by the _consensus_ of theologians, is conceived to be, it seems that
Utilitarians may legitimately infer the existence of Divine sanctions
to the code of social duty as constructed on a Utilitarian basis; and
such sanctions would, of course, suffice to make it always every one’s
interest to promote universal happiness to the best of his knowledge.
It is, however, desirable, before we conclude, to examine carefully
the validity of this assumption, in so far as it is supported on
ethical grounds alone. For by the result of such an examination will
be determined, as we now see, the very important question whether
ethical science can be constructed on an independent basis; or whether
it is forced to borrow a fundamental and indispensable premiss from
Theology or some similar source.[382] In order fairly to perform this
examination, let us reflect upon the clearest and most certain of
our moral intuitions. I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as
clearly and certainly as I see any axiom in Arithmetic or Geometry,
that it is ‘right’ and ‘reasonable’ for me to treat others as I should
think that I myself ought to be treated under similar conditions,
and to do what I believe to be ultimately conducive to universal
Good or Happiness. But I cannot find inseparably connected with this
conviction, and similarly attainable by mere reflective intuition,
any cognition that there actually is a Supreme Being who will
adequately[383] reward me for obeying these rules of duty, or punish
me for violating them.[384] Or,--omitting the strictly theological
element of the proposition,--I may say that I do not find in my moral
consciousness any intuition, claiming to be clear and certain, that
the performance of duty will be adequately rewarded and its violation
punished. I feel indeed a desire, apparently inseparable from the moral
sentiments, that this result may be realised not only in my own case
but universally; but the mere existence of the desire would not go
far to establish the probability of its fulfilment, considering the
large proportion of human desires that experience shows to be doomed
to disappointment. I also judge that in a certain sense this result
_ought_ to be realised: in this judgment, however, ‘ought’ is not used
in a strictly ethical meaning; it only expresses the vital need that
our Practical Reason feels of proving or postulating this connexion of
Virtue and self-interest, if it is to be made consistent with itself.
For the negation of the connexion must force us to admit an ultimate
and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is
Reasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would seem to follow
that the apparently intuitive operation of the Practical Reason,
manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory.
I do not mean that if we gave up the hope of attaining a practical
solution of this fundamental contradiction, through any legitimately
obtained conclusion or postulate as to the moral order of the world,
it would become reasonable for us to abandon morality altogether:
but it would seem necessary to abandon the idea of rationalising it
completely. We should doubtless still, not only from self-interest, but
also through sympathy and sentiments protective of social wellbeing,
imparted by education and sustained by communication with other men,
feel a desire for the general observance of rules conducive to general
happiness; and practical reason would still impel us decisively to
the performance of duty in the more ordinary cases in which what
is recognised as duty is in harmony with self-interest properly
understood. But in the rarer cases of a recognised conflict between
self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself,
would cease to be a motive on either side; the conflict would have to
be decided by the comparative preponderance of one or other of two
groups of non-rational impulses.
If then the reconciliation of duty and self-interest is to be
regarded as a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental
contradiction in one chief department of our thought, it remains
to ask how far this necessity constitutes a sufficient reason for
accepting this hypothesis. This, however, is a profoundly difficult
and controverted question, the discussion of which belongs rather
to a treatise on General Philosophy than to a work on the Methods
of Ethics: as it could not be satisfactorily answered, without a
general examination of the criteria of true and false beliefs. Those
who hold that the edifice of physical science is really constructed
of conclusions logically inferred from self-evident premises, may
reasonably demand that any practical judgments claiming philosophic
certainty should be based on an equally firm foundation. If on the
other hand we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of
nature propositions are commonly taken to be universally true, which
yet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong
disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the
systematic coherence of our beliefs,--it will be more difficult to
reject a similarly supported assumption in ethics, without opening the
door to universal scepticism.
FOOTNOTES:
[375] See J. S. Mill’s treatise on Utilitarianism (chap. iii. passim):
where, however, the argument is not easy to follow, from a confusion
between three different objects of inquiry: (1) the actual effect of
sympathy in inducing conformity to the rules of Utilitarian ethics, (2)
the effect in this direction which it is likely to have in the future,
(3) the value of sympathetic pleasures and pains as estimated by an
enlightened Egoist. The first and third of these questions Mill did not
clearly separate, owing to his psychological doctrine that each one’s
own pleasure is the sole object of his desires. But if my refutation of
this doctrine (Book i. chap. iv. § 3) is valid, we have to distinguish
two ways in which sympathy operates: it generates sympathetic pleasures
and pains, which have to be taken into account in the calculations of
Egoistic Hedonism; but it also may cause impulses to altruistic action,
of which the force is quite out of proportion to the sympathetic
pleasure (or relief from pain) which such action seems likely to
secure to the agent. So that even if the average man ever should reach
such a pitch of sympathetic development, as never to feel prompted to
sacrifice the general good to his own, still this will not prove that
it is egoistically reasonable for him to behave in this way.
