Venetians, though so prodigal of offers of assistance, declined to come
forward until he had an army at his back. The Milanese refused to
recognize him. Worst of all, the French appeared to have forgotten him.
It seemed best to return to France and collect his forces. So on Aug.
10th, after a stay of nine months in Asti, Charles of Orleans with all
his household went home again across the mountains. The Duke took back
with him his friend Antonio Astesano, and ever afterwards he retained a
strong affection for the country of his mother. The visit of Charles of
Orleans to Asti was important as an introduction of Italian fashions,
Italian architecture, Italian arms, jewels,[73] and vestments into
France. It caused a pure whiff of Italy to breathe across the Gothic
style of Charles VII. But it made little or no effect on the furthering
of the French claim to Milan.
Footnote 73:
Viollet-le-Duc, “Mobilier Français,” iv. 454.
Orleans had scarcely crossed the Alps before he was as completely
disregarded as though he had never seemed the most dangerous pretender
to the throne of Milan. Savoy had taken his place. The claim of Savoy
was quite childish and ridiculous. He pretended that, on the payment of
his sister’s dowry to the late Duke of Milan, Filippo Maria had promised
to leave his duchy, in default of sons, to the Duke of Savoy.[74] It was
evident that the Duke had done nothing of the sort; he had left his
throne to Arragon. Besides, it is difficult to see how his testament
could dispose of property which, by his father’s will and his sister’s
marriage contract, was entailed on his nephews of Orleans, and which, by
feudal law, must return to the Holy Roman Empire. But, however shadowy
his claims, the Duke of Savoy was a great person to the Milanese. He was
loved by them and he was feared by them; and had he hazarded a bold
stroke instead of counteracting his own efforts by a perfect maze of
petty intrigues, he might easily have made himself, if not the Duke of
Milan, at any rate protector of the Milanese republic.
Footnote 74:
Olivier de la Marche, “Mémoires,” livre i. chap. 17.
But Duke Louis was afraid to hazard all his chances on any single throw.
In 1446 he had intrigued with the Dauphin to divide the Milanese with
France; on the 3rd of May, 1448, he drew up a secret and solemn contract
with the Milanese to protect their republic, in consequence of which, a
few months later, the grateful city privately elected him her chief. In
June, 1449, he was arranging with the King of Arragon to conquer the
estates of Milan with this ally, and divide them at the rate of
three-fifths for Arragon and two-fifths for Savoy;[75] and in the autumn
of the same year he was making a very similar proposal to the Venetians.
In the pains he took to win something, however little, Savoy effectually
safeguarded himself from winning all. Yet at one time he appeared to
have great chances in his favour.
Footnote 75:
Secreta del Senato, Reg. 18, fol. 106, MS.
In the summer and early autumn of 1448, both Venice and the Milanese
believed that a republic under the joint protection of Venice and Savoy
might flourish in Milan, were it not for the undying energy and
resolution of Count Francesco Sforza. To be rid of this man was to be
rid of war; and twice in August and once in September the Ten wrote to a
certain Lorenzo Minio, captain of the Brescia, that they accept a
certain proposal he had made: “If the person he suggests will in truth
deal death to Count Francesco we shall be his debtors.”[76] According to
the discretion of Minio they offered his candidate from ten thousand to
twenty thousand ducats; or, should he be of the sort that stoops not to
money, he should have the captaincy of a regiment, of from two hundred
to four hundred lances. “But,” they proceeded, “let not the matter stick
for a trifle—cheer him and inspirit him so that his resolution come to a
good effect, and that speedily; put him in heart with his work and let
it be done well.” The plain English of these phrases means that the
Venetian Council was willing to pay a great sum of money to any one who
would undertake to poison Count Francesco Sforza.
Footnote 76:
Lamansky, “Secrets d’Etat de Venise,” p. 160.
But before the proposal was carried out, a second message, five months
later, bade the friend of Minio stay the destruction in his hand. “Count
Francesco having entered into good and faithful relations with the
Senate, we withdraw the order for his death.” As suddenly as before and
for as short a time an alliance was declared between the Venetians and
the Milanese.
This alliance, as before, was merely an occasion for the resumption of
intrigues. Arragon and Savoy, Savoy and Venice, Venice and Milan were
secretly determining an arrangement which should exclude Francesco
Sforza. It seems scarcely worth while to have countermanded the order
for his death, since by some means or another to be rid of this
adventurer was the aim and end of all this policy. The Guelfs of Milan
sent to Venice a certain Arrigo Panigarola, who throwing himself upon
his knees before the Ten, with tears and prayers implored the Venetians
to defend his hapless city from Count Francesco. The Council was
impressed, but decided to reserve its answer for a little while.
