VIEWS AND REVIEWS
The three years succeeding the termination of my appointment at Chatham
were mainly occupied with questions of naval reform. The task was of
my own choosing; and if, in comparison with the life I led, the
existence of the early martyrs was leisured, dignified and luxurious,
it is not for me to draw the parallel. The chief difficulty
encountered by any reformer is not an evil but a good. It is the
native virtue of the English people, which leads them to place implicit
confidence in constituted authority. The advocacy of a change implies
that constituted authority is failing to fulfil its duty. You cannot
at the same time both trust and distrust the men in charge of affairs.
Again, reform often involves expenditure; and the dislike to spend
money upon an idea is natural to man. And it is the custom of
constituted authority to tell the people that all is well, in fact
never so well. They have all the weight of their high office behind
them; and people will believe what they are told by authority in
despite of the evidence of their senses.
Moreover, there are endless difficulties and disappointments inherent
in the very nature of the task of the naval or military reformer. The
problems of defence are highly intricate; and although the principles
governing them remain unaltered, the application of those principles is
constantly changing. The most skilled officers may differ one from
another; and a man who is devoting his whole time and energy to benefit
the Service to which he belongs, {402} will often be disheartened by
the opposition of his brother officers.
The influence of society, again, is often baneful. Society is apt to
admonish a public man, especially if he be popular, perpetually telling
him that he must not do this, and he must not say that, or he will
injure his reputation, ruin his career, and alienate his friends;
until, perhaps, he becomes so habitually terrified at what may happen,
that he ends by doing nothing, and spoiling his career at the latter
end after all. Public life to-day is permeated through and through
with a selfish solicitude for personal immunity. But it remains the
fact that he who intends to achieve a certain object, must first put
aside all personal considerations. Upon going into action, a fighting
man is occupied, not with speculations as to whether or not he will be
hit, and if so where, but in trying to find out where and how soon and
how hard he can hit the enemy. Even so, he may be beaten; but at least
he will have nothing to regret; he will be able to say that if it were
all to do again, he would do the same; for he will know that on any
other terms his defeat would be assured.
If, then, these pages record in brief the continual endeavours of those
who made it their business to represent to the nation the requirements
of Imperial defence, it is for the purpose of once more exemplifying
the defects in our system which periodically expose the country and the
Empire to dangers from without and panics from within, and involve them
in a series of false economies alternating with spasms of wasteful
expenditure. The remedy advocated was the constitution of a body whose
duty it should be to represent requirements. Such a body was not
created until 1912. In the meantime, more money was spent than would
purchase security, which was not always obtained. Nor have we yet
produced what is the first essential of national security, the feeling
of the officers and men of the fighting services that they are being
justly treated by the nation in the matter of pay and pension and
proper administrative treatment.
{403}
In 1896, the most pressing need of the Navy was for more officers and
men. As already explained, the failure to enter the number required to
man the ships of the Naval Defence Act of 1889, had now become
manifest. Battleships are a showy asset; the absence of men is not
noticed by the public; therefore the politician builds the ships and
omits the men. In an address delivered before the Liverpool Chamber of
Commerce in July, 1896, I stated that the deficiency in the personnel
was 27,562 men, including a deficiency of 5000 in engine-room ratings.
A resolution urging the necessity of an immediate increase in the
personnel was passed by the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, and was sent
to the First Lord, Mr. Goschen.
The First Lord replied to the resolution, stating that the increase in
the personnel since 1889 had been 31,360. These figures, however,
included the whole of the numbers borne, without distinction of the
numbers available for sea service, and represented the numbers voted,
irrespective of deaths or retirements. The true increase was estimated
by me, upon the evidence of the Navy Estimates, at 17,262; and the
total number required at 105,000.
A good deal of public interest having been aroused on the subject, Mr.
Goschen stated in the House that it would be his duty next year "to
propose such a number of men for the Navy and Reserves as we judge to
be rendered necessary by the extension of the Fleet."
The increase of personnel was provided accordingly. Here is one
instance among many, of a responsible statesman declaring in all good
faith that matters were perfectly satisfactory as they were; being
obliged by the insistence of outside representations to examine
requirements; and then discovering that these were in fact what had
been represented. Mr. Goschen was necessarily dependent upon the
advice of the Sea Lords; but the Sea Lords themselves were immersed in
the mass of routine work involved in keeping the machine going. The
business of supply and the business of {404} organisation for war were
confused together; with the inevitable result that organisation for war
was neglected.
