BOOK I.

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THE

ACADEMICA OF CICERO.

_THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED_

BY

JAMES S. REID,

M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)

ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;

ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

LONDON:

MACMILLAN AND CO.

1874

[_All Rights reserved_.]

* * * * *

TO

THOSE OF HIS PUPILS

WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM

_THE ACADEMICA_,

THIS EDITION

IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED

BY

THE EDITOR.

* * * * *

PREFACE.

Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has edited

the _Academica_. In Germany the last edition with explanatory notes is that

of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and untrustworthiness of

Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong evidence; while the work of

Davies, though in every way far superior to that of Goerenz, is very

deficient when judged by the criticism of the present time.

This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures given by

me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work in its

present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the Universities,

and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where the

philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those where an

attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient Philosophy as

will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now required in the final

Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford and Cambridge. My notes

have been written throughout with a practical reference to the needs of

junior students. During the last three or four years I have read the

_Academica_ with a large number of intelligent pupils, and there is

scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested by some difficulty or

want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody in an Introduction such

information concerning Cicero's philosophical views and the literary

history of the _Academica_ as could not be readily got from existing books;

next, to provide a good text; then to aid the student in obtaining a higher

knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, and lastly, to put it in his power to

learn thoroughly the philosophy with which Cicero deals.

My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in the

edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the

editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second edition

of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that editor. I

have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass without carefully

weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also studied all original

criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain access. The result is a

text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than that of Halm. My

obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently acknowledged in my

notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled _Emendationes ad

Ciceronis libros Philosophicos_, published in 1825 at Copenhagen, but

never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in the edition of

Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few passages I have

introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the conjecttires of

other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the MSS. If any

apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the notes, questions

of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from a conviction that

the very excellence of the texts now in use is depriving a Classical

training of a great deal of its old educational value. The judgment was

better cultivated when the student had to fight his way through bad texts

to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the Latin tongue. The

acceptance of results without a knowledge of the processes by which they

are obtained is worthless for the purposes of education, which is thus made

to rest on memory alone. I have therefore done my best to place before the

reader the arguments for and against different readings in the most

important places where the text is doubtful.

My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the students

for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller acquaintance than they

ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties of language which the

best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide them to the best

teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding editor of Cicero

must build. His edition of the _De Finibus_ contains more valuable material

for illustrating, not merely the language, but also the subject-matter of

the _Academica_, than all the professed editions of the latter work in

existence. Yet, even after Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be

done in pointing out what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have

therefore added very many references from my own reading, and from other

sources. Wherever a quotation would not have been given but for its

appearance in some other work, I have pointed out the authority from whom

it was taken. I need hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to

look out all the references given. It was necessary to provide material by

means of which the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if

it were new to him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that

occurred. Want of space has compelled me often to substitute a mere

reference for an actual quotation.

As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not

touched upon somewhere in the _Academica_, it is evidently impossible for

an editor to give information which would be complete for a reader who is

studying that subject for the first time. I have therefore tried to enable

readers to find easily for themselves the information they require, and

have only dwelt in my own language upon such philosophical difficulties as

were in some special way bound up with the _Academica_. The two books

chiefly referred to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's

_Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics_ (whenever Zeller is quoted without any

further description this book is meant), and the _Historia Philosophiae_ of

Ritter and Preller. The _pages_, not the _sections_, of the fourth edition

of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's _De Finibus_, all

teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a

philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have

constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all

of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.

Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is

hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as bringing

together much scattered information illustrative of the _Academica_, which

was before difficult of access. The present work will, I hope, prepare the

way for an exhaustive edition either from my own or some more competent

hand. It must be regarded as an experiment, for no English scholar of

recent times has treated any portion of Cicero's philosophical works with

quite the purpose which I have kept in view and have explained above.

Should this attempt meet with favour, I propose to edit after the same plan

some others of the less known and less edited portions of Cicero's

writings.

In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited I

cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to

repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than

to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a

great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that intellectual

disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this University,

and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of English

scholarship as compared with that of Germany,

I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and

omissions from any who are interested in the subject.

JAMES S. REID.

CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, _December, 1873._

* * * * *

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.

Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica

Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De

Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =

Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;

Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De

Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. =

Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad

Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. =

In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. =

In Catilinam.

Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia Socratis;

Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.

Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna

Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De

Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =

Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.

Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. =

De Stoicis Repugnantiis.

Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =

Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhoneôn

Hypotyposeôn Syntagmata.

Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.

Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.

Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et Platonis.

Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.

Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; De

Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.

Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.

Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad Helvidium.

Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.

Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =

Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. =

Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.

Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. =

Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or

Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.

Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.

Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie.

Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.

Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.

Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =

conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =

emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =

especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. =

Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or

omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =

subjunctive.

R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium locis

contexta.

* * * * *

THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.

INTRODUCTION.

I. _Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of

Letters:_ 90--45 B.C.

It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his

father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent

the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived

that strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son

throughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young

Cicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a

corrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]

Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the

Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens,

whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed

the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the

tenets of the master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend

of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition

and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception

of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power.[4]

Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius

Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.

It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend

became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the

Epicurean school.[5]

At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of

Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,

the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important to the

orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the monopoly of

the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in

the severest study, but he seems never to have been much attracted by the

general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till

the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic

circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's

house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not

inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most

accomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those

of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]

In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the

Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled

from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo,

like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher,

he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice of oratory.

Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was

swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to

the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he

abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the

conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,

and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]

We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought

into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent

philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and

important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become

thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each.

His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has

been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later

works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy.[11] It would

be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection which subsisted

between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there

can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then Rhodian

ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the

ethical part of Greek philosophy.

During the years 88--81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly with the

study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious

works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him at this

period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian

party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and

Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of

Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he was busily engaged,

and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually

supposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman

Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of

Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence

than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in

defence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than

his health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of

oratory[13].

The whole two years 79--77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek

philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at Athens, and

were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of

Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time

resident in the city[14]. By the advice of Philo himself[15], Cicero

attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes calls

him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's

later works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and

sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to

Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by

Cicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[18].

Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus who loved him beyond all

other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much time in listening to his

instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[20]. Patro was

probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere explicitly stated.

Cicero must at this time have attained an almost complete familiarity with

the Epicurean doctrines.

There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school then

at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures

Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic,

was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three notable

Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who

lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is

probable, however, from a mention of him in the De Oratore, that Cicero

knew himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently

named by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time

unknown to him.

The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this

period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised

Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later,

when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our

author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in

controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think

with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he

set a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially

in dialectic, which was taught after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him

as eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and

acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a

pointed style[25]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the

philosophers of the age[26]. A considerable friendship sprang up between

Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was strengthened by the fact that many

friends of the latter, such as Piso, Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or

less adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at

this time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in

the Academica[28] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was

unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.

The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn philosophy; in

Asia and at Rhodes he devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the

guidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was his old

friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian school[29]. Cicero, however,

formed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of

philosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous

Stoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than

to any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the

Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the

midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[31]; as a

minute inquirer[32]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression

of affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of

any other author[33]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome, and

stayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius,

may have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers

of Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well

acquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known

either personally.

From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters begins,

Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to

spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to

philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his

letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study

of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period

then, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he

kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a

bent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time

came to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this he added

such reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first

book of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68--62 B.C.,

afford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary

employment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus

to let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same

time in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his

love for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the

midst of his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest

for the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan

villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be

taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all

things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory

held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed

his intellect, but never his heart.

The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his

literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which

were crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[35]; the history of

his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to

Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his

consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him

reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his

acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of leisure

seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this

time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he

presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes

to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the

endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even

slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find

greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]."

At this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates

near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater

emphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero

was a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore

paraphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for

every kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each

department considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his

age, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38]

will give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied

the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and

Dicaearchus[39]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of

Theopompus[40].

The years from 59--57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares

overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from

exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring literature" with

a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that

nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the

year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, the

son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace

and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus had,

beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the

end of the year, he was busily engaged on the _De Oratore_, a work which

clearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[43]. In the

following year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he

therefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature,

that of the student[44]. During this year he was again for the most part at

those of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At

this time was written the _De Republica_, a work to which I may appeal for

evidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to

drop[45]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at

this time[46]. In the year 52 B.C. came the _De Legibus_, written amid many

distracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older

philosophers of the Socratic schools.

In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much

to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of

Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance

with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate

mention in the _Brutus_[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an

Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at

this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil of the great

Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had

lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state

of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident

there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the

acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the

Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at Mitylene, where

Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the

greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and

indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].

The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's

thoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He

wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and

anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a προπυλον

at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis[53]. It

seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient

statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome

inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter

of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in

the books _De Republica_[54]. His wishes with regard to Athens still kept

their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke of

conferring on the city some signal favour[55]. Cicero was anxious to show

Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus,

who accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days[56].

From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with

Aristus[57], and renewed his friendship with other philosophers, among them

Xeno the friend of Atticus[58].

On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical

condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters

which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts

the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the _De

Republica_[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant

is present to his mind[60]; when, he deliberates about the course he is

himself to take, he naturally recals the example of Socrates, who refused

to leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious

to find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the book of

Demetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in

arguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about

tyranny[63]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of

books; by nothing but accident a politician. In these evil days, however,

nothing was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn

became unpleasant[64].

As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he

returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter

written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner

returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books."

These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit

than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this

time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to

Sulpicius[67]. The _Partitiones Oratoriae_, the _Paradoxa_, the _Orator_,

and the _Laudatio Catonis_, to which Caesar replied by his _Anticato_, were

all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the _Hortensius_

and the _De Finibus_ had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in

the following year the _Academica_, the history of which I shall trace

elsewhere, was written.

I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as

the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his

life which preceded the writing of the _Academica_. Even the evidence I

have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of

philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical

works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he

been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge made

by some people on the publication of his first book of the later

period--the _Hortensius_--that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the

assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts

throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[69]. Did the scope of

this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in showing from a

minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with ancient

authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as accurate

as it was extensive. So far as the _Academica_ is concerned, I have had in

my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's substantial accuracy; of the

success of the defence I must leave the reader to judge. During the

progress of this work I shall have to expose the groundlessness of many

feelings and judgments now current which have contributed to produce a low

estimate of Cicero's philosophical attainments, but there is one piece of

unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the

present. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the

shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise

his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate

his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too

closely into their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance

the illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the _De Legibus_ as "an oasis in the

desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political partizanship,

and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all

students to free themselves in reading the _Academica_.

II. _The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero_.

In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student of

philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed historical

examination of the later Greek schools--the Stoic, Peripatetic, Epicurean

and new Academic. These it would be necessary to know, not merely as they

came from the hands of their founders, but as they existed in Cicero's age;

Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as Posidonius and the other pupils

of Panaetius propounded it; not merely the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but

that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum

by Cratippus; the new Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and

Carneades; the medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put

forward by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic attempt

to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by

these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements concerning

any particular school are generally tested by comparing them with the

assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier representatives of

the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at once concluded that

Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all probability, he is uttering

opinions which would have been recognised as genuine by those who were at

the head of the school in his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free

from this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the

_Academica_[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I

have indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the

relation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools.

The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often

insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to

distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical

standard[71]. We have in the _Academica_ Cicero's view of the first

problem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To

go more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the _Lucullus_

as well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in

this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and

in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that

absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which

all the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most

distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.

It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing

was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was

accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both

sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a

conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One

requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this

arrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most

opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from

all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most

probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart

from his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration,

and repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the

diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to

lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In

positiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and

disgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a

touch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar

to some put forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to

Mill, to show that the free conflict of opinion is necessary to the

progress of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to

maturity in Greece[77]. Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice,

says Cicero, there philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a

warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often

depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires us to find out what can

be said for every view. It is a positive duty to discuss all aspects of

every question, after the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle[80].

Those who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are mere busybodies[81].

The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to

defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their

predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom,

that in the fifth book of the _Tusculan Disputations_, he maintains a view

entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the _De Finibus_,

and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former

statements, on the score that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo

hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur[84]." The Academic sips the best of

every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic

dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[86]. The Academic is

only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he makes it his

sole aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and others of the mists of

error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus the Antiochean[88]. While

professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero indignantly

repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth,

has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.

Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their

evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that

eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators,

politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the

teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and

Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic

tenets were those with which the common sense of the world could have most

sympathy[92]. The Academy also was the school which had the most

respectable pedigree. Compared with its system, all other philosophies were

plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was

most estimable, _ceteris paribus_, and that man was Carneades[94].

In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, we

must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later

philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.

Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of conduct (_ars vivendi_).

All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as

supplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is

equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and

Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were mere outworks or

ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school was carried on. These

were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; in time of peace ethics

held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a key to unlock many

difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may instance one passage

in the beginning of the _Academica Posteriora_[95], which has given much

trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro with having deserted

the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. How is this to be

reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he never recanted the

doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. Arcesilas, Carneades, and

Philo had been too busy with their polemic against Zeno and his followers,

maintained on logical grounds, to deal much with ethics. On the other hand,

in the works which Cicero had written and published before the _Academica_,

wherever he had touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The

works themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and

Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics

mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase

"Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical

resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical difference, would

naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus Academia," so

long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought dialectic to the front,

and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would naturally regard him as a

deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This view is confirmed by the

fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had

found no eminent expositor. So much was this the case, that when Cicero

wrote the _Academica_ he was charged with constituting himself the champion

of an exploded and discredited school[96].

Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the sphere

of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in the _De

Legibus_ when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he begs the New

Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be

silent[97]. Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected,

is in the _De Legibus_ spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical

systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an

attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the

power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he

calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks

with something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands

of Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they

should be the only true philosophers after all[100]. There was a kind of

magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a

superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the

barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions,

therefore, we often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism

than even his teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the

philosophers of the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The

Stoics maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero

agrees with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a

life enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be

happy, but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic

and Peripatetic schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire)

and to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired

even if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he

admits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104].

These opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but

appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an

ignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is

Cicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt

that he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno,

ever stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,

regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so

regarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the difference

between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true

and Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon

Socrates as the apostle of doubt[106]. On the whole Cicero was more in

accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in all points, however: for

while Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero

hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded that they were

Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all

emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in his joys and sorrows,

refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some points Cicero

was inconsistent. In the _De Finibus_ he argued that the difference between

the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of terms; in the _Tusculan

Disputations_ he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his

works are the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Officiis_.

With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a comparatively

small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this branch of

philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient theology was,

as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical science. The

religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to

sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal operation of

divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were impossible in any form,

he thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[109]. It

went to Cicero's heart that Carneades should have found it necessary to

oppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by

the plea that his one aim was to arouse men to the investigation of the

truth[110]. At the same time, while really following the Stoics in physics,

Cicero often believed himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose

from the actual adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines,

which they gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious

and the genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange

oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111].

Still, Cicero contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic

physics by a study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of

his notions about physics, the _Timaeus_ of Plato, which he knew well and

translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that

the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well

aware of the fact.

Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's estimate of

the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully

represented during his lifetime. The philosophical descendants of the

author of the _Organon_ were notorious for their ignorance of logic[112],

and in ethics had approximated considerably to the Stoic teaching. While

not much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for

the sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic

family. With the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood

absolutely alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they

discarded mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing

but loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors

by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely

indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.

III. _The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works_.

It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a philosopher,

and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is true, but still

absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of Cicero's purpose in

writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek speculation. The

conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite unwarranted. If the later

philosophy of the Greeks is of any value, Cicero's works are of equal

value, for it is only from them that we get any full or clear view of it.

Any one who attempts to reconcile the contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes

Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and other authorities, will perhaps

feel little inclination to cry out against the confusion of Ciceros ideas.

Such outcry, now so common, is due largely to the want, which I have

already noticed, of any clear exposition of the variations in doctrine

which the late Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before

the Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This

is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works

(if we except the third book of the _De Officiis_), which he does not

freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the time

when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault rather

than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no one had

propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had been

simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing tenets. It

would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two centuries are

therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not the substance of

the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which ultimately exercised

no unimportant influence on society and on the Christian religion itself.

When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have been

destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to

those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the best Greek

speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the education of

his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at the same time

to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism throughout Italy. The

doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin in a shape suited to

catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a very large Epicurean

literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty traces is now lost. C.

Amafinius, mentioned in the _Academica_[113], was the first to write, and

his books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large

number of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in

Cicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115].

Rabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of

Horace, were two of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various

reasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean

physics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and

the voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in

one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It is

exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature

dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics than with the

ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the

Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal

and social constitution of the family, and did not much feel the need of

any speculative system; while the general decay among the educated classes

of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of

superstition among the masses, prepared the way for the acceptance of a

purely mechanical explanation of the universe. But of this subject,

interesting and important as it is in itself, and neglected though it has

been, I can treat no farther.

These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero for their

uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not read

them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious question

arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero had for

omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman Epicureans.

The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible to include

the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being unwilling to allow

that anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred to

keep silence, which nothing compelled him to break, since Lucretius was an

obscure man and only slowly won his way to favour with the public.

In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a

patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the reproach

that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He often tries by

the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had left its mark on

the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that philosophy was

best left to the Greek language, he replies with indignation, accusing them

of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a glorious thing, he

thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to

Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the Greek is a richer tongue

than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect

to deal with philosophical enquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only,

he says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other

channels that so little progress has been made. The history of Roman

oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an impulse

were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in

Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of oratory,

which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].

There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he

could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political

inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one

service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he claims praise

for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most

prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and in

those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125].

Philosophy took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and

politics[126]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies

as he does for devoting himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might

set them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such

studies were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a

life to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly,

unpractical and unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were

ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh

importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were

received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, like

the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was

good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that

Cicero should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging

the pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.

Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused

by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder

generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and

many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now

extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as to

bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed

to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy could not be thoroughly

understood till the whole subject had been mastered[132]. This design then,

which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess,

the _Academica_ and the _De Finibus_, required the composition of a sort of

philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an

interpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to

present new views of philosophy, or even original criticisms on its

history. The only thing he proclaims to be his own is his style. Looked at

in this, the true light, his work cannot be judged a failure. Those who

contrive to pronounce this judgment must either insist upon trying the work

by a standard to which it does not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek

philosophy it copies, or perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed

worthlessness of the philosophy of his age.

In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his oratorical

and political writings, all or nearly all published before the

_Hortensius_, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only

two works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded

the _Academica_, were the _De Consolatione_, founded on Crantor's book,

περι πενθους, and the _Hortensius_, which was introductory to philosophy,

or, as it was then called, protreptic.

For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of their

composition, the student must be referred to the _Dict. of Biography_, Art.

Cicero.

IV. _History of the Academica_.

On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 B.C.,

Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was

pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[134].

Here he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book

_De Consolatione_ was written. He found the mechanic exercise of

composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days

together[135]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the

dense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till

nightfall[136]. Often exertion failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the

entreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A

grief, which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would

crush him, he felt, in the busy city[137].

It was amid such surroundings that the _Academica_ was written. The first

trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a letter of Cicero

to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks of his

bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus very much for

historical and biographical details, and in the letter in question he asks

for just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the

_Academica_. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he

had determined on some new work to which our _Academica_ would

correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome the embassy which

Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean

school; who were then the most noted πολιτικοι at Athens. The meaning of

the last question is made clear by a passage in the _De Oratore_[140],

where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under

that name. It may be with reference to the progress of the _Academica_ that

in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has

made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of the remainder

of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although

he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention in

his letters to Atticus of the _Academica_[142]. He declares that however

much his detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not

read the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the

same space of time that he has taken to write them[143].

In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near

Antium[144], where he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he

afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same place he wrote to Atticus of his

intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome by way of Lanuvium about the

middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately following Tullia's

death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she died. This he felt

now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either abandon Tusculum

altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even ten years would make

the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero wrote

to Atticus that he had finished while at Astura _duo magna_ συνταγματα,

words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many scholars,

including Madvig, have understood that the first edition of the

_Academica_, along with the _De Finibus_, is intended. Against this view

the reasons adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the

letters to Atticus that the _De Finibus_ was being worked out book by book

long after the first edition of the _Academica_ had been placed in the

hands of Atticus. The _De Finibus_ was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it

was still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the

_Academica_[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in the _De

Finibus_ is announced later still[152]; and even at a later date Cicero

complains that Balbus had managed to obtain surreptitiously a copy of the

fifth book before it was properly corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia

having copied the whole five books while in that state[153]. A passage in

the _De Divinatione_[154] affords almost direct evidence that the

_Academica_ was published before the _De Finibus_. On all these grounds I

hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero describes as having

been finished simultaneously at Astura.