A few months after the arrival of Panigarola, the Duke of Savoy sent an
ambassador to Venice upon a similar errand. How was it possible that the
Venetians, so respectable a state, could support a wearisome adventurer
like Count Francesco? Savoy gave the Venetians to understand that if
they continued to supply soldiers to the camp of Sforza he should reckon
his behaviour on their part a _casus belli_. How much better it would be
if the Venetians would acquiesce in an honourable peace between the
Milanese republic and Savoy and Venice! This threefold league would
effectually crush Francesco Sforza, and would establish plenty and
security in devastated Lombardy; whereas if the present dissensions
continue, both Orleans and Arragon would certainly come across the
mountains to seek their profit here, and so should a great fire be lit
in Italy which much effusion of blood would never quench. The Savoyard
ambassador waxed really eloquent over the blessings of peace; for at
this very time his master was writing to his father the Antipope at
Lucerne: “The Milanese have secretly elected me chief, but what am I to
do with Italy for Sforza, Germany for the emperor, and France for
Orleans?” All indeed that he could do was _faire entretenir les Milanais
par tous moyens, sans avoir dict encore ne_ non, _ne_ ouy; _et, d’aultre
part, envoyer à Venise, et aussi envers le Comte François, et aultres où
il est nécessaire practicquer quelque bons moyens par voye
d’accord_.[77] Of all these various plots the most successful for Savoy
would have been a peace strong enough to set at naught Francesco Sforza,
to restore prosperity to Lombardy, and to enable the Milanese to elect
him, with apparent spontaneity, protector of their state. The first step
was to secure peace with Venice; and he found the Venetians in an
acquiescent mood. The important city of Crema had followed the lead of
Lodi and Codogno, and had declared itself the subject of Saint Mark; and
the Venetians, who could not keep Crema and continue to ally of Count
Francesco, suddenly came to terms with Panigarola, declared themselves
the champions of the Milanese republic, and offered the Duke of Savoy
not merely a friendly neutrality but an offensive alliance.[78] They
resumed their negotiations for the assassination of Count Francesco,
and, “without a thought,” says Corio, “of the league or law divine,”
despatched him a message informing him that they, his comrades in arms
of yesterday, should become to-morrow his enemies upon the field of
battle.
Footnote 77:
Gaullieur, _op. cit._
Footnote 78:
Reg. 18, fol. 83. April 21, 1449. Secreta del Senato, MS.
Count Francesco received the news with great gravity, without a sign of
anger, or sorrow, or displeasure; although his situation was becoming
really desperate; for, as the Venetian legate maliciously informed him,
the Venetians were negotiating alliances with Savoy, with Arragon, and
with the Pope. As to Savoy, Sforza forestalled them; for he forthwith
despatched a messenger to Turin with terms so advantageous to Duke Louis
that that unstable personage put the Venetians out of mind and settled
into peace with Sforza: who, enabled to turn his entire force against
Venice, drove his late allies back beyond the Adda, defeated them
utterly at Caravaggio, made peace with them as a victor with success
before him, and in the middle of October turned his arms against the
Milanese republic.
Sforza had disarmed Savoy and conquered Venice; but he had not yet come
to an end of his enemies. In November, 1447, Charles of Orleans
seriously resumed his intentions of a Milanese campaign. Already in
July, Burgundy had rewritten to the Venetians entreating them to favour
Orleans; and the council had replied[80] that though their _acts_ of
late may have appeared hostile to the cause of Orleans, yet nothing but
the instinct of self-preservation had ever induced them to make peace
with Francesco, and their _sentiments_ were still most loyal to the
house of France. Nothing appeared more likely than a French invasion;
Savoy already had warned the Venetians of it. On the 14th of November
the Duke of Orleans wrote to the city of Asti,[79] saying that he was
now positively certain of the alliance with Brittany and Burgundy, and
that before Christmas, his army, under Jean Focaud, would arrive in
Lombardy. This letter, written in a tone of the cheerfullest high
spirits, was followed a week later by one equally sanguine and happy:
_Dei gratia, omnia negotia Lombardie ad nos spectantia sunt in his
presentibus optime disposita_. Jacques Cœur has pronounced himself
favourable to the affair. And on the 4th of December Orleans writes that
the companies of Foix and Bourbon are on the point of departure; and
that John of Angoulême is arranging with the king for the reinforcement
from the royal troops.
Footnote 79:
Secreta del Senato, MS. Reg. 10, fol. 93. July 3. 1449.
Footnote 80:
These four letters are quoted by M. Maurice Faucon from the Milanese
Archive in his report of his two missions in Italy in the years 1879
and 1880, pp. 35-37.
But Christmas came, and the phantom armies of the expectant Orleans
remained as visionary as before. Yet on the 7th of January he writes,
still sanguine, still bent on conquering his castle in the air: “The
army will be larger than we thought; for all the French princes will
lend their aid. Burgundy is sending great sums of gold and abundant
troops into Lombardy.” The Duke is as full as ever of his schemes and
hopes. But this is the last of his letter; and before his messenger
could bring an answer home from Asti, Milan had found a master among the
ranks of Italy.