[376] I do not mean to imply that the process of change is merely
circular. In the earlier period sympathy is narrower, simpler, and
more presentative; in the later it is more extensive, complex, and
representative.
[377] I do not, however, think that we are justified in stating as
_universally_ true what has been admitted in the preceding paragraph.
Some few thoroughly selfish persons appear at least to be happier
than most of the unselfish; and there are other exceptional natures
whose chief happiness seems to be derived from activity, disinterested
indeed, but directed towards other ends than human happiness.
[378] See chap. iii. § 3 of this Book, pp. 432-33.
[379] See Book iii. chap. i. § 2: also Book iii. chap. ii. § 1.
[380] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. § 2.
[381] It may perhaps be said that this comparison has no force for
Libertarians, who consider the essence of Virtue to lie in free choice.
But to say that _any_ free choice is virtuous would be a paradox from
which most Libertarians--admitting that Evil may be freely chosen no
less than Good--would recoil. It must therefore be Free choice of good
that is conceived to realise the divine end: and if so, the arguments
for the utilitarian interpretation of Good--thus freely chosen--would
still be applicable _mutatis mutandis_: and if so, the arguments for
regarding rules of utilitarian duty as divinely sanctioned would be
similarly applicable.
[382] It is not necessary, if we are simply considering Ethics as a
possible independent science, to throw the fundamental premiss of
which we are now examining the validity into a Theistic form. Nor does
it seem always to have taken that form in the support which Positive
Religion has given to Morality. In the Buddhist creed this notion of
the rewards inseparably attaching to right conduct seems to have been
developed in a far more elaborate and systematic manner than it has in
any phase of Christianity. But, as conceived by enlightened Buddhists,
these rewards are not distributed by the volition of a Supreme Person,
but by the natural operation of an impersonal Law.
[383] It may be well to remind the reader that by ‘adequate’ is here
meant ‘sufficient to make it the agent’s interest to promote universal
good’; not necessarily ‘proportional to Desert.’
[384] I cannot fall back on the resource of thinking myself under a
moral necessity to regard all my duties _as if they_ were commandments
of God, although not entitled to hold speculatively that any such
Supreme Being really exists. I am so far from feeling bound to
believe for purposes of practice what I see no ground for holding as
a speculative truth, that I cannot even conceive the state of mind
which these words seem to describe, except as a momentary half-wilful
irrationality, committed in a violent access of philosophic despair.
APPENDIX
THE KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF FREE WILL
[_Reprinted, with some omissions, from_ MIND, 1888, _Vol. XIII., No.
51_.]
My aim is to show that, in different parts of Kant’s exposition of his
doctrine, two essentially different conceptions are expressed by the
same word freedom; while yet Kant does not appear to be conscious of
any variation in the meaning of the term.
[In the one sense, Freedom = Rationality, so that a man is free in
proportion as he acts in accordance with Reason.] I do not in the
least object to this use of the term Freedom, on account of its
deviation from ordinary usage. On the contrary, I think it has much
support in men’s natural expression of ordinary moral experience in
discourse. In the conflict that is continually going on in all of us,
between non-rational impulses and what we recognise as dictates of
practical reason, we are in the habit of identifying ourselves with
the latter rather than with the former: as Whewell says, “we speak of
Desire, Love, Anger, as mastering us, and of ourselves as controlling
them”--we continually call men “slaves” of appetite or passion, whereas
no one was ever called a slave of reason. If, therefore, the term
Freedom had not already been appropriated by moralists to another
meaning--if it were merely a question of taking it from ordinary
discourse and stamping it with greater precision for purposes of
ethical discussion--I should make no objection to the statement that
“a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally.” But, what
English defenders of man’s free agency have generally been concerned
to maintain, is that “man has a freedom of _choice_ between good and
evil,” which is realised or manifested when he deliberately chooses
evil just as much as when he deliberately chooses good; and it is
clear that if we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he
acts rationally, we cannot also say, in the same sense of the term,
that it is by his free choice that he acts irrationally when he does
so act. The notions of Freedom must be admitted to be fundamentally
different in the two statements: and though usage might fairly allow
the word Freedom to represent either notion, if only one or other of
the above-mentioned propositions were affirmed, to use it to represent
both, in affirming both propositions, is obviously inconvenient; and it
implies a confusion of thought so to use it, without pointing out the
difference of meaning.
