AN IMMEDIATE PROGRAMME
To the practical man who wants to know what to do and when and how to
do it, general principles seem unreal and valueless. He is interested
in the decisions of the next few months, not in a vague general
direction of events for the coming century. And so in international
politics he would like to decide what the nation shall do _now_ about
the British blacklist, the German submarines, the Mexican revolution,
the California-Japanese situation, and he is not keenly interested in
the formulation of a policy which seems to hang high above the
difficult concrete problems that must be solved immediately. He may
languidly agree with proposals to create a community of interest among
colonising nations and to establish the freedom of the sea, but he
wishes to know whether in the meanwhile we are to back up Carranza in
Mexico and what we are to do if the revolutionists "shoot up" an
American town. While we work for these ideals, are we to allow Germany
to sink our liners and Japan to swallow up China, or are we to fight?
This attitude is not unreasonable. A general policy is of little value
unless we can make successive decisions conform to it. But it is not
easy or always possible to predict these decisions. We can tell
approximately how many people in the United States will die next year,
but not how many will die in any particular family. We can {289}
advise a man who is walking from New York to San Francisco to take a
generally westward course, but for any given mile of the road the
direction may be north or south or east. A trend of policy is made up
of innumerable deflections, small or large; it is an irregular chain of
successive actions, which do not all tend in one direction. Even if we
narrow our field of vision and seek to elaborate a more immediate
policy, we do not escape from the vagueness which inheres in all such
general conclusions.
In the main our problem consists in using the influence of the United
States to create such an economic harmony among the nations, and to
give each nation such a measure of security as to permit them to agree
upon an international policy, which will be in the interest of all.
The chief elements of this programme are two in number: to create
conditions within the United States which will permit us to exert a
real influence; and to use this influence in the creation of an
international organisation, which will give each nation a measure of
economic and military security, and prevent any nation from wantonly
breaking the peace.
How far we can progress towards such an organisation will depend upon
the course and uncertain issue of the present war. The war may end
with the Central Allies crushed, with Germany reduced in size and
Austria and Turkey dismembered. It may end with a lesser defeat for
the Central Powers and with lesser penalties. There may be an
inconclusive peace, which may either be a mere truce or a new basis of
agreement between nations disillusioned by the conflict. Finally the
war may end with the partial or even complete victory of the Central
Powers, either through their overcoming the united opposition of their
enemies or by detaching one or more from their alliances.
{290}
What the United States can effect at the conclusion of the war will
inevitably depend upon which of these developments takes place.
Assuming that we ourselves are not drawn into the conflict, it is
probable that our influence will be larger if neither of the great
coalitions wins an overwhelming victory. If the Western and Eastern
Allies completely crush the resistance of the Central Powers, it is
hardly likely that they will concede to us, who have not borne a share
of the danger and toil, a large discretion in proposing the terms of
peace. Such an unconditional victory by either side would probably
lead to an onerous and vindictive settlement, for each coalition is
bound together by promises to its constituent nations, and these
promises cannot be fulfilled without wholesale spoliation. Moreover,
each coalition will wish to weaken the future power of its opponents.
A request by the United States that the victorious alliance deal
generously with the defeated nations in order to create the conditions
of a permanent peace would therefore probably meet with a more or less
courteous denial. On the other hand, a drawn battle, or one in which
the defeated party asking for peace still retained a considerable power
of resistance, might lead to conditions in which the influence of the
neutral nations, led by the United States, would be all-decisive. A
situation might be created out of which no further fighting could bring
a tolerable peace, and the nations might agree to some form of
incipient international organisation, to which the United States could
contribute.
The problem of Constantinople illustrates this possibility. That city,
with the command of the straits, is likely to go to Russia if the
Allies win, and to fall under a disguised German-Austrian domination if
the Central Powers are victorious. Either situation would be vicious;
{291} either would leave the commerce of the defeated nations at the
mercy of the great power that held the Bosphorus. If on the other
hand, the two opposed alliances were almost equally formidable at the
end of the war, or if England and France became unwilling to fight
longer in order to give Russia a strategic position at Constantinople,
a true solution of the problem might be obtained by neutralising the
straits. A union of all the powers might guarantee the free passage of
these waters at all times, and an American commissioner in command of a
small American army might carry out the wishes of an international
council. It would not be a pleasant or in any sense a profitable
adventure for the United States, and we should accept the task most
unwillingly. Our sole motive would be the belief that our acceptance
of this responsibility would remove one of the greatest causes of
future war.
Such an assumption of obligations at Constantinople would constitute
for us a new and dangerous international policy. While Constantinople
is easily defended and while ample assistance would be forthcoming if
defence were necessary, it can hardly be doubted that a rupture of such
an international agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of the straits
would bring on a war in which we should be obliged to take our part.
Yet the danger which we thus incur by entering upon an agreement
looking to international peace is perhaps less than the danger of not
entering since if Constantinople causes another world war, as it may if
not neutralised, it is by no means unlikely that sooner or later we may
be forced into the struggle. It is better to risk our peace in seeking
to avert a world disaster than to permit the great war to come.