Another view of the συνταγματα in question is that they are simply the two

books, entitled _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, of the _Priora Academica_. In my

opinion the word συνταγμα, the use of which to denote a portion of a work

Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains its natural meaning. Cicero uses the

word συνταξις of the whole work[156], while συνταγμα[157], and

συγγραμμα[158], designate definite portions or divisions of a work. I

should be quite content, then, to refer the words of Cicero to the

_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides

that this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the _Hortensius_

(or _de Philosophia_) and the _Priora Academica_ are the compositions in

question. If this conjecture is correct, we have in the disputed passage

the only reference to the _Hortensius_ which is to be found in the letters

of Cicero. We are quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and

published before the _Academica_. This would be clear from the mention in

the _Academica Posteriora_ alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the _De

Finibus_[160] place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the

_Hortensius_ had been published a sufficiently long time before the _De

Finibus_, to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers.

Further, in the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Divinatione_[161] the

_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ are mentioned together in such a way as to

show that the former was finished and given to the world before the latter.

Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's conjecture, except the

doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word συνταγμα, which equally

affects the old view maintained by Madvig.

Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the

_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ must have been more closely connected, in

style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting perhaps the

_Academica_ and the _De Finibus_. The interlocutors in the _Hortensius_

were exactly the same as in the _Academica Priora_, for the introduction of

Balbus into some editions of the fragments of the _Hortensius_ is an

error[162]. The discussion in the _Academica Priora_ is carried on at

Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the _Hortensius_ at the villa of Lucullus

near Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there

should be but one direct reference to the _Hortensius_ in the

_Lucullus_[163].

While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, Cicero

sent Atticus the _Torquatus_, as he calls the first book of the _De

Finibus_[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the _Academica_ to

Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia had been added to the

_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, in which the public characters from whom the

books took their names were extolled. In all probability the extant

prooemium of the _Lucullus_ is the one which was then affixed. Atticus, who

visited Cicero at Tusculum, had doubtless pointed out the incongruity

between the known attainments of Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they

were made to take in difficult philosophical discussions. It is not

uncharacteristic of Cicero that his first plan for healing the incongruity

should be a deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of

statements concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans

which he knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I

may note, as of some interest in connection with the _Academica_, the fact

that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one

from Varro[166].

On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, to

arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing attentions of

Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it had been his intention to

go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still unsatisfied with his

choice of interlocutors for the _Academica_, for the first thing he did on

his arrival was to transfer the parts of Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and

Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the receipt of a letter

from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to

Varro, or if not the _Academica_, the _De Finibus_[170]. Cicero had never

been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems to have been

chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw

them more closely together. Nine years before he had pressed Cicero to find

room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of the works

on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to comply with

the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full two years before the

_Academica_ was written, to dedicate to Cicero his great work _De Lingua

Latino_. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared

himself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise.

From this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude

of that work. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years

without making any progress[173], shows that there could have been little

of anything like friendship between the two. Apart from these causes for

grumbling, Cicero thought the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since

the _De Finibus_ was already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer

to Varro the _Academica_, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of

noble birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they

possess that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had

been made in the first edition of the _Academica_ to maintain[176]. For

them another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the

_Academica_ would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, and the

fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It

happened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's

stay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his

_Academica_, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making

the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position occupied by

Atticus in the dialogue was quite an inferior one, but he was so pleased

with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often in the future such

minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta should also be

introduced was found impracticable[180].

Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had

constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He

frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,

but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his plans.

Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work

contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again

before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for these

solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to

assure him that there were reasons, which he could not disclose in a

letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did appear in some later letters.

In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he

wishes it, but you know he is

δεινος ανηρ, ταχα κεν και αναιτιον αιτιοωιτο.

So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may

be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than his; a

charge which you will perceive to be untrue[183]." Cicero, then, feared

Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidiousness.

Before these explanations Atticus had concluded that Cicero was afraid of

the effect the work might produce on the public. This notion Cicero assured

him to be wrong; the only cause for his vacillation was his doubt as to how

Varro would receive the dedication[184]. Atticus would seem to have

repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured Cicero that there

was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a general assurance,

and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the reasons from which it

proceeded[185]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that

Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour[186]. We

find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it

Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not

have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to

have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed ignorant

of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of being

actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at

Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the _De Finibus_, but

employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[187].

Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the _Academica_

is often given in the letters. He tells us that it extended, on the whole,

to greater length than the first, though much had been omitted; he adds,

"Unless human self love deceives me, the books have been so finished that

the Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to

approach them.... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and

altogether better than the last[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has

all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may

possess[189]." Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what

success, but with a care which nothing could surpass[190]." The binding and

adornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and

the letter accompanying it was carefully elaborated[191]. Yet after

everything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome,

Cicero was still uneasy as to the reception it would meet with from Varro.

He wrote thus to Atticus: "I tell you again and again that the presentation

will be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to

Brutus, who is also a follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou

wert ever wont, flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part

"shuddered" at the idea of taking the responsibility[192]. After the work

had passed into his hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to

prevent it from getting into circulation until they could meet one another

in Rome[193]. This warning was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had

just managed to get access to the _De Finibus_[194]. In a letter, dated

apparently a day or two later, Cicero declared his intention to meet

Atticus at Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable

to do so, after a consultation[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take

place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to

approve any course that might be taken[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as

soon as Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time,

then," says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal

step; oh dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my

letter stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to

hear how the matter stands[197]." Again, a little later: "You have been

bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them,

but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books in the first

fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work on the _Tusculan

Disputations_[198]. A copy of the first edition had already got into

Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which Cicero begs Atticus to

ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the _Academica_, at a

time when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[199]. From

this fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing

the first edition. If he consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies

of the first edition, it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of

course assumes that Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people,

wishes to have the "Splendidiora, breviora, meliora." Still, on every

occasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised

edition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately

after the _Academica Posteriora_ was completed[200], and often

subsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as

four[201]. That he wished the work to bear the title _Academica_ is

clear[202]. The expressions _Academica quaestio_, Ακαδημικη συνταξις, and

_Academia_, are merely descriptive[203]; so also is the frequent

appellation _Academici libri_[204]. The title _Academicae Quaestiones_,

found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the _Tusculanae

Quaestiones_, which was supported by the false notion, found as early as

Pliny[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia, at which the book was

written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he called

his Academia, but we are certain from the letters to Atticus that the work

was written entirely at Astura, Antium, and Arpinum.

Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well[206], but the

second edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books

are expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the

title _Academica_. Augustine speaks of them only as _Academici libri_, and

his references show that he knew the second edition only. Lactantius also

uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks of the _Academica_.

Plutarch shows only a knowledge of the first edition[207].

I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the

genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it

was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which

old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two editions. A

fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of Goerenz. I now proceed

to examine into the constitution and arrangement of the two editions.

a. _The lost dialogue "Catulus."_

The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the _Lucullus_ are among

those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero

so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was

son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of

father and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their

position with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of

their connection with Cicero.

Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the

_Lucullus_[208] that he did little more than put forward opinions he had

received from his father. Cicero would, doubtless, have preferred to

introduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in

the _De Oratore_, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself

from the conversation[209]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of

the father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does

nothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to

have heard[210]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be

found in their ατριψια with respect to philosophy[211]. This ατριψια did

not amount to απαιδευσια, or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the

younger the advocate of philosophy in the _Hortensius_[212]. Though Cicero

sometimes classes the father and son together as men of literary culture

and perfect masters of Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of

all the passages where the two are mentioned, that no very high value was

placed on the learning of the son[213]. But however slight were the claims

of Catulus the younger to be considered a philosopher, he was closely

linked to Cicero by other ties. During all the most brilliant period of

Cicero's life, Catulus was one of the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his

character, life, and influence are often depicted in even extravagant

language by the orator[214]. He is one of the pillars of the state[215],

Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed with the ancient worthies of

Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law, and asks the people on whom

they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic power concentrated in his

hands, were to die, the people answer with one voice "On you[217]." He

alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the one hand, of the mob,

on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no storm of danger, no favouring

breeze of fortune, could ever inspire either fear or hope, or cause to

swerve from his own course[219]. His influence, though he be dead, will

ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not only glorious in his life,

but fortunate in his death[221].

Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were

special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the _viri consulares_

who had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the

suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on

Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title "Father of his

country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to

Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by

bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden times[223]." The statement of

Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so

unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna

held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast between the

zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[224].

Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of

the two Catuli[225].

We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first

edition of the _Academica_ from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each

book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the

passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such

matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of

the contents of the lost prooemium to the _Catulus_. The achievements of

the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The

philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the

younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great

stress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the

younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which

Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was

made to the connection of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had

written in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its supposed

date, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the

Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60

B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which

is alluded to in the _Lucullus_[227]. It is well known that in the

arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against

anachronisms.

The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made

to the _Hortensius_, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after

more compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to

Cicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between

the dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's

views, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy.

Before we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from

indications offered by the _Lucullus_, it is necessary to speak of the

character and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.

In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention

his _sapientia_, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was,

says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the holiest of

men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second

Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the _De Oratore_, in which he

appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments.

Throughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man,

par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made to him when any

question is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We

are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and

his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the Greeks from

the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin

historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical

teaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[234].

The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his

mind[235]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation

in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to

many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written a history of his

own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[238], and

was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].

Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the

_Academica_ that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the _De

Oratore_, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does

not declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in

his long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular

teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the

poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded that he

was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero

repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator spring, and

the whole tone of the _De Oratore_ shows that Catulus could have had no

leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The probability is that he

had never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any

length of time, but had rather gained his information from books and

especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual

communication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have

failed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[243], and

Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between

Philo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the

_Lucullus_ seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation

during the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek

literature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his

opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus

undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the latest development

of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to

Catulus[248].

I now proceed to draw out from the references in the _Lucullus_ the chief

features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced

by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the speech

must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the

genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with

great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of the

older Academics[250]. The most important part of the speech, however, must

have consisted of a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic

schools[251]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of

the later than with that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly

probable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic

arguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the

πιθανον which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of

Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to

be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the

discourse of the day before[252]. On the other hand, those parts of

Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of Academicism[253]

seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance of the genuine

Carneadean distinction between αδηλα and ακαταληπτα would be a peculiarly

congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by Lucullus on the way in

which the _probabile_ had been handled appertains to Catulus. The

exposition of the sceptical criticism would naturally be reserved for the

most brilliant and incisive orator of the party--Cicero himself. These

conjectures have the advantage of establishing an intimate connection

between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and the succeeding one of

Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo were mentioned;

Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them, a satisfactory

basis for επιστημη, was already attained by the Carneadean theory of the

πιθανον; whereupon Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus,

that such a basis was provided by the older philosophy, which both

Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central

point or pivot of the discussion. With this arrangement none of the

indications in the _Lucullus_ clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius

upon Catulus[254] need only imply such a bare statement on the part of the

latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for

the Carneadean πιθανον. One important opinion maintained by Catulus after

Carneades, that the wise man would opine[255] (τον σοφον δοξασειν), seems

another indication of the generally constructive character of his

exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the

dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.

Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of

Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it

extremely probable that he gave a résumé of the history of philosophy,

corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the _Academica

Posteriora_. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of

understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the speech

could have been assigned in the first edition. In the _Academica

Posteriora_ it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as

Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition

of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate

only in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the

view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that

Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue

which bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[258], and

denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a

historical résumé as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the

reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to

show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old

Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for

stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We

are thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word

_commoveris_[261], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled

_Hortensius_, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from

whom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any

allusion.

The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and

attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been

as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible

for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius

were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral teaching of

Antiochus.

The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the

preceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued

the same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is

preserved in the _Academica Posteriora_[262]. He justified the New Academy

by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, and also with

those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore,

reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient

names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according to

Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes,

Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical

summary. He must have dealt with the theory of καταληπτικη φαντασια and

εννοιαι (which though really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he

found it necessary to "manufacture" (_fabricari_) Latin terms to represent

the Greek[265]. He probably also commented on the headlong rashness with

which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a

retort is made by Lucullus[266]. That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic

schools was incomplete may be seen by the fact that he had not had occasion

to Latinize the terms καταληψις (i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the

individual καταληπτικη φαντασια), εναργεια, ‛ορμη, αποδειξις, δογμα,

οικειον, αδηλα, εποχη, nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some

extent in the Antiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to

translate for himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the more

clearly does it appear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was

to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the New Academy,

and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience, which were

reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he expressly

tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him in the first

day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely introduced in

order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these arguments

must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although

foreign to its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary

classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent

to the truth of each class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of the

elaborate speech of Cicero in the _Lucullus_ proves that no general or

minute demonstration of the impossibility of επιστημη in the dogmatic sense

had been attempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in

the _Catulus_ was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the

cause of Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and

Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the

discussion[272], but only cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a

more minute examination in the _Lucullus_.

One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of

Catulus? Krische believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point

by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere

as the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[273]. The expressions of

Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by

all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of

dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (_partes mihi

sumpsi Philonis_[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general

New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil

of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's

speech in the _Catulus_ were, doubtless, Philo himself and Clitomachus.

In that intermediate form of the _Academica_, where Cato and Brutus

appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt

that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato

must have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus

took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the

Stoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that

philosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The rôle given to Hortensius,

however, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had

not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an

Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively

secondary position assigned to Hortensius in the _Academica Priora_. He

would naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[276].

If this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the

work. Cato is not closely enough connected with the _Academica_ to render

it necessary to treat of him farther.

b. _The "Lucullus."_

The day after the discussion narrated in the _Catulus_, during which

Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the Cuman villa

of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius at

Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for

his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[278]. Bauli was a little

place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which so many legends

lingered[279]. The scenery in view was magnificent[280]. As the party were

seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines of statues, the

waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and

quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening

breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia

distant[281].

Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly

free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although

when the words were written he had been dead for many years[282]. The

surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom

of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private troubles

which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully

out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and

plans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His

intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the

book, while in the last but one the _De Finibus_, the _De Natura Deorum_

and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another passage the design of

the _Tusculan Disputations_, which was carried out immediately after the

publication of the _Academica_ and _De Finibus_, is clearly to be

seen[285].

Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the

conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially

acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly

all that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,

and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have

dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was

directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train when he went to

Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the

East he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was

found in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius

Rogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[288]. He is several

times mentioned by Pliny in the _Natural History_ as the patron of Greek

artists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters

to Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like

Catulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are

explicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard

Antiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a

reply to that of Cicero in the _Catulus_. Any closer examination of its

contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The

same may be said of Cicero's answer.

In the intermediate form of the _Academica_, the speech of Lucullus was no

doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connection

with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call

attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in

which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He

was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[289].

Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while

Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the

Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,

during the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both

friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].

c. _The Second Edition._

When Cicero dedicated the _Academica_ to Varro, very slight alterations

were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero

had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost within sight of

Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now

laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date

of the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is

shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many

allusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the

Pompeian party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the

_Hortensius_[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of

the _Academica_, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not

have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works

an impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro,

and Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[296].

For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the

ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact

between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his

philosophical opinions, are alone needed here. The first mention we have of

Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his

character and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the

two. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came

before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in

the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to

read, adding "_Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti,_ ελικτα και

ουδεν[297]." All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in

the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks

for supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[298]. Several

passages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported

by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in

the same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already

seen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great

polymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to

have been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in

the year before the _Academica_ was published, testify to this

approximation[300]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very

different from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for

instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all

show a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility

in presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to Cicero.

The negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication

of the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this

slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].

The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy

from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro _De

Philosophia_[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the

so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school from, among the 288

philosophies which he considered possible, by an elaborate and pedantic

process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on

the _Academica Posteriora_ will show that there is no reason for accusing

Cicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition

owes its currency to Müller, who, from Stoic phrases in the _De Lingua

Latina_, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that

work was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].

The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the

subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more

conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition

preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the

contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition

of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the

historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given

in the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an

exposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same

as that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that

foretaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had

formed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech

of Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in

ed. 1. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1.

Atticus must have been almost a κωφον προσωπον.

I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old

editions the _Lucullus_ is marked throughout as _Academicorum liber IV_.

This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius'

quotations, which are always from the _second_ edition, and can tell us

nothing about the constitution of the _first_. One other thing is worth

remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the _Academica Priora_

before the _Posteriora_. This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the

subject-matter of the _Varro_ is certainly prior, logically, to that of the

_Lucullus_.

* * * * *

M. TULLII CICERONIS

ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM

LIBER PRIMUS.

* * * * *

I. 1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a

M. Varrone, venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset,

continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram

interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et

vetustate amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus,

paulumque cum _ab_ eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus:

atque ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad

suam villam reduximus. 2. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis,

ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec

audire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse

novi. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum

cessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille:

intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo

opus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum--me autem

dicebat--quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me

politius. 3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, Varro, iam diu exspectans, non

audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti

studium--nihil enim eius modi celare possumus--non te ea intermittere, sed

accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante

hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam

sum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis

philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare,

quaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim

cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et

studiis et artibus antecedat.

II. 4. Tum ille: Rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris.

Itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu,

quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam

viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de

nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca

potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis

abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca

intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti

intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. 5. Vides autem--eadem enim

ipse didicisti--non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui nulla

arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone disputant, nihil

definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam

denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis

dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri

putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae

docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem

accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur _labor_. 6. Iam vero physica, si

Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut

Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris,

de corpusculorum--ita enim appellat atomos--concursione fortuita loqui?

Nostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia

ea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam

quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit

adducere? _Quid_, haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis

fugiendisque rebus? Illi enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum

esse censent: apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.

7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intelligat quid

sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab honestate seiungi:

quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine voluptatibus sensum

moventibus ne suspicari _quidem_. Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur,

quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam

argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud

philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum

possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est,

maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. 8. Sed meos amicos, in quibus

est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a

fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc

docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui--nihil

enim magno opere meorum miror--feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim

peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et

tamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati,

quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa

dicta dialectice †quae quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate

quadam ad legendum invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum

prooemiis †philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.

III. 9. Tum, ego. Sunt, inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe

peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum

deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem

patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu

domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium

divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti,

plurimumque poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis

attulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti

philosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum

parum. 10. Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere

malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi

nunc: satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca

poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos

Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat

Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum

expresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi

Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,

Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem

sint aut Demosthenem imitati. 11. Ego autem--dicam enim, ut res est--dum me

ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed

quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat,

haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum licebat, legendo.

Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et administratione rei

publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii

oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime

aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis

consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si

haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. 12. Brutus quidem

noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris

persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem

sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, cuius

tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi

litterarum.

IV. 13. Tum, ille. Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te

ipso quid est, inquit, quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te

veterem illam, inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho

id magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam

nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et

emendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu

existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas

Academias esse erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit,

ut dicis: sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra _ea_ Philonis Antiochus

scripserit. 14. Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum

iam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus,

inquam, si videtur. Sane istud quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus.

Sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi

vero, ille: quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita

recordari? et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum

essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus [omnes].

15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter

omnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes

ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam

communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et

malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione

censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum

_valere_. 16. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum

audierunt perscripti varie _et_ copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil

adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque

praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil

scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium

sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non

arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea

sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in

hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum

libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. 17. Platonis autem

auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens

duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et

Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum

Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,

duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium

et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti

sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis

instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones

habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis

ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam

quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus

rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt.

Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et

rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut

dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem

Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem

videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum

expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.

V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non

sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus:

Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque

ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid me, inquam, putas,

qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum? Pergamus

igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. 19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone

philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et

rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid

rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac

primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse

dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum

bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum

expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et

corpore et vita. Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in

partibus: valetudinem, viris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem

sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus

celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam

vocum impressionem: 20. animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam

ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et mores dividebantur.

Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: quorum utrumque mentis

esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi

consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione

formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque

absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum,

id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis

ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. 21. Vitae autem--id enim erat

tertium--adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus

animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et _in_ quibusdam quae non tam naturae

quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem

quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum

hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono

sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum,

ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis

inducitur ratio bonorum.

VI. 22. Atque haec illa sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique

Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum:

illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios

Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum

finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese

expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo

atque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia

sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam,

nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad

virtutis usum idonea. 23. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita

et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat in conservatione earum

rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae

voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum

magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes

cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque

aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec

quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui,

forma atque descriptio.

24. De natura autem--id enim sequebatur--ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in

res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,

ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in

eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque:

neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur,

neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse

cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam

nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi

faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum

inauditis.

VII. 25. Nos vero, inquit Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum

voles, si te Latina forte deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine

loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut

physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam

utitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas ποιοτητας Graeci

vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed philosophorum,

atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica: suis

utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut enim nova sunt

rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. Quod si Graeci

faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto id magis nobis

concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur? 26. Tu vero,

inquam, Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos

non modo copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus

ergo, inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur

qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius

modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes.