If this be admitted, the next thing is to show that Kant does use the
term in this double way. In arguing this, it will be convenient to have
names for what we admit to be two distinct ideas. Accordingly, the kind
of freedom which I first mentioned--which a man is said to manifest
more in proportion as he acts more under the guidance of reason--shall
be referred to as ‘Good’ or ‘Rational Freedom,’ and the freedom that is
manifested in choosing between good and evil shall be called ‘Neutral’
or ‘Moral Freedom.’[385]
But before I proceed to the different passages of Kant’s exposition in
which ‘Good Freedom’ and ‘Neutral Freedom’ respectively occur, it seems
desirable to distinguish this latter from a wider notion with which
it may possibly be confounded, and which it would be clearly wrong to
attribute to Kant. I mean the “power of acting without a motive,” which
Reid and other writers, on what used to be called the Libertarian side,
have thought it necessary to claim. “If a man could not act without
a motive,” says Reid, “he could have no power”--that is, in Reid’s
meaning, no free agency--“at all.” This conception of Freedom--which
I may conveniently distinguish as ‘Capricious Freedom’--is, as I
said, certainly not Kantian: not only does he expressly repudiate it,
but nowhere--so far as I know--does he unconsciously introduce it.
Indeed it is incompatible with any and every part of his explanation
of human volition: the originality and interest of his defence of
Neutral Freedom--the power of choice between good and evil--lies in its
complete avoidance of Capricious Freedom or the power of acting without
a motive _in any particular volition_.
[This] distinction helps me to understand how [it is that] many
intelligent readers have failed to see in Kant’s exposition the two
Freedoms--Good or Rational Freedom and Neutral or Moral Freedom--which
I find in Kant. They have their view fixed on the difference between
Rational or Moral Freedom, which Kant maintains, and the Freedom
of Caprice, which he undoubtedly repudiates: and are thus led to
overlook with him the distinction between the Freedom that we realise
or manifest in proportion as we do right, and the Freedom that is
realised or manifested equally in choosing either right or wrong.
When we have once put completely out of view the Freedom of Caprice,
the power of acting without a motive, or against the strongest
motive when the competition is among merely natural or non-rational
desires or aversions,--when we have agreed to exclude this, and to
concentrate attention on the difference between Good Freedom and
Neutral Freedom--I venture to think that no one can avoid seeing each
member of this latter antithesis in Kant. It will be easily understood
that, as he does not himself distinguish the two conceptions, it is
naturally impossible for the most careful reader always to tell which
is to be understood; but there are many passages where his argument
unmistakably requires the one, and many other passages where it
unmistakably requires the other. Speaking broadly, I may say that,
wherever Kant has to connect the notion of Freedom with that of Moral
Responsibility or moral imputation, he, like all other moralists who
have maintained Free Will in this connexion, means (chiefly, but not
solely) Neutral Freedom--Freedom exhibited in choosing wrong as much
as in choosing right. Indeed, in such passages it is with the Freedom
of the wrong-chooser that he is primarily concerned: since it is the
wrong-chooser that he especially wishes to prevent from shifting his
responsibility on to causes beyond his control. On the other hand, when
what he has to prove is the possibility of disinterested obedience to
Law as such, without the intervention of sensible impulses, when he
seeks to exhibit the independence of Reason in influencing choice,
then in many though not all his statements he explicitly identifies
Freedom with this independence of Reason, and thus clearly implies the
proposition that a man is free in proportion as he acts rationally.
As an example of the first kind, I will take the passage towards
the close of chap. iii. of the “Analytic of Practical Reason,”[386]
where he treats, in its bearing on Moral Responsibility, his
peculiar metaphysical doctrine of a double kind of causation in
human actions. According to Kant, every such action, regarded as a
phenomenon determined in time, must be thought as a necessary result
of determining causes in antecedent time--otherwise its existence
would be inconceivable--but it may be also regarded in relation to the
agent considered as a thing-in-himself, as the “noümenon” of which the
action is a phenomenon: and the conception of Freedom may be applied
to the agent so considered in relation to his phenomena. For since his
existence as a noümenon is not subject to time-conditions, nothing in
this noümenal existence comes under the principle of determination
by antecedent causes: hence, as Kant says, “in this his existence
nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will, but every
action ... even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being,
is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but
the result of his causality as a noümenon.” This is the well-known
metaphysical solution of the difficulty of reconciling Free Will with
the Universality of physical causation: I am not now concerned to
criticise it,--my point is that if we accept this view of Freedom at
all, it must obviously be Neutral Freedom: it must express the relation
of a noümenon that manifests itself as a scoundrel to a series of
bad volitions, in which the moral law is violated, no less than the
relation of a noümenon that manifests itself as a saint to good or
rational volitions, in which the moral law or categorical imperative
is obeyed. And, as I before said, Kant in this passage--being
especially concerned to explain the possibility of moral imputation,
and justify the judicial sentences of conscience--especially takes as
his illustrations noümena that exhibit bad phenomena. The question he
expressly raises is “How a man who commits a theft” can “be called
quite free” at the moment of committing it? and answers that it is
in virtue of his “transcendental freedom” that “the rational being
can justly say of _every unlawful action_ that he performs that he
could very well have left it undone,” although as phenomenon it is
determined by antecedents, and so necessary; “for it, with all the
past which determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of
his character which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he
imputes to himself” the bad actions that result necessarily from his
bad character taken in conjunction with other causes. Hence, however he
may account for his error from bad habits which he has allowed to grow
on him, whatever art he may use to paint to himself an unlawful act he
remembers as something in which he was carried away by the stream of
physical necessity, this cannot protect him from self-reproach:--not
even if he have shown depravity so early that he may reasonably be
thought to have been born in a morally hopeless condition--he will
still be rightly judged, and will judge himself “just as responsible
as any other man”: since in relation to his noümenal self his life as
a whole, from first to last, is to be regarded as a single phenomenon
resulting from an absolutely free choice.