There are other international policies which in favouring circumstances
might be urged by the United States at {292} the close of the war. We
might append our signature to international conventions defining and
guaranteeing a freedom of the seas, to agreements looking towards a
co-operative exploitation of backward countries, to laws regulating the
settlement of arbitrable international disputes, and to such special
conventions as might be made for the re-neutralisation of Belgium.
Upon the basis of such agreements, even though they were but tentative
and partial, we might enter with the other nations upon some form of a
League of Peace and International Polity, which would secure these new
conventions from being rudely disturbed by the aggression of one or two
powers.
Whether we help to carry out these policies at the close of this war,
will depend upon the balance of power then existing in Europe and upon
the mood of the nations. If Russia wants Constantinople, if Britain
insists upon the right of capture at sea, if France, Italy, Servia,
Roumania and the British colonies demand territorial gains without
compensation, and these powers are able to enforce their will, our
delegates to the Peace Conference may make representations and
suggestions, but will not be able to carry them through. Nor if the
Central Powers are victorious and unyielding, shall we be able to make
our advice count. No one power or group of powers could carry out such
a policy against the will of a majority or even of a strong minority of
powers. Unless the conditions at the end of the war are such as to
convince the victors (if there are victors) that it is wiser to
readjust the world than to get all they can, unless great nations like
Britain, France and Germany can agree that a groundwork for future
peace is more valuable than territorial gains and punitive damages, the
opportunity for a peaceful reconstruction will pass. New coalitions
will be formed; new wars will be fought.
It is of course possible that such an international {293}
reconstruction will be entered upon only with hesitation by several of
the nations, including some of the victors. It is even conceivable
that the movement might be furthered by certain of the belligerents on
both sides, as for example Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy
(aided by the United States and other neutrals) and be opposed to some
extent by, let us say, Russia and Turkey. It is not assumed that this
particular division among the nations will actually occur, but merely
that upon the conclusion of the war the moral integrity of the
alliances may be shattered and with the prospect of new cleavages and
disagreements, an effort be made, aided by the neutrals, to create
conditions doing away with the present balance of power. A war
disintegrates the elements making for success in war; enemies become
allies and allies enemies. At the final council board each nation
tends to return to its allegiance to itself, and with the passing of
the old alliances a new league based upon totally different principles
becomes possible.
It is, however, with a tempered optimism that we should approach the
international conference that is to end this war. Even if America is
represented and wisely represented, even if the powers are willing to
listen to proposals looking toward international reconstruction, the
probability that there will be an inclination to make concessions is
not overwhelming. Hatred, distrust, the injection of petty interests,
the tenacity of diplomatic conservatism will all work against a wise
forbearance and a far-seeing policy, and the errors of the Vienna
Conference of 1815 and of the Berlin Conference of 1878 may be
duplicated or worse. There is at least an even chance that the
international situation will be quite as unsatisfactory and perilous in
1920 as it was in 1900. Progress towards international reconstruction
is a possible but by no means {294} certain part of the agenda of the
diplomatic conference, which will meet when enough millions of the
youth of Europe have been slaughtered and maimed.
But those who desire peace and the international relations which will
alone make peace possible have learned to be patient, and if the
problem advances only slowly to a solution it will be sufficient
satisfaction to know that it advances at all. After this war there
will be many long years during which the nations may study at their
leisure the clumsiness of the arrangements which make for international
conflict. There will be years in which America, if she is worthy and
strong, will be able to make her influence for peace felt.
The problem, however, is not how rapidly we shall move but whether we
shall move at all and in what direction. That direction seems to be
clearly indicated by the recent trend of world events. With the
passing of our isolation we are given the opportunity to use our
immense influence directly, continuously and intelligently for the
strengthening of the economic bonds which make for a world peace. Time
and the economic trend work on our side. We can hasten, though we
cannot and need not create, the vast unifying movement which comes with
the further integration of industry. What we can contribute to this
consummation is an ability to see the world as it is and a willingness
to work and if necessary to fight for the changes without which
international peace is impossible. We must avoid a cautious yet
dangerous clinging to a philosophy of national irresponsibility, as we
must likewise avoid the excesses of a nationalistic imperialism. We
must take our part manfully, side by side with the other nations, in
the great reorganisation of the world, which even to-day is
foreshadowed by an economic internationalism, now in its beginnings.
{295}
In the last century and a half the United States has made three great
contributions to the political advancement of the world. The first was
the adoption of the constitution, an experiment in federalism on a
scale larger than ever before known in history. The second was the
adoption of a policy, by which the vast territories of all the states
were held in common, and these new territories admitted to statehood
upon exactly the same terms as the original commonwealths, which formed
the Union. Our third contribution was the Monroe Doctrine, which
removed two continents from the field of foreign conquest and
guaranteed to each American nation the freedom to determine its own
form of government and its own sovereignty.
To-day the nation is again in a position to contribute to the political
progress of the world. It stands before a fourth decision. Either it
can cling hopelessly to the last vestiges of its policy of isolation or
can launch out into imperialistic ventures, or finally it can promote,
as can no other nation, a policy of internationalism, which will bind
together the nations in a union of mutual interest, and will hasten the
peaceful progress of the economic and political integration of the
world.
