RADICAL MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
The “carnival of crime and corruption” described in the preceding
chapter was not confined to the Legislature. Similar scenes were
enacted in almost every county and city in the State. As the suffrage
limitations placed upon the ex-Confederates applied to all elections,
the Radicals were in complete control of these local governments. The
large municipalities, such as Memphis, Nashville, Chattanooga, and
Knoxville were the greatest sufferers from the rule of irresponsible
and corrupt officials.
In 1867, a carpetbagger, by the name of Alden, had succeeded in being
elected Mayor of Nashville. Having filled the city council with his
political followers, most of whom were non-property-holders, he
entered upon a course of open and systematic public plunder, which
made even the State administration stand aghast. The city treasury was
soon drained. The tax rate was enormously increased; but as this did
not suffice, checks, warrants, and due bills, made out in the name of
the city, and payable to bearer, were sold to street shavers of notes
at any price they could bring. Bonds were also issued. As these
evidences of indebtedness multiplied, the market quotations for them
declined.
In the face of this wholesale corruption, Alden and his associates
were re-elected. It now became evident that, unless some heroic
measure was resorted to, the entire property of the city would be
confiscated by their rapacity. A tax-payers association was formed,
which began a campaign of public agitation. Public meetings were held
in various parts of the city, and resolutions were adopted denouncing
the “Alden ring” in the most scathing terms.
It was finally decided to seek relief through the courts. All the
judges throughout the State were Radical, but in striking contrast
with all the other officials of the Radical régime, they were men of
unquestioned integrity, and, for the most part, lawyers of high
standing. They had displayed great independence in interpreting the
franchise laws, and in curtailing, as far as possible, the excessive
use of the military power. Mr. Thornburg, the defeated candidate for
mayor, filed a bill in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, in which
he alleged that the city administration was inefficient, that its
members were guilty of fraud and corruption, and that of right their
offices were vacant because they were not owners of real estate, as
required by law. He therefore prayed that the city officials be
enjoined from the further issuance of checks and notes, and that they
be declared usurpers and turned out of office, and that a receiver be
appointed to take charge of the affairs of the corporation. Pending
the coming in of the answer of the defendants, and the final decision
of the case, Chancellor Shackelford granted a temporary injunction
restraining the mayor and the city council from receiving any salary
or perquisites of office. On December 7th, final decision was
rendered, the Chancellor using the following language: “I am of the
opinion that the complainants are not entitled to the injunction or
the receiver prayed for, and the application is therefore refused.”
In May, 1869, Col. A. S. Colyar, editor of the _Union and American_,
and one of the most distinguished lawyers in the South, made a
thorough examination of the city’s books and records. At a
mass-meeting of the citizens, he made the most startling disclosure in
regard to the extravagance and corruption uncovered by that
investigation. He declared that the city was in the hands of thieves,
and expressed the opinion that there was not a judge on the bench of
Tennessee who would refuse to grant relief. On June 1st, he filed a
bill at Gallatin, Tenn., before Charles Smith, Chancellor of the
Seventh Chancery Division.
The bill was brought “in the name of the State in the relation of 466
citizens in behalf of themselves and others against the mayor, and the
city council, the city treasurer, revenue collector, and others.” It
prayed “that further speculation in checks be enjoined; that no more
checks be issued and no more received until, on the one hand, the
right of the city to issue them should be accurately defined, and
until, on the other, the validity of outstanding checks should be
determined; that the corporation officers who were defendants in the
case, be compelled to account for money made by speculation in the
means and credit of the city; and lastly, that a receiver of known
financial ability, with good credit and good reputation, be appointed
with full power to control the finances of the city and make contracts
so as to save the city from ruin.”
The terrible condition of the city was set forth at length in the
bill. It was alleged, among other things, that $1,323,668 in checks
had been issued, $759,000 of which were without authority of law,
while much of the remainder was for illegal purposes. The most
exorbitant rates of interest were paid, in some cases as much as 100%.
Failing to meet its maturing obligations, the creditors of the city
were resorting to the courts, and the city’s property was being sold
to satisfy them.
After an elaborate argument of the case, in which the defendants were
represented by eminent lawyers, Chancellor Smith granted the prayer of
the petitioners. Mr. John M. Bass was appointed receiver. After
furnishing a bond of $500,000, he entered upon the receivership, June
28th. On the following month, a motion was made by the deposed
officials, in the Nashville Chancery Division, to have the
receivership dissolved. The motion came up for hearing before Judge
Edwin H. East, the successor of Chancellor Shackelford. Judge East had
been the private secretary of President Johnson, and had taken a
leading part in the reorganization of the State.
In arguing against the motion to dissolve, Col. Colyar took the ground
that a municipal corporation was not a political body, but simply a
business corporation whose officers were amenable to the courts for
the proper discharge of their functions. Judge East concurred in this
view, and upheld the receivership. In his opinion, he used the
following language: “The functions of a municipality are twofold:
first, political, discretionary, legislative; secondly, ministerial.
While acting within the sphere of the former, they are exempt from
liability inasmuch as the corporation is a part of the government, to
that extent, and its officers are to the same extent public officers,
and as such entitled to the protection of this principle; but within
the sphere of the latter (ministerial duties), they drop the badge of
governmental officers, and become, as it were, the representatives of
a private corporation in the exercise of private functions. The
distinction between these legislative powers which it holds for public
purposes as a part of the government of the country, and those public
franchises which belong to it as creation of law, is well taken.”
The receivership was of short duration. In August the regular city
election occurred. Mr. Morris, a wealthy citizen, was elected mayor.
Immediately after the election, the affairs of the city were again
placed in the hands of its ordinary officials.
Several years after the occurrence of these extraordinary proceedings,
Col. Colyar, in a speech delivered at Buffalo, N. Y., explained the
legal theory on which he placed the application for the receivership.
“I took the ground,” he said, “that, while in England, cities were in
a sense political, because in the creation of the House of Commons,
the cities and boroughs had in part organized it, in the time of
Edward I., and to this day, as cities and boroughs, they elect members
to the House of Commons; but that in this country, our cities have no
such political status, and that in nowise are they separate from the
balance of the community in politics, and therefore our cities are not
political bodies, and that the delegation of a part of a State’s
sovereignty is a fiction, and the management of a city is a mere
trust.”