Itaque aër--utimur enim pro Latino--et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt:

ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae gignuntur e

terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa dicuntur: e quibus

aër et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi

et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e quo essent astra

mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi, dissimile

Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. 27. Sed subiectam putant omnibus sine

ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate--faciamus enim tractando

usitatius hoc verbum et tritius--materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa

atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari

atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in nihilum, sed in suas

partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in

rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem moveantur, omnia

intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 28. Et

cum ita moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro

citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa

effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et

continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla

pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae

insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit,

quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat: 29.

quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque

perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae,

quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris

ea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant,

quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem

et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem

fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter

obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.

VIII. 30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in

disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus,

tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse

iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id,

quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi

ιδεαν appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus

dicere. 31. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec

percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae

essent aut ita parvae, ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et

concitatae, ut nihil umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia

continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum

opinabilem appellabant. 32. Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in

animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa definitiones rerum

probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Verborum

etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa quaeque essent ita

nominata, quam ετυμολογιαν appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum

notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari

volebant: itaque tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis

ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi

adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae.

33. Haec erat illis disciplina a Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim

mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico

etiam respondeam.

IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum

et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo

ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis

quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et

ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat,

vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae:

spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in

ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 34. Nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam

fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum

maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et

moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in

ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi

Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates

unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus

acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas.

35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret

et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si

videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero,

inquam, videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium.

X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos virtutis

inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una

virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret

honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 36. Cetera

autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat,

alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.

Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione

dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis relinquebat,

in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 37. Sed quae essent sumenda,

ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea

praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam

rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum,

officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in

bonis actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem

servata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. 38. Cumque superiores non

omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut

more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera

virtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo

modo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed

ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse

quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non

tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et

efferri laetitia dicerent, sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent,

hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. 39. Cumque eas

perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque

in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem

adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque

iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse

immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.

XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum illis

quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur,

non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque

gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo

modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis,

cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero

aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 40.

Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de

sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi

impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille φαντασιαν, nos visum appellemus

licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone

saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus, adsensionem

adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et voluntariam. 41.

Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam

haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum

ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile--feretis hoc? Nos vero, inquit.

Quonam enim modo καταληπτον diceres?--Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum

esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu

prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo

tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis--nova enim

dicebat--usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum

appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset,

scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam

opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. 42. Sed

inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi,

collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli

credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut

supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis

videbatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia

nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam

scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis

imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad

rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et

ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent

aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat.

Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a

superioribus.

XII. 43. Quae cum dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est,

inquam, a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse

[autem] arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem

veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc

Varro: Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis

et ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa

discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. 44. Tum

ego: Cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen

instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed

earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant

Socratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis

paene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse

dixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut

Democritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis

omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa

esse dixerunt. 45. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri

posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia

latere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi

posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare

quemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu

continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita

res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et

perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod

erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam

plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus

momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio

sustineretur. 46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur,

si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil

adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur,

nihil certi dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposui_sti_, vetus, haec nova

nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit,

in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae

partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex

Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter

ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....

* * * * *

ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.

EX LIBRO I.

1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. _Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere,

dictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I._: quid autem stomachatur

Menesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?

2. Nonius s.v. _concinnare_ p. 43. _Idem in Academicis lib. I._: qui cum

similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.

EX LIBRO II.

3. Nonius p. 65. _Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II.

vocabulum accepisse confirmat_: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo

etiam aequor illud poetae vocant.

4. Nonius p. 69. _Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II._: qui enim serius

honores adamaverunt vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini

possunt esse.

5. Nonius p. 104. _Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis

lib. II._: frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad

imitandum iuventuti.

6. Nonius p. 121. _Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero

Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere?

cuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur

cornua.

7. Nonius p. 162. _Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? mare

nonne caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem

aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....

8. Nonius p. 162. _Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_

atqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non

regulis.

9. Nonius p. 394. _Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur

et sobrium, non madidum ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ alius (_color_)

adultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, _alius sanis_, alius siccis,

alius vinulentis ...

10. Nonius p. 474. _Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:_ si quando enim

nos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum

cernimus.

11. Nonius p. 545. _Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ quibus etiam

alabaster plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.

EX LIBRO III.

Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. _De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo_

prooemium _id est, quod in Academico tertio._

12. Nonius p. 65. _Digladiari ... idem tertio:_ digladiari autem semper,

depugnare cum facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam

stultissimum dixerit?

13. Nonius p. 65. _Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib.

III._: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus

...

14. Nonius p. 123. _Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib.

III._: in tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas

ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae.

15. Nonius p. 419. _Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum

lib. III._: aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.

16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. _Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico

tertio verba sunt:_ quod si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent,

sic vitam deviam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset

emendatio temeritatis.

17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. _Varro ad Ciceronem

tertio_ fixum _et Cicero Academicorum tertio_ (= _Lucullus_ §27): †malcho

in opera adfixa.

18. Nonius p. 139. _Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic.

Academicorum lib. III._: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus,

abesse dicemus. = _Lucullus_ §51.

19. Nonius p. 117. _Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III._: qui gallinas

alere permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae

gallina peperisset dicere solebant. = _Lucullus_ §57.

EX LIBRO IIII.

20. Nonius p. 69, _Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in Academicis

lib. IIII._: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = _Lucullus_ §67.

21. Nonius p. 65. _Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et

columna Maenia. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: item ille cum aestuaret,

veterum ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = _Lucullus_

§70.

22. Nonius p. 99. _Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum

vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII._: non

enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. = _Lucullus_ §100.

23. Nonius p. 164. _Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: quia

nobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole

conlucet.... = _Lucullus_ §105.

24. Nonius p. 107. _Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. Academicorum

lib. IIII._: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem

exanclatum. = _Lucullus_ §108.

25. Nonius p. 163. _Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.

Academicorum lib. IIII._: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = _Lucullus_ §109.

26. Nonius p. 122. _Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: at hoc

Anaximandro infinitatem. = _Lucullus_ §118.

27. Nonius p. 65. _Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. Academicorum lib.

IIII._: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = _Lucullus_ §120.

28. Nonius p. 189. _Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: nec

ut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse

dicat. = _Lucullus_ §121.

29. Martianus Capella V. §517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. _Cicero ... in

Academicis_: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa

tenebris. = _Lucullus_ §122.

30. Nonius p. 102. _E regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum

lib. IIII._: nec ego non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in

contraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia.

= _Lucullus_ §123.

31. Nonius p. 80. _Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et

confusione trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: plane, ut supra

dictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = _Lucullus_ §135.

Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.

32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. _Haec tua verba sunt_ (_sc. Cicero!_):

mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua

ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.

33. August. contra Academicos II. §26.: _id probabile vel veri simile

Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent invitare_. ...

Talia, _inquit Academicus_, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri

similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno.

Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus

haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem

decet esse sapientem. [_Proximis post hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat

Augustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis verba_.]

34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §15. _Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius

causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... _

Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes

videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse

sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,

qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.

35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §43. _Ait enim Cicero_ illis (_i.e.

Academicis_) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi

qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.

36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei VI. 2. _Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T.

Varroni) tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi

versatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone_, homine, _inquit_,

omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.

* * * * *

ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM

LIBER II.

I. 1. Magnum ingenium Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum

omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus

temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut

enim admodum adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito

paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor

profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit;

deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor--licebat enim celerius legis

praemio--, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut

diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad

Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, quae

de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. 2. Idque eo fuit

mirabilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui

adolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum

in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni

magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter

et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in

rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma

profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum,

verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam

verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in

Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt: qui

quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum

proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere,

credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali

ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles

spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis

mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. 3. Tantus ergo

imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus

pugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum

maximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos

legisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis

temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli

institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum

utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque

ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum

victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio

tardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in

urbem currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum

in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod

hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio

quam id cum mea laude communicem.

II. 4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt

et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum

multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim

studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit

quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed

et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei

militaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus

otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur

Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et

post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea

saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset.

Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat.

5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam

etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras,

plures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum

rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego

autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P.

autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante

censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum

Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. 6. Restat ut iis

respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari.

Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut

ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro

vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque

amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis,

quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis

de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo

operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem

ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non

modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis

prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri

arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus

notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, qui

in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur,

scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam mortuis invidere.

III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur.

Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret

praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere

quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare:

quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla

contentione volumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim

omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis

rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa

antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint,

tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati

relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in

utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut

verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. 8. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se

scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea

vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile,

adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod

integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta et

quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum

ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde

infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius,

quem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad

quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad

saxum adhaerescunt. 9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent

fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare

potuissent--statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse

sapientis--, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis

etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad

unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare

malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, pugnacissime defendere quam

sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et

alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa,

quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie

venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus,

quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in

Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in

spatio consedimus.

IV. 10. Hic Catulus: Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene

explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea,

quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem,

inquit Hortensius, feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram

servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in

promptu erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille:

Non sane, inquit, Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est

iis, qui placere volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde

ea, quae dico, probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec

ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, _non_ vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed

mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata

est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus

agebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno

studio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei

faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum

animos ereximus. 11. At ille: Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem,

fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi

Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat,

homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus

et nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque

leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo

est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant:

et homo natura lenissimus--nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius--stomachari

tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante videram. At ille, Heracliti

memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num

vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis

tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei

familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa

audivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent

descripsisse. 12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus

commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin

contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur

et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item

Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex

eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque

compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et

Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in

ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat,

praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est adversarius is, qui ista, quae

sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur,

tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.

V. 13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini--me

autem nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod

seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,

quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.

Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,

commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, cum

consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam

aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito

senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium: illi

quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero

sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt

Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam,

alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium. Et de hoc

quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum

expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. 14. Similiter vos, cum

perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam

velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem,

Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum

inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec

Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti

physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente

incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa

esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse

reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam

quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant. 15. Quod si illi

tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot

saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum

iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut

in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui

constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret,

qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e numero tollendus

est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam,

Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a

quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates

autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat

refellere. Ita, cum aliud agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus

est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci ειρωνειαν vocant: quam ait etiam in

Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non putandum,

quod idem fuerit in Socrate.

VI. 16. Sed fuerint illa veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est

igitur actum, quod investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut

putatur, obtrectans nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores

immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est

clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio,

quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi,

proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est

quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi

discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit:

nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum floruerunt: e

quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit--declarat multitudo

librorum--ingeni non minus in [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in

Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus

Metrodorus putabatur. 17. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos

dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos

facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e

philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant: nec

vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis, qui nihil probarent,

Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec

definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si

verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam καταληψιν illi vocant, eosque,

qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi posset,

inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius εναργειαι,

ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus

fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi--me appellabat iocans--hoc

licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa

evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent, definienda

censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam priores fuisse

dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere putabant, ne qui

fallerentur. 18. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam evidentium

rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et homines dignos,

quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova quaedam commovet, quod

ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur,

et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit

Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum enim ita negaret,

quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset--id enim volumus esse ακαταληπτον--,

si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum--iam enim hoc pro

φαντασιαι verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus--visum igitur impressum

effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non

esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest

quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod

est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo,

iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse

comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis

oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem,

quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse

concedimus.

VII. 19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa

sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat

contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius

aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum

est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum,

qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit

et alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et

sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt.

Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur,

et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum

adspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in

odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis

iudicium requirat acrius. 20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi

pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in

sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos

non videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere

exercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut

Andromacham, quum id nos ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu

et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen.

Quid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris

aut voluptatis? in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia

sentiatur:--potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter

eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet non

apertissime insaniat? 21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi

dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed

quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,

hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non

sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde

sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum

comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis

particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec

intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. 22. Quod si essent falsae

notitiae--εννοιας enim notitias appellare tu videbare--, si igitur essent

hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non

possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei

consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae

non modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime

continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria

falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet?

Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis

animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem

ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus,

sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item.

Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat,

aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea

potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is,

qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in

similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo atque

agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem

tractabit, multa perceperit?

VIII. 23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi

multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non

comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse

censemus, itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat

constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti,

quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui

statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam

aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges

imposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi,

percepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam

tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum

supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non

possint. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo

modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam

rem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum

vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia

referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est,

constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat,

sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter

appetitio--eam enim volumus esse ‛ορμην--, qua ad agendum impellimur, et id

appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. 25. Illud autem, quod movet,

prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id, quod visum

erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri animus ad

appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur accommodatumne

naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non occurrit animo,

nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur, numquam

movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei verum,

quod occurrit, videri. 26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis

tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate

perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,

cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio

cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,

quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi

involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium

quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet_ur_. Itaque

argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece αποδειξις, ita definitur: 'ratio, quae

ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit.'

IX. 27. Quod si omnia visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel

falsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo

quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset

conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi

debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de

se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant

δογματα, quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum

proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum

proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari

quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse

falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla

ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui

illa visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis

interesse. 28. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id

ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed

Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse

percipi, consentaneum esse unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia

non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id

consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam

esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum

quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.

29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id

haberent Academici decretum,--sentitis enim iam hoc me δογμα dicere--,

nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus,

fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam

totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam

rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis_a_ accipi oporteret

et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium

esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia,

iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse, qui aut

cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde

proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere dubia

neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia

plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum

saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia

totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil

approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.

X. 30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior--habet

enim aliquantum a physicis--, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra

dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de

abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat

subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal

omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum

primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut

sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons

est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea,

quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia

quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus

construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum εννοιας,

tum προληψεις vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque

innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem

ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit. 31. Ad rerum igitur

scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur

maxime cognitionem, et istam καταληψιν, quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo

exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat--nihil est enim

ei veritatis luce dulcius--tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus

utitur et artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam

ipsam corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit.

Ergo ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel

instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt

funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate

eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere.

32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid

velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea,

quae disputentur, vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid

ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo

veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius,

qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque

intersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur

eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui

omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi

desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim--et hoc quidem vel maxime vos

animadvertebam moveri--probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque

se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.

XI. 33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi,

propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus,

interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si

nihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique

communis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum

dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem

modo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt

pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut

si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non

ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed

propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu

probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades

volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo

agimus, tibi erit revertendum. 34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum

falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non

potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod

ita mihi videatur verum, ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore

versantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt

distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud

quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque

comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum

possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo

ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere

inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec

argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. 35. Ex hoc illud

iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur:

'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur.

Non enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque

adseverare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et

propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique

occurrit et primo quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo

levius? 36. Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod

visum sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis

visis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides:

deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit

diligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile

videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent

dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt.

Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et

oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam

absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei

signum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod

significatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione

hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam

absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.

XII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione

atque approbatione, quam Graeci συγκαταθεσιν vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo

non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim,

quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi

multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non potest. Deinde

cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod animal agit

aliquid--nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit--, aut ei

sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda

adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos neque sentire

neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus

impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo non potest

animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat--Graeci

id οικειον appellant--, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non

approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil

attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur

statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse

constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit

aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit.

39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem

absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi

adsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et

firmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit,

omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum

sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem

actionem tollit e vita.

XIII. 40. Nunc ea videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius

potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt

igitur primum artem quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et

genera definiunt, in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit,

totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant

omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri

possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia

non percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi

sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti

conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic

est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est,

id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, ut

eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius modi, ut

in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint,

alia non possint. 41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae

autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant

concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa sint,

ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis

non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint:'

reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum:

'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum,

quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.' 42. Haec duo

proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam

adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:

primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni

consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne

ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa

concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,

item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt,

volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta esse falsa,

quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.

XIV. 43. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed

ab eorum causa, qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et

partitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines

dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est

hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui

clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum

aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam

rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa

vera definitio sit? si_n_ negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera

definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur,

id percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus

partibus. 44. Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide

perspicere nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se

fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui

poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam

concludi argumentum non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt,

ita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus

comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse

comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque

ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam

quod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et

ea, quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse

quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro

congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa

visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, inter

falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam

interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.

45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse

videamur, quaeque ab iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis

relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam

habet vim, ut ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed

tamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus

est vel arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese,

quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit

subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,

dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil

profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.

XV. 46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus

adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim

primum, quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt,

ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod

fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti

quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet

igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere,

de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus

interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere

constitui. 47. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam

illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri

esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus

iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa

quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis,

auspiciis, extis declarentur--haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra

disputant--, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere

possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, efficere non

possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae

perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae

nihil sit omnino? 48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea

declarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel

furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut

non modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis

nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se

motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,

qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset

inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae

falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile

internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi

dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in

visis distinctio appareat.

XVI. 49. Ad has omnis visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat

et erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum

puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod

captiosissimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in

philosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut

demitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano.

Vitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum

obiectum est a deo dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri

simile? cur deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne

internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc si

perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin ipse

tua sponte processeris, tuum. 50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum

posse aut ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid

cui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?

deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus

similes _sunt_, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt

quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa:

quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia

quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri

possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium generum nihil

interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. 51.

Quod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive

illa cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete

sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis

perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,

cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse

commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et

inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum

Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba

ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:

'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'

Idemque in Epicharmo:

'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'

Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus,

ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.

XVII. 52. At enim dum videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum_que_,

quae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim

dicimus, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium

nec mente nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione

faciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae

videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam

levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes

furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum

relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:

'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum

adspectu' ...

53. At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro

veris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte

gravitas aut tarditas aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo

temporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando

sustinere adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset,

aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest

levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus

gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis

somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere

quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos

aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium

visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil

interesse. 54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod

nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae αδηλα Graeci. Si enim res se ita habeant, ut

nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano, cui possit

exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non mediocris insaniae

est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis impressorum

pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat esse, cum

eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si satis est ad tollendam cognitionem

similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti, praesertim

concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius contenditis, quod rerum natura non

patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus

aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas? ut [sibi] sint et ova

ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in

geminis? Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu

autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest. 55.

Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in Academia irridentur, a quibus

ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse

mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum similis, sed undique

perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos

quidem innumerabiles], itemque homines. Deinde postulas, ut, si mundus ita

sit par alteri mundo, ut inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur

tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par, ut nihil

differat, nihil intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis individuis, unde

omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem

innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse, sed

etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?

XVIII. 56. Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior

potiusque refello propter id, quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis

singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos

Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam

eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a

suis. An non videmus hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis

internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti

ne minimum quidem similes viderentur? 57. Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo:

quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum

ei res similes occurrant, quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum

nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse

non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis

possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater

geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si

adsueveris. Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen

hoc accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere

permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina

peperisset dicere solebant. 58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis

est ova illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc

illud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam,

ut talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non

licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri

enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit

quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,

cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones

nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non

specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi

nota. 59. Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re

nulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non

distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa

necessario nata est εποχη, id est adsensionis retentio, in qua melius sibi

constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli existimant. Si

enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, tollendus adsensus est.

Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non cognitum? Carneadem

autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse _eo_ delabi interdum, ut diceret

opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est

esse aliquid, quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo,

quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel

incognitae. 60. Restat illud, quod dicunt, veri inveniendi causa contra

omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo igitur videre quid invenerint. Non

solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? aut cur

celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit,

ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur. Quid, si utroque? num peius est?

Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo

auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur vel plurimum. Quis enim ista

tam aperte perspicueque et perversa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in

Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis

fuisset?

XIX. 61. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo

etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus.

Sed iam confirmata causa te, hominem amicissimum--me autem appellabat--et

aliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus

philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, eam

philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio,

privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus

adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat sive eius loci, quem

incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat,

isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem

ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si sequamur, iis vinculis

simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. 62. Sublata enim adsensione

omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo recte

fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam

sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris

in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, quod mihi

quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem ullam quae

cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam atque etiam ne

illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas. Quae cum

dixisset ille, finem fecit. 63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod

quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,

nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, me

quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens--non enim satis intellegebam--, coepit

hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli

oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, accurate, copiose, taceo neque te

quo minus, si tibi ita videatur, sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud

vero non censuerim, ut eius auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo

monuit, inquit adridens, ut caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis,

quorum vides quanta copia semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione

quaereret qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse

reperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De

causa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno

opere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia

sensisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset

Catulus, me omnes intueri.