{297}
INDEX
A
Abbott, J. F., "Japanese Expansion and American Policies," quoted, 215
n.
Africa, slavery under imperialistic system in, 95.
Agricultural nations, how war was a necessity to early, 22-23; effect
of conversion of, into industrial nations, 79-81.
Agricultural progress, as one of the causes of war, 17.
Agriculture, an economic activity that is pacific in tendency, 174; how
America's economic mutuality with Europe may depend upon, 175; a secure
base for a policy of non-aggression in development of, 176; amount of
land available for, in America, 176-177; growth in products of,
compared with growth in population, 177-178; opportunities for further
development of American, 178-179; probable increase in efficiency in,
181-182.
Alaska, attitude of America in purchase of, 46.
Algeria, preferential treatment of, as to tariffs, by France, 104;
volume of trade of, with France compared with that with other
countries, 105.
America, effect of Great War upon, 1; choice of foreign policies open
to, 2; influences which will determine national trend, 2-3; attitude of
pacifist idealists, 3; attitude of self-seeking individualists, 4;
origin and character of demand in, for preparedness, 5-6; the ideal of
a united, 7-8; interest of financial groups in preparedness and "united
America" ideal, 8-9; question as to what purpose armament in, is to be
used, 10; the group for defence and the group for establishment of
proper international relations, 10-11; factors which will determine
foreign policy of, 11-12; goal of internationalism to be aspired for
by, 12; causes of failure of, to realise ideal of internationalism, 13;
imperialistic ideas in, 13-14; steadfastness necessary in whatever
course decided on, 14-15; not exempt from economic forces which cause
war, 30-31; attitude of, toward peace and war, 32-43; period of clipper
ships in, 39; character of diplomacy of, 43-44; plunge taken by, in
1898; into imperialism, 45; strategic and industrial motives behind
change in foreign policy of, 46-50; "congestion of capital" argument
proved futile, 51-53; effect upon thought in, of imperialistic venture,
55; relations of, with Europe, as affected by Monroe Doctrine, and
international responsibilities thrust upon, 55-57; lessons derived by,
from European War, 57-58; a positive policy to be substituted for a
negative, 58-59; comparative intensity of competition with Great
Britain, Germany and France for foreign trade, 61-62; development in
field of investment, 67-70; obvious entrance of, upon economic
competition, 70-71; isolation evidently no longer possible to, 71;
decision to be made by, as to nature of expansion policy to be adopted,
151-153; choice lies between Nationalistic Imperialism and
Internationalism, 153; arguments of imperialists as to course to be
taken by, 153-154; dangers of imperialistic policy to, 154-156; secure
road to imperialism for, in Anglo-American union, 156-160; arguments
for ideal of internationalism, 160-166; capability of, for leading in
promotion of international peace, dependent on economic development,
169 ff.; tendency to imperialistic policy from unequal distribution of
wealth, 186 ff.; danger of present favourable conditions as to incomes
and wages not continuing, 190-191; foreign policy must accord with
international ideals, 199-200; course to be followed by, in foreign
policy, in choosing between immediate and ultimate interest, 203-212;
question of future relations with Canada, 212-213; policy toward China,
213-216; three ways open to, of promoting international adjustments
aimed to secure peace, 231; absurdity of method of "going it alone,"
231-234; the method of forming an alliance with one or more selected
nations, 234-236; third and most promising method, to constitute our
nation a rallying-point for the formulation and enforcement of
principles of international policy, 236-241; leading part taken by, in
advocacy of freedom of the seas, 247; hostility of, to British
domination of the seas, 253; an immediate programme for, 288-295.
Americanism, as an ideal, 7-8.
Anglo-American union, arguments favouring, 156-160; drawbacks to plan
of, 160; further discussion of possible value of, and disadvantages of,
234-236.
Anti-imperialists, arguments of, 126-138; considerations which work
against, 138-139.
Arbitration, defects of, as a plan for preserving peace, 225-226.
Aristocracy, benefits of imperialism confined to the, 132-135; evil
effects of imperialistic system upon, 135.
Arndt, Paul, on handicapping of Germany because of meagreness of
colonial possessions, 107.
B
Backward countries, root of imperialism in exploitation of, by
imperialistic powers, 85-98; problem of governing, an argument for
imperialism, 139; proposed joint development of, by all the great
powers, 263-269.
Banks, German, in foreign countries, 118, 120-121.
Barker, Ernest, article "Crusades," quoted, 23.
Bauer, Otto, quoted on diversified interests of wage-earners in
different countries, 143-144.
Belgium, monopoly of trade with her colonies secured by, 104;
industrial invasion of, by Germany, 116 ff.; truths illustrated by
German invasion of, 256; position of, before 1914, as a neutralised
state, 270.
Birth rate, decline in, the greatest of factors making for
internationalism and peace, 287.
Bismarck, policy of, in encouraging France's colonial ambitions,
109-110.
Boycott, proposed for states violating principles of international
league for peace, 242-244; discussion of, of Germany after the war,
273-274.
