THE HIGHER IMPERIALISM
One of the greatest difficulties in the problem of working out an
international colonial policy is our neglect of the immediate and
overwhelming influence of colonies, as of other economic outlets, in
the provocation of destructive wars. Until the nations recognize that
wars are in the main wars of interest, fought for concrete things, and
unless such things can be utilised with some regard to the desires of
all nations involved, war cannot be avoided.
If these questions of interest were merely a matter of short division,
of so much trade to be distributed, the problem, though difficult,
would be easier of solution. But in many cases a single, indivisible
prize must be awarded. There is only one Antwerp, one Trieste, one
Constantinople, and there are many claimants. Is Russia to control the
Yellow Sea or is Japan? Is the Persian Gulf to be British, Russian or
German? Is the present division of colonial possessions to be
maintained or is there to be a new distribution, from which some
nations will gain and others lose? What is to decide what colonies
shall belong to what nation or what share each nation shall have in the
profits of exploitations? These and a hundred other questions indicate
the wide range of complicated economic interests which to-day divide
nations and illustrate the difficulty of establishing a basis of
agreement.
Clearly we cannot solve the problem by permanently {259} maintaining
the _status quo_. For the _status quo_, being based upon the relative
power of nations in the past, does not conform to the power of the same
nations to-day or to-morrow. Moreover, the maintenance of the _status
quo_ means the perpetuation of absurd anachronisms. It is undesirable
as well as impossible. Nations are not static. You can no more assure
exclusive economic advantages to a weak and unprogressive nation than
you could have preserved the American continent to the aborigines.
Even if there were no single economic principle to apply, it would not
follow that some approach to an economic equilibrium would be
impossible. As law develops out of an endless chaos of human relations
by means of decisions (based on temporary exigencies) until a rule of
law is established, as the market-price grows out of the innumerable
hagglings of the market, so even without the aid of a fundamental
principle, some _modus vivendi_, some approach to an economic concert,
could be attained. Economically considered, war is an attempt to solve
the problem of the utilisation of the world's resources. If the
world's wealth and income can be so distributed among the world's
inhabitants, grouped into nations, as to render those nations, not
indeed satisfied, but sufficiently satisfied not to go to war, a basis
for peace results, even though the arrangement is not ideal. If,
however, the distribution is obviously at variance with the relative
power and needs of the nations, then one nation or group seeks to
overturn the arrangement by force.
To secure such a distribution requires the establishment of certain
canons of international policy and modes of international procedure.
The decision must in some degree conform to the median expectations of
the powers. Back of any particular economic arrangement also, there
{260} must be the force of tradition, a sense of security, a sense of
justice. The redistribution must be such that the resulting motive to
war will be weaker than the motive to peace.
But before we can even approach such a plan to prevent war by reducing
the economic incentive, we must frankly recognise that in certain
circumstances a nation may have a direct economic interest in war. To
deny such an interest is not only fallacious but even dangerous. For
if we believe that nations have no economic motive to war, when in
truth they have, we are likely to neglect to do things necessary to
reverse such motives. Our international task is to make arrangements
which will cause nations to lose their interest in war. It is not that
of trying to persuade nations that they have no such interest.
There is much ambiguity and incoherence in most discussions concerning
the economic advantages of war. On the whole, while the world does not
usually gain by war, but loses through the destruction of capital and
through industrial deterioration, an individual nation may clearly
gain. England gained from the Seven Years' War, the United States from
the war with Mexico, Germany from the war of 1870, Japan from its war
with China. By war nations may secure markets, access to raw
materials, better opportunities for investment and a firm basis for
industrial progress; they may cripple troublesome competitors; they may
exact indemnities. Much that is accounted gain on this score may in
the end prove to be loss, but it is false to state that there can be no
profit at all.
The discussion whether or not a war is profitable often takes the
superficial form of a comparison between the indemnity received and the
money expended on the war. It is pointed out, for example, that in
1895 Japan received a larger sum from China than {261} had been spent
on the war, while on the other hand it is emphasised that thereafter
the military expenditures of Japan increased so rapidly that much more
than this profit was spent. But the indemnity was the smallest part of
Japan's gain and the military expenditures were made necessary, not by
the Chinese War nor by the payment of the indemnity but by a concrete
military policy, which was largely based on concrete economic needs.