For famine and weariness and civil discord had broken the spirit of the
Milanese republic. Even Savoy, even Venice, were seized with pity, and
murmured to each other that almost any change would be desirable, _ut
hec afflicta et misera Lombardia, dudum guerrarum disturbijs lacessita,
aliquando quiescere possit; tot populis, tot calamitatibus, totque
oppressorum vocibus compatiendum et miserandum erat_. Anything short of
the success of Count Francesco would be a happy alternative to such
disaster. And in Milan itself the discontent was as pronounced. The
Guelfs still vociferated against Francesco, but the Ghibellines, the
party of the nobles, grew slowly and strongly in favour of the Count.
All parties at last were out of conceit with this miserable liberty,
which was but another name for civil disunion and ruin. Some were for
the Pope, and some for Charles of France, and these were the Guelfs.
Some were for Savoy, some for the King of Naples. But all these princes
lived a long way off; they had no armies ready to combat the Venetians,
whom each and every faction dreaded now and hated worse than famine.
When one day Gasparo de Vimercato rose up in public conclave, and
suggested that Milan should give herself to Count Francesco Sforza, it
was incredible how suddenly the whole mind of the city turned towards
the Count. The Count was the son-in-law of the late duke. The city was
familiar with him. He was known to be humane and generous and strong.
Should the city elect him, in one day he could dissipate the famine, the
battles, the fear of enemies, and the suspicion of treachery, which for
thirty months had made the misery of Milan. Leonardo Gariboldo, Aloigi
Trombetta, and Gasparo da Vimercato were sent at once to acquaint Count
Francesco, that by the free voice of the people he had been elected lord
of Milan.
Among the innumerable conspirators, intriguing diplomatists, and
successful tradesmen who filled the high places of the Italy of that
day, Francesco Sforza appears at least a man. Simple, direct, and brave,
no sudden honour and no reverse of fortune took from him that natural
dignity of a balanced mind which is one of the finest attributes of the
Italian. Good sense and kindness made a moral force of this captain of
adventure. He disciplined his troops, erected a court-martial, and
punished offences of rape and violence by death; so that while the
miserable populations of Lombardy had everything to fear from the other
armies that occupied their soil, gradually they learned to feel
themselves secure in the rough, mailed hands of Count Francesco. Among
the soldiers his reputation was more than mortal. We have to leap over a
dozen generations before the prestige of the Little Corporal present an
analogy to such devotion. But Count Francesco was loved and respected
even by his enemies; and there is a story of him which has ever struck
me as among the most charming in military history. It was at the siege
of Como, in that very February of 1450, when, unknown to him, the
Milanese who had so long and so furiously resisted him, were crying,
“Sforza! Sforza!” in an ecstasy of hungry enthusiasm in the great
piazza. Meanwhile Sforza and his men were occupying Monte Barro; by
means of a little hill in front, overlooking the Adda, and fortified by
five bastions, they kept in check the troops of Venice and Milan, ranged
in impotent lines along the further side of the river. The bulwarks of
the little hill were but slight, improvised in a few days for the
occasion, and the poor Italian artillery of the fifteenth century,
wrought no great destruction; yet such was the spell of Sforza’s name,
that the two armies across the Adda never ventured to try the place by
assault. One night, however, it leaked out that Count Francesco was not
in the fort; he had gone up the mountain to arrange a fresh disposition
of his troops upon the summit of Monte Barro. In his absence it was
decided to attack the hill, and in the late February dawn the Venetians
and Milanese poured under the slender bulwarks, armed with artillery,
which silenced that of the fort, and, planting their scaling ladders
against the ramparts, they soon were in possession of the place. Now, as
it happened, unknown to either army, late at night Count Francesco had
returned home, and hearing the clamour in the place, he started out of
sleep and strode at once to the ramparts, ignorant that the enemy had
taken the place by surprise and that his soldiers, unaware of his
presence in their midst, had already given the sign of surrender.
“Defend yourselves, for I am here!” rang out the clear voice of the
Count; and at that moment he perceived that he stood alone in the midst
of his foes. But the mere fact of his presence was a better defence to
his bastions than a world of soldiers. The assailants, like chidden
children, withdrew from their positions, dropped the guns and pieces
they were carrying away, and with uncovered heads made for their
scaling-ladders. As they passed the Count, standing alone there, they
made for his hand—kneeling, crowding to touch it. “Father and ornament
of Italian arms we salute you,” cried the soft Venetian voices; and in
little knots and groups, as quickly as they might, they dropped over the
walls into the moat again, leaving Count Francesco the master of his
ramparts. It was to this man, so eminently the hero of his hour, that
the three Milanese delegates brought their news of the submission of the
city.