Brailsford, H. W., quoted on solution of colonial problem, 265-266.
Brazil, tropical imperialism and the atrocities in, 87.
Bulnes, F., quoted on future relations of United States and Latin
America, 209.
Burgess, "Homeland," cited, 136.
Burgess, J. W., "The European War of 1914," quoted, 253-254.
Business, international evolution of, 279-283.
C
Canada, trade of, with United States compared with that with Great
Britain, 102; present and future relations of United States with,
212-213.
Capital, internationalism of, 279-283.
Caraballo Sotolongo, F., work by, cited, 208 n.
Cartels, description of German, 121-122.
Carver, T. N., quoted on small-scale farming, 179 n.
Children, dangers of neglect of, in United States, 191-192.
China, views of official of, quoted, 75-76; question of America's
policy regarding, 213-216; possibilities of the impending industrial
progress of, 216 n.
Class, increasing internationalism of, 280.
Class policy, imperialism viewed as a, 138.
Coercion, preserving peace by, 226-228.
Colonies, how germs of war are carried in nationalistic competition
for, 99 ff.; tendency of, to trade with home country, 101-103;
preference given to, by tariff legislation, 104; the open and the
closed door policy in treatment of, by home countries, 104; future
advantages resulting from possession of, 107-108; problem of, in plans
for a higher imperialism, 246, 258 ff.; internationalisation of, under
proposed higher imperialism, 263-269.
Colonisation, failure of argument for imperialism based on, 129-131.
Coloured labour and the root of imperialism, 85-98.
Commerce, development of, and the economic motive for war, 23-24.
Conant, C. A., arguments of, for American imperialism, 48-49.
Constantinople, problem of, after the war, and part America might play,
290-291.
Coolidge, A. C., "United States as a World Power," quoted, 45 n.
Cramb, J. A., war mystic, quoted, 20, 21; book, "England and Germany,"
quoted, 221.
Crusades, economic motives behind, 23.
D
Dardanelles, internationalisation of, 254, 279.
Democracy, the American tradition of, 12-13; failure to achieve ideal
purpose of, 13.
Diepenhorst, Fritz, quoted on German cartels, 121.
Diplomacy, character of American, 43-44.
Disarmament, defects in proposal for universal, 225.
Distribution of wealth, incentive to war found in unequal, 17.
Dodsworth, W., arguments of, in favour of imperialism, 50.
"Dumping" of surplus goods by Germany, 62; as one of Germany's methods
of industrial invasion, 117, 119-120.
E
Economic forces, determination of national policies by, 2-3; one of
chief causes of wars, 14, 17-19, 21-28; hope of directing toward peace
rather than war, 28-29.
Economic gains to imperialistic nation from tropical agriculture, 92.
Economic invasion, of other countries by Germany, 116-125; relative
success or failure of system of, 124-125.
Educational system in America, imperfections of, 191-192.
Emigration, as one of the causes of war, 17.
England, relations between America and, 35-36, 40; economic competition
between Germany and, 99-101; strength of imperialism in, 140. _See_
Great Britain.
Enoch, C. R., on boycotting Germany after the war, 274 n.
Europe, importance to, of American foreign policy, 2; attitude of
pacifist idealists and of individualistic realists concerning America's
relations with, 4-5; attitude of America toward, 35-42; economic
competition of United States with, 55 ff.; significance to, of American
competition for Latin-American trade, 59-60; renewed competition of,
for foreign trade after the war, 66; financial relations of America
and, 67-70; foreign investment by, in new countries, 81-84; lack of
firm basis for union of peoples of, 111-114; problems presented by
Canada's relation to controversies in, 213 n.
Extractive industries, pacific tendency of, 174.
F
Farms, possibilities for future development of, in America, 178-179.
_See_ Agriculture.
Fear of war, value to certain interests of, 137-138.
Federation of nations, defect of plan for, to preserve peace, 224-225.
Finance, internationalism of, 279-283.
Financial relations of America and Europe, 67-70.
Financiers, interest of, in preparedness and spirited foreign policy,
8-9.
Foreign investment and the internationalism of capital, 280-281. _See_
Investment.
Foreign policy of America, effect of European war upon, 1 ff., 58-59;
special factors which will figure in future, 11-12; change in, after
the Spanish War, 45; in part due to military considerations, 46; part
played by economic motives in, 46-50; must accord with international
ideals which we aim to promote, 199-200; the choice between immediate
and ultimate interest, 203-204; concerning Latin America, 207-212;
concerning Canada, 212-213; concerning China, 213-216.
Foreign trade, effect on America's, of opening of Panama Canal, 62-63;
America's gain in, since outbreak of European war, 63-64; European
competition for, after the war, 66; question of value of, resulting
from imperialism, 131-136.
France, relations between America and, 36; American competition with,
for foreign trade, less keen than with Germany, 62; preferential
tariffs given to colonies of, 104; industrial invasion of, by Germany,
116 ff.; appeal of imperialism in, 140.