Either an expansion into Asia was necessary and in the end possible for
Japan or it was not; if it was, the expenditure of a few hundred
million dollars on the wars against China, Russia and Germany were a
paying investment, irrespective of indemnities; if it was not the wars
would have been a bad investment even had they shown a clear balance on
the books.
The problem is not whether every war is advantageous to the victor but
whether any war is of benefit. It is highly improbable that the war of
1914 will in the end pay most if any of the combatants, but if Germany
by a victory as easy as that of 1870 could have secured from France an
indemnity of four or five billion dollars and the cession of Northern
Africa, it would surely have paid. A war between Germany and Holland,
if the other powers held off, would be equally profitable to the
stronger power. If a coalition of nations could defeat and blockade
Great Britain, they could easily recoup themselves for any expenditures
involved. It is true that they could not physically remove British
railways and mines, but they could confiscate the navy, the merchant
marine, a part of the foreign and colonial investments and a certain
part of the profits of business within the kingdom. To assert that a
nation can never gain at war is merely to state that nations never have
conflicting interests, whereas in truth some nations are cramped
economically by other nations, {262} and a large part of the wealth and
income of most nations can be diverted by means of physical compulsion.
The problem of internationalism is therefore not solely to teach the
nation its own interest but so to change the conditions that the
nation's interest in war will disappear. The temptation to war can be
overcome only by reversing the motives of the nation, either by making
war no longer profitable, or by making the nation harmless. Within the
nation the same problem exists with regard to classes. Either the
bellicose class must be satisfied in some other way, must have its
energies directed to some other task, or it must be made impotent.
The first problem, that of destroying the economic root of war, can be
solved only by securing a community of interest among great nations, an
economic internationalism. Not, of course, a complete community; there
is perhaps no such thing in the world. The inter-class relations
within a nation illustrate this point. These social classes,
wage-earners and capitalists, industrialists and agriculturalists, are
separated by many differences and have no complete community of
interest, yet are sufficiently united to prevent a complete dissolution
of the state. So, internationally, a community of interest may be
partial and tentative if it suffices to give the countries enough, or
the promise of enough, to discourage them from easily resorting to the
costly and dangerous expedient of war.
In securing this concert, we must work upon the general principle that
wherever possible, a joint use of a given resource by various nations
is better than an exclusive use by any one nation. The progress of
society within the last few centuries has been toward an extension of
this principle of joint use. More and more things are held by society
for the benefit of the nation. {263} Similarly an increasing number of
the things for which nations compete might be held by the nations of
the world for the joint use of humanity. While such a joint use is not
always possible, especially when it runs counter to long usage, an
immense opportunity for such joint use remains.
This principle of joint use might advantageously be applied to the
development of backward countries. Nothing has been more difficult
than the distribution among industrial nations of the advantages
accruing from colonial exploitation. There are three methods by which
nations, if they can agree at all, may seek to adjust their rival
claims. The first is to do nothing nationally; to permit the backward
countries to be exploited at will by individual competitors. The
second is to divide the new territories among the rival powers. The
third is to secure a joint development by all the great powers.
The first method usually means both a ruthless exploitation of natives
and a constant conflict among the interested nations. The nationals of
one country conspire against those of another for a control of the
native government. If, for example, we were to leave the Philippines
entirely alone, various enterprising capitalists would immediately
organise and support corrupt native governments, lend money at usurious
rates and secure exclusive concessions. To upset these arrangements,
financiers of a rival nation would foment revolutions, and the country
would be split up into political factions, supported by money from
various European capitals. The political leaders though talking
grandiloquently of independence and native sovereignty, would be, and
perhaps would know that they were, merely pawns in a financial chess
game.
