THE CHANNEL FLEET
H.M.S. _Majestic_, first-class battleship, completed in 1895, sister
ship to the _Magnificent_ (which was built at Chatham during my time at
that port as captain of the Steam Reserve), was one of nine ships of
the same class; the rest being _Magnificent_, _Hannibal_, _Prince
George_, _Victorious_, _Jupiter_, _Mars_, _Cæsar_ and _Illustrious_.
These represented an improvement on the preceding Royal Sovereign
class, the _Renown_, a beautiful, somewhat smaller vessel, being a
class by herself.
The _Majestic_ is of 14,900 tons displacement, carries four 12-inch and
twelve 6-inch guns, was of 17.5 knots designed speed, and had a
complement of 772. My flag was hoisted in the _Majestic_ on 17th
April, 1903. The Channel Fleet, of which I was now in command,
consisted of the _Majestic_ (flag of vice-admiral), _Magnificent_ (flag
of Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. G. Curzon-Howe, and afterwards of
Rear-Admiral the Hon. Hedworth Lambton), _Jupiter_, _Hannibal_, _Mars_,
and _Prince George_, battleships; _Hogue_ and _Sutlej_, armoured
cruisers; and _Doris_, _Pactolus_ and _Prometheus_, small cruisers.
Vice-Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson (now Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. K.
Wilson, V.C., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.), whom I relieved, was a
consummate master of the art of handling a Fleet, a great tactician, a
man inexorably devoted to the Service, to which he gave unsparing
labour.
The Staff in the _Majestic_ consisted of the flag-captain, Hugh
Evan-Thomas; the flag-commander, Michael Culme-Seymour; the
flag-lieutenant, Charles D. Roper; and the {486} secretary, John A.
Keys. The commander was Henry B. Pelly (now Captain Pelly, M.V.O.).
As the efficiency of the Fleet depends upon its admiral, so the admiral
depends upon the officers of his staff and upon the captains under his
command; because it is theirs to execute his policy. I have always
said that they were the officers who did the work and who were entitled
to the credit of it. In the conduct of a Fleet, it is first of all
necessary that the admiral and the officers of the Fleet should work
together in a common understanding. For this reason, the captains
should have access to the admiral at all times of the day or night, and
in all matters affecting the organisation and fighting efficiency of
the Fleet they should be in full possession of his views, and the
admiral of their views.
Efficiency consists in the maintenance of the most rigid discipline,
together with cheerfulness, contentment and smartness. To this end,
definite and strict orders must be issued; no mistake or failure,
however small, must be allowed to pass, and, conversely, merit should
be commended; and as much leave should be given as the exigencies of
the Service permit. The admiral is responsible for the whole
administration, smartness and efficiency of the Fleet. The captains
are responsible for the administration, smartness and discipline of the
individual ships of the Fleet. The officers and men of the Royal Navy
are loyal to the core; and when a mistake occurs, it is usually due,
not to a deficiency on their part but, to the failure of the senior
officer of the Fleet to give his orders clearly and to show beforehand
what is to be done and how it is to be done.
But for the adequate treatment of the subject of Fleet Administration,
a volume would be needed; the principles only can be indicated in these
pages, together with such instances of its practice as may serve a
useful purpose or may possess intrinsic interest.
The question of giving leave, for example, is of essential importance,
because the comfort and contentment of officers and men so largely
depend upon the system employed. In {487} the Channel Fleet, the
system was to give week-end leave, from after dinner on Saturday, every
week, the liberty men being due on board at seven o'clock on the
following Monday morning, so that, if the Fleet were at Portland, they
had only one night at home. Many of the men were therefore obliged to
spend Sunday night in travelling; often, if they were not to break
their leave, arriving at the port hours before they could get a boat
off to their ship, and spending the interval shelterless and miserable.
In the result the number of leave-breakers was usually very large.