Freedom of the seas, one of the elements in a programme of peace, 246;
growth in significance of problem of, 247; opposite sides taken by
America and England concerning, 247; benefits and drawbacks of
England's policy, 249-254; five things desirable in order to establish,
254-255; international organisation to enforce convention regarding,
with Anglo-American agreement as a corner-stone, 255; value of proposed
international arrangement, dependent upon belief of nations in its
enforcement, 255-257.
Free trade, as an antidote to war, 29; error lurking in the doctrine,
29-30.
G
Garcia Calderon, F., quoted on course of United States in the future,
155-156; on North American influence in Latin America, 209.
Geographical location, effect of, on a nation's policy, 172-173.
Germany, defence of war offered by romanticists in, 20-21; possibility
of future competition with, by America, in battle for world market,
61-62; economic competition between England and, 99-101; volume of
trade of colonies with, compared with that with other countries, 105;
handicapping of, through lack of colonial possessions, 107; dangers of
colonial ambition of, 109; Bismarck's policy regarding colonies,
109-110; industrial invasion of competing countries by, 116; tactics
of, in trade invasions, 117 ff.; limitations and obstacles to policy of
invasion of, 124; appeal of imperialism in, 140; why imperialism
appeals to wage-earners in, 145-146; frugality and efficiency
characteristic of, 189; the proposal to boycott after the war, 273-274.
Gibraltar, Straits of, internationalisation of, 254, 279.
Great Britain, what loss of markets for manufactured goods would mean
to, 60; American competition with, for foreign trade, less keen than
that with Germany, 61-62; comparative volume of trade between colonies
and, 102-103; arguments for alliance between America and, 156-160; how
surplus capital seeking a vent may lead to an imperialistic policy
shown by, 187; policy of obstruction followed by, regarding freedom of
the seas, 247; necessity to, of navy and command of seas, illustrated
by case of Germany, 248-249; discussion of advantages and disadvantages
of attitude of, on naval supremacy, 249-254.
H
Hauser, Henri, work by, cited and quoted, 116, 121, 122.
Hawaii, acquisition of, by United States, 46; America's international
liabilities increased by, 57.
Hobson, C. K., "The Export of Capital," cited, 68 n., 83.
Hobson, John A., "Imperialism," quoted, 51, 131; "Towards International
Government," quoted and cited, 242, 245.
Holland, industrial invasion of, by Germany, 116 ff.
Honour, the demands of national, 197-199.
Hunting tribes, war inevitable among, 22.
Hurley, Edwin W., address by, cited and quoted, 66 n.
Hutchinson, Lincoln, "Panama Canal and International Trade
Competition," cited, 63.
I
Idealists, position of pacifists as, 3; mystic interpretation of war
by, 20-21.
Immigration, effect of growth of America's population due to, on
nation's economic development and foreign policy, 184.
Imperialism, American ideal of internationalism opposed to, 12-13;
intricacy of problem of, 13; the present an age of, 13-14; America's
plunge into, in 1898, 45; strategic and industrial arguments for
American, 46-50; not warranted by real conditions in America, 51-53;
significance of America's premature venture into, 54; root of, found in
necessity of compelling subject peoples to labour for industrial
nations, 85-98; arguments against, 126 ff.; results of, for investment
purposes beneficial only to a few, 127; regarded by Socialists as
immoral, brutal, anti-democratic, and uneconomic, 128; revolt against,
led by people of imperialistic powers not benefited by policy, 128 ff.;
outlet for redundant population not secured by, 129-131; questionable
value of foreign trade resulting from, 131-132; danger of war resulting
from, 136-137; a class policy, 137-138; difficulty in Europe of
democratic leaders making headway against, 138-139; popular appeal of,
140; economic argument for, 141-147; patriotic appeal of, 147-150;
decision to be made by America between internationalism and, 151-153;
road open to America, through Anglo-American union, 156-160; lack of
economic reserves as an impelling force toward, 170-171; relation
between geographical location and, 172-173; relation of inequalities of
wealth and income to, 186 ff.; a more equal distribution of wealth an
antidote to, 186-188; in what the economic antidote to, really
consists, 194-195; measures necessary to achievement of higher form of,
258-269.
Income, equable distribution of, an antidote to imperialism, 191.
India, British conquest of, due to desire for trade, 21; tendency of,
to give bulk of trade to home country, 101, 102; small percentage of
British born in, 129.
Industrial invasions of each other's territory by competing countries,
116-124; question of success or failure of policy of, 124-125.
Inequality of wealth and income, risk of imperialistic policy resulting
from, 186-188.
Intensive cultivation, limitations of, 179.
Internationalisation of colonies, 263-269; of capital, 279-283.
Internationalism, ideal of, to be aspired for by America, 12; causes of
failure of America to realise ideal of, 13; what is necessary if
America decides on the course of, 14-15; decision to be made by America
between nationalistic imperialism and, 151-153; meaning of ideal of, as
opposed to ideal of imperialism, 160; steps necessary to achievement
of, 161-166; to be secured only by further political and economic
development, 270; forces making for, 270 ff.; actual profit of, 272;
impossibility of independence for small subject nations, 277-279.
Intervention, objections to a policy of, for preserving peace, 231-234.