The second method, now more or less usual, of {264} establishing
national spheres of influence, also leads to friction and the threat of
force. The crucial difficulty of this plan lies in the fact that great
nations which have come late into the colonial competition are left
without a sufficient agricultural base for their industry and live in
fear of having the colonies of rival powers shut against them. The
whole plan is based upon the assumed right of each nation to monopolise
the resources of colonies, in other words, to use exclusively what
might be used jointly. As a result of this method the temptation to go
to war over colonies is immensely great. If by a single war, Germany
could secure enough colonial territory from France to maintain her
industry for three or four generations, it might well be worth her
while to fight. It is the lives of one or of two million men to-day
against tens of millions of lives a generation hence. A nation which
would not fight for a somewhat larger share in the exploitation of a
given colony would be tempted to fight for a sole and monopolistic
possession.
The third plan of distribution is what may be called the
internationalisation of colonies. It is a step in the direction of an
international imperialism, as opposed to the nationalistic imperialism
of to-day. There have been numerous proposals to secure a machinery
for such internationalism in colonies. Especially during the last
decade or two many men in Europe and America have come to the
conclusion that the danger of the present international scramble for
colonies is so great that any change, even though not in itself
unassailable, is better than the present anarchy. Even among
Socialists the belief is now expressed that the colonial problem is to
be solved, not by leaving it alone, but by a concerted action of the
Great Powers, which will give each nation the assurance of a {265}
certain stake in colonial development, and will lessen the temptation
to wage imperialistic wars.
Of the various recent plans two concrete proposals are worth citing.
Thus Mr. Walter Lippmann[1] suggests a permanent international
conference of the great powers which would act as a senate to the
native legislative body of the backward country, let us say Morocco,
and would in time supervise the budget, fix salaries and make
appointments. It is hoped by Mr. Lippmann, though not confidently
predicted, that such a body would guarantee the open door and give
equal opportunities to the investors of all nations in the particular
colony. A broader plan, proposed by Mr. H. W. Brailsford[2] involves
the union into a permanent international syndicate of all companies and
individuals seeking railroad, mining and other concessions in a
backward country.
Fundamentally the plan of Mr. Brailsford is based on the open door for
colonial trade and the equal (and automatic) participation of the great
nations in colonial investment. "The remedy," he says, "is so simple
that only a very clever man could sophisticate himself into missing it,
and it is as old as Cobden. It is not necessary to establish universal
free trade to stop the rivalry to monopolise colonial markets; it would
suffice to declare free trade in the colonies, or even in those which
are not self-governing." "It ought not to be utterly beyond the
statesmanship of Europe to decree some limited form of colonial free
trade by general agreement--to apply it, for example, to Africa." "For
the plague of concession-hunting the best expedient would probably be
to impose on all the competing national groups in each area the duty of
{266} amalgamating in a permanently international syndicate. If one
such syndicate controlled all the railways and another all the mines of
China and Turkey, a vast cause of national rivalry would be removed.
The interests of China and Turkey might be secured by interposing a
disinterested council or arbitrator between them and the syndicate to
adjust their respective interests. Short of creating a world State or
a European federation, the chief constructive work for peace is to
establish colonial free trade and internationalise the export of
capital."[3]
Both the plans mentioned are limited in scope and difficult of
application, but each contains the germ of a possible development.
That of Mr. Brailsford seems on the whole the more promising. It is
likely that a senate such as is proposed by Mr. Lippmann would go to
pieces over the question whether a certain valuable and exclusive
concession should go to a French or to a German syndicate or whether a
punitive expedition should or should not be sent against the tribes in
the interior. On the other hand the plan of Mr. Brailsford, which by
no means excludes the other, has the advantage of making once and for
all a fixed and certain distribution of all eventual profits and thus
effecting a real community of interest among the promoters and
investors of all nations. It is an economic rather than a political
solution, and it is along the line of a present trend, the evolution of
international investment and of economic internationalism generally.
It would seem easier for the capitalists of six great nations to form a
great international trust for specific purposes than for an
international senate to make a multitude of decisions each affecting
strong national interests.