On Feb. 25, 1450, Count Francesco Sforza rode into Milan. He rode at the
head of his troops, and he had taken care that his future subjects
should welcome the army; for every soldier was hung all over, from
corslet, from waist, from shoulder, and from arm and hand, with loaves
of bread—great clustering rolls and loaves that hid the armour
underneath, as much as every man could carry. It was fine, wrote Corio,
to see how the famished Milanese fell upon the troops, avidly tearing
the longed-for food from neck and arm, and falling to at once (_con
quanta ingordigia!_) upon the delicious bread. “Sforza! Sforza!” cried
the citizens, a thousand times more eagerly than before. Some of them
cried out in the words of the Psalms _Hæc est dies, quam fecit Dominus;
exultemus et lætemur in ea_! Sforza was in the city; his troops and his
bread had effectually secured his future. The Venetians might brew
another poison. Charles of Orleans at Chauny might return that loan of
men and gold which his cousin of Burgundy had lent him. Louis of Savoy
wrote to his father at Lucerne: _Le Comte François a obtenu ceste ville
par intelligence, déceptions et pratiques et non mie par force de
guerre_. All these pretenders, who had felt the bird already in the
hand, must dissemble as best they might their disappointment. But
Genoa[81] and Florence welcomed the chance of peace, and in November,
1451, joined in a defensive league with Milan against the Dauphin, King
of France, the Duke of Savoy, and the Venetians. Lombardy was no longer
the devastated battlefield of doubtful victory. Count Francesco Sforza
was effectually the master of Milan.
Footnote 81:
Archives of Genoa. Materie Politiche, mazzo 12, 3. See also Charavay’s
“Report on the Italian Letters of Louis XI.,” 1881.
IV.
It is one thing to have a thing by might, another to hold that thing by
right. The theory that might is right appears sufficient in the hour of
conquest, yet it is but a slender basis for future government; and
Francesco Sforza, safely lodged in Milan, hedged round with troops,
greeted as duke by the very citizens who had so long repulsed him, was
none the less aware that men regarded him merely in the light of a
successful usurper. Even in Milan there were many who regretted the loss
of a legitimate dynasty; there were those who looked to the King of
Naples, the adopted heir of the late duke; and there was a party anxious
to proclaim the suzerainty of the Emperor; and a larger party still who
placed their faith in Charles of Orleans, the legitimate descendant of
the great Giangaleazzo. In the eyes of such men as these what claim had
Captain Francesco Sforza, _soi-disant_> Duke of Milan? He was merely a
successful soldier, the husband of the late duke’s bastard daughter,
unmentioned as heir to Milan in any testament or codicil, who by force
and famine had succeeded in imposing himself, as the alternative to
starvation, upon the miserable Milanese. In the sight of the Emperor,
Francesco Sforza had compromised whatever shadow of right he might once
have had by accepting from the illegal hand of the people the imperial
gift of his duchy.
Before the feudal law Francesco Sforza was merely a usurper, and a
compromised usurper. To Orleans he appeared the representative of the
illegitimate branch defrauding the legal heirs of their just claims. To
Arragon, Sforza was the man who pockets treasure bequeathed expressly to
another. The humiliation of this position is apparent. Yet Sforza, with
much magnanimity, refused to ruin his subjects with taxes in order to
buy the imperial investiture—a purchasable commodity, as his successors
and his predecessors knew, and one which would have legalized his
situation. At first, in the triumph of success, he appears to have
enjoyed his illegal honours, his glory as a popular hero; and he
affirmed that he preferred to rest his claims upon the people’s voice.
On March 25, 1450, they pronounced him Duke of Milan.
Sforza made a good ruler. Under him Milan ceased to be the prey of
miserable dissensions and disorder, and the streets no longer ran with
the cries of Guelf or Ghibelline. The soldier proved an excellent
despot; not harsh or selfish, as might have been expected from a man
sprung from so little and taught in so rude a school. He governed the
people for the good of the people, making his own gain but an accident
of their advantage; and that magnanimous and disastrous impulse which
made him refuse to tax the poor in order to purchase his investiture is
characteristic of the man.
Yet even in Milan there were many ill content to thrive under the
orderly government of this benevolent usurper. Many voices that famine
had silenced soon began to whisper—Republicans, Orleanists, Guelfs,
Ghibellines were alike jealous and ill at ease under the military
dictatorship of Sforza. Another party in the city headed by the
Dowager-duchess still kept alive the pretensions of Savoy, and he was
able to write to Lucerne that on the whole the news from Milan was not
bad, for the people were already beginning to dislike Francesco Sforza,
and that Madame de Milan proved herself an efficient supporter of his
claims.