I need not labour this point further; it is evident that the
necessities of Kant’s metaphysical explanation of moral responsibility
make him express with peculiar emphasis and fulness the notion of what
I have called Neutral Freedom, a kind of causality manifested in bad
and irrational volitions no less than in the good and rational.
On the other hand, it is no less easy to find passages in which the
term Freedom seems to me most distinctly to stand for Good or Rational
Freedom. Indeed, such passages are, I think, more frequent than those
in which the other meaning is plainly required. Thus he tells us that
“a free will must find its principle of determination in the [moral]
‘Law,’”[387] and that “freedom, whose causality can be determined only
by the law, consists just in this, that it restricts all inclinations
by the condition of obedience to pure law.”[388] Whereas, in the
argument previously examined, his whole effort was to prove that
the noümenon or supersensible being, of which each volition is a
phenomenon, exercises “free causality” in unlawful acts, he tells us
elsewhere, in the same treatise, that the “supersensible nature” of
rational beings, who have also a “sensible nature,” is their “existence
according to laws which are independent of every empirical condition,
and therefore belong to the autonomy of pure [practical] reason.”[389]
Similarly, in an earlier work, he explains that “since the conception
of causality involves that of laws ... though freedom is not a property
of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason
lawless; on the contrary, it must be a causality according to immutable
laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise, a free will would be a chimæra
(_Unding_).”[390] And this immutable law of the “free” or “autonomous”
will is, as he goes on to say, the fundamental principle of morality,
“so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the
same.”
I have quoted this last phrase, not because it clearly exhibits the
notion of Rational Freedom,--on the contrary, it rather shows how
easily this notion may be confounded with the other. A will subject to
its own moral laws _may_ mean a will that, so far as free, conforms
to these laws; but it also _may_ be conceived as capable of freely
disobeying these laws--exercising Neutral Freedom. But when Freedom
is said to be a “causality according to immutable laws” the ambiguity
is dispelled; for this evidently cannot mean merely a faculty of
laying down laws which may or may not be obeyed; it must mean that
the will, _quâ_ free, acts in accordance with these laws;--the human
being, doubtless, often acts contrary to them; but then, according to
this view, its choice in such actions is determined not “freely” but
“mechanically,” by “physical” and “empirical” springs of action.
If any further argument is necessary to show that Kantian “Freedom”
must sometimes be understood as Rational or Good Freedom, I may quote
one or two of the numerous passages in which Kant, either expressly or
by implication, identifies Will and Reason; for this identification
obviously excludes the possibility of Will’s choosing between Reason
and non-rational impulses. Thus in the _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik
der Sitten_,[391] he tells us that “as Reason is required to deduce
actions from laws, Will is nothing but pure practical reason”; and,
similarly, in the _Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_, he speaks of the
“objective reality of a pure Will or, _which is the same thing_, a pure
practical reason.”[392] Accordingly, whereas in some passages[393] the
“autonomy” which he identifies with “Freedom” is spoken of as “autonomy
of _will_,” in others we are told that the “moral law expresses
nothing else than autonomy of the pure practical _reason_: that is,
Freedom.”[394]
I think that I have now established the verbal ambiguity that I
undertook to bring home to Kant’s account of Free Will; I have shown
that in his exposition this fundamental term oscillates between
incompatible meanings. But it may, perhaps, be thought that the defect
thus pointed out can be cured by a merely verbal correction: that the
substance of Kant’s ethical doctrine may still be maintained, and may
still be connected with his metaphysical doctrine. It may still be held
that Reason dictates that we should at all times act from a maxim that
we can will to be a universal law, and that we should do this from pure
regard for reason and reason’s law, admitting that it is a law which we
are free to disobey; and it may still be held that the reality of this
moral freedom is to be reconciled with the universality of physical
causation by conceiving it as a relation between the agent’s noümenal
self--independent of time-conditions--and his character as manifested
in time; the only correction required being to avoid identifying
Freedom and Goodness or Rationality as attributes of agents or actions.