By means of altering the system, the number was at once reduced to a
fraction, such, for instance, as eight men, all of whom were accounted
for. Under the new arrangement weekend leave was allowed once a month,
when the liberty men of one watch left their ships on Friday after
dinner instead of upon Saturday, and returned on board at noon on
Monday, instead of at seven o'clock in the morning. Thus they had
three nights at home once a month, instead of one night at home twice a
month; and had to pay only one fare for three nights, instead of two
fares for two nights. In these matters the question of expense should
always be considered. Another advantage was that whereas heretofore
one watch was always absent on Sundays, under the new arrangement all
officers and men were on board upon two Sundays in every month.
The Navy, unlike the Army, is always on active service, and is
perpetually practising in peace what it will be required to do in war.
In the Navy, the only difference between peace and war is that in war
the target fires back. Hence it is that the record of a command afloat
consists almost entirely of incessant routine work; such as the
evolutions of: _clear ship for action, boats pull round Fleet,
collision and grounding stations, fire stations, out fire engine, moor
ship, unmoor ship, out nets, in nets, taking in tow, casting off tow,
let go sheet anchor, let go stern, kedge, bower anchors, weigh and cat
sheet anchor by hand, in boom boats, let go and pick up both lifebuoys
at sea, coaling, flag-signalling, man and arm boats, running {488}
torpedoes, field-gun and company landing, rifle practice_, etc. These
are matters of course. The Fleet is constantly exercised in manoeuvres
and in tactics; there is gunnery practice; and there are the periodical
combined manoeuvres.
In the Fleet under my command, the drills and exercises were
particularly onerous; for it was a rule never to go to sea or to steam
from port to port without practising some exercise or tactical problem.
For every pound's worth of coal burnt, a pound's worth of training.
Officers and men delighted in these exercises; and all (including the
commander-in-chief) learned something from them.
In July, 1903, the Channel Fleet assembled at Spithead to welcome the
United States Squadron, consisting of the _Kearsage_, flag of Admiral
Cotton, _Chicago_, _San Francisco_ and _Machias_. The American
officers were entertained to lunch by the Pilgrims' Society, and it
fell to me to propose the United States Navy, Admiral Cotton
responding. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales accepted an invitation to
breakfast on board the American flagship.
In August took place the combined manoeuvres of the Channel, Home and
Mediterranean Fleets; at their conclusion, the Fleets met in Lagos Bay
for tactical exercises; 25 battleships, 42 cruisers, and gunboats and
destroyers under the supreme command of Admiral Sir Compton E.
Domville, G.C.V.O., K.C.B.
Colonel Robert M. Thompson was a welcome guest of mine at this time,
and subsequently in all the ships in which I flew my flag. Colonel
Thompson afterwards published some observations upon the manoeuvres in
the _Evening Post_, U.S.A., from the point of view of an American
officer who began his career in the United States Navy.
"When the three Fleets participating in those manceuvres were combined,
there were 72 battleships and cruisers, with nearly 40,000 men, all
under the command of one admiral; probably the strongest Fleet ever
brought together in the history of the world. This enormous assemblage
of vessels was handled without a single break. When the entire 72
{489} ran to anchor in eight lines, had there been a straight-edge
placed in front of them it would not have shown a ship, it seems to me,
a foot out of position. They made a 'flying moor,' and when you
consider that in point of time, at the speed the ships were going, they
were only one minute apart, every seaman will appreciate how
wonderfully they must have been handled."
Colonel Thompson very kindly presented a challenge shield for the best
gun in the flagship of the Channel Fleet (afterwards Atlantic Fleet),
to be inscribed with the names of the crew of the best gun at the
annual gunlayers' competition; and at the same time generously placed
in trust a sum of money the interest of which, amounting to £10 a year,
was to be presented to the winning gun's crew. The record for the
_Cæsar_ while my flag was flown in that vessel was 18 hits out of 21
rounds in two minutes.
In September, 1903, the Fleet visited Scarborough; in pursuance of the
principle that to afford the public opportunities for seeing the Fleet
and for making acquaintance with the ships, arouses and maintains a
healthy interest in the Service. Upon this occasion, I invited my old
constituents at York to visit the Fleet. They came in thousands; but
sad to say, the weather was so bad that they could not leave the shore.