A difficulty, inhering in all plans, is that there is no rule of law or
morals that will decide how much each {267} nation should secure from
the profits of exploitation. To what extent shall American, Dutch,
Belgian, Austrian or Japanese capitalists contribute to the
international syndicate which is to exploit the backward countries?
But this problem, though difficult, is less hopeless than that of
equitably distributing colonies _en bloc_. For there is no principle
on which to divide such colonies. Neither national wealth nor
population nor the strength of the national army and navy will serve as
a criterion, though all perhaps would be factors in determining the
shares of the different countries. A still greater difficulty however
arises from the fact that the most valuable colonies are already
distributed. Even if Germany were to receive a share in Moroccan
opportunities, might she not still seek by war to obtain the exclusive
possession of the immense French colonial empire. Perhaps no
arrangement for a joint exploitation of new and presumably less
valuable colonies would wholly satisfy the imperialists of great
European powers, so long as the old colonies are so unevenly divided.
To satisfy the nations without colonies, some arrangements must also be
made for a redistribution of rights in colonies already belonging to
the great powers.
But against such redistribution immense forces are opposed. Algeria is
now safely French; India has been British for more than a century and a
half. Whatever rights are conceded in these countries to foreign
investors, whatever division of profits is granted, will be effected
only under the political control of the French and British governments.
The best concessions have long since been given out, and the nation
which has had political control has in the main favoured its own
nationals.
The essential problem here, however, is the open door. If the nations
without colonies or sufficient agricultural resources at home can sell
their products and buy their {268} raw materials on the same terms as
do the nations owning colonies, a large part of the present bitterness
and discontent would disappear. There are of course two difficulties
in the way of the establishment of such an open door. The first is
that commerce may be legally free and yet be hampered by a mass of
local, illegal discriminations, and the second is that the trend at the
present time is opposed to such equality in colonial commerce. The
first difficulty is not unsolvable; the second constitutes an obstacle,
which will only be removed when the forces making for an
internationalisation of colonies become stronger than they are to-day.
Even a settlement of the colonial problem would not solve all the
economic questions dividing the nations; equally perplexing
difficulties are found nearer home. A generation or two from now
Germany might be completely ruined by a refusal on France's part to
grant her access to the iron mines of Lorraine. At any moment Russia
may prohibit the temporary emigration of agricultural laborers upon
whom the prosperity of the East Prussian agriculture largely depends.
Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland and other countries can be ruined
by adverse tariff legislation. In very few countries is there such a
balanced economic structure, such a complete control over the
essentials of industry as to render an economic assault by other
nations innocuous.
It is not essential, however, in working out an economic concert that
all the problems that separate the nations be completely and finally
settled. Given a satisfactory solution of the chief difficulties, some
way will be sought to prevent secondary problems from leading nations
to war. A single instance of a joint successful enterprise of the
powers in a single economic field would act as a powerful inducement to
attempt joint action in other {269} cases. It is not to be assumed
that all the questions dividing Europe are to be solved in a day or by
a single decision. What is required is not one plan which will
safeguard all the nations all the time but an inclination or desire to
afford a measure of economic security to all and a gradual working out
of a machinery, which will effect a settlement here and a settlement
there and will in the end develop certain general lines of policy. It
is not for a single economic setback that nations go to war, nor even
because of a slower development than that of rivals; the chief animus
is an ever present fear of industrial _debacle_. Economic insecurity,
even more than present economic distress, forces nations to resort to
arms. The way out is towards some form of internationalisation of the
great external opportunities upon which the home industry of the nation
depends.
Is such a development probable? Will the nations in this generation or
in five generations agree to make sacrifices to permit their rivals to
live? It is a question not lightly to be answered. We cannot be
dogmatic concerning the future development of industry and of
international relations when we cannot see clearly a dozen years ahead.
Yet the very intensity, the almost pathological intensity, of the
nationalistic economic struggle to-day is an indication that it may be
approaching a change. In the midst of this struggle, there appears
below the surface the signs of a growing economic internationalism.
[1] "The Stakes of Diplomacy," New York, 1916, pp. 132-135.
[2] The _New Republic_, May 8, 1915.
[3] The _New Republic_, May 8th, 1915.
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