XX. 64. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius

modi quadam oratione sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita

movit, ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum,

quae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse

diffiderem. Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses

non minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.

65. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad

hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed

etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus

pertinacia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu

consilioque totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum

alios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali

disputatione id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum

solet, iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri

reperiendi et ea sentire, quae dicerem. 66. Qui enim possum non cupere

verum invenire, cum gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc

pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa

turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui

numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero

ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator--non enim sum sapiens--et meas

cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,

'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'

ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,

'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'

sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore

specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non de

me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem

sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec percipio

tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens; itaque visis

cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse

maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre. Nihil

est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de gravitate sapientis, errore,

levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis?

quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te

probatur--ut praepostere tecum agam, mox referam me ad ordinem--haec primum

conclusio quam habeat vim considera.

XXI. 67. Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam

opinabitur: numquam autem opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc

conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum.

Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita

sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed

illud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse

et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a

veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. 68.

Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo

adsentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam

vitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum,

sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet, si temere

processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa veris, eaque, quae percipi non

possunt, _iis quae possunt_--si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus--,

ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem

omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das,

accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus

omnes cohibiturum, ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum

esse sapientem. Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse

percipi: etenim de eo omnis est controversia.

XXII. 69. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me

defenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius

didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non

acrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur

fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim

iste dies illuxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse

negitavisset, veri et falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae

Stoici. Poenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime

ad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi

poenitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum.

Numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent

habere. 70. Unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? Nominis

dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod

erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii,

qui se sequerentur, Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non

potuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt

inter illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam

reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub

Novis solem non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum,

sic Academicorum umbram secutus est. 71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum,

cum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille

Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis

oportere, illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro

credidisset, honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea

defensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum:

qui ex illius commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis

nostris a vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit _ut_

quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum

hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.

XXIII. 72. Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a

nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros

viros, sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res _non_ bonas

tractent, similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri,

quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras

nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si

dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?--sic enim appellabantur

ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur--: maxima fuit et

gravitatis et ingeni gloria. 73. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo

conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam animi? qui ita sit

ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil excipit de quo non

profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa? quis hunc philosophum

non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis inferioris aetatis? qui mihi

cum illo collati quintae classis videntur. Atque is non hoc dicit, quod

nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille verum

plane negat esse: sensus quidem non obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic

enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus

initio libri, qui est de natura: 'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne

aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos,

nec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit.' 74. Furere tibi Empedocles videtur:

at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur, sonum fundere. Num ergo

is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse

ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt, iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus

bonis quamquam versibus, sed tamen illi versibus increpant eorum

adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire

dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis

certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones

perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum

sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, 'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius.

Quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non

esset, nisi probavisset. Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla

fuit ratio persequi.

XXIV. 75. Videorne tibi, non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris

homines, sed imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam

molestos vobis, sed minutos, Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt

contorta et aculeata quaedam σοφισματα; sic enim appellantur fallaces

conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire

putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam multa

contra omnia, quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi

quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset,

quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile

posse. 76. Quid Cyrenaici _tibi_ videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui

negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere,

quae tactu intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid

colore aut quo sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.

Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post

illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque

studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem

iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed

verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. 77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum non

modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec

solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum vera

sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid

futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari

sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, quod percipi

posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? tum illum ita

definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et

effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset visum verum, quale

vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi

posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non

est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum: neque

enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale, quale vel falsum.

Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a

vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. 78. Haec est una

contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse

sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil

percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: equidem

Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo

disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et

perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero

nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse.

XXV. 79. Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera

nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle, communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere

posses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram.

Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur?

Nam et in remo sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris

videri colores nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?--Manent

illa omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.--Igitur

semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim rem

demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam

esse credendum. 80. Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et

importune insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum

oculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse

mendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed

hic quidem maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas

esse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi

nobis ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et

integris sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?--Utinam

quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus,

quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non

cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies

longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at

familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem, non

videmus. 81. At ille nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et

octingenta stadia quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius.

Responderem igitur audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse

contentum. Dicet me acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque

videntur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere

possunt. Ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis aër crassus offunditur. At amplius

non desideramus. Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam

quererer cum deo, quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem

illam? Stare nobis videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa.

Quaere rationem cur ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio

an non possis, non tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum

testimonium dicere ostenderis.

XXVI. 82. Quid ego de nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse

quaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti

partibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi

quidem quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum

quam videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum

esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi

igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri

putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione

fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis

stare videatur. 83. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso, quam in

parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci,

percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E quibus primum

est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium,

inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi

possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu

profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo nihil intersit

quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium

omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos, quibuscum res est, id quoque

conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. 84. Qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum

videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum, quod

percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso: qua

distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Gemino consul

fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam

similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario

facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet igitur sensum, et si una

fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. Sublato enim iudicio illo,

quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem videris, qui tibi videbitur,

tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem

modi falsa. 85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus videri, quid

habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam

aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil

esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum credibile 'nullum

esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum.'

Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod agitur, nihil

interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an internosci non

possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo tanta esse non

potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem

temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros eiusdem

modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres? 86. Quid? si in

eius_dem_ modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in

agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui,

quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?

XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae nos

non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur. Quid?

hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad quae

pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire

possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros

mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura! 87. Cur non

extimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse

aliquam vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo

verbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi

adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur

etiam eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de

physicis mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo

ante dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam,

res iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris

solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:--de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose

omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem

consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem

fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.--88. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a

te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et furiosorum

visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum, sanorum. Quo

modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se vidisse Homerum,

sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:

'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'

Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit, eum

somnia re_ri_ et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea vera, quae

essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum videbantur, quo

modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non putamus ita totum illud

audivisse,

'O pietas animi ...',

si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit illa

visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti

probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:

'Mater, te appello ...'

nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde enim

illa:

'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur minorem

habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?

XXVIII. 89. Quid loquar de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus,

Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is

putabat quae videbantur? Quid ille, qui:

'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'

nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? apud

Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat sagittis,

cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde movebatur

falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi

cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:

'unde haec flamma oritur?'

et illa deinceps:

'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, _adsunt_, me expetunt:'

Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:

'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam

hanc vim, quae me excruciat!

Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant

cum ardentibus taedis.'

Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:

'Intendit crinitus Apollo

arcum auratum, luna innixus:

Diana facem iacit a laeva.'

90. Qui magis haec crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur?

Apparet enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur,

ut illud efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et

falsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa

falsa vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non

enim id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti

sint, aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut

furentium aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.

91. Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse

dicitis, veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et

falsi? et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus

iudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia

igitur. Sol quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut

queat iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera

sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si

haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem pollicebatur.

Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in philosophia multae

atque magnae, non est satis. 92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis,

videte ne contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit

elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum

paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod

tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.

XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam

nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus quatenus.

Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re

minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca,

magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto

certum respondeamus [non] habemus.--93. At vitiosi sunt soritae.--Frangite

igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum

est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa,

tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat

quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, ‛ησυχαζειν. Per me vel stertas

licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit? Sequitur

enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget. Quo in numero

conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt? Progrediere

rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim fateris, neque ultimum te

paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse. Cuius generis error ita

manat, ut non videam quo non possit accedere. 94. Nihil me laedit, inquit:

ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem veniam, equos

sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi, praeceps erit. Sic

me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti respondeo. Si

habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus es: si non habes, ne tu quidem

percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed negas te usque ad obscura

progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si id tantum modo, ut taceas,

nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te captare volt, utrum tacentem

irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad novem, verbi gratia, sine

dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis: etiam a certis et

illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me in obscuris facere non sinis.

Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuvat, quae nec augentis nec

minuentis quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet. 95. Quid? quod eadem

illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora.

Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est,

quidquid enuntietur--id autem appellant αξιωμα, quod est quasi effatum--,

aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt? Si te

mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris _an_ verum dicis? Haec scilicet

inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius quam illa, quae nos non

comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.

XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec eorum

ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi

est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum sit'? Rebus

sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias improbandas, quae sint

in genere contrario. 96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si

dicis _nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem_ nunc lucere et verum

dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis.

Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid

igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo

hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis,

mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui

potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec

Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic

conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet

scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius

concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris,

mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec

approbare nec improbare. 97. Qui igitur magis illud? Si ars, si ratio, si

via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in utroque. Sed hoc

extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum

aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim

cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non

impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'aut vivet cras

Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic statuant, omne, quod ita

diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non modo verum esse, sed etiam

necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti tardum putant. Si enim,

inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras

Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis

necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est, Antiochus et Stoici:

totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis diiunctio--contraria

autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa

potest esse, nulla vera est. 98. Mecum vero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum

disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades

solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose, minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab

eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec autem merces erat dialecticorum.

Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo

iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob eam causam, quod ita didici, omne,

quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris,

mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi

hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.

XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi

relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis sententia

Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam, ut quisquam

id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum

Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde studiosus ac diligens.

Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae

iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. 99. Duo placet esse Carneadi genera

visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi possint, alia

quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse probabilia; alia non

probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur,

ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra posteriorem nihil dici

oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum esse, ut perceptio

consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam esset, si

probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam tu, Luculle,

commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur

modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil

ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si

nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens

ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis

sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque

percepta neque adsensa, sed similia veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita

tollatur. 100. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num comprehensum animo

habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui potest? Sed si iam

ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta, probo navigio, bono

gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur se illuc venturum esse

salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi,

faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam erat Anaxagoras, qui id

non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde

illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri quidem. 101. Et quaecumque

res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum,

movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus, habet corpus,

habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut ei multa vera videantur,

neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam: eoque

sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem modi exsistere falsum aliquod,

cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui

multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.

XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, praesto

est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno

Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est

caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest.'

Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio

ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa

igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem

certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus, tibi adsentior. 102. Quamquam nihil

mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem maxime, cui erant

ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec quivis arbitratu suo

reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe levior reprehensio

est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non videtur hoc satis esse

vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere, quae a te vel maxime agitata

sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuum?'

Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret.

Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C.

Lucilium scripsit poëtam, cum scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum,

eum, qui consul cum M. Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis--sunt

enim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima

institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur--, sed scriptum est

ita: 103. 'Academicis placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut

aliae probabiles videantur, aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia

posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia

sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait

vehementer errare eos, qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus

numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit

disputatum, non inesse in his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et

certi notam. 104. Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus

sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli

adsentiri: altero, cum se a respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet,

sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum

placere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem,

ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere

possit. †Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab

adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa, quibus

ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque partem

respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit, dum sine

adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea, quae nulla re

impedirentur. 105. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, invidiosa

certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos percipi

comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus.

XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem expedito,

soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, iacere iam

illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens, de quo

loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, isdem

sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare illud, quod

nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec

tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane

ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et vibrat dissimileque

est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis rationem reddere cur id

eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod videbatur oculis, defendere.

106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? meminisse

visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaenus, qui magnus

mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro adsentiens totam

geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae sciebat, oblitus est?

Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis placet. Si

igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia, quae quisque

meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil

potest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc

omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime

vis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si

comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. 107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne,

quae ipsae fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae

tantum id, quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera

et falsa diiudicent?

Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum enim

negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem

perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum,

ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam

putant, vera esse haruspicum [_responsa_], auspicia, oracula, somnia,

vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is potest facere vel de

iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas habuerint, cur id

sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est aliquid, quod positum

vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non possit? an tu in soritis

poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo

insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione ipsam veri similitudinem

non impeditam sequi? 108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei

posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim videri

oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus

esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli autem

omnia, si visa tollantur.

XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed

brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto

repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere,

credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a

Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris

adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea

pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia

sequitur, nulla re impediente? 109. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod

statuet, ne id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque

impediet in navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis

procreandis plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter

probabile.

Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater, sed,

ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret consentaneum

esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum saltem dicere

posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et sibi ipsum

contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil comprehendi posse, si

quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum fuisse

Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse possit nisi comprehensum,

perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil

posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud

decretum habeat et sine decretis vitam agere possit! 110. Sed ut illa habet

probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc

haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non

habet, utitur probabilibus. Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur

et incerta reddere. Non enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit,

stellarum numerus par an impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de

rebus, in quibus versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis

enim nihil probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti

nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat. 111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti,

Luculle, reprehensionem Antiochi--nec mirum: in primis enim est nobilis--,

qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum. Cum enim

sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea differre a

veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse concessum, quod

videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli altero, quo neget

visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset, si nos

verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Sed

probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum habemus.

XXXV. 112. Ac mihi videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim

campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in

Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui

id percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet

illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum

simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque etiam,

si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille sapientem

interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco

valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? 113. Quaero enim quid sit quod

comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne

Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale

falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito nimirum

adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus Academia

concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, vel quod

amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum et

acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo

tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam alia,

haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae aut

Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale, quale

falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. Horum

neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque verum

puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.

XXXVI. 114. Illud ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes

idque turpissimum esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi

adroges, ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas,

mores fingas, finis bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam

vitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium

dicas te et artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia

complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad

quam me deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si

dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. 115. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad

suam quisque rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus

cognationem esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam

saepe rexisse, sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam

inter se amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi?

qui mecum vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo?

qui ista Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola,

si vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos

impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint

scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire.

Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale

est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis,

de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec quaestio est.

116. In tres igitur partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa

sapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita,

videamus: at illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se

illa scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura

pendent, quae disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent

persuadendi necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non

persuadere, sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non

quaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum

progredi non possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat:

extremitatem et quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit:

liniamentum sine ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero,

si adigam ius iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante

rationes omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem

maiorem esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem

deum censet esse, contempserit. 117. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est

crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille

longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus,

quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est:

quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum

esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget _et_ disciplinam? Etsi quamcumque

eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e physicis

potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor quaestiones

infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia constant, videamus

quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio.

XXXVII. 118. Princeps Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse

primas ferunt, ex aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari

et sodali suo, non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua

omnia gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum aëra, sed ea,

quae ex eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex

his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis

inter se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente

divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse

mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata

figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur:

Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in

ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem:

Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et fore.

Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo

sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci

volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem

sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo condemnatique discedent.

119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam

habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, quam,

quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quae et se

et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum

etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis, terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam

animalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat, fore tamen

aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret.

XXXVIII. Sint ista vera--vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse veri--,

comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens

syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens

Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum,

quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita

esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat motus mutationemque

moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum exsistere, ut hic ornatus

umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, illud autem superius sicut

caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem

relinquatur. 120. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium, quanti

libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? Cur deus,

omnia nostra causa cum faceret--sic enim voltis--, tantam vim natricum

viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa _ac_ perniciosa terra marique

disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine

divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad

apium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis

minutorum opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur. 121. Negas sine deo posse

quicquam. Ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo

immunitatem magni quidem muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem

habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad

fabricandum mundum. Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec,

ut ille, qui asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta

haec esse dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non

docentis, sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens,

quidquid aut sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet

ponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore.

Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes

divinum numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit--quod cui non

accidit?--extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen adsentior,

nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.

XXXIX. 122. Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa

tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum,

terram intrare possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium,

quam vim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum

intererat ea nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici

notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed

ecquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus,

ut videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an

media pendeat? 123. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram

multarum urbium et montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui

dixit, iurare posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam

dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis

vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos αντιποδας vocatis: cur mihi

magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis, qui, cum audiunt,

desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum,

solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare censet neque praeter

terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate

convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae, si stante terra caelum

moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam arbitrantur,

sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? loquere. Putas solem esse tantulum?

Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum

vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo

Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat posse. 124. Sed redeo ad animum et

corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura sit, quae

venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an, ut

Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis habeat, ut

Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si

simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus

nullo corpore--quod intellegi quale sit vix potest--et, quidquid est,

mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum

aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem

probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria

momenta.

XL. 125. Sin agis verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non

adsentiar, sed quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem

potissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis

fui. Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes

esse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur

corporum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos

ullas, e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine

aliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus

hic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante

post, alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc

simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis

isdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus,

isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid

animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus

irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus

adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire. 126. Non ergo id

agitur, ut aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam

postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia

quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam esse

arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne

exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud scio

an ita sit.

XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? an

Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis

fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia

regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis

auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione

sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri

serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem--ipse enim hic radiatus me intueri

videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui--vos ergo huius

magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis

architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum

sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior? 127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones

physicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale

quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur,

elatiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque

caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum

cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero

aliquid occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus

voluptate. 128. Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed

vester, ut adsentiatur, credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere

opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile

quod sit invenerit. Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum

ante dicendum est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde

adfirmant, earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur,

amittere. Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam,

cum cornix cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis

adfirmabunt signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem

metiri non possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam

terram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non

potest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas

res non percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id

approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi

quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera percipi

comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis minusve

comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.

XLII. 129. Sed quod coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis

explorati? nempe fines constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum

summa referatur: qua de re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio?

Omitto illa, quae relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et

scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum

ab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis

disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo

nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici

philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a

quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset

unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A Menedemo

autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in

mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli similia, sed,

opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius. 130. Hos si contemnimus et iam

abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui cum

Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum

nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in mediis ea

momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum bonum est in his

rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae αδιαφορια ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho

autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae απαθεια nominatur. Has igitur

tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae diu multumque defensa

sunt. 131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt: quorum princeps

Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post Epicurus, cuius est

disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de ipsa voluptate

consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse Callipho censuit:

vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate Diodorus: ambo hi

Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini

natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut indicant scripta Polemonis,

quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles eiusque amici nunc proxime

videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut

opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus iis, quas primas natura

conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae,

Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.

XLIII. 132. Iam illud perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos

exposui, malorum finis esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar:

modo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo

aliquem.' Nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos.

Licetne--omitto per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope

singularem--per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem,

si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in

discrimine. Nam aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae.

Utrumque non potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota

possessione contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni

continetur, de qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non

potest igitur uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed

alter. Si Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens--nam vos quidem

nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum--: sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem

in veteres Academicos _et_ Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur neutri

adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? 133. Quid? cum ipse

Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne

indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata

esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat tandem mihi

considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue aliquando

quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque

partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim dicebas esse,

Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito assentiar: quod

mihi tecum est dogma commune. 134. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno

in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit,

beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti,

homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse,

partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam

natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente.

Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et

fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat, si

sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur, et

tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his

discrepant.

XLIV. 135. Quid? illa, in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare

possumus? Sapientis animum numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia

efferri. Age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere,

numquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si

deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est

in bonis, tibi vero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona,

praeter turpitudinem multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens

necesse est et venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint _ab_ Academia

vetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent?

Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse

quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu. Est enim

non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad verbum

ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant

permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa, misericordiam

aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse

dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus. 136. Atrocitas quidem ista tua quo

modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non possum, non

quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum,

quae παραδοξα nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit?

hos enim quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos

reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis

esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum

quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum?

insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta

Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis quidem

aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? 137. Haec tibi, Luculle, si es

adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia: mihi

autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.

XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in

Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello coss.

praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane

hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem dixisse

Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia sapiens non

sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico non videris.'

Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset

quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas incoleret. Sed ille

noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens. 138. Vos

autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et comprobem

incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur saepe

Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus

bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem esse

finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse, si

vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in

vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum honestate

coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda

adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat probabiliter posse

defendi. 139. Sit sane ita--quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et

Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam habeo adhuc

probabilius--, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas sensibus nostris

blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo. Revocat virtus

vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem iungit

deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus, quasi animum nullum

habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, quasi corporis simus expertes, animum

solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem sequar, cuius quidem sententiam

Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur.

Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid

Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et

gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu, cum honestas in voluptate

contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate tamquam hominem cum belua

copulabis?

XLVI. 140. Unum igitur par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum

honestate. De quo Chrysippo fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio.

Alteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere,

caritas, amicitia, iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest,

nisi erit gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium

impellitur, ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis.

