RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEPARATION
Just as radical differences of opinion have existed as to the parties
responsible for the whole secession movement, so the action of
Tennessee has been variously interpreted. A number of writers have
contended that the majority of her citizens were never in favor of
secession, and it was only a _coup d’état_ of Governor Harris that
carried the State into the Confederacy. This view is a survival of the
opinion once so widely prevalent in the North that the Civil War was
the result of a conspiracy of a few ambitious Southern politicians,
who tricked the mass of the Southern people into a war which never had
their genuine approval.
It must be confessed that at first view the mode of Tennessee’s
withdrawal gives some countenance to this theory. In February, 1861,
she had placed her disapproval upon secession by voting down a
proposition to call a convention. Instead of yielding to this mandate
of the people, Governor Harris and the Legislature had entered into a
military league with the Confederate authorities, and having thus
surrendered the real control of the State, they again went through the
form of appealing to a plebiscite for approval of their action.
Nevertheless, we are confident that an unprejudiced examination of
these events will show that Tennessee, with the exception of the
eastern part of the State, joined the Confederacy as willingly as
South Carolina or Mississippi.
In the first place, these writers have made the mistake of classing
Tennessee among the border States. Mr. Wilson in his _History of the
Slave Power_ says: “Exactly why Tennessee should have been taken out
of the Union, while Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri were prevented
from going, no man is wise enough to say. At least, none but general
reasons can be given. Exactly why the conspirators were foiled in one
case and not in the other, exactly by whom the current of treason was
checked and turned in the one and not in the other, the wisest can
only conjecture.”
The answer to the problem which Mr. Wilson found so difficult to solve
lies in the fact that conditions in Tennessee were in no wise similar
to those in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. These border States were
not distinctly slave States. In all of them the institution of slavery
existed, but their industrial system was not based upon it. This arose
largely from the fact that cotton was not their chief staple.
Tennessee, on the other hand, was a great cotton-producing State.
According to the census of 1860, her annual product was 296,465 bales
of 400 lbs. each. Her interest was therefore identical with the
extreme Southern States. If there were to be two republics side by
side, one free and the other slave, both sentiment and interest
apparently demanded that Tennessee should cast her lot with the
latter.
When the vote of February was taken she was confronted by no such
dilemma. At that time, the Confederacy had not yet been organized, and
it was by no means clear that war would occur. In June, conditions had
entirely changed. The Confederacy was an established fact, and actual
hostilities had commenced. Neither side would permit Tennessee to
occupy a neutral position. She must fight either for or against the
South.
This change in the issues is clearly shown in the two messages of
Governor Harris. In his message of January 7th, he had sought to
establish the right of secession, and justify its present or immediate
assertion. But these principles had found no support in the Whig
party. Their opposition defeated the proposal for a convention. The
keynote to his second message is found in the following passage:
“Whatever differences may have heretofore existed amongst us growing
out of party divisions, as to the constitutional right of secession as
a remedy against usurpations, all admit the moral right asserted by
our fathers to resist wrong and to maintain their liberties by
whatever means necessary.” This was a direct appeal to the right of
revolution, and it found as ready a response among the Whigs as the
Democrats. It was therefore this change in the issue, and not coercive
means adopted by Governor Harris, that turned the tide toward
disunion.
The recognized leader of the Whig party was John Bell. Throughout his
long career in the service of the national government, he had
consistently opposed the doctrine of secession. In the presidential
election of 1860, he, even more than Mr. Lincoln, was the Union
candidate. When the question of holding a convention was submitted to
a vote of the people, he vigorously opposed it. In this opposition he
was joined by Neil S. Brown, Cave Johnson, Ewing, and other
distinguished Whig politicians. It was due to their efforts that the
Convention proposal was defeated. The vote against the Convention was
91,803. This represented the entire Whig party, and the Democrats of
East Tennessee. The votes cast for the Convention came almost wholly
from the Democrats of Middle and West Tennessee. In short, the
election of February was a division along party lines. Its result was
simply an indication that the Whig party of Tennessee was still
opposed to the doctrine of secession.
In June, party lines had been obliterated. For only a few weeks
elapsed after the defeat of the Convention, till a majority of the
Whig leaders, either in public addresses or through the public press,
counselled withdrawal from the Union. The contest now became
sectional; it was East Tennessee against Middle Tennessee and West
Tennessee. Governor Harris, in his negotiations with the Confederate
authorities, was counselled and supported by both Whigs and Democrats.
Although the unfavorable verdict of the people upon secession had not
been formally reversed, he was conscious that a real change had taken
place in their sentiments, and that he was, in fact, executing their
will by concluding a military league with the Confederacy.