When the Fleet was visiting Ireland, a certain worthy character, very
well known in Kingstown, Dublin, whose chosen occupation is--or
was--selling newspapers, came to me, as his countryman, on board the
_Majestic_, to his intense excitement.
"Glory to God, Lord Char-less," he screamed, "is that yourself in the
gold hat!" And he shrieked like a macaw, so that the men began to
crowd on deck to see what was the matter. I had to tell him to pipe
down, or they would turn the fire-engine on him.
The story of the accident to the _Prince George_ and its repair serves
to illustrate the emergencies of sea life. The Channel Fleet was
engaged in manoeuvres without lights off {490} Cape Finisterre, on the
night of 17th October, 1903. Two midshipmen of the _Prince George_
were relaxing their minds after the strain of the day's work with a
hand at cards, when the game was interrupted by the entrance into the
gun-room of the stem of the _Hannibal_, before which apparition the
young gentlemen incontinently fled.
The signal instantly made by the _Hannibal_, "Have collided with the
_Prince George_," was received on board the flagship at 9.41 p.m.
During the next half-hour the masthead flashing lamps winked their
messages back and forth; and at 10.10 the _Prince George_ signalled
that there was a large hole in her gun-room, and that the submerged
flat, cockpit and steering compartment were full of water.
The actual extent of the injury, as afterwards ascertained, caused by
the impact upon the port quarter of a 15,000 ton battleship travelling
at about nine knots, was an indentation in the form of an inverted
pyramid, the apex at the level of the protective steel deck, the base
level with the upper deck, measuring 24 feet 8 inches in height, and 6
feet 6 inches across at the upper deck, and diminishing to a crack at
the apex, where the ship's side had been driven in to a depth of 1 foot
4 inches, by the impact of the _Hannibal_. In the centre of the
indentation was a triangular rift, starting from the crack at the
bottom, measuring 3 feet 4 inches in height and 1 foot 6 inches in
breadth at the top.
At 11 o'clock p.m. I went on board the _Prince George_; examined into
the damage; made a general signal to the Fleet ordering all hand-pumps
and 14 foot planks and plenty of wedges to be sent on board the _Prince
George_. Under Captain F. L. Campbell, perfect discipline had been
maintained; the collision mat had been placed over the injury; and the
men were working cheerily with hand-pumps and baling out with buckets
the water from the gun-room. The rudder was out of action, the
steam-pipes being full of water. The engineer-commander had wisely
shut off steam when the helm was amidships, thus avoiding the jamming
of the rudder. Had the rudder jammed to {491} starboard or to port,
the difficulty of steering by the screws would have been greatly
increased. The bulkheads closing in the compartments which were full
of water, and all horizontal water-tight doors, were shored up with
baulks of timber. But the water was still coming in, because, owing to
the indentation in the side of the ship, the collision mat did not fit
tightly to it.
The Fleet was ordered to proceed to Ferrol.
I sent on a boat to buoy the sunken rocks; a proceeding which aroused
the suspicions of the Spanish authorities; who, however, upon learning
the circumstances, were most courteous and obliging. The boat,
however, was only able to get down one buoy.
The _Howe_ had gone aground in the passage into Ferrol in 1892, and
three vessels had gone aground subsequently.
Captain Campbell took the _Prince George_ into Ferrol harbour, up the
tortuous channel, which, owing to unbuoyed sunken rocks, is difficult
and dangerous. Under my directions Captain Campbell steered by the
screws, both screws going slow, or going astern slow with one
propeller, and stopping the other, according to which way it was
necessary to turn her head, and thus reducing her way if she were
nearing a rock, and by this method keeping her under perfect control.
At this time the ship was heavily down by the stern, drawing 25 feet 2
inches forward and 34 feet 6 inches aft. Her stern walk was flush with
the water.
Immediately upon the arrival of the _Prince George_ in Ferrol harbour
(on Sunday, 18th October) divers and working parties were sent to her
from all the other ships, and the Spanish Government courteously placed
the resources of the dockyard at my disposal. The working parties
worked day and night in three watches. On Monday, the _Hogue_,
armoured cruiser, Captain John L. Marx, M.V.O., was placed alongside
the _Prince George_ and employed her salvage pumps.