Audi contra illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant,

nisi forte, quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere:

fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc

praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in

vita sequeretur habiturum. 141. Nihil igitur me putatis, haec et alia

innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me

minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum interest, quod tu, cum es commotus,

adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas, verum illud certum, comprehensum,

perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque

pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror, cui si

adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam vera a falsis nullo

discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia ista dialecticae nulla sint.

142. Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium

Protagorae est, qui putet id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud

Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii:

aliud Epicuri, qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in

voluptate constituit. Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque

ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis

esse voluit. 143. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne

maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt

de ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo

profecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.

XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut cur

cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in elementis

dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne sit, si quid

ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta contentio est! Aliter

Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? cum Cleanthe

doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! quid? duo vel principes

dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis

in rebus dissentiunt? 144. Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam

in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi

tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud, cum artificia tolli quereris a

nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui si undique omnes convenerint,

facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos

omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules, servos, insanos esse dicatis:

deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos,

qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos Zeno, negat Antiochus scire

quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa

comprehendere. 145. At scire negatis quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et

hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum

ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum

digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat

pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine

etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, καταληψιν imposuit. Cum autem

laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat,

scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem.

Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi quidem solent dicere. Ita tu

nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse. 146.

Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen nimis eleganter: illa

subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi posset, artificia

concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile esset, satis magnam

vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine scientia esse non

posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut Polyclitus, nihil se scire,

cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos docuisset aliquis quam vim

habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne nobis quidem suscenserent,

cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset

ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui

primum iurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri

'si sciens falleret,' quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita, tum, qui

testimonium diceret, ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset,

quaeque iurati iudices cognovissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'videri'

pronuntiarentur.

XLVIII. 147. Verum, quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius

ipse insusurrat navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis

multa dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius

de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate

naturae deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus

tanto opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere

necesse sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque

reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra

se Stoici texuerunt. 148. Tum Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec

contulisse. Saepius enim congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis

nostris, si quae videbuntur, requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus

sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor

sententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil

putem posse, adsensurum autem non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem

existimem, sed ita, ut intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod

comprehendi et percipi possit: qua re εποχην illam omnium rerum non

probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit, vehementer

adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum aspernor. Sed

tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens: Tollendum. Teneo te,

inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia. Ita sermone confecto

Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras descendimus.

* * * * *

NOTES.

BOOK I.

§§1--14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic.,

after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the _De

Lingua Latina_ is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards

philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2,

3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful

purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4--6). He

greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to

Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks

have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the

theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely

imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives

reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the

success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9--12).

Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the

Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for

the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro

refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a

proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference

between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition

of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14).

§1. _Noster_: our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus

than of Cic., see Introd. p. 37. _Nuntiatum_: the spelling _nunciatum_ is a

mistake, cf. Corssen, _Ausspr._ I. p. 51. _A M. Varrone_: _from M. Varro's

house_ news came. _Audissemus_: Cic. uses the contracted forms of such

subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms like

_audiissemus_. _Confestim_: note how artfully Cic. uses the dramatic form

of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for Varro. _Ab eius

villa_: the prep is absent from the MSS., but Wesenberg (_Em. M.T. Cic.

Epistolarum_, p. 62) shows that it must be inserted. Cic. writes _abesse

Roma_ (_Ad Fam._ V. 15, 4), _patria_ (_T.D._ V. 106) etc., but not _abesse

officio_ (_De Off._ I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the like. _Satis eum

longo intervallo_: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after Davies, reads _se

visentum_ for _satis eum_, quoting _Ad Att._ I. 4, Madv. _tum_ for _eum_

(Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the repetition

of pronouns (_illum_, _eum_) is quite Ciceronian. The emphatic _ille_ is

often repeated by the unemphatic _is_, cf. _T.D._ III. 71, and _M.D.F._ V.

22. I may note that the separation of _satis_ from _longo_ by the word

_eum_ is quite in Cicero's style (see my note on 25 _quanta id magis_).

Some editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking _intervallo_ of distance

in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly press _satis_,

which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently." The words _satis

longo intervallo_ simply = "after a tolerably long halt." For the clause

_ut mos_, etc., cf. _De Or._ II. 13.

§2. _Hic pauca primo_: for the omission of _locuti_, cf. the very similar

passages in _D.F._ I. 14, III. 8, also my note on 14. _Atque ea_: Halm

brackets _ea_, quite needlessly, for its insertion is like Cic. _Ecquid

forte Roma novi_: _Roma_ is the ablative, and some verb like _attulisset_

is omitted. (So Turnebus.) To take it as nom., understanding _faciat_, is

clearly wrong. _Percontari_: the spelling _percunctari_ rests on false

derivation (Corss. I. 36). _Ecquid ipse novi_: cf. _De Or._ II. 13. The

MSS. have _et si quid_, bad Latin altered by Manutius. _Istum_: some edd.

_ipsum_, but Cic. often makes a speaker use _iste_ of a person who is

present. Goer. qu. _Brut._ 125, _De Or._ II. 228. _Velit_: Walker reads

_velis_ with St Jerome. For _quod velit_ = _quod quis velit_, cf. _De Or._

I. 30. _In manibus_: so often, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 38. _Idque_: MSS. have in

the place of this _quod_ with variants _que_, _quae_, _qui_, _quo_. Dav.

gave _quia_, which was the vulgate reading down to Halm, who reads _idque_,

after Christ. _Ad hunc enim ipsum_: MSS. have _eum_ for _enim_ (exc. Halm's

G). Such a combination of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for

expressions like _me illum ipsum_ (_Ad Att._ II. 1, 11) are not in point.

Of course if _quia_ be read above, _eum_ must be ejected altogether.

_Quaedam institui_: the _De Lingua Latina_; see _Ad. Att_ XIII. 12.

§3. _E Libone_: the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see Cæsar _B. Civ._

III. 5, 16, 24. _Nihil enim eius modi_ again all MSS. except Halm's G. have

_eum_ for _enim_. Christ conj. _enim eum_; so Baiter. _Illud ...

requirere_: i.e. the question which follows; cf. _requiris_ in 4. _Tecum

simul_: Halm's G om. _tecum_; but cf. _De Or._ III. 330. _Mandare

monumentis--letteris illustrare_: common phrases in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 1,

_T.D._ I. 1, _De Div._ II. 4. _Monumentis_: this, and not _monimentis_

(Halm) or _monementis_, is probably the right spelling; cf. Corss. II. 314.

_Ortam a_: Cic. _always_ writes the prep. after _ortus_; cf. _M.D.F._ V.

69. _Genus_: regularly used by Cic. as _opus_ by Quintilian to mean

"department of literature." _Ea res_: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter

has _ars_; on the other hand Bentley (if the _amicus_ so often quoted in

Davies' notes be really he) reads _artibus_ for _rebus_ below. The slight

variation, however, from _res_ to _artibus_ is such as Cic. loves.

_Ceteris_: the spelling _caeteris_ (Klotz) is absolutely wrong, cf. Corss.

I. 325. _Antecedat_: some MSS. give _antecellat_. a frequent variant, cf.

_De Off._ I. 105

§4. _Deliberatam--agitatam_: Cic. as usual exaggerates the knowledge

possessed by the _personae_ of the dialogue; cf. Introd. p. 38, _De Or._

II. 1. _In promptu_: so II. 10. _Quod ista ipsa ... cogitavi_: Goer., who

half a page back had made merry over the gloss hunters, here himself

scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo expels the words. Yet

they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. _De Div._ II. 1, _Cat. Mai._ 38), and

moreover nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and

clauses in slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense

desire to flatter Varro. _Si qui ... si essent_: the first _si_ has really

no conditional force, _si qui_ like ειτινες merely means "all who," for a

strong instance see _Ad Fam._ I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe, _si accusandi sunt, si

qui pertimuerunt_. _Ea nolui scribere_, etc.: very similar expressions

occur in the prologue to _D.F._ I., which should be compared with this

prologue throughout.

§5. _Vides ... didicisti_: MSS. have _vides autem eadem ipse didicisti

enim_. My reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ,

has _vides autem ipse--didicisti enim eadem--non posse_, etc. _Similis_:

Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write _i_ and _e_ indiscriminately

in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write _i_ everywhere, we shall thus,

I believe, be far nearer Cicero's real writing. Though I do not presume to

say that his usage did not vary, he must in the vast majority of instances

have written _i_, see Corss. I. 738--744. _Amafinii aut Rabirii_: cf.

Introd. p. 26. _Definiunt ... partiuntur_: n. on 32. _Interrogatione_:

Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g.

Bentl. _argumentatione_, Ernesti _ratione_. But the word as it stands has

exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure.

_Interrogatio_ is merely the _conclusio_ or syllogism put as a series of

questions. Cf. _Paradoxa_ 2, with _T.D._ II. 42 which will show that

_interrogatiuncula_ and _conclusiuncula_ are almost convertible terms. See

also _M.D.F._ I. 39. _Nec dicendi nec disserendi_: Cic.'s constant mode of

denoting the Greek ‛ρητορικη and διαλεκτικη; note on 32. _Et oratorum

etiam_: Man., Lamb. om. _etiam_, needlessly. In _Ad Fam._ IX. 25, 3, the

two words even occur without any other word to separate them. For

_oratorum_ Pearce conj. _rhetorum_. _Rhetor_, however is not thus used in

Cic.'s phil. works. _Utramque vim virtutem_: strange that Baiter (esp.

after Halm's note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. _unam_ for

_virtutem_. Any power or faculty (vis, δυναμις) may be called in Gk. αρετη,

in Lat _virtus_. Two passages, _D.F._ III. 72, _De Or._ III. 65, will

remove all suspicion from the text. _Verbis quoque novis_: MSS. have

_quanquam_ which however is impossible in such a place in Cic. (cf.

_M.D.F._ V. 68). _Ne a nobis quidem_: so all the MSS., but Orelli (after

Ernesti) thinking the phrase "_arrogantius dictum_" places _quidem_ after

_accipient_. The text is quite right, _ne quidem_, as Halm remarks, implies

no more than the Germ. _auch nicht_, cf. also Gk. ουδε. _Suscipiatur

labor_: MSS. om. the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G.

§6. _Epicurum, id est si Democritum_: for the charge see _D.F._ I. 17, IV.

13, _N.D._ I. 73. _Id est_ often introduces in Cic. a clause which

intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause, exx. in _M.D.F._

I. 33. _Cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris_: cf. _D.F._ I. 18, the

same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists, _Met._ A, 2. Many

editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read _efficientis_, which would then

govern _rerum_ (cf. _D.F._ V. 81, _De Fato_, 33, also Gk. ποιητικος). But

the genitive is merely one of definition, the _causae_ are the _res

efficientes_, for which cf. 24 and _Topica_, 58, _proximus locus est rerum

efficientium, quae causae appellantur_. So Faber, though less fully.

_Appellat_: i.e. Amafinius, who first so translated ατομος. _Quae cum

contineantur_: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it must be

kept, and _adhibenda etiam_ begins the _apodosis_. Madvig (_Emendationes ad

Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos_, Hauniae, 1825, p. 108) tacitly reads

_continentur_ without _cum_, so Orelli and Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to

prop up the subj. without _cum_. _Quam quibusnam_: Durand's em. for

_quoniam quibusnam_ of the MSS., given by Halm and also Baiter. Madv.

(_Em._ p. 108) made a forced defence of _quoniam_, as marking a rapid

transition from one subject to another (here from physics to ethics) like

the Gk. επει, only one parallel instance, however, was adduced (_T.D._ III.

14) and the usage probably is not Latin. _Adducere?_: The note of

interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole sentence, so far, explains the

difficulty of setting forth the true system of physics. If _quoniam_ is

read and no break made at _adducere_, all after _quoniam_ will refer to

ethics, in that case there will be a strange change of subject in passing

from _quisquam_ to _haec ipsa_, both which expressions will be nominatives

to _poterit_, further, there will be the almost impossible ellipse of

_ars_, _scientia_, or something of the kind after _haec ipsa_. On every

ground the reading of Madv. is insupportable. _Quid, haec ipsa_: I have

added _quid_ to fill up the lacuna left by Halm, who supposes much more to

have fallen out. [The technical philosophical terms contained in this

section will be elucidated later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry

see note on II. 123] _Illi enim simpliciter_: "frankly," cf. _Ad Fam._

VIII. 6, 1 _Pecudis et hominis_: note on II. 139.

§7. _Sive sequare ... magnum est_: for the constr. cf. II. 140. _Magnum

est_: cf. _quid est magnum_, 6. _Verum et simplex bonum_: cf. 35. _Quod

bonum ... ne suspicari quidem_ an opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp

_T.D._ III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with the Greek

preserved by Diog. Laert. X. 6 (qu. Zeller, 451), and less accurately by

Athenaeus, VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). _Ne suspicari quidem_: for this

MSS. give _nec suspicari_, but Madv. (_D.F._, Excursus III.) has

conclusively shown that _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_ is post Augustan Latin.

Christ supposes some thing like _sentire_ to have fallen out before _nec

suspicari_; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in _D.F._ II.

20, 30, _T.D._ III. 46, _N.D._ I. 111, where the same opinion of Epicurus

is dealt with, we have either _ne suspicari quidem_ or _ne intellegere

quidem_ (cf. also _In Pisonem_ 69). Further, _ne ... quidem_ is esp

frequent with _suspicari_ (_D.F._ II. 20), and verbs of the kind

(_cogitari_ II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end of

sentences eg _Verr._ II. 1, 155. Notice _negat ... ne suspicari quidem_

without _se_, which however Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous

passages produced from Cic. by Madv. (_Em._ 111), in which not only _se_,

but _me_, _nos_, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the

infinitive, after verbs like _negat_. Cf. also the omission of _sibi_ in

_Paradoxa_ 40. _Si vero_: this, following _sive enim_ above, is a departure

from Cic.'s rule which is to write _sive--sive_ or _si--sin_, but not

_si--sive_ or _sive--si_. This and two or three other similar passages in

Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most important and

exhaustive excursus to his _D.F._ (p. 785, ed. 2), and are connected with

other instances of broken sequence. There is no need therefore to read

_sive_ here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others. _Quam nos ... probamus_:

cf. Introd. p. 62. _Erit explicanda_: for the separation of these words by

other words interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see 11, 17. I am

surprised that Halm and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical

objection to the phrase _explicare Academiam_, and read _erunt_ against the

MSS., making _illa_ plural. If _erunt_ is read, _erit_ must be supplied

from it to go with _disserendum_, which is harsh. _Quam argute, quam

obscure_: at first sight an oxymoron, but _argute_ need not only imply

_clearness_, it means merely "acutely". _Quantum possum_: some MSS. have

_quantam_, which is scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only

follows _nequeo_, _volo_, _malo_, _possum_, and such verbs when an

infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For _velle_ see a good

instance in _D.F._ III. 68, where consult Madv. _Constantiam_: the notions

of firmness, consistency, and clearness of mind are bound up in this word,

cf. II. 53. _Apud Platonem_: _Timaeus_, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by

Cic., cf. _De Leg._ I. 58, _Laelius_ 20, 47, _T.D._ I. 64.

§8. _Id est ... jubeo_: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss.

But Cicero is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight

variations in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of

slightly varied phrases connected by _id est_ in _D.F._ I. 72, II. 6, 90. I

therefore hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. _Ea a_:

Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read

_e_ for _a_, which Halm would also prefer. _De_, _ab_, and _ex_ follow

_haurire_ indifferently in Cic. _Rivulos consectentur_: so Wordsworth, "to

hunt the waterfalls". The metaphor involved in _fontibus--rivulos_ is often

applied by Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus

in _N.D._ I. 120. _Nihil enim magno opere_: _magno opere_ should be written

in two words, not as _magnopere_, cf. the phrases _maximo opere_, _nimio

opere_, the same holds good of _tanto opere_, _quanto opere_. _L. Aelii_:

MSS. _Laelii_. The person meant is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the

master of Varro, and the earliest systematic grammarian of Rome. See

Quintil. _Inst. Or._ X. 1, 99, Gellius X. 21, Sueton. _Gramm._ 3.

_Occasum_: an unusual metaphor. _Menippum_: a Cynic satirist, see _Dict.

Biogr._ Considerable fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and

have often been edited--most recently by Riese (published by Teubner).

_Imitati non interpretati_: Cic. _D.F._ I. 7, gives his opinion as to the

right use to be made of Greek models. _†Quae quo_: these words are

evidently wrong. Halm after Faber ejects _quae_, and is followed by Baiter.

Varro is thus made to say that he stated many things dialectically, _in

order that_ the populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault

lies in the word _quo_, for which I should prefer to read _cum_ (=_quom_,

which would be written _quō_ in the MSS.) The general sense would then be

"Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature which the

unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the learned

read." _Laudationibus_: λογοις επιταφιοις, cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 48 where

Varro's are mentioned. _†Philosophe scribere_: the MSS. all give

_philosophie_. Klotz has _philosophiam_, which is demonstrably wrong,

_physica_, _musica_ etc. _scribere_ may be said, but not _physicam_,

_musicam_ etc. _scribere_. The one passage formerly quoted to justify the

phrase _philosophiam scribere_ is now altered in the best texts (_T.D._ V.

121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads _philosophiae scribere_; his

explanation is, as Orelli gently says, "vix Latina." I can scarcely think

Halm's _philosophe_ to be right, the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic.

almost condemns it by his use of the Greek φιλοσοφως (_Ad Att._ XIII. 20).

In older Greek the adverb does not appear, nor is φιλοσοφος used as an

adjective much, yet Cic. uses _philosophus_ adjectivally in _T.D._ V. 121,

_Cat. Mai._ 22, _N.D._ III. 23, just as he uses _tyrannus_ (_De Rep._ III.

45), and _anapaestus_ (_T.D._ III. 57) Might we not read _philosophis_, in

the dative, which only requires the alteration of a single letter from the

MSS. reading? The meaning would then be "to write _for_ philosophers,"

which would agree with my emendation _cum_ for _quo_ above. _Philosophice_

would be a tempting alteration, but that the word φιλοσοφικος is not Greek,

nor do _philosophicus_, _philosophice_ occur till very late Latin times.

_Si modo id consecuti sumus_: cf. _Brut._ 316.

§9. _Sunt ista_: = εστι ταυτα, so often, e.g. _Lael._ 6. Some edd. have

_sint_, which is unlikely to be right. _Nos in nostra_: Augustine (_De Civ.

Dei_ VI. 2) quotes this with the reading _reduxerunt_ for _deduxerunt_,

which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's

remark, "_deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus humanitatis_." The

words, however, are almost convertible; see _Cat. Mai._ 63. In _Lael._ 12,

_Brut._ 86, we have _reducere_, where Durand's rule requires _deducere_, on

the other hand cf. _Ad Herennium_ IV. 64, _hospites domum deducere. Aetatem

patriae_ etc., August. (_De Civ. Dei_ VI. 3) describes Varro's "_Libri

Antiquitatum_" (referred to in 8), in which most of the subjects here

mentioned were treated of. _Descriptiones temporum_: lists of dates, so

χρονοι is technically used for dates, Thuc. V. 20, etc. _Tu sacerdotum_:

after this Lamb. inserts _munera_ to keep the balance of the clauses. Cic.

however is quite as fond of variety as of formal accuracy.

_Domesticam--bellicam_: opposed like _domi bellique_, cf. _Brut._ 49, _De

Off._ I. 74. Augustine's reading _publicam_ shows him to have been quoting

from memory. _Sedem_: so the best MSS. of Aug., some edd. here give

_sedium_. The argument for _sedem_ is the awkwardness of making the three

genitives, _sedium_, _regionum_, _locorum_, dependent on the accusatives,

_nomina_, _genera_, _officia_, _causas_. Cic. is fond of using _sedes_,

_locus_, _regio_ together, see _Pro Murena_, 85, _Pro Cluentio_, 171,

quoted by Goer. _Omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum_: from the frequent

references of Aug. it appears that the "_Libri Antiquitatum_" were divided

into two parts, one treating of _res humanae_, the other of _res divinae_

(_De Civ. Dei_, IV. 1, 27, VI. 3). _Et litteris luminis_: for _luminis_,

cf. _T.D._ I. 5. _Et verbis_: Manut. reads _rebus_ from 26. Varro's

researches into the Latin tongue are meant. _Multis locis incohasti_:

Varro's book "_De Philosophia_" had apparently not yet been written.

§10. _Causa_: = προφασις. _Probabilem_: = specious. _Nesciunt_: Halm with

his one MS. G, which is the work of a clever emendator, gives _nescient_ to

suit _malent_ above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not necessary to

force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which Halm himself

allows to be broken in two similar passages, II. 20, 105. _Sed da mihi

nunc, satisne probas?_: So all MSS. except G, which has the evident conj.