The personnel was increased in 1897-8 by 6300 (numbers voted). In the
following year, 1898-9, my estimate of 105,000 men was passed, the
numbers voted being 106,390; and, excepting intervals of false economy,
continued to rise until they now (1913) stand at 146,000.
The proposals with regard to the personnel were supported by (among
others) Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, who, in a letter to _The Times_
of 2nd April, 1897, stated that "an ex-Controller of the Navy said to
me when I was at the Admiralty, 'Your building programme is ahead of
the manning.' And he was right, more particularly in officers." Sir
R. Vesey Hamilton was a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty from
January, 1889, the year of the Naval Defence Act, to September, 1891.
His testimony is therefore authoritative. It was, of course, no fault
of Sir Vesey Hamilton that the personnel was deficient.
It is not too much to say that owing to the omission from that Act of
the requisite increase in the personnel, the Navy has been short of men
ever since.
In December, 1896, I suggested in a letter to the Press that promotion
to flag-rank should take place at an earlier age in order that officers
might gain the necessary experience while still in the vigour of youth.
Officers who remain too long in a subordinate position are liable to
have the faculty of initiative taken out of them, and to fall into the
habit of thinking that things will last their time. The services of
old and experienced officers are of course invaluable; but officers
should acquire the knowledge of the duties of an admiral (upon whom in
modern warfare all depends) as early in life as possible. Progressive
pay for all ranks from lieutenants upwards, was also advocated.
The requirements of the time were set forth by me in an article
contributed to _The Nineteenth Century_ of February, 1897. Briefly,
these were as follows:
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1. The necessity of obtaining the requisite number of personnel for
active service, long service ratings, such number to be definitely
specified by the Board of Admiralty as being necessary to fulfil stated
requirements.
2. A thorough reorganisation of the Royal Naval Reserve. A scheme of
reorganisation, founded on the proposals of Captain Joseph Honner,
Royal Navy, Captain Crutchley, R.N.R., and others, was explained by me
to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce. In order to meet the emergency,
it was suggested that 5000 men should be annually joined for five
years, after which they should pass into the first-class Reserve; at
the same time, 5000 men should be annually joined for two months'
training, after which they should pass into the second-class Reserve.
Such emergencies periodically occur, because the authorities neglect to
look ahead.
3. Seventeen old but useful ironclads to be re-armed with modern guns.
A list of these was drawn up; the proposed alterations in each vessel
were specified in detail, together with their cost; a task which took
me some three months to accomplish.
The principle of the suggestion was that the invention of the
quick-firing gun was actually a far more important revolution than the
change from muzzle-loading to breech-loading guns. It was calculated
that the older vessels were strong enough to withstand the increased
strain. The proposal was not made in order to avoid the necessity of
building new vessels, but as an expedient to make up a deficiency in
ships. Building new vessels was the preferable course of action, which
the Admiralty rightly decided to adopt.
4. The advisability of eliminating altogether from the number of ships
in commission or in reserve those vessels which could neither fight nor
run away, and of replacing them by modern vessels.
The scheme was carried into effect by degrees. Such an elimination
should take place periodically, upon the {406} industrial principle of
replacing obsolete plant with new machines. In later years, the
elimination of old vessels which was carried into effect by the
Admiralty, was effected without replacing them by new ships, a course
of action which contravened the very principle upon which it was
ostensibly based.
5. The advisability of holding annual manoeuvres in combination with
the Army at all naval bases of operation.
6. The designing of a definite plan of Imperial defence, or plan of
campaign; and the provision and equipment of such naval bases and
stations abroad as should enable such plan to be put into effective
operation.
It will be observed that all the aforesaid recommendations of my
brother officers and myself were directed to the fulfilment of Sir
Frederick Richards' great scheme of 1894-5, as already described. In
the result, the Naval Works Bill, March 1897, showed that work was in
progress at Gibraltar, Portland, Dover, Keyham, Portsmouth, Hong Kong,
Colombo, Pembroke, Haulbowline; on barracks at Chatham, Sheerness,
Portsmouth, Keyham, Walmer, the new college for engineers at Keyham and
new magazines, the money voted being just under a million.
Writing from Cairo, in March, 1897, to the secretary of the Guildhall
Club (the letter being published at the time) I said that Mr.
