CHAPTER V.

The Mode in Which the Value of Money is Settled in Lombard Street.

Many persons believe that the Bank of England has some peculiar

power of fixing the value of money. They see that the Bank of

England varies its minimum rate of discount from time to time, and

that, more or less, all other banks follow its lead, and charge much

as it charges; and they are puzzled why this should be. 'Money,' as

economists teach, 'is a commodity, and only a commodity;' why then,

it is asked, is its value fixed in so odd a way, and not the way in

which the value of all other commodities is fixed?

There is at bottom, however, no difficulty in the matter. The value

of money is settled, like that of all other commodities, by supply

and demand, and only the form is essentially different. In other

commodities all the large dealers fix their own price; they try to

underbid one another, and that keeps down the price; they try to get

as much as they can out of the buyer, and that keeps up the price.

Between the two what Adam Smith calls the higgling of the market

settles it. And this is the most simple and natural mode of doing

business, but it is not the only mode. If circumstances make it

convenient another may be adopted. A single large holder--especially

if he be by far the greatest holder--may fix his price, and other

dealers may say whether or not they will undersell him, or whether

or not they will ask more than he does. A very considerable holder

of an article may, for a time, vitally affect its value if he lay

down the minimum price which he will take, and obstinately adhere to

it. This is the way in which the value of money in Lombard Street is

settled. The Bank of England used to be a predominant, and is still

a most important, dealer in money. It lays down the least price at

which alone it will dispose of its stock, and this, for the most

part, enables other dealers to obtain that price, or something near

it.

The reason is obvious. At all ordinary moments there is not money

enough in Lombard Street to discount all the bills in Lombard Street

without taking some money from the Bank of England. As soon as the

Bank rate is fixed, a great many persons who have bills to discount

try how much cheaper than the Bank they can get these bills

discounted. But they seldom can get them discounted very much

cheaper, for if they did everyone would leave the Bank, and the

outer market would have more bills than it could bear.

In practice, when the Bank finds this process beginning, and sees

that its business is much diminishing, it lowers the rate, so as to

secure a reasonable portion of the business to itself, and to keep a

fair part of its deposits employed. At Dutch auctions an upset or

maximum price used to be fixed by the seller, and he came down in

his bidding till he found a buyer. The value of money is fixed in

Lombard Street in much the same way, only that the upset price is

not that of all sellers, but that of one very important seller, some

part of whose supply is essential.

The notion that the Bank of England has a control over the Money

Market, and can fix the rate of discount as it likes, has survived

from the old days before 1844, when the Bank could issue as many

notes as it liked. But even then the notion was a mistake. A bank

with a monopoly of note issue has great sudden power in the Money

Market, but no permanent power: it can affect the rate of discount

at any particular moment, but it cannot affect the average rate. And

the reason is, that any momentary fall in money, caused by the

caprice of such a bank, of itself tends to create an immediate and

equal rise, so that upon an average the value is not altered.

What happens is this. If a bank with a monopoly of note issue

suddenly lends (suppose) 2,000,000 L. more than usual, it causes a

proportionate increase of trade and increase of prices. The persons

to whom that 2,000,000 L. was lent, did not borrow it to lock it up;

they borrow it, in the language of the market, to 'operate with' that

is, they try to buy with it; and that new attempt to buy--that new

demand raises prices. And this rise of prices has three

consequences. First. It makes everybody else want to borrow money.

Money is not so efficient in buying as it was, and therefore

operators require more money for the same dealings. If railway stock

is 10 per cent dearer this year than last, a speculator who borrows

money to enable him to deal must borrow 10 per cent more this year

than last, and in consequence there is an augmented demand for

loans. Secondly. This is an effectual demand, for the increased

price of railway stock enables those who wish it to borrow more upon

it. The common practice is to lend a certain portion of the market

value of such securities, and if that value increases, the amount of

the usual loan to be obtained on them increases too. In this way,

therefore, any artificial reduction in the value of money causes a

new augmentation of the demand for money, and thus restores that

value to its natural level. In all business this is well known by

experience: a stimulated market soon becomes a tight market, for so

sanguine are enterprising men, that as soon as they get any unusual

ease they always fancy that the relaxation is greater than it is,

and speculate till they want more than they can obtain.