_sed ea (eam) mihi non sane probas_. This last Baiter gives, while Halm

after Durand reads _sed eam mihi non satis probas_, which is too far from

the MSS. to please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable, though _da

mihi_ for _dic mihi_ is certainly poetic. _Da te mihi_ (Manut., Goer.,

Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be supported by 12,

_Brut._ 306, _Ad Fam._ II. 8, or such like passages. _Attius_: the old

spelling _Accius_ is wrong. _Si qui ... imitati_: note the collocation, and

cf. 17. Halm needlessly writes _sint_ for MSS. _sunt_. For this section

throughout cf. the prologues to _D.F._ I., _T.D._ I. and II.

§11. _Procuratio_: for the proper meaning of _procurator_ and _procuratio_

see Jordan on _Pro Caecina_ 55. _Implacatum et constrictum_: the

conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual; cf. 17 _plenam ac

refertam_, II. 127 _exigua et minima_, so και in Greek. _Inclusa habebam_:

cf. _T.D._ I. 1. _Obsolescerent_, used of _individual_ memory, is

noteworthy. _Percussus volnere_: many edd. give the frequent variant

_perculsus_. The _volnus_, which Goer. finds so mysterious, is the death of

Tullia, cf. _N.D._ I. 9, _De Consolatione_, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, and

Introd. p. 32. _Aut ... aut ... aut ... aut_: This casting about for an

excuse shows how low philosophy stood in public estimation at Rome. See

Introd. p. 29. The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the

exordium of _N.D._ I.

§12. _Brutus_: the same praise often recurs in _D.F._ and the _Brutus

Graecia desideret_ so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has _Graeca_. Halm

(and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, _Graeca

desideres_. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's _Philologus_ XXIV. 483,

approves the reading on the curious ground that Brutus was not anxious to

satisfy Greek requirements, but rather to render it unnecessary for Romans

to have recourse to Greece for philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for

Greece with Cicero is the supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if

she is satisfied the philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. _Ad Att._ I. 20, 6,

_D.F._ I. 8, _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 16, 5. I just note the em. of Turnebus, _a

Graecia desideres_, and that of Dav. _Graecia desideretur_. _Eandem

sententiam_: cf. Introd. p. 56. _Aristum_: cf. II. 11, and _M.D.F._ V. 8.

§13. _Sine te_: = σου διχα. _Relictam_: Cic. very rarely omits _esse_, see

note on II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p. 20.

_Veterem illam_: MSS. have _iam_ for _illam_. The position of _iam_ would

be strange, in the passage which used to be compared, _Pro Cluentio_ 16,

Classen and Baiter now om. the word. Further, _vetus_ and _nova_ can

scarcely be so barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The

reading _illam_ is from Madv. (_Em._ 115), and is supported by _illam

veterem_ (18), _illa antiqua_ (22), _istius veteris_ (_D.F._ V. 8), and

similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and Bait.) thinks _iam_ comprises

the last two syllables of _Academiam_, which he reads. _Correcta et

emendata_: a fine sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words

often occur together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of

expression, cf. _De Leg._ III. 30, _D.F._ IV. 21, also Tac. _Hist._ I. 37.

_Negat_: MSS. have _negaret_, but Cic. never writes the subj. after

_quamquam_ in _oratio recta_, as Tac. does, unless there is some

conditional or potential force in the sentence; see _M.D.F._ III. 70.

Nothing is commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for

the pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and _vice versa_. _In libris_:

see II. 11. _Duas Academias_: for the various modes of dividing the Academy

refer to R. and P. 404. _Contra ea Philonis_: MSS. have _contra Philonis_

merely, exc. Halm's V., which gives _Philonem_, as does the ed. Rom.

(1471). I have added _ea_. Orelli quotes _Ad Att._ XII. 23, 2, _ex

Apollodori_. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and _libros_ may be supplied

from _libris_ above, so in _Ad Att._ XIII. 32, 2, _Dicaearchi_ περι ψυχης

_utrosque_, the word _libros_ has to be supplied from the preceding letter,

cf. a similar ellipse of _bona_ in 19, 22. Madvig's _Philonia_ is

improbable from its non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective

_Antiochius_ is frequent. Halm inserts _sententiam_, a heroic remedy. To

make _contra_ an adv. and construe _Philonis Antiochus_ together, supplying

_auditor_, as is done by some unknown commentators who probably only exist

in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified by _D.F._ V. 13.

§14. _A qua absum iam diu_: MSS. have strangely _aqua absumtam diu_,

changed by Manut. _Renovari_: the vulg. _revocari_ is a curious instance of

oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note he

gave _renovari_. Orelli--who speaks of Goerenz's "_praestantissima

recensio_," and founds his own text upon it two years after Madvig's

crushing exposure in his _Em._ often quoted by me--not only reads

_revocari_, but quotes _renovari_ as an em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536.

From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no independent value, took it.

_Renovare_ in Cic. often means "to refresh the memory," e.g. 11, _Brut._

315. _Nisi molestum est_: like _nisi alienum putas_, a variation on the

common _si placet, si videtur_. _Adsidamus_: some MSS. have _adsideamus_,

which would be wrong here. _Sane istud_: Halm _istuc_ from G. _Inquit_: for

the late position of this word, which is often caused by its affinity for

_quoniam_, _quidem_, etc., cf. _M.D.F._ III. 20 _Quae cum essent dicta, in

conspectu consedimus (omnes)_: most edd. since Gulielmus print this without

_essent_ as a hexameter, and suppose it a quotation. But firstly, a verse

so commonplace, if familiar, would occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if

not familiar, would not be given without the name of its author. Secondly,

most MSS. have _sint_ or _essent_ before _dicta_. It is more probable

therefore that _omnes_ was added from an involuntary desire to make up the

hexameter rhythm. Phrases like _quae cum essent dicta consedimus_ often

occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. _De Div._ II. 150, and

Augustine, the imitator of Cic., _Contra Academicos_, I. 25, also

_consedimus_ at the end of a clause in _Brut._ 24, and _considitur_ in _De

Or._ III. 18. _Mihi vero_: the omission of _inquit_, which is strange to

Goer., is well illustrated in _M.D.F._ I. 9. There is an odd ellipse of

_laudasti_ in _D.F._ V. 81.

§§15--42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. First part of

Varro's Exposition, 15--18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made

ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets, his one

doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance.

Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the

teaching of his master, from him sprang two schools which abandoned the

negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained

in essential agreement with one another--the Peripatetic and the

Academic (17, 18).

§15. _A rebus ... involutis_: physical phenomena are often spoken of in

these words by Cic., cf. 19, _Timaeus_ c. 1, _D.F._ I. 64, IV. 18, V. 10,

_N.D._ I. 49. Ursinus rejected _ab_ here, but the insertion or omission of

_ab_ after the passive verb depends on the degree to which _natura_ is

personified, if 28 be compared with _Tim._ c. 1, this will be clear.

_Involutis_ = veiled; cf. _involucrum_. Cic. shows his feeling of the

metaphor by adding _quasi_ in II. 26, and often. _Avocavisse philosophiam_:

this, the Xenophontic view of Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's

time, cf. II. 123, _T.D._ V. 10, _D.F._ V. 87, 88, also Varro in Aug. _De

Civ. Dei_, VIII. 3. Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were

curiously answered in _De Rep._ I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug. _De Civ.

Dei_, VIII. 4). The same view is supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the

passages quoted by R. and P. 141. To form an opinion on this difficult

question the student should read Schleiermacher's _Essay on the Worth of

Socrates as a Philosopher_ (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's _Socrates

and the Socratic Schools_, Eng. Trans., pp. 112--116 [I dissent from his

view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's _Handbook_, so far as it

relates to Socrates and Plato. _Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere_:

_valere_ is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm, its use in 21 makes

it more probable than _conferre_, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius

vainly tries to justify the MSS. reading by such passages as _D.F._ I. 39,

_T.D._ I. 70. The strangest ellipse with _nihil ad_ elsewhere in Cic. is in

_De Leg._ I. 6.

§16. _Hic ... illum_: for this repetition of pronouns see _M.D.F._ IV. 43.

_Varie et copiose_: MSS. omit _et_, but it may be doubted whether Cic.

would let two _adverbs_ stand together without _et_, though three may (cf.

II. 63), and though with pairs of _nouns_ and _adjectives, et_ often is

left out, as in the passages quoted here by Manut. _Ad Att._ IV. 3, 3, _Ad

Fam._ XIII. 24, XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, reprinted

in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works (1861), on

_T.D._ III. 6. _Varie et copiose_ is also in _De Or._ II. 240. Cf. the

omission of _que_ in 23, also II. 63. _Perscripti_: Cic. like Aristotle

often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were authentic reports of

Socratic conversations, cf. II. 74. _Nihil adfirmet_: so _T.D._ I. 99.

"_Eoque praestare ceteris_" this is evidently from Plato _Apol._ p. 21, as

to the proper understanding of which see note on II. 74. _Ab Apolline_,

Plato _Apol._ 21 A, _Omnium_: Dav. conj. _hominum_ needlessly. _Dictum_:

Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads _iudicatum_, it is remarkable that in four

passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (_Cato Mai._ 78, _Lael._ 7,

9, 13) he uses the verb _iudicare_. _Una omnis_: Lamb. _hominis_, Baiter

also. _Omnis eius oratio tamen_: _notwithstanding_ his negative dialectic

he gave positive teaching in morals. _Tamen_: for MSS. _tam_ or _tum_ is

due to Gruter, Halm has _tantum_. _Tam_, _tum_ and _tamen_ are often

confused in MSS., e.g. _In Veri_ (_Act_ II.) I. 3, 65, II. 55, 112, V. 78,

where see Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that _tum ... et_, _tum

... que_, _et ... tum_, correspond in Cic. like _tum ... cum_, _tum ...

tum_. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled by _Ac._ II. 1, 43. _Ad

virtutis studium cohortandis_: this broad assertion is distinctly untrue;

see Zeller's _Socrates_ 88, with footnote.

§17. _Varius et multiplex, et copiosus_: these characteristics are named to

account for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For

_multiplex_ "many sided," cf. _T.D._ V. 11. _Una et consentiens_: this is

an opinion of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in

_D.F._ IV. 5 _De Leg._ I. 38, _De Or._ III. 67. Five ancient philosophers

are generally included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic

school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo (cf.

_D.F._ IV. 2), sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have

been first broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in

Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1, cf. also 34. Antiochus doubtless rested his

theory almost entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In

_D.F._ V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus, this appears, as also

in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as though ethics were the whole

of philosophy (cf. also _De Off._ III. 20). Antiochus probably made light

of such dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about

ιδεαι, which had long ceased. Krische _Uber Cicero's Akademika_ p. 51, has

some good remarks. _Nominibus_: the same as _vocabulis_ above. Cic. does

not observe Varro's distinction (_De L. L._ IX. 1) which confines _nomen_

to proper nouns, _vocabulum_ to common nouns, though he would not use

_vocabulum_ as Tac. does, for the name of a person (_Annals_ XII. 66,

etc.). _Quasi heredem ... duos autem_: the conj. of Ciaconus "_ex asse

heredem, secundos autem_" is as acute as it is absurd. _Duos_: it is

difficult to decide whether this or _duo_ is right in Cic., he can scarcely

have been so inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and

Halm's ed., _Ac._ II. 11, 13 with _De Div._ I. 6). The older inscr. in the

_Corpus_ vol. I. have _duo_, but only in _duoviros_, two near the time of

Cic. (_C.I._ vol. I. nos. 571 and 1007) give _duos_, which Cic. probably

wrote. _Duo_ is in old Latin poets and Virgil. _Chalcedonium_: not

_Calchedonium_ as Klotz, cf. Gk. Χαλκηδονιον. _Praestantissimos_: Halm

wrongly, cf. _Brut._ 125. _Stagiritem_: not _Stagiritam_ as Lamb., for

Cic., exc. in a few nouns like _Persa_, _pirata_, etc., which came down

from antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in -ης into Latin nouns in _-a_.

See _M.D.F._ II. 94. _Coetus ... soliti_: cf. 10. _Platonis ubertate_: cf.

Quintilian's "_illa Livii lactea ubertas_." _Plenum ac refertam_: n. on 11.

_Dubitationem_: Halm with one MS., G, gives _dubitantem_, Baiter

_dubitanter_, Why alter? _Ars quaedam philosophiae_: before these words all

Halm's MSS., exc G, insert _disserendi_, probably from the line above,

Lipsius keeps it and ejects _philosophiae_, while Lamb., Day read

_philosophia_ in the nom. Varro, however, would never say that philosophy

became entirely dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and

Peripatetics. _Ars_ = τεχνη, a set of definite rules, so Varro in Aug. (as

above) speaks of the _certa dogmata_ of this old school as opposed to the

incertitude of the New Academy. _Descriptio_: so Halm here, but often

_discriptio_. The _Corp. Inscr._, vol. I. nos. 198 and 200, has thrice

_discriptos_ or _discriptum_, the other spelling never.

§18. _Ut mihi quidem videtur_: MSS. transpose _quidem_ and _videtur_, as in

44. _Quidem_, however nearly always comes closely after the pronoun, see

_M.D.F._ IV. 43, cf. also I. 71, III. 28, _Opusc._ I. 406. _Expetendarum

fugiendarumque_: ‛αιρετων και φευκτων, about which more in n. on 36. The

Platonic and Aristotelian ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but

the ultimate bases of the two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of

the Good, Aristotle did away with what Plato would have considered most

valuable in his system. The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct

in the time of Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools

seemed much greater than it was. _Non sus Minervam_: a Greek proverb, cf.

Theocr. _Id._ V. 23, _De Or._ II. 233, _Ad Fam._ IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his

German translation of the _Academica_, also quotes Plutarch _Præc. Polit._

7. _Inepte ... docet_: elliptic for _inepte docet, quisquis docet_. _Nostra

atque nostros_: few of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects

everything Athenian, and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s

letters to him the words "_tui cives_," meaning the Athenians, often occur.

_Quid me putas_: i.e. _velle_. _Exhibiturum_: Halm inserts _me_ before this

from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist. For the omission

of _me_, cf. note on 7.

§§19--23. Part II. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.

The threefold division of philosophy into ηθικη, φυσικη, διαλεκτικη.

Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of

natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and

external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental, which fall

into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of

the acquired (20), then the external, which form with the bodily

advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The ethical

standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief part, and

is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the greatest

happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three classes

of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible to give

an intelligent account of action and duty (23).

§19. _Ratio triplex_: Plato has not this division, either consciously or

unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's time,

so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ VIII. 4, and by

Diog. Laert. III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself cannot be

traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian Peripatetics,

to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 16. It was probably

first brought into strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more

sharply and decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf.

esp. _M.D.F._ IV. 3. _Quid verum ... repugnans iudicando_: MSS. exc. G have

_et_ before _quid falsum_, whence Klotz conj. _sit_ in order to obviate the

awkwardness of _repugnet_ which MSS. have for _repugnans_. Krische wishes

to read _consequens_ for _consentiens_, comparing _Orator_ 115, _T.D._ V.

68, _De Div._ II. 150, to which add _T.D._ V. 21 On the other hand cf. II.

22, 91. Notice the double translations of the Greek terms, _de vita et

moribus_ for ηθικη, etc. This is very characteristic of Cic., as we shall

see later. _Ac primum_: many MSS. and edd. _primam_, cf. 23, 30. _A natura

petebant_: how Antiochus could have found this in Plato and Aristotle is

difficult to see; that he did so, however, is indubitable; see _D.F._ V.

24--27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro in

Aug. XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is the ιδεα of the Good, while so

far is Aristotle from founding his system on the abstract φυσις, that he

scarcely appeals even incidentally to φυσις in his ethical works. The

abstract conception of nature in relation to ethics is first strongly

apparent in Polemo, from whom it passed into Stoic hands and then into

those of Antiochus. _Adeptum esse omnia_: put rather differently in _D.F._

V. 24, 26, cf. also _D.F._ II. 33, 34, _Ac._ II. 131. _Et animo et corpore

et vita_: this is the τριας or τριλογια των αγαθων, which belongs in this

form to late Peripateticism (cf. _M.D.F._ III. 43), the third division is a

development from the βιος τελειος of Aristotle. The τριας in this distinct

shape is foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus, _Ethica_ II. 6,

4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro seems to merge the two last

divisions into one in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX 3. This agrees better with

_D.F._ V. 34--36, cf. also Aug. VIII. 8. On the Antiochean _finis_ see more

in note on 22. _Corporis alia_: for ellipse of _bona_, see n. on 13.

_Ponebant esse_: n. on 36. _In toto in partibus_: the same distinction is

in Stob. _Eth._ II. 6, 7; cf. also _D.F._ V. 35. _Pulchritudinem_: Cic.

_Orator_ 160, puts the spelling _pulcher_ beyond a doubt; it often appears

in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only _pulcrai_, _pulcrum_,

etc., occur in inscr., exc. _pulchre_, which is found once (_Corp. Inscr._

I. no 1019). _Sepulchrum_, however, is frequent at an early time. On the

tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see Boscher in Curtius'

_Studien_ II. 1, p. 145. In the case of _pulcher_ the false derivation from

πολυχροος may have aided the corruption. Similarly in modern times J.C.

Scaliger derived it from πολυ χειρ (Curtius' _Grundz_ ed. 3, p. 8) For

_valetudinem viris pulchritudinem_, cf. the ‛υγιεια ισχυς καλλος of Stob.

_Eth_. II. 6, 7, and _T.D._ V. 22. _Sensus integros_ ευαισθησια in Stob.,

cf. also _D.F._ V. 36 (_in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus_).

_Celeritatem_: so ποδωκεια in Stob., _bene currere_ in Aug. XIX. 3.

_Claritatem in voce_: cf. _De Off._ I. 133. _Impressionem_: al.

_expressionem_. For the former cf. _De Or._ III. 185, which will show the

meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter _De Or._

III. 41, which will disprove Klotz's remark "_imprimit lingua voces, non

exprimit_." See also _De Off._ I. 133. One old ed. has _pressionem_, which,

though not itself Ciceronian, recalls _presse loqui_, and _N.D._ II. 149.

Pliny, _Panegyric_, c. 64, has _expressit explanavitque verba_; he and

Quintilian often so use _exprimere_.

§20. _Ingeniis_: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. _T.D._ III. 2, and

_animis_ below and in _N.D._ II. 58. _In naturam et mores_: for _in ea quae

natura et moribus fiunt_. A similar inaccuracy of expression is found in

II. 42. The division is practically Aristotle's, who severs αρεται into

διανοητικαι and ηθικαι (_Nic. Eth._ I. c. 13, _Magna Mor._ I. c. 5). In

_D.F._ V. 38 the διανοητικαι are called _non voluntariae_, the ηθικαι

_voluntariae_. _Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam_: cf. the ευμαθεια,

μνημη of Arist. (who adds αγχινοια σοφια φρονησις), and the _docilitas,

memoria_ of _D.F._ V. 36. _Quasi consuetudinem_: the _quasi_ marks a

translation from the Greek, as frequently, here probably of εθισμος (_Nic.

Eth._ II. c. 1). _Partim ratione formabant_: the relation which reason

bears to virtue is set forth in _Nic. Eth._ VI. c. 2. _In quibus_: i.e. _in

moribus_. All the late schools held that ethics formed the sole ultimate

aim of philosophy. _Erat_: note the change from _oratio obliqua_ to

_recta_, and cf. the opposite change in II. 40. _Progressio_: this, like

the whole of the sentence in which it stands, is intensely Stoic. For the

Stoic προκορη, προκοπτειν εις αρετην, cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 64, 66, R. and P.

392, sq., Zeller, _Stoics_ 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said to be

Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised

Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. _Perfectio naturae_:

cf. esp. _De Leg._ I. 25. More Stoic still is the definition of virtue as

the perfection of the _reason_, cf. II. 26, _D.F._ IV. 35, V. 38, and

Madvig's note on _D.F._ II. 88. Faber quotes Galen _De Decr. Hipp. et

Plat._ c. 5, ‛η αρετη τελειοτης εστι της ‛εκαστου φυσεος. _Una res optima_:

the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. XIX. 3, cf. also

_D.F._ V. 36, 38.

§21. _Virtutis usum_: so the Stoics speak of their αδιαφορα as the

practising ground for virtue (_D.F._ III. 50), cf. _virtutis usum_ in Aug.

XIX. 1. _Nam virtus_: most MSS. have _iam_, which is out of place here.

_Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam_: MSS. omit _et_ between

_cernitur_ and _in_, exc. Halm's G which has _in_ before _animi_ and also

before _corporis_. These last insertions are not necessary, as may be seen

from _Topica_ 80, _causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus

negotiis cernitur aut_ in _omnibus aut_ in _plerisque_, also _T.D._ V. 22.