I should quite admit that the most important parts both of Kant’s
doctrine of morality, and of his doctrine of Freedom may be saved:--or
I should perhaps rather say that the latter may be left to conduct an
unequal struggle with the modern notions of heredity and evolution:
at any rate I admit that it is not fundamentally affected by my
present argument. But I think that a good deal more will have to go
from a corrected edition of Kantism than merely the “word” Freedom
in certain passages, if the confusion introduced by the ambiguity of
this word is to be eliminated in the manner that I have suggested. I
think that the whole topic of the “heteronomy” of the will, when it
yields to empirical or sensible impulses, will have to be abandoned or
profoundly modified. And I am afraid that most readers of Kant will
feel the loss to be serious; since nothing in Kant’s ethical writing
is more fascinating than the idea--which he expresses repeatedly in
various forms--that a man realises the aim of his true self when he
obeys the moral law, whereas, when he wrongly allows his action to
be determined by empirical or sensible stimuli, he becomes subject
to physical causation, to laws of a brute outer world. But if we
dismiss the identification of Freedom and Rationality, and accept
definitely and singly Kant’s other notion of Freedom as expressing the
relation of the human thing-in-itself to its phenomenon, I am afraid
that this spirit-stirring appeal to the sentiment of Liberty must be
dismissed as idle rhetoric. For the life of the saint must be as much
subject--in any particular portion of it--to the necessary laws of
physical causation as the life of the scoundrel: and the scoundrel must
exhibit and express his characteristic self-hood in his transcendental
choice of a bad life, as much as the saint does in his transcendental
choice of a good one. If, on the other hand, to avoid this result,
we take the other horn of the dilemma, and identify inner freedom
with rationality, than a more serious excision will be required. For,
along with ‘Neutral’ or ‘Moral’ Freedom, the whole Kantian view of the
relation of the noümenon to the empirical character will have to be
dropped, and with it must go the whole Kantian method of maintaining
moral responsibility and moral imputation: in fact, all that has made
Kant’s doctrine interesting and impressive to English advocates of Free
Will (in the ordinary sense), even when they have not been convinced of
its soundness.
FOOTNOTES:
[385] The terms ‘rational’ and ‘moral’ seem to me most appropriate
when I wish to suggest the affinity between the two notions: the terms
‘good’ and ‘neutral’ seem preferable when I wish to lay stress on the
difference.
[386] _Werke_, v. pp. 100-104 (Hartenstein).
[387] _Werke_, v. p. 30.
[388] _Ibid._ p. 83.
[389] _Ibid._ p. 46.
[390] _Werke_, iv. p. 294.
[391] _Werke_, iv. p. 260 (Hartenstein).
[392] _Werke_, v. p. 58. See an acute discussion of Kant’s perplexing
use of the term “Will” in Prof. Schurman’s _Kantian Ethics_, which has
anticipated me in the above quotations.
[393] _E.g._ _Werke_, iv. p. 296.
[394] _E.g._ _Werke_, v. p. 35.
INDEX
‘Absolute’ and ‘Relative’ Ethics, 18 note 2, 177 note 1
‘Act,’ meaning of, 200 note 3, 201, 202
Action, ultimate end of, 3, 4, etc.;
motive to, may be non-rational, 5;
instinctive, 24, 61;
deliberate, 24, 61;
deliberate and impulsive, 61
Acuteness, 236
Æsthetic Intuitionism, 228, 392;
implicit reference to Ultimate Good in, 392, 393
Æsthetic sensibility, theories of, 189
Affections, Duties of the, 345-349
Affections, social and domestic, 138, 153, 156, 157, 433, 434
‘Altruism,’ 439
ἀνδρεία, 456
‘Apathy’ as ideal of happiness, 125
Aristotle, 59 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 98-99, 99 note 1, 121-122,
180, 180 note 1, 181 note 1, 215, 224, 231 note 1, 264 note 2,
281, 375 note 1, 376, 403, 456
Art, Definition of, 4
‘Art of conduct,’ 4
Austin, 300 note 1
Aversion, 42, 43, 46, 145