Brodrick's speech showed that the Government had a definite plan of
campaign, which was "proved by the proposal to fortify important
strategic bases at present absolutely undefended; ... without such
fortified bases it is palpable that no clear plan of campaign existed
at headquarters; and a happy-go-lucky method must have prevailed in the
event of war. The Government appear to me to have really begun to put
our defences into business-like trim and to have looked into and
endeavoured to make complete all those auxiliaries, any one of which
being imperfect would jeopardise the defences of the Empire as a
whole.... It is always very hard for authorities to make proposals
involving large sums of money unless the public {407} and the Press
combine to show that they wish such expenditure."
There remained, and still remains, an essential reform to be
accomplished. I have never ceased to advocate as a matter of
elementary justice such an increase of the pay of officers and men as
should bear some proportion to the responsibilities with which they are
charged and the duties which they fulfil. In 1897, the increase of the
officers' pay, the rate of which had hardly been altered since the time
of Nelson, was an urgent necessity. As a result of the steady refusal
of the Government to grant anything except the most meagre concessions,
officers are now leaving the Service almost daily, and among those who
remain there is considerable discontent. At that time, the pay of the
men was, if not generous, still adequate. Owing to a variety of
causes, it has since become totally inadequate; the concessions wrung
from the Government in response to perfectly reasonable demands are
ridiculously insufficient; and numbers of trained men are leaving the
Service as soon as they can.
In view of the obstinacy of the Government upon this matter, it is
worth recalling that, speaking at Newbury in May, 1897, I put the whole
case for the officers as plainly as possible. It was pointed out that
every condition of life had improved during the Queen's reign, except
the pay and prospects of the officers and men of the Royal Navy,
although their responsibilities had increased a hundred-fold. The
lieutenant's pay was £15 a month; after eight years he could get £3 a
month extra; and after twelve years another £3 extra. Except for
specialist duty, such as gunnery, torpedo and navigation, he could not
get another shilling. There were over 200 lieutenants then on the list
of over twelve years' service, who were only getting £21 a month. They
could get no more, although some among them had twenty-one years'
service. Half-pay, often compulsory, was a shameful scandal to the
country. It was not even half-pay, but very often barely a third.
Rear-admirals of forty {408} years' service were sent on shore with
£450 a year to live upon. Captains were even worse off, often getting
four years on compulsory half-pay at £200 a year.
That was sixteen years ago. The Government have done nothing worth
consideration in the interval.
The case was again publicly represented by me in 1912. By that time,
owing to the increase in price of the necessities of life and other
causes, the pay of the men had become grossly inadequate. In order
that it should be commensurate with the pay obtained by an equivalent
class of men in civil employment, it ought to have been doubled. All
that the Government did was to grant a trifling increase to men of a
certain term of service. How long will the nation allow the Navy to
continue a sweated industry?
Another measure of reform which is still far from accomplishment, is
the manning of British ships by British seamen. The principle, as I
stated in May, 1897, is that in dealing with the innumerable
emergencies inseparable from the life of the sea, it is better to
depend upon British seamen than upon foreigners. In May, 1897, it was
estimated that of the total number of men employed in the mercantile
marine, the proportion of British seamen was no more than three-fourths.
In the same year, 1897, the question of the contribution of the
Colonies to Imperial Naval Defence, which, for practical purposes, was
first raised at the Imperial Conference of 1887, was the subject of one
of those discussions which have occupied the public mind at intervals
ever since; and which have eventually resulted in the decision of
Australia and New Zealand to establish navies of their own.
In a letter written in reply to a correspondent and published in the
Press in June, 1897, I expressed the opinion that:
"It certainly would help in Imperial defence if the Colonies did
subscribe some portion of the money necessary to secure adequate
Imperial defence, but I think that all such proposals should emanate
from the Colonies in the first instance."
{409}
In another communication I observed that: "We can only be prepared for
war thoroughly when the Colonies offer to join us in a definite scheme
of Imperial defence, and the Colonies and their trade are inseparable
portions of the question of Imperial defence. We must, however, offer
them an inducing quid pro quo. We cannot expect that they will bear a
share of the costs unless we are prepared to give them a voice in the
administration of Imperial affairs. Imperial consolidation must be
real, not one-sided, and we must devise a scheme for admitting the
Colonies to Parliamentary representation on all questions affecting
Imperial policy."
