Informed by Pettigrew that Union forces had reached Gettysburg, and
anxious to know their strength, Hill sent Heth’s and Pender’s Divisions
with Pegram’s battalion of artillery forward on a reconnaissance in
force. This movement, made at 5.30 A.M. on July 1, precipitated the
battle.
The advance was soon interrupted by Buford’s skirmishers. On reaching
Herr Ridge, which crosses the Cashtown Road at right angles, Hill
deployed his line of battle—Heth on both sides of the road with Pender
in reserve. Pegram posted his artillery on Herr Ridge, and at 8 o’clock
fired his first shot. Buford’s artillery, under Calef, posted on the
opposite ridge, fired in reply. The battle was on, and the gravity of
the situation was clear to Buford, who at 10.10 A.M. sent this message
to Meade:
“_The enemy’s force are advancing on me at this point and driving my
pickets and skirmishers very rapidly. There is a large force at
Heidlersburg that is driving my pickets at that point from that
direction. I am sure that the whole of A. P. Hill’s force is
advancing._”
Arrival of Reynolds.
Union reinforcements were at hand. General Reynolds, in advance of the
1st Corps, arrived from Marsh Creek, via the Emmitsburg Road. After a
short conference with Buford at the Seminary buildings, he sent an
orderly urging Wadsworth, whose division was advancing across the
fields, to hasten. On its arrival, Reynolds posted Cutler to the right,
across the railroad cut which lies parallel to the Chambersburg Pike,
and Meredith on the left. (Reynolds Avenue now marks this line.)
Death of Reynolds.
After posting Hall’s battery in place of Calef’s, Reynolds rode to the
McPherson Woods, and while directing the advance of Meredith at 10.15
A.M. was instantly killed by a Confederate sharpshooter. Doubleday
consequently assumed command of the 1st Corps, and Rowley succeeded
Doubleday in command of the Division. Compelled to fall back into the
grove, Buford moved his cavalry to the left near the Fairfield Road, and
Meredith advanced into the woods, drove Hill’s right across Willoughby
Run, and captured General Archer and part of his men.
On the Union right, Cutler was attacked in flank by Davis’s Brigade, of
the left of Hill’s line, and was compelled to withdraw. Davis advanced
into the railroad cut where part of his force was captured. He then
withdrew to his original line.
A Morning Lull.
At 11 A.M. there was a lull. Doubleday withdrew his forces from across
Willoughby Run and established a new line through the McPherson Woods
from north to south. Robinson’s Division reached the field and was held
in reserve at the Seminary buildings. Rowley’s Division (formerly
Doubleday’s) arrived a little later; Stone’s Brigade of this Division
was deployed in the front line on what is now Stone Avenue, and Biddle’s
Brigade was placed on the left of Meredith, along what is now South
Reynolds Avenue. In the afternoon, Robinson’s Division was moved to the
right, prolonging the Union line to the Mummasburg Road in order to meet
the advance of Rodes’ Division, coming forward via the Carlisle Road.
Devin’s cavalry was moved from Buford’s right to the vicinity of the
York Pike and the Hanover Road.
[Illustration: Gettysburg Seminary Doorway.—The Lutheran Theological
Seminary was used as an observation point and hospital. The portico
was erected in 1913 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the
battle.]
In this preliminary action of the forenoon the advantage was in favor of
the Union forces. The Confederate General Heth reported:
“_The enemy had now been felt, and found in heavy force in and around
Gettysburg. The division was now formed in line of battle on the right
of the road; Archer’s brigade on the right, Pettigrew’s in the center,
and Brockenbrough’s on the left. Davis’s brigade was kept on the left
of the road that it might collect its stragglers, and from its
shattered condition it was not deemed advisable to bring it again into
action that day._”
The Union General Buford reported:
“_On July 1, between 8 and 9_ A.M. _reports came in from the 1st
Brigade (Colonel Gamble’s) that the enemy was coming down from toward
Cashtown in force. Colonel Gamble made an admirable line of battle,
and moved off proudly to meet him. The two lines soon became hotly
engaged, we having the advantage of position, he of numbers. The 1st
Brigade held its own for more than two hours, and had to be literally
dragged back a few hundred yards to a more secure and sheltered
position._”
Arrival of Rodes and Early.
On learning at Middletown (now Biglerville) that Hill was engaged with
the Union forces at Gettysburg, Rodes marched thither directly via the
Carlisle Road. Early approached via the Harrisburg or Heidlersburg Road.
The advance of both was quickened by the sound of cannonading. Arriving
a little past noon, Rodes deployed his Division of five brigades on both
sides of Oak Ridge, his right on the left of Heth’s Division and his
left with Early’s right, extending across the plain north of the town.
Carter’s artillery was posted on Oak Hill.
The Opposing Lines.
Robinson’s Division of the 1st Union Corps was moved from its position
in reserve at the Seminary buildings to the right of Cutler, to oppose
Rodes’s Confederate line.
Hill prolonged his right by bringing up Pender’s Division that had been
held in reserve. The artillery of McIntosh’s battalion was brought into
action in support. These guns, with Carter’s and Pegram’s, together
numbering 60, and 11 brigades of infantry now opposed the 1st Union
Corps of 36 guns and 6 brigades.
Arrival of Howard.