The first thing to do was to prevent more water from coming in and to
get rid of the water already in the ship. {492} Mats were made of
canvas, thrummed with blankets, and these, with collision mats cut up,
and shot mats, were thrust horizontally through the holes in the ship's
side and wedged up so that the ends of the mats projected inside and
out; and the moisture, causing them to swell, closed up the holes. At
the same time the water was being pumped out and coffer-dams were being
constructed on the inside of the ship.
The coffer-dam was a stout wooden partition built round the injury in
the ship side, thoroughly buttressed from within the ship with stout
baulks of timber. It thus formed a chamber, which was filled up with
all sorts of absorbent and other material, such as seamen's beds,
blankets, rope, hammocks, pieces of collision mats, gymnasium
mattresses, cushions, biscuit tins, etc. Thus the coffer-dam formed a
block, part absorbent and part solid, wedged and shored over the site
of the injury. In addition, the splintered wood sheathing was cut away
and trimmed up, and the mouth of the submerged torpedo tube was stopped
up with blankets and wedges, and sealed up with 3/16-inch steel plate
bolted to the ship's side.
The extent of the injury may be exemplified by the amount of stuff used
for filling up the coffer-dams and for stopping the leaks, which was:
10 shot hole stopper mats; two collision mats 15 feet by 15 feet; 350
seamen's hammocks, nine boats' covers, 14 coat-shoot covers, eight
steaming covers, 11 coaling screens, 1500 yards of deckcloth, 23
shot-hole stopper mats cut into pieces, 57 blankets, one cwt. of oakum
and cotton waste, and about 1000 wooden wedges, etc. etc. Over 145
tons of ammunition and stores were shifted in order to trim the ship.
The divers and carpenters of the Fleet worked continually in three
watches from 3 p.m. on Sunday, 18th of October, till 6 a.m. on Friday,
23rd of October. There were employed: 24 engine-room artificers, 24
stokers, 88 carpenter ratings, 43 divers and attendants. The majority
of the divers and carpenters were working in three watches {493} for
the whole time; that is, from 30 to 40 working hours each. From the
time stated, a period of in hours, 178 men were employed for various
periods. The total "men-hours" amounted to 3898, of which 3219 were
done by 27 divers and 60 carpenters. Two engineer sub-lieutenants from
other vessels of the Fleet assisted the engineer staff of the ship.
At the completion of the repairs the _Prince George_, leaving Ferrol on
24th October, proceeded to Portsmouth escorted by the _Sutlej_.
Although the weather was rough, the total amount of water shipped by
the Prince George during the voyage was one gallon; a proof of the
excellent work done by the artificers.
The repairs were carried out in six days altogether; the carpenters of
the Fleet being under Mr. Lavers, chief carpenter of _Majestic_, and
the divers of the Fleet under Mr. Manners, gunner of _Majestic_. The
total cost of the stores purchased at Ferrol was £116, 2s. 4d. The
whole incident is an example, but one of many, of the ability of the
Fleet to execute its own repairs.
In the following year, the officers and men of the _Majestic_ turned
over to the _Cæsar_, in which ship my flag was hoisted on 2nd February,
1904, and in which it was flown during the remainder of the commission.
His Majesty the Emperor of Germany visited Gibraltar in March, in the
s.s. _König Albert_, escorted by H.I.M. cruiser _Friedrich Karl_. His
Majesty hoisted his flag as Honorary Admiral in the Royal Navy in the
_Cæsar_. On the 20th, his Majesty honouring me with his presence at
dinner in the _Cæsar_, the boats of the Fleet were lined on either side
of the passage between the _König Albert_ and the _Cæsar_; and when the
Emperor proceeded between the lines, every boat burned a blue light,
all oars were tossed, blades fore and aft, in perfect silence, the
midshipmen conveying their orders by signs. After dinner, when it fell
to me to propose his Majesty's health, and I stood up, glass in hand,
as I {494} said the words "Emperor of Germany," a rocket went up from
the deck above, and at the signal every ship in the Fleet fired a Royal
Salute.