And in a letter to the Secretary of the Toronto Branch of the Navy
League, I said: "The great necessity of the times is to have thoroughly
equipped and efficient naval bases in all the Colonies, so that no
matter where a British man-of-war meets the enemy, she will practically
be fighting in home waters with a good base within easy reach for
repairs, stores, coal, etc."
I still think that this was a practical suggestion. Some years
afterwards, Canada took over certain naval bases; but the result has
not been a success. But she took them over at a time when the British
Government were engaged in dismantling and abandoning naval bases all
over the world. These have still to be restored. But as the danger is
out of sight, the public do not perceive that the demolition of naval
bases abroad may very likely, in the event of war, result in disaster
to the British Navy.
In June, 1897, was celebrated the Diamond Jubilee of Her Majesty Queen
Victoria. Some observations contained in an article contributed by me
to _The Navy League Guide_ to the great naval review held at Spithead,
may perhaps be historically interesting. It was shown that the two
great naval reviews, that of the Jubilee in 1887 and the Diamond
Jubilee of 1897, mark important epochs in the history of the British
Navy. The Fleet of 1887 was in no way adequate to our needs at that
time, and many of the ships assembled for review could not have taken
their places in the fighting line. {410} (So it was represented at the
time; luckily, the supreme test of war was escaped; the proof that the
need existed, therefore, resides in its ultimate recognition by the
authorities.) In 1897, on the contrary, there was assembled a fleet of
warships representing a large proportion of the Navy we then possessed,
which was rapidly becoming equal to our necessities both in numbers and
efficiency. In 1887, the battleship fleet was represented by only four
vessels of less than ten years of age, _Collingwood_, _Edinburgh_,
_Conqueror_ and _Ajax_. Two out of the four were armed with
muzzle-loading guns, although all foreign navies had mounted nothing
but breech-loaders for several years previously. The contrast afforded
by the 1897 review was remarkable. Nothing could better have displayed
the giant strides we had made both in construction and fighting
efficiency, than the eleven splendid first-class battleships assembled
on 26th June, 1897.
A suggestion was added which was not adopted; nor has the proposal yet
been carried into execution upon a large scale, probably because the
authorities are afraid of accidents. "To make the review a success and
to test the capabilities of the captains, it would be well if the Fleet
could be got under way and ordered to pass the royal yacht which should
be anchored as the saluting base. Possibly a few accidents would
occur, but it would be a capital display of seamanship and the art of
handling ships; and no Fleet in the world could execute so imposing a
manoeuvre so well as our own."
Indeed, I have always held that a naval review should be conducted like
a military review. The Sovereign should first proceed between the
lines; then the ships should get under way and should steam past the
saluting base.
The Dean of Saint Paul's unexpectedly provided a diversion in naval
affairs. In order to make room in the Cathedral for the monument to be
erected to the memory of the late Lord Leighton, _P_.R.A., the Dean
proposed to remove the monument to Captain Richard Rundle Burges, R.N.,
from the south aisle to the crypt; a proceeding to {411} which I
expressed strong objection on behalf of the Service to which I had the
honour to belong. The controversy was conducted in the columns of _The
Times_.
The Dean, writing on 7th July, 1897, protested that the "monument is
unsightly. Captain Burges making love to Victory over a gun is not a
very suitable monument for a church, and during the twenty-eight years
I have been connected with the Cathedral I have been most anxious to
see this monument in a less conspicuous place."
In my reply, I said that, in the first place, I was not prepared to
accept his description of the sculptor's work; and secondly, that it
was rather late in the day to criticise it. And I submitted to the
Dean and Chapter, that as the Cathedral did not appear to have suffered
by the retention of that monument for the last hundred years, no harm
could possibly result from allowing it to remain. And I submitted with
great respect that the twenty-eight years' repugnance of the present
Dean had curiously enough only found vent in action at the time when it
was found necessary to select a spot for the site of a monument to the
late distinguished President of the Academy. I added that "Lord
Leighton was a personal friend of my own, but I have yet to learn that
he was the sort of man who would have wished to usurp the place of any
one, or that he would have even admitted that an artist, however
distinguished, takes precedence in the nation's history of those heroes
to whom the existence of our Empire is due. I rather think from what I
knew of Lord Leighton's character that had such a hypothesis been
presented to him in his lifetime his answer would have been like that
of her gracious Majesty the Queen, who, it is reported, when it was
suggested to her that Queen Anne's statue should be moved to make room
for one of herself, replied, 'Certainly not; why, you would be
proposing to move myself next.'"