Axioms, 215, 338-343, 379-389 _passim_;
must (_a_) have the terms clear and precise, 338, 339;
(_b_) be really self-evident, 339-341;
(_c_) not conflict with any other accepted proposition, 341;
(_d_) be supported by consensus of experts, 341, 342
Axiom--of Justice or Equity, and Rational Benevolence, 387;
of Prudence, the logical basis of Egoism, 386;
of Rational Benevolence, the logical basis of Utilitarianism,
387, 388;
-s of Impartiality, 379-383, 496, 497
Bacon, 338
Bain, 43 note 2, Note 54-56, Note 87-88, 125, 126, 127, 477 note 1;
(_The Emotions and the Will_) 54, 55 Note, 126 note 1;
(_Mental and Moral Science_) 127 notes 1-3, 177 note 1
Bastiat, 278 note 1
Beauty, 114
Benevolence, 238-263 _passim_, 391, 393;
comprehensiveness and supremacy of, 238, 238 note 2;
common maxim of, 238-239;
axiom of, 382, 385, 387, 496;
prescribes promotion of others’ Happiness rather than Perfection,
240, 241;
principles of its distribution, 241, 242, 261, 262, 263;
and Justice, spheres of, 242, 243, 268;
virtue of, 244, 253;
duty of, 252, 253, 253 note 1, 258;
Kant’s view of the duty of, 239, 240;
intellectual _versus_ emotional excellence of, 244 note 1;
conflicting claims to, 246;
duties of, classified, 248;
rational, cf. _Rational Benevolence_;
Intuitional and Utilitarian notions of, reconciled, 430-431
Benevolent--emotion, 239;
disposition, 239
Bentham, 10, 41, 41 note 1, 84, 85, 86, Note 87-88, 92, 94, 119,
124 note 1, 143, 164, 203, 292, 364, 414, 417, 423 note 2, 424;
(_Memoirs_) 10 notes 2 and 3,
(_Deontology, Works_, Bowring’s edition) 87, 88 Note,
(_Principles of Morals and Legislation_) 26 note 1,
(_Constitutional Code_) 41 note 2
Bequest, change of view respecting, 246, 247
Berkeley, Bishop, 120
Blackstone, _Introduction_, 302 note 1
Bouillier, 180 note 2
Butler, 7, 39, 44, 44 note 2, 81, 86, 93, 94, 119, 133 note 2, 136,
172, 200, 222, 366, 366 note 3, 371, 372, 378, 386, 401, 405,
501;
(_Analogy_) 378;
(_Dissertation Of the Nature of Virtue_) 86 note 2, 176 note 1,
327 note 1;
(_Sermons on Human Nature_) 7 note 1, 86 note 2, 93 note 2,
120 note 1, 200 note 2, 323 note 1
Candour, 355
Cardinal Virtues, 375
Carelessness, Culpability of, 60, 292
Casuistry, 99
Categorical Imperative, 7, 8, 15, 35, 36, 37, 209, 209 note 1
Caution, 236, 236 note 1, 237
Celibacy, 487, 488
Charity (Philanthropy), 222, 239, 430, 431, 434
Chastity and Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2
‘Chief Good’ (Summum Bonum), 134, 407 note 1
Chivalry, 326
Chrysippus, 376
Cicero, 376;
_De Finibus_, 125 note 1
Clarke, 86, 104, 120, 120 note 2, 384, 384 notes 3 and 4, 385;
_Boyle Lectures_, 120 note 2, 385 notes 1 and 2
Classification of Duties, 312-315
‘Cognition,’ use of, 34 note 2
“Common good of all Rationals,” Cumberland’s ultimate end, 104, 423
Common Morality, 215-216; (cf. _Morality of Common Sense_)
Common Sense aversion to admit Happiness as sole ultimate Good,
explanation of, 402-406
Compassion, 262, 371
Conditional prescriptions (Hypothetical Imperatives), 6, 7
Conjugal relation, the duties relating to it, 254, 255, 256,
255 notes 1 and 2, 347, 348, 348 note 1
Conscience, popular view of, 99;
jural view of, 100-101
Conscience (Moral Faculty) and Benevolence, Butler’s view of the
relation between, 86, 86 note 2;
and Self-love, Butler’s view of relation between, 119, 120, 200,
200 note 2, 327 note 1, 366
Conscious Utilitarianism rather the adult than the germinal form
of morality, 455-457
Consciousness not normally without pleasure or pain, 125
Consequences of actions, ulterior, 96, 97;
may be judged desirable without reference to pleasure or pain, 97
Contract, claims arising from, 269;
and Freedom, 276, 276 note 1
Courage, 332-334;
defined, 332;
Greek view of, 456;
and Fortitude, are subordinate duties, 332, 333;
Moral, 333 note 3;
Virtue of, 313, 333, 334;
and Foolhardiness, distinguished by Utilitarian considerations,
334, 355
Courtesy, 253
Cudworth, 103 Note
Culture, 157, etc.