In Stob. II. 6, 8, the τελος of the Peripatetics is stated to be το κατ'

αρετην ζην εν τοις περι σωμα και τοις εξωθεν αγαθοις, here _quibusdam quae_

etc., denote the εξωθεν or εκτος αγαθα, the third class in 19. _Hominem ...

societate_: all this is strongly Stoic, though also attributed to the

Peripatetics by Stob. II. 6, 7 (κοινη φιλανθρωπια), etc., doubtless the

humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the φυσει ανθρωπος

πολιτικον ζωον theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf. _D.F._ III. 66, _De Leg._

I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293--296. The repetitions _hominem_,

_humani_, _hominibus_, _humana_ are striking. For the last, Bentley (i.e.

Davies' anonymous friend) proposed _mundana_ from _T.D._ V. 108, Varro,

however, has _humana societas_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Cetera autem_: what are

these _cetera?_ They form portion of the εκτος αγαθα, and although not

strictly contained within the _summum bonum_ are necessary to enrich it and

preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. II. 6, 8, 13, φιλια, φιλοι

would belong to the _quaedam_ of Cicero, while πλουτος αρχη ευτυχια

ευγενεια δυναστεια would be included in _cetera_. The same distinction is

drawn in Aug. VIII. 8. _Tuendum_: most MSS. _tenendum_, but _tuendum_

corresponds best with the division of αγαθα into ποιητικα and φυλακτικα,

Stob. II. 6, 13. For the word _pertinere_ see _M.D.F._ III. 54.

§22. _Plerique_: Antiochus believes it also Academic. _Qui tum

appellarentur_: MSS. _dum_, the subj. is strange, and was felt to be so by

the writer of Halm's G, which has _appellantur_. _Videbatur_: Goer. and

Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that it has the strong meaning of

the Gr. εδοκει, "it was their dogma," so often. _Adipisci_: cf. _adeptum

esse_, 19. _Quae essent prima natura_: MSS. have _in natura_. For the

various modes of denoting the πρωτα κατα φυσιν in Latin see Madvig's

_Fourth Excursus to the D.F._, which the student of Cic.'s philosophy ought

to know by heart. The phrase _prima natura_ (abl.) could not stand alone,

for τα πρωτα τη φυσει is one of Goerenz's numerous forgeries. The ablative

is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv. A comparison of this

statement of the ethical _finis_ with that in 19 and the passages quoted in

my note there, will show that Cic. drew little distinction between the

Stoic τα πρωτα κατα φυσιν and the Peripatetic τριλογια. That this is

historically absurd Madvig shows in his _Excursus_, but he does not

sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly correctly

reported Antiochus. At all events, Varro's report (Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX.

3) coincides with Cic.'s in every particular. Even the _inexplicabilis

perversitas_ of which Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus,

who, as will be seen from Augustine XIX. 1, 3, included even _virtus_ among

the _prima naturae_. A little reflection will show that in no other way

could Antiochus have maintained the practical identity of the Stoic and

Peripatetic views of the _finis_. I regret that my space does not allow me

to pursue this difficult subject farther. For the Stoic πρωτα κατα φυσιν

see Zeller, chap XI. _Ipsa per sese expetenda_: Gk. ‛αιρετα, which is

applied to all things contained within the _summum bonum_. As the Stoic

_finis_ was αρετη only, that alone to them was ‛αιρετον, their πρωτα κατα

φυσιν were not ‛αιρετα, (cf. _D.F._ III. 21). Antiochus' _prima naturae_

were ‛αιρετα to him, cf. Aug. XIX. 3, _prima illa naturae propter se ipsa

existimat expetenda_ so Stob., II. 6, 7, demonstrates each branch of the

τριλογια to be καθ' ‛αυτο ‛αιρετον. _Aut omnia aut maxima_: so frequently

in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ IV. 27, so Stob. II. 6, 8, τα πλειστα και κυριωτατα.

_Ea sunt maxima_: so Stob., Varro in Aug. _passim_. _Sensit_: much

misunderstood by edd., here = _iudicavit_ not _animadvertit_ cf. _M.D.F._

II. 6. _Reperiebatur_: for change of constr. cf. _D.F._ IV. 26 _Nec tamen

beatissimam_: the question whether αρετη was αυταρκες προς ευδαιμονιαν was

one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As to Antiochus,

consult _M.D.F._ V. 67.

§23. _Agendi aliquid_: Gk. πραξεως, the usual translation, cf. II. 24, 37.

_Officii ipsius initium_: του καθηκοντος αρχην, Stob. II. 6, 7. This

sentence is covertly aimed at the New Academics, whose scepticism,

according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action and duty, see

II. 24. _Recti honestique_: these words are redolent of the Stoa. _Earum

rerum_: Halm thinks something like _appetitio_ has fallen out, _susceptio_

however, above, is quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is

found in _D.F._ III. 32. _Descriptione naturae_: Halm with one MS. (G)

gives _praescriptione_, which is in II. 140, cf. also _praescriberet_

above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. _prima constitutio naturae_ in _D.F._

IV. 15. _Aequitas_: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of

επιεικεια. _Eaeque_: so Halm for MSS. _haeque_, _haecque_. Of course

_haecque_, like _hicque_, _sicque_, would be un-Ciceronian. _Voluptatibus_:

a side blow at the Epicureans. _Forma_ see n. on 33.

§§24--29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus' _Physics_.

Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never

actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When

force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity

(ποιον τι or _quale_)--(24). These formed entities are either _primary_

or _secondary_. Air, fire, water, earth are primary, the two first

having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle added a

fifth (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless matter,

matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or form acts

on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe, outside

which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it

eternal. This Reason has various names--Soul of the Universe, Mind,

Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the

same thing (28, 29).

§24. _Natura_: this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a

translation both of φυσις and ουσια. Here it is ουσια in the broadest

sense, all that exists. _In res duas_: the distinction between Force and

Matter, the active and passive agencies in the universe, is of course

Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however probably apprehended the

distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this read carefully Zeller, 135

sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of Aristotle's doctrine is to be

got from Schwegler, _Handbook_, pp 99--105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be

consulted for the important coincidence of Force with logical _genus_

(ειδος), and of Matter (‛υλη) with logical _differentia_ (διαφορα). For the

_duae res_, cf. _D.F._ I. 18. _Efficiens ... huic se praebens_: an attempt

to translate το ποιουν and το πασχον of the _Theaetetus_, το οθεν and το

δεχομενον of the _Timaeus_ (50 D). Cic. in _Tim._ has _efficere_ and

_pati_, Lucretius I. 440 _facere_ and _fungi_. _Ea quae_: so Gruter, Halm

for MSS. _eaque._ The meaning is this; passive matter when worked upon by

an active generative form results in an _aliquid_, a τοδε τι as Aristotle

calls it. Passive matter ‛υλη is only potentially τοδε τι, passing into

actual τοδε τι, when affected by the form. (Cf. τοδε, τουτο, Plato _Tim._

49 E, 50 A, also Arist. _Metaph_ H, 1, R. and P. 270--274). A figurative

description of the process is given in _Timaeus_, 50 D. _In eo quod

efficeret ... materiam quandam_: Cic. is hampered by the _patrii sermonis

egestas_, which compels him to render simple Greek terms by laboured

periphrases. _Id quod efficit_ is not distinct from, but _equivalent_ to

_vis_, _id quod efficitur_ to _materia_. _Materiam quandam_: it is

extraordinary how edd. (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled over _quandam_

and _quasi_ used in this fashion. Both words (which are joined below)

simply mark the unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical use,

in the Greek ‛υλη the strangeness had had time to wear off. _In utroque_:

for _in eo quod ex utroque_ (sc. _vi et materia_) _fit_, the meaning is

clearly given by the next clause, viz. that Force and Matter cannot

actually exist apart, but only in the compound of the two, the formed

entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the reff. given above.

_Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur_: the meaning of this is

clear, that nothing can _exist_ except in space _(alicubi)_, it is more

difficult to see why it should be introduced here. Unless _est_ be taken of

merely phenomenal existence (the only existence the Stoics and Antiochus

would allow), the sentence does not represent the belief of Aristotle and

Plato. The ιδεαι for instance, though to Plato in the highest sense

existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle explicitly says this, _Phys._

III. 4). Aristotle also recognised much as existent which did not exist in

space, as in _Phys._ IV. 5 (qu. R. and P. 289). Cic. perhaps translates

here from _Tim._ 52 B, φαμεν αναγκαιον ειναι που το ‛ον ‛απαν εν τινι τοπω.

For ancient theories about space the student must be referred to the

histories of philosophy. A fair summary is given by Stob. _Phys._ περι

κενου και τοπου και χωρας, ch. XVIII. 1. _Corpus et quasi qualitatem_: note

that _corpus_ is _formed_, as contrasted with _materia_, _unformed_ matter.

_Qualitas_ is here wrongly used for _quale_; it ought to be used of Force

only, not of the product of Force and Matter, cf. 28. The Greeks themselves

sometimes confuse ποιοτης and ποιον, the confusion is aided by the

ambiguity of the phrase το ποιον in Greek, which may either denote the τοδε

τι as ποιον, or the Force which makes it ποιον, hence Arist. calls one of

his categories το ποιον and ποιοτης indifferently For the Stoic view of

ποιοτης, see Zeller, 96--103, with footnotes.

§25. _Bene facis_: _passim_ in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. _D.F._

III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly like this. _Rhetoricam_:

Hülsemann conj. _ethicam_, which however is _not_ Latin. The words have no

philosophical significance here, but are simply specimens of words once

foreign, now naturalised. _D.F._ III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words make

it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first declension

nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in _en_. _Non est vulgi

verbum_: it first appears in _Theaet._ 182 A, where it is called αλλοκοτον

ονομα. _Nova ... facienda_: = _imponenda_ in _D.F._ III. 5. _Suis utuntur_:

so _D.F._ III. 4. _Transferenda_: _transferre_ = μεταφερειν, which is

technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor, _De Or._ III.

153 sq., where _necessitas_ is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as

here; cf. also _De Or._ III. 149. _Saecula_: the spelling _secula_ is

wrong; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from

_secare_, and _sequi_. _Quanto id magis_: Cic. is exceedingly fond of

separating _tam quam ita tantus quantus_, etc., from the words with which

they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g. _Lael._ 53

_quam id recte_, _Acad._ II. 125 _tam sit mirabilis_, II. 68 _tam in

praecipitem_; also _D.F._ III. 5 _quanto id nobis magis est concedendum qui

ea nunc primum audemus attingere_.

§26. _Non modo rerum sed verborum_: cf. 9. _Igitur_ picks up the broken

thread of the exposition; so 35, and frequently. _Principes ... ex his

ortae_: the Greek terms are ‛απλα and συνθετα, see Arist. _De Coelo_, I. 2

(R. and P. 294). The distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P.

382). It was both Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.)

followed partly Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle

which will be found in R. and P. 297. _Quasi multiformes_: evidently a

trans. of πολυειδεις, which is opposed to ‛απλους in Plat. _Phaedr._ 238 A,

and often. Plato uses also μονοειδης for _unius modi_; cf. Cic. _Tim._ ch.

VII., a transl. of Plat. _Tim._ 35 A. _Prima sunt_: _primae_ (sc.

_qualitates_) is the needless em. of Walker, followed by Halm. _Formae_ =

_genera_, ειδη. The word is applied to the four elements themselves, _N.D._

I. 19; cf. also _quintum genus_ below, and _Topica_, 11--13. A good view of

the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be gained from the

section of Stob. _Phys._, entitled περι αρχων και στοιχειων και του παντος.

It will be there seen that Cic. is wrong in making _initia_ and _elementa_

here and in 39 (αρχαι and στοιχεια) convertible terms. The Greeks would

call the four elements στοιχεια but _not_ αρχαι, which term would be

reserved for the primary Matter and Force. _Aër et ignis_: this is Stoic

but _not_ Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary

properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two

former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns _two_ of these

properties, _one_ active and _one_ passive, to each of the four elements;

each therefore is to him _both_ active and passive. The Stoics assign only

_one_ property to each element; heat to fire, cold to air (cf. _N.D._ II.

26), moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows

at once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq.

_Accipiendi ... patiendi_: δεχεσθαι often comes in Plat. _Tim._ _Quintum

genus_: the note on this, referred to in Introd. p. 16, is postponed to 39.

_Dissimile ... quoddam_: so MSS.; one would expect _quiddam_, which Orelli

gives. _Rebatur_: an old poetical word revived by Cic. _De Or._ III. 153;

cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ VIII. 3, 26.

§27. _Subiectam ... materiam_: the ‛υποκειμενη ‛υλη of Aristotle, from

which our word subject-matter is descended. _Sine ulla specie_: _species_

here = _forma_ above, the ειδος or μορφη of Arist. _Omnibus_ without

_rebus_ is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes avoided by the immediate

succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in 21 in _quibusdam_, _quae_.

_Expressa_: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf. _expressa effigies_ _De Off_.

III. 69); _efficta_, moulded as by a potter (see II. 77); the word was

given by Turnebus for MSS. _effecta_. So Matter is called an εκμαγειον in

Plat. _Tim._ _Quae tota omnia_: these words have given rise to needless

doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them. _Tota_ is feminine sing.; cf.

_materiam totam ipsam_ in 28; "which matter throughout its whole extent can

suffer all changes." For the word _omnia_ cf. II. 118, and Plat. _Tim._ 50

B (δεχεται γαρ ηι τα παντα), 51 A (ειδος πανδεχες). The word πανδεχες is

also quoted from Okellus in Stob. I. 20, 3. Binder is certainly wrong in

taking _tota_ and _omnia_ both as neut.--"_alles und jedes_." Cic. knew the

_Tim._ well and imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments

on the passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between

Plato's ‛υλη and that of Aristotle. _Eoque interire_: so MSS.; Halm after

Dav. _eaque_. Faber was right in supposing that Cic. has said loosely of

the _materia_ what he ought to have said of the _qualia_. Of course the

προτε ‛υλη, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, is imperishable (cf. _Tim._

52 A. φθοραν ου προσδεχομενον). _Non in nihilum_: this is aimed at the

Atomists, who maintained that infinite subdivision logically led to the

passing of things into nothing and their reparation out of nothing again.

See Lucr. I. 215--264, and elsewhere. _Infinite secari_: through the

authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the infinite subdivisibility of

matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox one that the Atom was scouted

as a silly absurdity. Cf. _D.F._ I. 20 _ne illud quidem physici credere

esse minimum_, Arist. _Physica_, I. 1 ουκ εστιν ελαχιστον μεγεθος. The

history of ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie

close enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn

Plato's opinions from _Tim._ 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates,

tripping over the old αντιφασις of the One and the Many, denied παν μεγεθος

διαιρετον ειναι και μερος εχειν (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus followed

Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378). _Intervallis moveri_: this is

the theory of motion without void which Lucr. I. 370 sq. disproves, where

see Munro. Cf. also Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 214. Aristotle denied the

existence of void either within or without the universe, Strato allowed its

possibility within, while denying its existence without (Stob. I. 18, 1),

the Stoics did the exact opposite affirming its existence without, and

denying it within the universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). _Quae

intervalla ... possint_: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is

no matter atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed

Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and

especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the _Physica_.

§28. _Ultro citroque_: this is the common reading, but I doubt its

correctness. MSS. have _ultro introque_, whence _ed. Rom._ (1471) has

_ultro in utroque_. I think that _in utroque_, simply, was the reading, and

that _ultro_ is a dittographia from _utro_. The meaning would be "since

force plays this part in the compound," _utroque_ being as in 24 for _eo

quod ex utroque fit_. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this

motion and is ever thus on the move." _Ultro citroque_ is an odd expression

to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with a _quasi_.

Indeed if it is kept I suggest _quasi_ for _cum sic_. The use of _versetur_

is also strange. _E quibus in omni natura_: most edd. since Dav. (Halm

included) eject _in_. It is perfectly sound if _natura_ be taken as ουσια =

existence substance. The meaning is "out of which _qualia_, themselves

existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf. _totam

commutari_ above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was formed."

For the _in_ cf. _N.D._ II. 35, _in omni natura necesse est absolvi

aliquid_, also a similar use _ib._ II. 80, and _Ac._ II. 42. If _in

utroque_ be read above, _in omni natura_ will form an exact contrast,

substance as a whole being opposed to the individual _quale_. _Cohaerente

et continuata_: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than any

other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in _N.D._ II.

19, 84, 119, _De Div._ II. 33, _De Leg._ fragm. 1. (at the end of Bait. and

Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if they be got at

second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. I. 22, 3. The _partes

mundi_ are spoken of in most of the passages just quoted, also in _N.D._

II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic sources. _Effectum

esse mundum_: Halm adds _unum_ from his favourite MS. (G). _Natura

sentiente_: a clumsy trans. of αισθητη ουσια = substance which can affect

the senses. The same expression is in _N.D._ II. 75. It should not be

forgotten, however, that to the Stoics the universe was itself sentient,

cf. _N.D._ II. 22, 47, 87. _Teneantur_: for _contineantur_; cf. _N.D._ II.

29 with II. 31 _In qua ratio perfecta insit_: this is thorough going

Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are interchangeable terms with the

Stoics. See Zeller 145--150 By an inevitable inconsistency, while believing

that Reason _is_ the Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being _in_ the

Universe, as here (cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 138, _N.D._ II. 34) In a curious

passage (_N.D._ I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same inconsistency.

For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life, extends through

all extent". _Sempiterna_: Aristotle held this: see II. 119 and _N.D._ II.

118, Stob. I. 21, 6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be

destroyed by fire (Diog. Laert. VII. 141, R. and P. 378, Stob. I. 20, 1)

regarded the destruction as merely an absorption into the Universal World

God, who will recreate the world out of himself, since he is beyond the

reach of harm (Diog. Laert. VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some

Stoics however denied the εκπυρωσις. _Nihil enim valentius_: this is an

argument often urged, as in _N.D._ II. 31 (_quid potest esse mundo

valentius?_), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. _A quo intereat_: _interire_

here replaces the passive of _perdere_ cf. αναστηναι, εκπιπτειν ‛υπο τινος.

§29. _Quam vim animum_: there is no need to read _animam_, as some edd. do.

The Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the

names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance,

Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. VI. _passim_.

Nearly all these names occur in _N.D._ II. The whole of this section is

undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it

all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics.

_Sapientiam_: cf. _N.D._ II. 36 with III. 23, in which latter passage the

Stoic opinion is severely criticised. _Deum_: Cic. in _N.D._ I. 30 remarks

that Plato in his _Timaeus_ had already made the _mundus_ a God. _Quasi

prudentium quandam_: the Greek προνοια is translated both by _prudentia_

and _providentia_ in the same passage, _N.D._ II. 58, also in _N.D._ II.

77--80. _Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad homines_: the World God is

perfectly beneficent, see _Ac._ II. 120, _N.D._ I. 23, II. 160 (where there

is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq. _Necessitatem_: αναγκην,

which is ειρμος αιτιων, _causarum series sempiterna_ (_De Fato_ 20, cf.

_N.D._ I. 55, _De Div._ I. 125, 127, Diog. VII. 149, and Zeller as before).

This is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence

of cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is

expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence. Τυχη therefore

is defined as αιτια αδηλος ανθρωπινωι λογισμωι (Stob. I. 7, 9, where the

same definition is ascribed to Anaxagoras--see also _Topica_, 58--66). This

identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and excites

his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward by

Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. I. 5, 15. _Nihil aliter possit_: on

_posse_ for _posse fieri_ see _M.D.F._ IV. 48, also _Ac._ II. 121. For the

sense of Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), ουδε τι

γιγνεται εργον επι χθονι σου διχα δαιμον. _Inter quasi fatalem_: a trans.

of the Gk. κατηναγκασμενον. I see no reason for suspecting _inter_, as Halm

does. _Ignorationemque causarum_: the same words in _De Div._ II. 49; cf.

also August. _Contra Academicos_ I. 1. In addition to studying the reff.

given above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's _Physica_

II. ch. 4--6, with M. Saint Hilaire's explanation, for the views of

Aristotle about τυχη and το αυτοματον, also ch. 8--9 for αναγκη. Plato's

doctrine of αναγκη, which is diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics,

is to be found in _Timaeus_ p. 47, 48, Grote's _Plato_, III. 249--59.

§§30--32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.

Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the

senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of truth, but the

mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The

senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of

such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense,

or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained

constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous

flux. Knowledge based _only_ on sense was therefore mere opinion (31).

Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they

_defined_ everything about which they argued, and also used verbal

explanations, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes

consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric

(32).

§30. _Quae erat_: the Platonic ην, = was, as we said. _In ratione et

disserendo_: an instance of Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. _D.F._ I.

22 _quaerendi ac disserendi_. _Quamquam oriretur_: the sentence is inexact,

it is _knowledge_ which takes its rise in the senses, not the criterion of

truth, which is the mind itself; cf. however II. 30 and n. _Iudicium_: the

constant translation of κριτηριον, a word foreign to the older philosophy.

_Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem_: Halm with his pet MS. writes _esse

rerum_, thus giving an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before

and after, so that there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I

venture to say that no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it

stands in glaring contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in

prose, _Orator_ 194 sq., _De Or._ III. 182 sq. _Solam censebant ... tale

quale esset_: probably from Plato's _Tim._ 35 A thus translated by Cic.,

_Tim._ c. 7 _ex ea materia quae individua est et unius modi_ (αει κατα

ταυτα εχουσης cf. 28 A. το κατα ταυτα εχον) _et sui simile_, cf. also

_T.D._ I. 58 _id solum esse quod semper tale sit quale sit, quam_ ιδεαν

_appellat ille, nos speciem_, and _Ac._ II. 129. _Illi_ ιδεαν, etc.: there

is more than one difficulty here. The words _iam a Platone ita nom_ seem to

exclude Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may

be an oversight, but to say first that the school (_illi_, cf. _sic

tractabatur ab utrisque_) which included Aristotle held the doctrine of

ιδεαι, and next, in 33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears

very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's

ιδεαι and Aristotle's τα καθαλου would naturally seem microscopic to

Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in his time as those of

Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid at Cicero's door, for

Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with Plato's must have been

driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very knowledge of Plato has, however,

probably led him to intensify what inconsistency there was in Antiochus,

who would have glided over Plato's opinions with a much more cautious step.

§31. _Sensus omnis hebetes_: this stands in contradiction to the whole

Antiochean view as given in II. 12--64, cf. esp. 19 _sensibus quorum ita

clara et certa iudicia sunt_, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his

agreement with Plato by asserting that though sense is naturally dull,

reason may sift out the certain from the uncertain. _Res eas ... quae

essent aut ita_: Halm by following his pet MS. without regard to the

meaning of Cic. has greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He

reads _res ullas ... quod aut ita essent_; thus making Antiochus assert

that _no_ true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall

see in the _Lucullus_, he really divided sensations into true and false. I

believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's

reminiscences of the _Theaetetus_ and of Xenocrates; see below. _Nec

percipere_: for this see _Lucullus_ passim. Christ's conj. _percipi, quod

perceptio sit mentis non sensuum_, which Halm seems to approve, is a wanton

corruption of the text, cf. II. 101 _neget rem ullam percipi posse

sensibus_, so 21, 119 (just like _ratione percipi_ 91), also I. 41 _sensu

comprehensum_. _Subiectae sensibus_: cf. II. 74 and Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._

VIII. 9, τα ‛υποπιπτοντα τη αισθησει. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.: this

strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For _constans_ cf.

εστηκος, which so often occurs there and in the _Sophistes_. _Ne idem_:

Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_, Heraclitus' theory of flux is

carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even

the word εμε is stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent

subject, whereas the subject is changing from moment to moment; the

expression therefore ought to be τους εμε. _Continenter_: ουνεχως; cf.

Simplicius quoted in Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, εν μεταβολη

γαρ συνεχει τα οντα. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases ‛ροη, παντα

‛ρει, ‛οιον ‛ρευματα κινεισθαι τα παντα, etc., which are scattered thickly

over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a very

similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: δοξαστην, so _opinabile_ =

δοξαστον in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely used by Xenocrates (R.

and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between the δοξαστον and the

επιστητον, e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33 (qu. R. and P. 264).

§32. For this cf. _D.F._ IV. 8--10. _Notionibus_: so one MS. for

_motionibus_ which the rest have. _Notio_ is Cicero's regular translation

for εννοια, which is Stoic. This statement might have been made both by

Aristotle and Plato, though each would put a separate meaning on the word

_notio_. Επιστημη in Plato is of the ιδεαι only, while in Aristotle it is

τον καθολου; cf. _Anal. Post._ I. 33 (R. and P. 264), λεγω νουν αρχην

επιστημης. _Definitiones rerum_: these must be carefully distinguished fiom

_definitiones nominum_, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in R. and

P. 265, note b. The _definitio rei_ really involves the whole of philosophy

with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with moderns too). Its

importance to Plato may be seen from the _Politicus_ and _Sophistes_, to

Aristotle from the passages quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes

will make the subject as clear as it can be made to any one who has not a

knowledge of the whole of Aristotle's philosophy. _Verborum explicatio_:

this is quite a different thing from those _definitiones nominum_ just

referred to; it is _derivation_, which does not necessitate definition.

ετυμολογιαν: this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the

Classic Greek Prose, as are ετυμος and all its derivatives. (Ετυμως means

"etymologically" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The

word ετυμολογια is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather

ονοματων ορθοτης (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of their books on the

subject preserved by Diog. is generally "περι των ετυμολογικων" The

systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when it

became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had given

the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic etymology are given

in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62 _in enodandis

nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis et quasi rerum

notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove

something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in

_Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation

_veriloquium_ of ετυμολογια and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_ (Greek

συμβολον) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro translated

ετυμολογια by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28). Aristotle had already laid

down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology, and Plato also

incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to belong to the old

Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer examination of authorities would

have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for _notas ducibus_,

the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of etymology, and not for

particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74)

describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum notae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for

_notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_ in _N.D._ III. 62 is quite

different). One more remark, and I conclude this wearisome note. The

_quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of συμβολον. Davies

therefore ought not to have placed it before _ducibus_, which word, strong

as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance in

_T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so Halm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for

_in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to 30

_pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in ea parte in qua_) is violent, while

Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum opinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj.

_in quo_, Cic. does often use the neut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not

quite thus. I have sometimes thought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf.

_huic_ below). _Dialecticae_: as λογικη had not been Latinised, Cic. is

obliged to use this word to denote λογικη, of which διαλεκτικη is really

one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, ‛ρητορικη which is mentioned

in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70. _Orationis ratione

conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which becomes _oratio

perpetua_ under the influence of ‛ρητορικη. _Quasi ex altera parte_: a

trans. of Aristotle's αντιστροφος in the beginning of the _Rhetoric_.

_Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf. however a close parallel in

_Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The construction is simply a

variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive (_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_

being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_: το πιθανον is with Arist. and

all ancient authorities the one aim of ‛ρητορικη.

§§33--42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old

Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the ιδεαι of

Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned

ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor

faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils

of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but

virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_ to

nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes, some

were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and some

were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and

called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them

_rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on

the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_

belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate

action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things

_preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in

the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_

of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not

but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and

immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and

believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow

the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed

sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding

judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40).

Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the

examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a

sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41).

_Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor

wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving

assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them

of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect

wisdom (42).

§33. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_,

comparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to

which add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the

MSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is

unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved

in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for

_disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase

_disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost

certain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's

odd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's

_Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the

one passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf.

_et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_:

"system". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the

omission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin

here. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno

opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer.

feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is

copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and

evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's

resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought

to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded.

_Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the

supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact

that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the

strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi

nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of

the relation in which Plato's ιδεαι stand to his notion of the deity.

_Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His real

name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf. _loquendi

nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf. _Orat._

161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V. 12 sq.,

_T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed very

widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him

transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of

him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in

22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of

ευδαιμονιαν. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_ but does

not elsewhere employ them.

§34. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for

Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while

Stob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the αγαθον. _Diligenter ...

tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic, cf.

Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P.

_Congregati_: "_all_ in the Academic fold," cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut

ita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ...

Zeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many

teachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among

the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which

accounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two

fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, συμφοιτωντες

παρα Πολεμωνι εφιλο τιμηθησαν. Dates are against the theory, see Zeller

500.

§35. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350,

though the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl.

missing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl.

_partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in

emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the

words refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's

nature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close

parallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in

_Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III.

83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._

135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right).

Plato uses νευρα εκτεμνειν metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but

_poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the

sequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS.

_quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's

statement "_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_"

with Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum

et unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R.

and P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved

in the special difficulties of the _Academica_.

§36. _Cetera_: Stoic αδιαφορα, the presence or absence of which cannot

affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being called

either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great battle

grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ... contraria_:

Gr. κατα φυσιν, παρα φυσιν. _His ipsis ... numerabat_: I see no reason for

placing this sentence after the words _quae minoris_ below (with Christ) or

for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm). The word _media_ is the Gk.

μεσα, which word however is not usually applied to _things_, but to

_actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. ληπτα. _Aestimatione_: αξια, positive value.

_Contraque contraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a

word to express απαξια (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that passage

coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V. 73.

§37. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section

the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller

and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it

would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general

acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic.

appears at first sight to have made the αποπροηγμενα a subdivision of the

ληπτα (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I admit, with Madv.

(_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the text to be

corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads _media_ in the

place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be said for

Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save Cicero's

consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could so utterly

misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of Stoicism, as

to think even for a moment that the αποπροηγμενα formed a branch of the

ληπτα. This view of Madvig's is strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in

36 had explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the αδιαφορα,

nor is there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the

theory any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with

the intention to speak of the _sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his

thought so as to embrace the whole class of αδιαφορα, which he accordingly

dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding

sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the

present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but

with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae

secundum locum obtinent_, προηγμενα _id est producta nominentur, quae vel

ita appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely

pressed, the αποπροηγμενα are made of a subdivision of the προηγμενα,

though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. So

if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are made to include

both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16 _appeterent_ includes

_fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata vita_ is abruptly

introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be construed together, and

_ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said _coerceri_, the writer's

thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are opposite to these

virtues.

I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_

Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to

talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and

_minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the αξια and απαξια of the Greek,

_not_ different degrees of αξια (positive value). That _minor aestimatio_

should mean απαξια need not surprise us when we reflect (1) on the

excessive difficulty there was in expressing this απαξια or negative value

in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on 36; (2) on the strong

negative meaning which _minor_ bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic.

means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing

απαξια. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours makes ελαττων αξια

equivalent to πολλη απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly

defining αποπροηγμενα as τα ‛ικανην απαξιαν εχοντα (_Adv. Math._ XI.

62--64) again speaks of them as τα μη ‛ικανην εχοντα αξιαν (_Pyrrhon.

Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning. Now I

contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong a

negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, τα μη ‛ικανην αξιαν εχοντα. I

therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language

allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the αδιαφορα, some have

αξια while others have απαξια. He may fairly claim to have applied to his

words the rule "_re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus_"

(_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and

Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero.

There are difficulties connected with the terms ‛ικανη αξια and ‛ικανη

απαξια which are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of

information; I regret that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation

of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the

passages of the _D.F._ quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_:

Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the

clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly

belonged to the Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob.

speaks II. 6, 6 of τα μεταξυ αρετης και κακιας. (This does not contradict

his words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, αρετης δε και κακιας ουδεν μεταξυ,

which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert.,

however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R. and P.

393.) _Recte factum_ = κατορθωμα, _peccatum_ = ‛αμαρτημα, _officium_ =

καθηκον (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller 238--248, 268--272). _Servata

praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before _servata_, which all edd. since

Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_ correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always

an afterthought, added in oblivion of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives,

adverbs, or participles, this oblivion is barely possible, but when the

conjunctions go with separate _clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._

V. 64.

§38. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful

construing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse

dicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes

natura perfectae_, the διανοητικαι αρεται of Arist., could be said to

belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are Aristotle's

ηθικαι αρεται. Trans. "but spoke of certain excellences as perfected by the

reason, or (as the case might be) by habit." _Ea genera virtutum_: both

Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of man into two parts, the

intellectual and the emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter

to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and Arist. το μεν ‛ως λογον εχον, το δε

επιπειθες λογωι); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be one and

indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name

‛ηγεμονικον (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and

indivisible (Zeller 248, _D.F._ III. _passim_). When the ‛ηγεμονικον was in

a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice

or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a

war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war

carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the

description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the

mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word ‛εξις, a use

which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the

_Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a ‛εξις, according to the

Stoics, but a διαθεσις (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes

speaks of virtue loosely as a ‛εξις, VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with

footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6

δυο γενη των ανθρωπων ειναι το μεν των σπουδαιων, το δε των φαυλων, και το

μεν των σπουδαιων δια παντος του βιου χρησθαι ταις αρεταις, το δε των

φαυλων ταις κακιαις. _Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the

fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which

Halm's text of the _Acad._ appears, should read the plural

_perturbationes_, a conj. of Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the

abstract; _perturbationes_ below, particular emotions. There is exactly the

same transition in _T.D._ III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while

_perturbatio_ is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other

passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a

trans. of Stoic παθεσι, which Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit

carere sapientem_: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the

reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic

sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless;

‛ηδονη or _laetitia_ for instance is αλογος επαρσις. (_T.D._ Books III. and

IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the

_T.D._ III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri

libidine_.

§39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De

Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the

Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of

the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general

Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion

arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object;

cf. Diog. VII. 111. τα παθη κρισεις ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller 233.

For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15, 18.

_Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. ακολασια, see Zeller 232.

_Quintam naturam_: the πεμπτη ουσια or πεμπτον σωμα of Aristotle, who

proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a curious and recondite

fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived _mind_ from

this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances.

He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic.

repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65, _D.F._ IV. 12. On this last

passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the

essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics

of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from αιθηρ, which is the

very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (σωμα αιθεριον in the

_De Coelo_), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error

once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at

work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange

oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but

will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully

influencing every other sect, and it placed νους εν αιθερι (see Plutarch,

qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The

notion that νους or ψυχη came from αιθηρ was also fostered by the language

of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as αεικινητος in passages which were

well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the

_Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in _Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._

VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only thing with Aristotle which is

αεικινητος in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular

motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the αιθηρ or πεμπτον σωμα, that

fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and

with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's

works, to conclude that the αεικινητος ψυχη of Plato came from the

αεικινητος αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that

the soul as an αρχη κινησεως must be ακινητος, but Cic. had no means of

knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls

at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to

their natural home, just where Arist. placed his πεμπτον σωμα Any one who

will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power

this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its

origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf.

_Somn. Scip._ 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither

Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could

have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of

Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we

seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between

animal heat and other heat, the former being αναλογον τω των αστρων

στοιχειω (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made

no difference, except one of degree, between αιθηρ and πυρ, see Zeller 189,

190. _Ipsam naturam_: πυρ is κατ' εξοχην στοιχειον (Stob. I. 10, 16), and

is the first thing generated from the αποιος ‛υλη; from it comes air, from

air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is

λογικον, from it comes the ‛ηγεμονικον of man, which comprises within it

all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who

was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view

of sensation and thought see Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R.

and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P.

"Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34 sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic

materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between

the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical

principles such as that of Democritus (ου γαρ εγχωρειν τα ‛ετερα και

διαφεροντα πασχειν ‛υπ' αλληλων, qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7,

by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old φυσικοι,

(Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines γαιαι μεν

γαιαν οπωπαμεν, etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though

in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of

thought. _Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed

old Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no

ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see

Zeller, pp. 134, 135.

§40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion

that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely

agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an

anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu

animorum_, but having to explain φαντασια was obliged to break off and

resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a very

similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis

Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44

_e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav.

_punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say.

Φαντασιαν: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given

by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus licet_: the same turn

of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc verbum quidem hoc quidem_

probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_ = συγκαταθεσιν. _In nobis

positam_: the usual expression for freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De

Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is

involuntary (ακουσιον Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I

note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the mind as

_involuntary,_ while the καταληπτικη φαντασια _compels_ assent (see II.

38). This is, however, only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may

refuse assent.

§41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all

sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to

the inner citadel of the καταληπτικη φαντασια. _Declarationem_: εναργειαν,

a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on II. 17. _Earum

rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct information of the

_things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole truth lies in its own

εναργεια, which requires no corroboration from without. _Comprehendibile_:

this form has better MSS. authority than the vulg _comprehensibile_.

Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity

_Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes _inquam_. Why change? Atticus

answers as in 14, 25, 33. Καταληπτον: strictly the _thing_ which emits the

_visum_ is said to be καταληπτον, but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_,

the sensation and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused.

_Comprehensionem_: this word properly denotes the process of perception in

the abstract, not the individual perception. The Greeks, however,

themselves use καταληψις for καταληπτικη φαντασια very often. _Quae manu

prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often

made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely

renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the

term αισθησις to the φαντασια. _Scientiam_: the word επιστημη is used in

two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or

systematised perceptions (καταληψεις or καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι) sometimes

also called τεχνη (cf. Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην δε ειναι συστημα

εκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων); (2) to denote a single perception, which

use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller

80. _Ut convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To

Zeno all καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι were ασφαλεις, αμεταπτωτοι ‛υπο λογου.

Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to

logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every

καταληπτικη φαντασια, instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to

pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed.

This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable

in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret_: I know nothing like

this in the Stoic texts; αμαθια is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_:

δοξα, see Zeller and cf. _Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.

§42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of επιστημην

και δοξαν και την εν μεθοπιαι τουτων καταληψιν. _Soli_: Halm, I know not

why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod omnia_: the

meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate sensations and

combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_. This will

appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78 seems to

take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this

in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of some Gk.

word, κριτηριον perhaps, or γνωμων or κανων. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic

εννοιαι; Zeller 81--84, R. and P. 367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission

of _eam_ is strange; Faber supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms

εναπεσφραγισμενη, εναπομεμαγμενη, εντετυπωμενη occur constantly, but

generally in relation to φαντασιαι, not to εννοιαι. _Non principia solum_:

there seems to be a ref. to those αρχαι της αποδειξεως of Arist. which,

induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all proof.

(See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in Bain's

_Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's _Aristotle._)

Zeno's εννοιαι were all this and more. _Reperiuntur_: two things vex the

edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_ to _recta_, which however has

repeatedly taken place during Varro's exposition, and for which see

_M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase _reperire viam_, which seems to me

sound enough. Dav., Halm give _aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant.

_Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._ III. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque

removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The

_firma adsensia_ is opposed to _imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the

_sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More information on the subject-matter of this

section will be found in my notes on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In

his constitit_: cf. II. 134.

§§43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy.

Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory

in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the

ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet

held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of

equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of

phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely

(45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were

carried on by Carneades (46).

§43. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a

consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in

deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading

defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_.

Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc.

The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_.

This is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15,

_aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from

Cic.

§44. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II.

14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a

side-blow at _declaratio_ 41. _Confessionem ignorationis_: see 16. Socrates

was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam

ante Socratem_: MSS. _veluti amantes Socratem;_ Democritus (460--357 B.C.)

was really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty

years before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously

inexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for

Democritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras

on II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all

equivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ...

idem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the

famous lines of Empedocles στεινοποι μεν γαρ παλαμαι κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107.

_Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' παυρον δε ζωης αβιου μερος. Is

there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada vitai tradunt_,

etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. εν βυθω, cf. II. 32. The common trans. "well" is

weak, "abyss" would suit better. _Institutis_: νομω of Democritus, see R.

and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance.

_Deinceps omnia_: παντα εφεξης there is no need to read _denique_ for

_deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm. _Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the

σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this

because of _dixerunt_ above, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often

thus repeated by Cic.

§45. _Ne illud quidem_: cf. 16. _Latere censebat_ Goer. omitted _censebat_

though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II.

122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. επεχειν, which we shall have to explain in the

_Lucullus_. _Temeritatem ... turpius_: for these expressions, see II. 66,

note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria momenta_:

this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility of the

_probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II. 124, for

the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of

Arcesilas, ειναι γαρ παντα ακαταληπτα και τους εις εκατερα λογους

ισοκρατεις αλληλοις, Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 ισοσθενεις λογοι; in the

latter writer the word ισοσθενεια very frequently occurs in the same sense,

e g _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 8 (add _N.D._ I. 10, _rationis momenta_)

§46. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus

_Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 τον Πλατωνα οιν ‛οι μεν δογματικον εφασαν ειναι, ‛οι

δε απο ητικον, ‛οι δε κατα μεν τι απορητικον, κατα δε τι δογματικον.

Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; Πλατων πολυφωνος ων,

ουχ ‛ως τινες οιονται πολυδοξος. _Exposuisti_: Durand's necessary em.,

approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_. _Zenone_: see Introd.

p. 5.

* * * * *

NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.

BOOK I.

1. _Mnesarchus_: see II. 69, _De Or._ I. 45, and _Dict. Biogr._

'Antipater'; cf. II. 143, _De Off._ III. 50. Evidently this fragment

belongs to that historical justification of the New Academy with which I

suppose Cicero to have concluded the first book.

2. The word _concinere_ occurs _D.F._ IV. 60, _N.D._ I. 16, in both which

places it is used of the Stoics, who are said _re concinere, verbis

discrepare_ with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had

already mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this fragment. Krische

remarks that Augustine, _Cont. Acad._ II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated

that part of Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic.

must have condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order

to excuse the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).