Then, on 12th July, 1897, Mr. Balfour stated in the House of Commons
that "the Dean and Chapter, after reviewing all the circumstances of
the case, had decided not to carry out {412} their intention of
relegating the Burges Memorial to the crypt." _The Times_ remarked
that "The public will be interested to know that among the
circumstances which have brought about this welcome change of purpose
an important place must be assigned to an appeal by the Prince of
Wales. His Royal Highness holds very strongly the opinion that if
memorials are to be liable to removal in this summary manner whenever
the taste of a later generation pronounces them unsightly, the door
will be opened to grave abuses. He accordingly expressed to the Dean
and Chapter his hope that they would see their way to retain the Burges
Memorial in its present position, and it is largely in deference to his
wishes that the monument remains where it was erected at the expense of
the nation."
So the good Dean was fated still to be scandalised by the "unsuitable"
spectacle of the gallant captain "making love to Victory over a gun";
although, personally, I doubt if Captain Burges's statue is really
doing anything of the kind. In January, 1897, I had the honour of
being appointed A.D.C. to the Queen. In July, 1897, when the intention
of the Duke and Duchess of York to visit Ireland was announced I seized
the opportunity to advocate a project which I had long desired to see
adopted, and for whose adoption, in fact, I am still hoping. That
project is the building of a Royal residence in Ireland. It has
hitherto been foiled by timid Ministers. Writing to _The Times_ (24th
July, 1897), I pointed out that the total sojourn of the Royal Family
in Ireland during the past sixty years had been fifty-nine days in all.
The letter continues: "In my humble opinion it is impossible to
overrate the harm that this apparent neglect has done to the cause of
loyalty in Ireland. I am convinced that many misfortunes and
misunderstandings would never have taken place if the Royal Family had
been permitted by Governments and courtiers to make more frequent
visits to Ireland, and to render such visits possible by the
establishment of a Royal residence in that country. I know for a fact
that Her Majesty has on one occasion, and I believe more, {413} made
strenuous efforts to obtain a Royal residence in Ireland. Her
Majesty's generous wish was never fulfilled, owing to opposition on the
part of her advisers, who have invariably entertained an ungenerous and
unworthy doubt of the Irish character.... Vice-regal rule from the
Castle at Dublin is hated with all the passion of resentment of a
generous-minded but impulsive people, who possibly regard it as placing
them on the same footing as the conquered and coloured races under
British domination. It must not be inferred that I in any way intend
to say a word against the present or preceding Viceroys of Ireland. I
only wonder that men could ever have been found with patriotism enough
to fill the office; but in common with patriotic Irishmen of all
parties, I object to the sham court of the rule of men who, so far from
really representing the Sovereign, represent merely the political party
which has the upper hand in England at the time of their holding
office--unlike the Viceroy of India, who holds office for a term of
years independent of the political party that appointed him.... I
believe Irishmen would like to have Royalty permanently among them, and
to see Ireland put on an equal footing with the rest of the United
Kingdom in these matters."
The project was received with the general approval of the public, in so
far as their opinion was represented by the Press. The truth was, the
Queen often wished to go to Ireland; but her Ministers prevented her
from visiting my country; and their action was keenly resented by
Irishmen. Personally, I protested against it; affirming what I believe
to be the fact, that the Irish are the most chivalrous people in the
world. In her sentiment towards my country, and in all her dealings
with the Irish, Her Majesty was invariably most charming. It is very
much to be regretted that the anomaly of Castle government was not
ended long ago: that it must be ended, is certain.
The Duke and Duchess of York, visiting Ireland in August, 1897, were
received with the greatest possible enthusiasm. The township of
Kingstown presented an {414} address in which the hope was expressed
that their visit might lead to the establishment of a Royal residence
in Ireland; and thirteen other addresses presented on the same day
expressed a like aspiration.
In the same month (August, 1897) I was promoted to rear-admiral.
Among other occupations, I had been collaborating with Mr. H. W. Wilson
in the preparation of a Life of Nelson. The work was published under
the title of _Nelson and his Times_, by Messrs. Harmsworth, in October,
1897.