In these two ways sudden loans by an issuer of notes, though they

may temporarily lower the value of money, do not lower it

permanently, because they generate their own counteraction. And this

they do whether the notes issued are convertible into coin or not.

During the period of Bank restriction, from 1797 to 1819, the Bank

of England could not absolutely control the Money Market, any more

than it could after 1819, when it was compelled to pay its notes in

coin. But in the case of convertible notes there is a third effect,

which works in the same direction, and works more quickly. A rise of

prices, confined to one country, tends to increase imports, because

other countries can obtain more for their goods if they send them

there, and it discourages exports, because a merchant who would have

gained a profit before the rise by buying here to sell again will

not gain so much, if any, profit after that rise. By this

augmentation of imports the indebtedness of this country is

augmented, and by this diminution of exports the proportion of that

indebtedness which is paid in the usual way is decreased also. In

consequence, there is a larger balance to be paid in bullion; the

store in the bank or banks keeping the reserve is diminished, and

the rate of interest must be raised by them to stay the efflux. And

the tightness so produced is often greater than, and always equal

to, the preceding unnatural laxity.

There is, therefore, no ground for believing, as is so common, that the

value of money is settled by different causes than those which affect

the value of other commodities, or that the Bank of England has any

despotism in that matter. It has the power of a large holder of money,

and no more. Even formerly, when its monetary powers were greater and

its rivals weaker, it had no absolute control. It was simply a large

corporate dealer, making bids and much influencing--though in no sense

compelling--other dealers thereby.

But though the value of money is not settled in an exceptional way,

there is nevertheless a peculiarity about it, as there is about many

articles. It is a commodity subject to great fluctuations of value,

and those fluctuations are easily produced by a slight excess or a

slight deficiency of quantity. Up to a certain point money is a

necessity. If a merchant has acceptances to meet to-morrow, money he

must and will find to-day at some price or other. And it is this

urgent need of the whole body of merchants which runs up the value

of money so wildly and to such a height in a great panic. On the

other hand, money easily becomes a 'drug,' as the phrase is, and

there is soon too much of it. The number of accepted securities is

limited, and cannot be rapidly increased; if the amount of money

seeking these accepted securities is more than can be lent on them

the value of money soon goes down. You may often hear in the market

that bills are not to be had, meaning good bills of course, and when

you hear this you may be sure that the value of money is very low.

If money were all held by the owners of it, or by banks which did

not pay an interest for it, the value of money might not fall so

fast. Money would, in the market phrase, be 'well held.' The

possessors would be under no necessity to employ it all; they might

employ part at a high rate rather than all at a low rate. But in

Lombard Street money is very largely held by those who do pay an

interest for it, and such persons must employ it all, or almost all,

for they have much to pay out with one hand, and unless they receive

much with the other they will be ruined. Such persons do not so much

care what is the rate of interest at which they employ their money:

they can reduce the interest they pay in proportion to that which

they can make. The vital points to them is to employ it at some

rate. If you hold (as in Lombard Street some persons do) millions of

other people's money at interest, arithmetic teaches that you will

soon be ruined if you make nothing of it even if the interest you

pay is not high.

The fluctuations in the value of money are therefore greater than

those on the value of most other commodities. At times there is an

excessive pressure to borrow it, and at times an excessive pressure

to lend it, and so the price is forced up and down.

These considerations enable us to estimate the responsibility which

is thrown on the Bank of England by our system, and by every system

on the bank or banks who by it keep the reserve of bullion or of

legal tender exchangeable for bullion. These banks can in no degree

control the permanent value of money, but they can completely

control its momentary value. They cannot change the average value,

but they can determine the deviations from the average. If the

dominant banks manage ill, the rate of interest will at one time be

excessively high, and at another time excessively low: there will be

first a pernicious excitement, and next a fatal collapse. But if

they manage well, the rate of interest will not deviate so much from

the average rate; it will neither ascend so high nor descend so low.

As far as anything can be steady the value of money will then be

steady, and probably in consequence trade will be steady too--at least

a principal cause of periodical disturbance will have been withdrawn

from it.

Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market · 第 5 / 13 章