the salient at the Peach Orchard to
Devil’s Den. In plain view of the Union signal station on Little Round
Top, some of his forces were compelled to make a wide detour via the
Black Horse Tavern on the Fairfield Road in order to avoid observation.
Little Round Top.
Meanwhile, General Warren on Little Round Top saw the importance of the
hill as a tactical position on Meade’s left. The signal officers were
preparing to leave; he ordered them to remain and to keep waving their
flags so as to lead the Confederates to believe that the hill was
occupied. He dispatched a messenger to Devil’s Den, where a Union
battery was posted, with an order that a shot be fired to produce
confusion in the woods in front, through which Hood’s forces were
supposed to be advancing. Seeing the reflection of the sunlight from
Confederate muskets, he realized that if this important position were to
be held, it would be necessary to get troops there without delay.
Quickly he sent a member of his staff to Sickles for troops. Sickles
said none could be spared. Warren sent another staff officer to Meade,
who immediately ordered Sykes to move his Corps to Little Round Top.
Barnes’ Division of this Corps had already been called for by Sickles to
defend his line, and three brigades, Vincent’s, Tilton’s, and
Sweitzer’s, were moving toward the Wheatfield. Learning of the need of
troops on Little Round Top, Vincent moved back, skirted the east side of
Little Round Top, and went into position between Little and Big Round
Top, arriving just before the Confederates from Hood’s right advanced
over Big Round Top.
Having watched these movements, Warren rode down to the crossing of what
is now Sykes Avenue and the Wheatfield Road. There he met Colonel
O’Rorke, in command of the 140th New York, and ordered his regiment,
together with Hazlett’s battery, to the crest of the hill. With the
addition of Weed’s Brigade, the combined forces held the Round Tops.
There was a desperate engagement in which both contestants displayed
courage of a very high order. The Union soldiers were victorious, and
Meade’s left was secured against further attack.
The Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield.
After the struggle for the possession of Little Round Top, the other
Confederate brigades of Hood and McLaws advanced rapidly. A lack of
coordination in their movement allowed Meade to bring up supports. Three
brigades of Anderson’s Division of Hill’s Corps advanced against
Humphreys’ line, in the following order: Wilcox, Perry, Wright. Wounded,
General Pender was unable to direct Posey and Mahone in support of
Wright, and Wright was obliged to withdraw. Humphreys was compelled to
change front in order to meet the assault on his flanks. This maneuver
served to stay the Confederate attack for a brief time. The Valley of
Death between the Round Tops and the opposite height was now a seething
mass of opposing forces, enshrouded in clouds of smoke.
Meade had already depleted his right to support his left by withdrawing
all of Slocum’s 12th Corps except Greene’s Brigade. He now sent all of
the 5th Corps to the left and ordered Caldwell’s Division from the left
of Hancock’s 2nd Corps south of the Angle to the Wheatfield. Willard’s
Brigade on Hays’ line of the 2nd Corps was ordered to advance and oppose
the Confederate, Barksdale, who, after crossing the Emmitsburg Road
north of the Peach Orchard and the field beyond, reached Watson’s Union
battery posted on the Trostle farm. General Sickles was severely and
Barksdale mortally wounded.
[Illustration: Wheatfield.—Scene of carnage on the second day]
Wofford’s Brigade of McLaws’ Division broke through the salient at the
Peach Orchard and reached the valley between Devil’s Den and Little
Round Top, where they were met by a charge of the Pennsylvania Reserves
of Crawford’s Division, led by McCandless, some of whose men fought in
sight of their own homes. Wofford was obliged to withdraw to and beyond
the Wheatfield; the Reserves advanced across the valley from their
position on the north of Little Round Top and reached the stone wall on
the east side of the Wheatfield. Here they remained until after
Pickett’s charge on the 3rd, when they advanced against the Confederates
who had succeeded in regaining control of that part of the field.
About the time when Sickles was wounded, Meade directed Hancock to
assume command of Sickles’ Corps in addition to his own. Meade in person
led Lockwood’s brigade, brought from the extreme right, against the
Confederate advance. Newton, now in command of the 1st Corps, sent in
Doubleday’s Division. With these troops Hancock checked the advance of
the Confederate brigades of Barksdale, Wilcox, Perry, and Wright, while
Sykes checked the advance of Hood and McLaws. Brigades of the 6th Corps
reached the field toward the close of the engagement. Withdrawing from
the Wheatfield Road, Bigelow’s battery made a determined stand at the
Trostle buildings and succeeded in checking the Confederate advance
until the gap on Sickles’ first line was protected by a line of guns.