As the Emperor was leaving that night, the German flag and the Union
Jack were hoisted on the Rock, half the search-lights of the Fleet
being turned on the one flag, and half on the other. Precisely as the
_König Albert_ passed between the ends of the breakwaters, two stands
of a thousand rockets, each stand placed upon the end of a breakwater,
were ignited and rushing upwards, met in a triumphal arch of fire high
over the mast-heads of the Emperor's ship.
In the following October (1904) occurred one of those sudden and
unforeseen emergencies which test alike the readiness of the Fleet and
the temper of the nation. The Fleet was ready, and the nation lost its
temper.
The Russo-Japanese war was then waging. The Channel Fleet, which had
been coaling, left Portland at midday on 17th October for Gibraltar.
On the 21st, the Fleet left Lagos. On the same day, just before
midnight, the Russian Baltic Fleet, commanded by Admiral Rojdesvenski,
who believed that his Fleet was about to be attacked by Japanese
torpedo-boats, fired upon the British Gamecock Trawling Fleet in the
vicinity of the Dogger Bank, in the North Sea. The steam trawler
_Crane_ was sunk, her captain and third hand were killed, and the
Russian Fleet proceeded upon its course. Of these things we in the
Channel Fleet were of course ignorant. The next day, the Channel Fleet
was exercised in running torpedoes, and a torpedo attack for exercise
upon Gibraltar was arranged for the night of the 23rd-24th.
In the meantime, the news of the North Sea incident had run about the
world; democracy in England wanted war; and the occurrence of highly
strained relations between Great Britain and Russia coinciding with the
arrival of the Channel Fleet at Gibraltar, upon which the torpedo-boats
were innocently making a night attack, might have resulted in their
being mistaken for a real enemy. Fortunately {495} no such catastrophe
occurred. At seven o'clock upon the morning of the 24th, the Fleet was
anchored in the harbour of Gibraltar; I learned the news; received my
instructions by telegram, and made my dispositions.
On that day, peace and war hung in the balance. The Home, Channel and
Mediterranean Fleets were instructed to act in concert, a detachment of
the Mediterranean Fleet being ordered to reinforce the Channel Fleet at
Gibraltar. The Russian Baltic Fleet was then proceeding to Vigo, a
detachment of it being already at Tangier. On the following day (25th
October) King Edward received a message from the Czar expressing the
profound regret of his Imperial Majesty. It is a matter of history how
the negotiations proceeded until an amicable settlement was arranged.
The uncertainty, however, lasted until the 7th November.
It is a subject for thankfulness that there was no engagement. The
Russian ships were so loaded with coal and stores that their upper-deck
guns could not have been worked, and a fight would have been murder.
Nor would war have been justified. The popular indignation was due to
a misunderstanding, and the misunderstanding arose because the Russian
admiral did not proceed to the nearest British port and explain the
circumstances. If he believed that the Fleet was about to be attacked
by torpedo craft, he was right to fire upon what he thought was the
enemy, nor could he risk the time required to exchange recognition
signals.
The result of the Russian admiral's mistake was to kindle a sudden
resentment in this country which as nearly as possible forced a war
between the two nations. It is one of the dangers inherent in the
nature of democracy in all countries, that while democracy dislikes and
hinders organisation and preparation for war, the moment that its
vanity or self-respect is injured, democracy wants to fight. It is the
impulse of the mob. The North Sea incident was one example of this
disastrous tendency; the Spanish-American war was another.
{496}
But had war been most unfortunately declared by Great Britain in
October, 1904, the Navy would have been quite ready. All it had to do
was to proceed to the scene of operations. In this respect, it owns an
advantage over the Army, because the Navy is always on active service,
and does nothing in war which it is not doing every day in peace; if it
is not fighting an enemy, it is fighting the elements; and whether in
peace or in war, it goes to dinner at the same time. The Army, on the
other hand, must do in war what it cannot do in peace; it changes from
one condition to quite another; and the transition stage involves
immense organisation, expense and discomfort.
In December, 1904, owing to the redistribution of the Fleet, the
Channel Fleet became the Atlantic Fleet, which was under my command
until the 5th March, 1905, when I hauled down my flag.
{497}