In the meantime the Government had been making tentative efforts
towards the constitution of a Council of Defence, upon which both
Services should be represented, and which should form a kind of
advisory body. The President of the new body was the Duke of
Devonshire, who, universally esteemed and respected for the
high-minded, conscientious statesman that he was, had neither the
training nor the aptitude required to fulfil such an office. At the
same time, the Duke was not only occupied with the affairs of his great
estates, and in the discharge of many social duties, but he was also
head of the Education Department. While expressing the utmost respect
for the Duke, I did not hesitate publicly to express my opinion, in the
course of an address delivered at the Cutlers' Feast at Sheffield in
November, 1897, that under the circumstances it was impossible to take
the new Council seriously. Nor is it probable that anyone did take it
seriously, least of all Her Majesty's Ministers.
It was in 1897 that I first saw Mr. Marconi's invention for wireless
telegraphy. Mr. Marconi, to whom I recently wrote asking him for
particulars of the occasion, very kindly replied as follows:
"In July, 1897, you first saw my original apparatus working at 28 Mark
Lane in the City of London, the corresponding instrument being placed
in another office in the City. Among others who witnessed the tests
was the late {415} Mr. Ritchie, then, I believe, President of the Board
of Trade."
But the time was shortly to arrive when I was once more to take part in
doing what I could to represent the interests of the Navy in
Parliament. Since 1890, I had been approached by forty constituencies
as to whether I would become a candidate. One invitation came upon me
unawares. It was in the garden of my house at Ham Common. I was
seated at my sailmaker's bench, clad in my old canvas jumper and
trousers, employed in fitting a dipping lug I used to have in the
_Undaunted_, for the roof of a summer-house; when to me entered a party
of gentlemen, immaculately clad in frock coats and silk hats. I had
not the least idea who they were; but they conversed with me very
affably, fell to criticising my work, and presently inquired if I had
seen Lord Charles, as they had been told that he was on the lawn. At
that, I suddenly recollected that I had promised to receive a
deputation.
During 1897, I had accepted the invitation to stand for a division of
Birmingham; but in consequence of a misunderstanding, the intention was
abandoned. Then, in December, owing to the death of my old friend Sir
Frank Lockwood, the seat of York became vacant. My opponent was Sir
Christopher Furness (afterwards Lord Furness). First in my election
address was placed the necessity for improving the efficiency both of
the Navy and Army by connecting the two Services in a plan of combined
defence. The advisability of altering the Constitution of the House of
Lords was also urged, together with the necessity of constituting a
strong Second Chamber.
The election campaign was lively enough. Sir Christopher's main
supporter was no other than Mr. Sam Story, who afterwards became an
enthusiastic Tariff Reformer. He and I interchanged ideas in a debate
conducted for the edification of an audience of 12,000 people, turn and
turn about for twenty minutes each.
My brothers Lord William and Lord Marcus were {416} helping me. Lord
Marcus accompanied me to a meeting, and I told him that he must make a
speech.
"I can't," he said. "I don't know what to say."
I told him to begin, because he was sure to be interrupted, and then,
being an Irishman, he would certainly find something to say. Lord
Marcus thereupon rose to his feet; and a voice immediately shouted:
"Who are ye?"
It was enough. The fire kindled.
"Who are we?" cried Lord Marcus. "I'll tell you who we are. We are
three brothers, and our names are Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego. And
we have come here to put out the burning fiery Furness!"
There was a good deal of excitement during the election, and sometimes
stones would be flying. A cousin of mine, a lady, was driving along
the street, when a stone lodged in her bonnet. Lord William caused it
to be mounted in silver, upon which was inscribed the legend: "This
proves that our opponents left no stone unturned to win the York
election"; and presented it to the lady to use as a paper-weight.
It was a close contest indeed. On the night of the poll, the Mayor
most unfortunately succumbed to the strain and died suddenly.
In the result I won the seat by a majority of 11 (after two counts), on
a poll of over 11,000 votes.
When I had taken my seat in the House, a political opponent whose
opinions were as changeable as the wind, who had held high office, and
who was distinguished by a handsome and majestic presence, said to me
in the smoking-room:
"Well, my dear Charlie, you have not much of the appearance of a
statesman."
"My dear old friend," I said, "you must not judge by appearances. You
have not the appearance of a weather-cock--but you are one."
At Christmas, 1908, Mr. Henniker Heaton's indomitable {417}
perseverance had resulted in the establishment of Imperial penny
postage in every part of the British Empire except Australia and New
Zealand. Lord Randolph Churchill and myself were hearty supporters of
Mr. Henniker Heaton, who gave to each of us a golden penny in
commemoration of the event.
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