Most of the Confederate brigades got no farther than Plum Run, except
Wright’s, which actually reached the line of guns on Hancock’s front
before it was obliged to withdraw.
During the repulse of the Confederate advance, the 1st Minnesota
regiment of Harrow’s Brigade of Gibbon’s Division of Hancock’s Corps was
ordered by Hancock to oppose Wilcox’s and Perry’s Brigades, rapidly
advancing against Hancock’s left. The Minnesota regiment moved up at
once and succeeded in repelling the attack, but only after losing 82 per
cent of its men.
Though seriously threatened, Meade’s line held, and after the repulse of
Wright, the attack ended. During the night the line was prolonged to the
top of Big Round Top. The Confederates remained west of Plum Run, except
at Big Round Top, where they intrenched along the western slope.
Ewell’s Attack on Meade’s Right.
Ordered by Lee to begin his attack on Meade’s right at the same time as
Longstreet’s attack on Meade’s left, Ewell’s artillery on Benner’s Hill
opened fire on Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill where the Union forces were
posted and well protected with earthworks. On account of the destructive
fire from the Union batteries on East Cemetery Hill, Ewell lost most of
his guns, and no infantry advance was made until Longstreet’s assault
had ended. At sundown General Johnson’s infantry advanced against Culp’s
Hill, General Early against East Cemetery Hill. Rodes, who was directed
to move against West Cemetery Hill, was unable to obey instructions.
General Walker, who had been sent east to Brinkerhoff Ridge in the
forenoon, to guard Ewell’s flank, and who was expected to assist in this
attack, was prevented by meeting part of the Union cavalry of Gregg’s
Division that had arrived via Hanover on the forenoon of the 2nd. After
an engagement with Gregg, Walker moved up to assist Johnson, but too
late to be of service, as the attack on Culp’s Hill had ended.
The attack was conducted with the greatest dash and daring, in part up
rough slopes of woodland over heaped boulders. On East Cemetery Hill the
fight among the Union guns was hand to hand, and clubbed muskets,
stones, and rammers were used to drive back the assailants. After sunset
a bright moon illuminated the field. The Union troops stood firm, and at
10 o’clock the Confederates desisted, having captured only a few Union
entrenchments.
[Illustration: Monument of the Irish Brigade.—At the foot of the
Celtic Cross is the Irish wolfhound, symbolic of devotion.]
Situation at End of the Second Day.
Lee’s assaults on Meade’s left had failed to accomplish anything
decisive. While Sickles’ advance-line was driven back and most of the
field, including the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield, Devil’s Den, and the
base of Big Round Top, was occupied by the Confederates, Meade’s line
was practically intact from the crest of Big Round Top on the left to
near Spangler’s Spring on the right. On the slopes of Round Top, on
Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill, the advantage of the defensive positions
multiplied the forces of the defenders in comparison with the attackers
at least three to one. Prodigious deeds of valor were performed by both
armies, and courage of the highest order was displayed in attack and in
the defense. Casualties were very heavy on both sides. Meade estimated
that his losses were 65 per cent of the total for the three days. At the
end of the day he made the following report:
“_July 2, 1863, 8_ P.M. _The enemy attacked me about 4_ P.M. _this
day, and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed
at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded.
Among the former are Brigadier Generals Paul and Zook, and among the
wounded are Generals Sickles, Barlow, Graham, and Warren slightly. We
have taken a large number of prisoners. I shall remain in my present
position tomorrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of
the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an
offensive or defensive character._”
Later in the night, at a council of war held by Meade with his corps
commanders—Gibbon, Williams, Sykes, Newton, Howard, Hancock, Sedgwick
and Slocum—sentiment favored remaining and fighting a defensive battle.
As Lee attacked both wings of Meade’s line on the 2nd it was expected
that if another attack were made it would be on the center. This
expectation was correct—Wright’s attack on the 2nd, when he succeeded in
reaching Meade’s line south of the Angle, led Lee to believe that this
was the most vulnerable point.
General Lee had more definite plans:
“_The result of this day’s operations induced the belief that, with
proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the
positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the
assaulting column, we should ultimately succeed, and it was
accordingly determined to continue the attack._”
The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett’s
three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon
of the 2nd, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell
was directed to assail the enemy’s right at the same time. The latter,
during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with three brigades from
Rodes’ and Early’s Divisions.