PREPARATION IN PEACE FOR WAR
The greater the experience gained of the application of rail-power
in practice, and the closer the study devoted to its possibilities,
in theory, the more obvious it became that the fullest degree of
advantage to be derived therefrom could only be assured as the result
of preparation and organisation in peace; and this conclusion appeared
specially to apply to countries whose geographical and political
conditions led them to regard it as expedient that they should always
be ready to meet some great national emergency. The Federal Government
of the United States certainly did succeed, in the early sixties,
in creating an excellent military rail-transport organisation after
hostilities had broken out; but the conditions of warfare to-day make
it essentially necessary that arrangements for the use of railways for
military purposes should, as far as possible, be planned, perfected or
provided for long in advance of any possible outbreak of hostilities.
Among other considerations which strengthen this view are the
following:--
I. The increasing dependence of armies on rail transport owing to
(_a_) the vastly greater number of troops employed now than in former
days; (_b_) the supreme importance of time as a factor in enabling
a Commander-in-Chief to effect, possibly, an earlier concentration
than the enemy, and so obtain the power of initiative; and (_c_) the
magnitude of the supplies, munitions and other necessaries wanted to
meet the daily wants of the prodigious forces in the field, and only
to be assured by the employment of rail transport from a more or less
distant base.
II. The complications, confusion and possible chaos which may result
if, without prior preparation, railway lines designed to serve ordinary
transport purposes are suddenly required to meet military demands taxing
their resources to the utmost extreme.
III. The further troubles that will assuredly arise if, in the
absence of efficient control by properly-constituted and responsible
intermediaries, railwaymen unfamiliar with military technicalities
are left to deal with the possibly conflicting and impracticable
orders of individual military officers themselves unfamiliar with the
technicalities and limitations of railway working.
IV. The imperative necessity of having an organised and well-regulated
system of forwarding military supplies, etc., in order both to avoid
congestion of stations and lines and to ensure the punctual arrival of
those supplies in the right quantities, at the right spot, and at the
right time.
V. The need, in view of the vital importance of the part that railways
may play in war, of having organised forces of railway troops and
railway workers available, together with stores of materials and
appliances, to carry out, speedily and thoroughly, all the work that
may be necessary for the repair, construction or destruction of railway
lines.
In making the necessary preparations, in time of peace, to ensure the
successful realisation of these and other purposes, there is a vast
amount of work that requires to be done.
In readiness for the excessive strain that will be thrown on the
railways as soon as they pass from a peace footing to a war footing, on
the order being given for mobilisation, the military authorities and
the railway authorities must needs have at their command the fullest
information as to the physical conditions, the resources and the
transport capabilities of every line of railway in the country which,
directly or indirectly, may be able to render useful service. Details as
to double or single track; gradients; number of locomotives, carriages,
wagons, horse-boxes and other vehicles available; and facilities
afforded by stations in important centres as regards number and length
of platforms and sidings, water supply, loading, unloading or storage
accommodation, etc., are all carefully compiled and kept up to date.
As regards rolling stock, lines not likely to be called upon to carry
any military transports at all may still be able to contribute to the
supply of carriages and wagons wanted to meet the heavy demands on other
railways. By including all lines of railway in the collected data, it
will be known exactly where additional rolling stock may be obtained
if wanted. The carrying capacity of the different types of carriages,
trucks, etc., is also noted. If necessary, arrangements will be made for
the reduction of gradients, the improvement of curves, the construction
of connecting links between different main lines, the lengthening of
station platforms, or the provision of increased loading or unloading
facilities.
On the basis of the information collected elaborate calculations are
made in regard to such matters as (1) the number of vehicles required
for a given number of men, with horses, guns, munitions, stores, road
vehicles, etc., so that rolling stock can be used to the best advantage
and according as to whether the troops carried belong to the Infantry,
Cavalry or the Artillery; (2) the number of vehicles that can be made
up into a train going by any one route; (3) the length of time likely
to be taken for the entraining and detraining respectively of a given
unit; (4) the time intervals at which a succession of troop trains can
follow one another on the same line; (5) the speed of troop trains; and
(6) the further intervals to be allowed in the arrival at one and the
same station, or centre, of a number of trains starting from different
points, so as to avoid the risk of congestion and of consequent delays.
Military time-tables, corresponding to those in everyday use, have
next to be prepared, showing exactly what trains must run from given
stations, at fixed hours, by clearly defined routes, to specified
destinations as soon as the occasion arises. The great aim kept in view
in the compilation of these time-tables is, not alone preparation in
advance, but the most complete utilisation possible of the available
transport facilities of the country as a whole.
A selection must also be made in advance of the stations at which troops
on long journeys can obtain food, as well as of the stations to be used
as depôts for stores and supplies, all the necessary arrangements being
provided for.
After the initial great strain on the railway resources involved in
mobilisation and concentration, there will still be an enormous amount
of transport to be done during the campaign. In the one direction there
will be a constant despatch of reinforcements, provisions, clothing,
munitions and supplies or stores to the front; in the other direction
there will be a steady flow of sick and wounded, of prisoners of war,
and of materiel not wanted at the front, followed by the final return
home of the troops at the end of the campaign.
At each important point along the lines of communication where special
services in connection with the rail transport, in either direction, are
to be rendered, there must be organisation of such kind as will ensure
that whatever is necessary shall be done promptly and efficiently under
the control of persons of recognised authority and responsibility, and
without any of the friction that would, inevitably, lead to delays,
traffic blocks and other complications.
Nor can the same system of organisation apply to the whole line of
communication, from the base to the limit of the rail service at the
front. A point will be reached therein where the control, if not the
actual operation, of the railway lines must needs be transferred from
the civil to the military authorities, rendering necessary a scheme of
supervision and working different from that which can be followed on the
sections not within the actual theatre of war.
Then, if the army should be compelled to retreat before the enemy,
there should be available a sufficiency of forces skilled in the art of
rapidly and effectively destroying lines, bridges, viaducts, tunnels, or
other railway property, with a view to retarding the enemy's movements
until, it may be, reinforcements can be brought up in sufficient number
to check his further progress. If, alternatively, the army should
advance into the enemy's country, there must again be a provision of
Railway Troops fully qualified by previous training and experience both
to repair quickly the demolitions or the damage which the enemy will
have carried out on his own lines and to construct hastily such new
lines--light railways or otherwise--as the circumstances of the moment
require. These things done, and still further advance being made into
the invaded territory, the need will also arise for a staff capable of
operating, under war conditions, the lines of which possession has been
taken, in order that communications with the advanced front and the
forwarding of reinforcements and supplies can still be maintained.
All these and many other things, besides, must needs be thought out and
prepared for in time of peace, long in advance of any probable or even
any possible war. They are, in fact, made the subject of exhaustive and
continuous study alike by military officers specially entrusted with
the task and by railway managers commanding all the technical knowledge
requisite for making arrangements calculated to ensure the prompt and
efficient satisfaction of all such demands for military rail-transport
as may, with whatever urgency, and under whatever conditions, some day
be put forward.
Still more practical do the preparations in peace for war become when
they include the construction of a network of strategical railways
expressly designed to facilitate the mobilisation of troops, their
speedy concentration on the frontier, or their movement from one point
of attack to another at the theatre of war.