Cumberland, 86, 86 note 1, 104;
and Utilitarianism, 423, 423 note 1
Custom, alterations in, 247
Decision, 236, 237
Deductive Hedonism, 176-195
Descartes, 338, 339
Desert--Good, how determined, 284-290;
Ill, how determined, 291-292;
requital of, as principle of Ideal Justice, 280, 281, 283, 294, 349;
and Freedom, 280, 287;
and Right of Property, 280, 280 note 1;
and Determinism, 284, 285;
Utilitarian interpretation of, 284 note 1;
and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 291
‘Desirable,’ confusion in Mill’s use of, 388 note 2
Desirable consciousness is either happiness or certain objective
relations of the conscious mind, 398-400
Desire, 43, 45-47;
non-rational, 23-24;
irrational, 23, 24;
and Pleasure, relation between, 39-56 _passim_
Determinism and Free Will, 57 _seq._;
Aristotelian, 59 note 1;
and Materialism, 62;
arguments for, 62-65;
argument against, 65, 66
Determinist meaning of ‘desert,’ etc., 71, 72, 284 note 1
Development as ethical aim, 90 _seq._, 192 _seq._, 473
‘Dictates,’ how used, 96 note 1
δικαιοσύνη, two meanings of, 264 note 2
‘Disinterested action,’ 57
Distribution, Principle of Equality a _prima facie_ reasonable
Principle of, 417
Divine penalties, 31
‘Doing good,’ ambiguity of, 239, 240
Dualism of the Practical (or Moral) Reason, 200, 205, 206,
366, 404, 404 note 1;
need of harmonising, 507-509
Dumont, 180 note 2
‘Duties to God’ and ‘duty to man,’ 218
Duties, division of, into Self-regarding and Social, 163, 312, 313
‘Duties to oneself,’ 7
‘Duty’--meaning and use of, 78, 217, 218, 220 note 3, 239, 504-505;
and ‘right conduct’ distinguished, 217
Duty relativity of, 218, 219;
and Happiness of agent, 36, 162-175 _passim_, 495 _seq._;
implies conflict of impulses, 81;
of self-preservation, 356;
of promoting others’ happiness, Kant’s arguments for, 389-390;
most of the received maxims of, involve reference to Ultimate
Good, 391, 392
‘Egoism,’ 11, 80 note 1, 89 _seq._;
ordinary use, and ambiguity of, 89;
indefiniteness of, 95;
and Greek ethical controversy, 91-92
Egoism, cf. _Egoistic Hedonism_
Egoism--meaning of, 120-121;
and Self-love, 36, 89-95 _passim_;
Principle and Method of, 119-122;
precepts of, not clear and precise, 199-200;
rationality of, 119-120, 199, 200 note 1;
sense of ignobility of, 199-200, 200 note 1 (cf. 402 _seq._), 501;
= Pure (or Quantitative) Egoistic Hedonism, 95;
and Utilitarianism, relation between, 497 _seq._;
and Utilitarian sanctions, 499-503
‘Egoist,’ meaning of, 121
Egoistic End--and Positive Religion, 121;
and Natural Religion, 121
Egoistic Hedonism designated as Egoism or as Epicureanism, 11, 84, 95
Egoistic Hedonism, 42, 119-121;
End of, 93;
Pure or Quantitative, defined, 95;
Fundamental Principle of, 93, 120, 121;
Empirical-reflective Method of, 121, 122, 131 _seq._;
and Conscience, 161 note 1;
Fundamental Paradox of, 48, 130, 136, 137, 173-174, 194
Empirical Hedonism, 123-150;
fundamental assumption of, 123, 131, 146;
objections to, 460;
Method of, takes advantage of traditional experience and of
special knowledge, 477, 479
Empirical Quantitative Hedonism, 146
Empiricism, 104
‘End,’ ethical use of the term, 134
End, Interdependence of Method and, 8, 83, 84;
adoption of any, as paramount, a phenomenon distinct from Desire, 39
Ends accepted as rational by Common Sense, 8, 9
Energy, 237
Epicureanism, 11, 84
Epicurus, 158
‘Equal return,’ ambiguity of, 261 (cf. 288 _seq._)
‘Equality of Happiness,’ as Social End, 284 note 2
Ethical--judgment, 23-38, 77;
Principles and Methods, 77-88 _passim_;
Method, three principal species of, 83 _seq._;
controversy, ancient and modern, 105, 106, 392;
Hedonism, fundamental proposition of, 129;
and Psychological Hedonism, 40-42, 412, 412 note 1;
and Physical Science, structure of, compared, 509
Ethics--boundaries of, 1;
Study or Science? 1, 2;
forms of the problem of, 2, 3, 391;
and man’s ‘True Good,’ 3;
definition of, 4, 15;
Absolute and Relative, 18 note 2, 177 note 1;
and geometry, analogy between, 18-19;
and astronomy, analogy between, 19;
concerned with Duty under present conditions, 19;
aim of, 40, 77;
and Rational or Natural Theology, 504-506;
mutual relations of the three Methods of, 496-509
Ethics and Politics (cf. _Law_), 15-22 _passim_, 266, 457;
distinguished from Positive sciences, 1, 2;
Utilitarian, 457 (cf. 274, 298);
in an ideal society, 18 _seq._
εὐδαιμονία (= Well-being = the Good attainable in
human life), 91, 92;