General Howard, in command of the 11th Union Corps, reached Gettysburg
from Emmitsburg between 10 and 11 A.M., in advance of his Corps, and
took command of the Union forces. Schurz succeeded Howard in command of
the Corps, and Doubleday resumed command of his Division.
On reaching Gettysburg, Howard went to the top of the Fahnestock
building at the corner of Baltimore and Middle streets to observe the
lines of battle. He reported:
“_I had studied the position a few moments, when a report reached me
that General Reynolds was wounded. At first I hoped his wound might be
slight and that he would continue to command, but in a short time I
was undeceived. His aid-de-camp, Major William Riddle, brought the sad
tidings of his death. This was about 11.30_ A.M. _Prior to this the
General had sent me orders to move up at a double quick, for he was
severely engaged. On hearing of the death of Reynolds, I assumed
command of the left wing, instructing General Schurz to take command
of the 11th Corps. After an examination of the general features of the
country, I came to the conclusion that the only tenable position for
my limited force was the ridge to the southeast of Gettysburg (now
well known as Cemetery Ridge). I at once established my headquarters
near the cemetery, and on the highest point north of the Baltimore
Pike._”
Howard’s Position.
On the arrival of the 11th Corps, Howard ordered Schurz to move the 3rd
and 1st Divisions to positions north of the town, while the 2nd Division
was held on Cemetery Hill in reserve. On account of the prior arrival of
the Confederates under Rodes, who covered the plain north of the town,
Schurz was unable to connect with the right of the Union line on Oak
Hill, and a gap remained between the two lines. The position of the 11th
Corps coincides with what is now Howard Avenue.
The Confederate General Early’s Position.
Shortly after the 11th Corps moved to the front, Early’s Division of
Ewell’s Corps arrived from Heidlersburg and went into line to the right
of Howard, connecting with Rodes’s left across the plain. Early posted
his artillery, Jones’s battalion, in position to enfilade the right of
Howard, while Carter’s batteries on Oak Hill enfiladed the left. The
Confederate forces largely exceeded the Union forces, the former being
about 28,000 and the latter about 18,000. The whole Confederate line
advanced and attacked the Union forces in front and on both flanks. On
Oak Hill part of Rodes’ forces, O’Neal’s and Iverson’s brigades, were
repulsed, a large part of the latter being captured.
The Union Retreat.
After a strenuous resistance the whole Union line was compelled to
withdraw to Cemetery Hill. The 11th Corps retreated through the center
of town where many were captured. The 1st Corps fell back through the
western part of the town. By 4.30 P.M. all the territory held by the
Union forces was occupied by the Confederates.
Arrival of Lee.
General Lee reached the field from Cashtown about 3 P.M., witnessed the
retreat of the Union forces, and established his headquarters in tents
in an apple orchard back of the Seminary. He ordered Ewell to follow up
the repulse if he thought it practicable. In this connection Ewell
reported:
“_The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery
Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front
there. On entering the town, I received a message from the Commanding
General to attack this hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could
not bring artillery to bear on it, and all the troops with me were
jaded by twelve hours’ marching and fighting, and I was notified that
General Johnson’s division (the only one of my corps that had not been
engaged) was close to town. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the
town.... Before Johnson could be placed in position the night was far
advanced._”
[Illustration: John Burns, Gettysburg constable and Mexican War
veteran, shouldered his musket and went out to meet the
Confederates.]
General Hill reported:
“_Under the impression that the enemy was entirely routed, my own two
divisions exhausted by some six hours’ hard fighting, prudence led me
to be content with what had been gained._”
The failure of Ewell to follow up the repulse and capture Cemetery Hill
and Culp’s Hill, defended by a weak line of the Union forces, enabled
the Union commanders to establish during the night a line of defence
that was secure against attack. By many military critics, this is
generally considered Lee’s lost opportunity.
Formation of Union Line.
The retreating Union soldiers were met at East Cemetery Hill by Generals
Hancock and Howard, who directed them to positions, the 1st Corps on
Cemetery Ridge and Culp’s Hill, and the 11th on East Cemetery Hill. The
12th Corps arrived on the Baltimore Pike, and soon after Sickles’ 3rd
Corps came up from Emmitsburg.
Hancock had been instructed by Meade to take command and report if he
thought the ground a suitable place to continue the battle. A
battle-line was at once established on Cemetery Ridge. Geary’s Division
of the 12th Corps was ordered to the extreme left to occupy Little Round
Top. Hancock sent word to General Meade that the position was strong,
but that it might be easily turned. He then turned over the command to
Slocum, his senior, and returned to Taneytown to report in person. Meade
had already ordered a rapid concentration of all his forces at
Gettysburg.
[Illustration: Barlow’s Knoll.—The extreme right of the Union line
on the first day]
General Lee’s Report.
For the day, the Confederate commander reported:
“_The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg
on the morning of July 1. Driving back these troops to within a short
distance of the town, he there encountered a larger force, with which
two of his divisions became engaged. Ewell coming up with two of his
divisions by the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement. The
enemy was driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about
5,000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery. He retired to a high
range of hills south and east of the town. The attack was not pressed
that afternoon, the enemy’s force being unknown, and it being
considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops.
Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime,
every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and position of the
enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been
intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base,
unless attacked by the enemy, but, finding ourselves unexpectedly
confronted by the Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to
withdraw through the mountains with our large trains.... Encouraged by
the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view
of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army
of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack._”