Investment, America's development in field of foreign, 67-70; value of
new countries as a field for, 81-82; extent of foreign, by European
countries, 83; internationalism of capital shown by foreign, 280-281.
Iron, "dumping" of, by Germany in foreign countries, 119-120.
Italy, industrial invasion of, by Germany, 116 ff.; "dumping" of German
products in, 119.
J
Jamaica, trade of, with United States compared with that with United
Kingdom, 102.
James, William, "The Moral Equivalent of War," quoted, 195-196.
Japan, relations between America and, as influenced by Philippine
Islands, 57; an example of a nation driven to imperialistic policy
through lack of economic reserves, 170-171.
Jingoism, the irreducible minimum of, 196-197.
Joehlinger, Otto, on the open and the closed door in colonies, 104 n.
K
Kidd, Benjamin, "Control of the Tropics," cited, 91.
Kiel Canal, internationalisation of, 254, 279.
King, W. I., "Wealth and Income of People of United States," cited, 190
n.
Krehbiel, Edward, digest of history of pacifism by, 219 n.
L
Latin America, competition of America for trade of, 59-60;
possibilities of, as a field for investment, 69-70; course to be
followed by America toward, 207-208; fear of policy of aggression on
part of United States by, 208-209; danger in our relations with, from
its political instability and unripeness, 211.
League for peace, foundations of a true, 240-241; question of how to
form, premature, 241; things essential to continued existence of,
241-242; methods of enforcing system, 242-244; creation of
international machinery for working out modes of action, 245.
League to enforce peace, arguments for and against a, 226-228, 230.
Lippmann, Walter, quoted on solution of colonial problem, 265.
Loree, L. F., compilation by, cited, 68 n.
Lough, W. H., quoted on trade of United States with South America, 65 n.
M
McMaster, J. B., quotation from, 172 n.
Mahan, A. T., "Interest of America in Sea Power," etc., cited, 46; on
the possibilities of an Anglo-American alliance, 156-157.
Marx, Karl, on the workingman's lack of a fatherland, 143.
Merles, Salvador R., work by, cited, 208 n.
Merritt, Eugene, on disadvantages of small-sized farms, 179.
Mexico, significance of revolution in, to United States, 55; inferences
to be drawn from action of United States concerning, 56-57; laming of
industry by frequent revolutions in, 88. _See_ Latin America.
Millard, T. F., "Our Eastern Question," quoted, 214 n.
Milloud, Maurice, "The Ruling Caste and Frenzied Finance in Germany,"
quoted, 116, 119, 120, 124.
Mining, an economic activity that is pacific in tendency, 174.
Monroe Doctrine, the, 39; effect of, on America's relations with
Europe, 55-57; stands for principle that Latin-American countries will
develop naturally, 89; possibility of cloaking a policy of aggression
under, 206-207; tolerance of, by Europe, conditioned upon America's
acting as guardian and not conqueror, 207-208; peril in, both to United
States and to Latin America, 209-210; question of future treatment of,
212.
Munition makers, value to, of constant fear of war, 137-138.
Mystic interpretation of war, 20-21.
N
Napoleonic Wars, economic factors in, 26.
National consciousness, development of, in Europe, 111-112.
Nationalism and Internationalism, discussion of use of terms, 153 n.
Nationalities, the struggle of subject, for independence, 274-276;
impossibility of independence for all, 276-278.
Natural resources, lack of, a cause of militaristic and imperialistic
policy, 170-171.
Naumann, Friedrich, on handicapping of Germany through meagreness of
colonial possessions, 107.
Navies, arguments for reduction of, to secure freedom of the seas,
247-252.
O
Olivier, Sir Sidney, "White Capital and Coloured Labour," quoted, 85,
86-87.
Olney, Richard, on sovereignty of United States in Western hemisphere,
56.
Open door, America's policy of the, relative to China, 213; what
America should mean by, 215; problem of, the essential one in solution
of question of colonies, 267-268.
Orient, possibilities of, as a field for investment, 69-70.
P
Pacifism, history of, 218-221; must be either static or dynamic, 222;
our hope in dynamic type of, 223; character of dynamic as opposed to
static, 223-226. _See also_ Peace.
Pacifists in America, attitude of, toward national policies, 3; effect
upon, of great war and the demand for preparedness, 6-7; mistaken ideas
concerning war and its causes held by many, 16-17.
Panama Canal, international liabilities of United States increased by,
57; competition of United States for foreign trade increased by, 62-63;
internationalisation of, 254, 279.
Pastoral nations, war a necessity to, 22.
Peace, direct and indirect interest of America in, 217-218; the classic
ideal of, 218-219; change in character of movement for, before French
Revolution, 219-220; proven inapplicability of rationalistic theories
of, 220-221; cause of failures of pacifist efforts, 221-224; criticism
of plans of static type for preserving, 224-230; the all-pervasive
sentiment for, 237; decline in population rate a help toward, 287;
proposed league for, _see_ League for peace.
Philippine Islands, acquisition of, by America, 46; change in feeling
of Americans regarding ownership of, 53-54; increase of America's
international responsibilities by, 57; small percentage of Europeans
and Americans in, 130.
Popular appeal of imperialistic policy, 140; reason for, found in
economic argument, 141-147; patriotic ideals and, 147-150.
Population, growth in, one incentive to war, 17; increase in, one of
the chief forces driving Western nations outward, 76-77; imperialism
not an outlet for superfluity of, 129-131; overtaking of extension of
agriculture by, 182; statistics of, 183; diminishing rate of increase
in, 183; increase of America's, by immigration, 184; distribution of
wealth among, in United States, 190 n.; increase in, means increased
inequality in distribution of wealth, 190-191; decline in rate of, the
greatest of factors making for internationalism and peace, 287.
Preparedness, origin and character of demand for, 5-6; effect of, on
pacifist ideals, 6-7; interest of financial groups in policy of, 8-9.
Preziosi, G., work by, cited, 117.
Punic Wars, economic motives behind, 21.
R
Railroad policy of Germany, impetus given to "dumping" by, 120.
Rationalistic pacifism, inapplicability of, to the facts of life,
220-221.
Reinsch, Paul, "World Politics," quoted, 54 n.; "Colonial
Administration" by, cited and quoted, 95, 103.
Religion, a lesser cause of war than economic interests, 27-28; not a
preventive of war, 165.
Ripley, W. Z., cited concerning American debt to Europe, 68 n.
Robinson, E. V. D., essay by, cited, 28 n.
Rohrbach, Paul, "German World Policies," quoted, 93 n.
Ruedorffer, J. J., quoted on future of Germany's world policy, 109.
Russia, relations between America and, 36.
S
_Saturday Review_ article on competition between England and Germany,
100.
Schulze-Gaevernitz, Dr., work by, cited and quoted, 133-134.
Scottish Border wars, viewed as cattle-stealing raids, 24-25.
Shipping, an economic activity that is not pacific in tendency, 174.
Sidebotham, H., "The Freedom of the Seas," quoted, 251, 253.
Six-Power Loan, in principle a right step, 216.
Slavery, modern forms of, under system of tropical imperialism, 95.
Slosson, E. E., article by, quoted, 90-91.
Social Democratic party in Germany, attitude of, toward imperialism,
146.
Socialists, anti-imperialistic philosophy of, 128-129; allegiance of,
to their own countries, 143-144; reason for failure of, to prevent war,
239-240; agreement of, with theory that colonial problem can be solved
only by concerted action of Great Powers, 264-266.
Solf, Wilhelm, quoted on Germany's colonial policy, 104, 106 n.
South American trade, competition of United States for, 63-65. _See_
Latin America.
Suez Canal, internationalisation of, 254.
Sumner, W. G., quoted on war, 196-197.
Supra-nationalism, the proximate economic development, 284.
Switzerland, industrial invasion of, by Germany, 116 ff., 119.
T
Taxation, an underlying cause of war, 17.
Thompson, Warren S., "Population: A Study in Malthusianism," cited, 178.
Trade development, as one of the causes of war, 17.
Trojan War, a free-booting expedition, 24.
Tropical imperialism, conditions causing, 85; arguments for and
against, 85-98.
Tropical products, growing significance of, 90-92.
Trusts, tendency to internationalism in process of formation of,
281-282.
Tunis, trade of, favoured by France, 104.
U
United States. _See_ America.
United States of Europe, fallacy in proposal to create a, 224-225.
V
Von der Goltz, Field-Marshal, quoted on necessity of imminence of war
to maintenance of prestige of officer class, 138 n.
W
Wage-earners, imperialistic arguments that appeal to, 141-147;
internationalism of, 280.
Wages, supposed beneficial reaction of imperialism upon, 144-146.
War, popular theories regarding, 16; the real motives, incentives and
origins of, 17; reason for both ancient and modern, traced to economic
forces, 17-19, 260-262; interpretation of, by school of romanticists,
20-21; question of permanence of, as an institution, 28; attitude of
Americans toward, 32 ff.; cause of attitude of average American toward,
32-42; how system of imperialism tends to lead to, 99-115, 136-137;
value of fear of, to certain political and industrial interests,
137-138; elements in America that foster spirit of, 164; antidotes to
imperialistic policy and, 186-200. _See also_ Peace.
War after the war, the, 273.
War of 1914, effect of, upon America, 1-15; lessons derived by America
from, 57-58; the part that America might play at close of, 290-294.
Wealth, equal distribution of, an antidote to imperialism, 186-188.
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, "History of Trade Unionism," quoted, 145 n.
West Indies, working of modern imperialistic methods in, 85-87.
Wilcox, E. V., "Tropical Agriculture," quoted, 91-92.
Willcox, W. F., birth and death rate statistics by, 183 n.
Willford, Isbell, "Wealth and Income of People of United States,"
quoted, 177 n.
Willis, J. C., arguments by, for tropical imperialism, 86 n.
Wilson, C. Usher, article on "The Native Question and Irrigation in
South Africa," quoted, 95 n.
Printed in the United States of America.
Italy, France and Britain at War
BY H. G. WELLS
Author of "Mr. Britling Sees it Through," "What is Coming," etc.
Here Mr. Wells discusses with an incisiveness and penetrativeness all
his own, conditions as he has seen them in three of the great countries
engaged in the European War. The book is divided into four main
sections: I. The Passing of the Effigy, in which are reviewed certain
changing sentiments as regards war; II. The War in Italy, taking up The
Isonzo Front, The Mountain War and Behind the Front; III. The Western
War, and IV. How People Think about the War, in which are found such
topics as Do They Really Think at All, The Yielding Pacifist, The
Religious Revival and The Social Changes in Progress.
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York
_BY THE SAME AUTHOR_
The New Democracy
An Essay on Certain Political and Economic Tendencies in the United
States
BY WALTER E. WEYL, PH.D.
A chief issue in the Presidential Campaign is "Socialized Democracy."
Dr. Weyl's new work gives a clear summary of its causes and aims.
_Crown 8vo, blue cloth, gilt top, $2.00_
_Standard Library edition .50_
SOME PRESS COMMENTS
"A masterly, scathing, and absolutely fearless arraignment of things
that ought not to be in a republic, and of tendencies that no democracy
ought to tolerate."--_Boston Herald_.
"A thoughtful volume ... a big synthesis of the whole social problem in
this country. A keen survey."--_Chicago Evening Post_.
"A searching and suggestive study of American life.... A book to make
people think.... Notable for its scholarship and brilliant in
execution, it is not merely for the theorist, but for the
citizen."--_Newark Evening News_.
"Dr. Weyl's book is a strong analysis of the whole subject. It will be
read widely and will exercise a large influence."--_The Evening Mail_.
"Dr. Weyl has read the modern writing on the wall and interprets it to
us more clearly than has yet been done."--_New York Globe_.
"A masterly interpretation of the industrial, political, social, and
moral revolution that is going on in this country."--_Albany Argus_.
"A complete and circumstantial statement of the whole case ... our
social and economic unrest is not to lead to a war of classes, but to a
'National Readjustment.'"--_New York Tribune_.
"The best and most comprehensive survey of the general social and
political status and prospects that has been published of late
years."--_The Pittsburg Post_.
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York
_OUR NATIONAL PROBLEMS_
_DECORATED BOARDS -------- EACH FIFTY CENTS_
THE PENTECOST OF CALAMITY
BY OWEN WISTER
"One of the most striking and moving utterances.... Let all Americans
read it."--_The Congregationalist_.
"It is written with sustained charm and freshness of insight."--_N. Y.
Times_.
THEIR TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE
BY GUSTAVUS OHLINGER
"Hundreds of thousands of this book should be distributed as tracts for
all honest, loyal, decent American citizens to read and digest."--_N.
Y. Sun_.
THE FORKS OF THE ROAD
BY WASHINGTON GLADDEN
(This book won the first prize offered by the Church Peace Union for
the best essay on war and peace.)
"Small as the book is, it is full of 'meat for strong men,' and its
closely reasoned argument is likely to set many people thinking along
unaccustomed lines."--_N. Y. Times_.
THE HERITAGE OF TYRE
BY WILLIAM BROWN MELONEY
"In terse, striking, forceful language the author of this most valuable
little volume shows us the greatest weakness America has, and the most
ominous danger such weakness involves."--_Boston Transcript_.
STRAIGHT AMERICA
BY FRANCES A. KELLOR
"Practical, candid, and most earnest. It gets down to the first
principles of American needs and discusses them with honesty, ability,
and a straight-from-the-shoulder forcefulness that ought to prove
inspiring and infectious."--_New York Times_.
AMERICANIZATION
BY ROYAL DIXON
"No better beginning with the immigrant can be made than to teach him
along the lines laid down in Mr. Dixon's sincere and ardent little
manual of decency in democracy."--_New York Sun_.
WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH MEXICO
BY CASPAR WHITNEY
"A vital question answered intelligently, fully and without
hesitation.... Should be read by every one whose sense of fair play
has not been warped by a baneful sophistry."--_Philadelphia Public
Ledger_.
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York
Brazil: Today and Tomorrow
BY LILLIAN ELWYN ELLIOTT, F. R. G. S.
Literary Editor of the Pan-American Magazine, New York.
This volume seeks to show how and to what extent Brazil "has been
opened up" and developed, and by whom, and to outline some of the work
that remains to be done. Miss Elliott first of all discusses present
social conditions in Brazil, explaining who the Brazilian is, what
political and social events have moulded him and what he has done to
develop his territory; a territory 300,000 square miles larger than
that of the United States. Later sections deal with finance, the
monetary conditions of the country, the problem of exchange, and the
source of income. Still others take up various means of transit, the
railroads, the coast-wise and the ocean service, rivers and roads.
Industries are treated in considerable detail--cattle, cotton raising,
weaving, coffee growing and the rubber trade. An unusual feature comes
under the heading of "The World's Horticultural and Medicinal Debt to
Brazil" in which the reader is made to realize something of the immense
forestal treasure house comprised in the huge, wild, half explored
regions of north Brazil.
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York
End of Project Gutenberg's American World Policies, by Walter E. Weyl