misunderstanding of Aristotle’s use of, 92 note 2
Excellence (cf. _Perfection_)
‘Excellence’ and ‘Perfection,’ 10 note 3
Excellence beyond strict duty, Utilitarian attitude towards, 492, 493
_Explanation_ essentially different from _Justification_, 2
Fame, 9, 155, 157, 159, 368, (Posthumous) 156 note 1
Feeling--preferableness of, other than pleasantness, dependent on
objective relations of the feeling mind, 127, 128, 399;
_quâ_ feeling, can only be judged by the person who feels, 128,
129, 398
Fidelity (cf. _Good Faith_), 258, 259
Firmness, 235, 236
Fitness and Desert, 350
‘Formal’ and ‘Material’ Rightness, 206-207, 206 note 1
Fortitude defined, 332
Free choice as virtuous, 504 note 1
Freedom--sentiment of, 39;
as absolute end of ideal law, 274 _seq._, 293, 297, 350-351;
sphere of, must be limited, 275;
ambiguity of, 275, 276, 293;
and Contract, 276, 276 note 1;
and Property, 276, 277;
Civil and Constitutional, 298, 351
Free Will--controversy, 57-76 _passim_, 59, 61-62, 65 note 1, 74, 75;
conception of, applied (_a_) in judging the conduct of others,
63 note 1, 66, 67, (_b_) in forecasting our own future, 64;
partial illusoriness of the belief in, 64, 65;
and Happiness, 68;
and Perfection (or Excellence), 68, 68 note 2;
and Moral government of the world, 69, 69 note 2, 70;
and Determinism, practical unimportance of issue between, 67,
68, 72-76, 285;
and Justice, 71, 72, 284, 291;
and Desert (or Merit), 68 note 2, 285, 291;
and Duty, 78;
(or Freedom of Will)--two senses of, 57-59;
and Moral responsibility, 58;
conception of, involved in ordinary meaning of ‘responsibility,’
‘desert,’ etc., 71;
metaphysical--ethical import of, as regards (_a_) choice between
rational and irrational alternatives, 67, 68, 70-71, (_b_) view
of what is rational, 68, 69, (_c_) forecasts of future action,
69, 70, 70 note 1
Friendship and its duties, 257-259, 257 note 1, 437
‘General Good,’ 392
Generosity, 219, 326
Gentleness, 253, 321
God’s Will--conformity to, 79;
as ultimate reason for action, 79, 80
‘Golden Rule,’ the, unpreciseness of, 379-380
‘Good,’ 105-115 _passim_;
indefiniteness of, 91-92;
use and force of the term, 86 note 1, 105, 107 _seq._, 112, 113;
and not ‘Right’ the fundamental notion in Greek ethics, 105;
has not the same connotation as ‘pleasant,’ 107, 108, 109, 110;
implies reference to an universally valid standard, 108-109, 114;
adjective, and ‘Good’ substantive, 109;
notion of, distinct from ‘Pleasure’ and ‘the Pleasant,’ and = ‘what
ought to be desired,’ 109 _seq._
Good, The, 3, 92, 106;
(human) or Well-being, its relation to Happiness and to Duty, 3;
(human) is either (_a_) Happiness or (_b_) Perfection or Excellence
of human existence, 114, 115;
the absolute and unconditional, in Kant’s view, 222;
in English ethical thought, 423 note 1
Good conduct, 106, 107, 112-113;
standard of, needed, 113;
Greek conception of, 107 note 1, 404-405, 405 note 1
Good Faith, 224, 303-311 _passim_, 352-354, 355;
stringency of the duty of, 304-305;
obligation of, affected by (_a_) fraud or force, 305-306,
306 note 1, (_b_) material change of circumstances, 306-308,
(_c_) misapprehension, 309, (_d_) use of a prescribed formula,
309, 310
Good Taste, 108
Good humour, 321
Goodness, implies relation to consciousness or feeling, 113-114,
113 note 2;
(Moral) and Beauty, 107-108, 107 note 1, 228
Government--by Consent of Subjects, 297, 351;
Aristocratic and Democratic Principles of, 299;
established, difficulty of identifying, 300, 301
Governmental Authority, conflicting claims to, 296, 297, 299-301;
ideal, 297-299
Grant Allen, 187;
_Physiological Æsthetics_, 187 note 1
Gratitude, 259-261, 437-438;
universalised, furnishes the principle ‘that desert ought to be
requited,’ 279, 279 note 1, 280;
Kant on, 223, 223 note 1
‘Greatest Happinesss,’ meaning of, 121, 413;
Utilitarian notion of, its extent, 414;
total and average, distinguished, 415, 416
‘Greatest Pleasure,’ explanation of, 44 note 3
Greek ethical thought, the problem of, 106;
tautological maxims of, 375-376
Green, T. H., 132 _seq._, 134 note 3, 135 note 3;
(_Introduction to Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature_) 132 note 2,
133 note 3;
(_Prolegomena to Ethics_) 93 note 1, 133 note 1, 134 notes 1 and 2,
135 notes 1 and 2, 363 note 1
Grote, J., _An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy_, 432 note 1
Gurney, E., 123, 184; (_Tertium Quid_) 123 note 1;
(_Power of Sound_) 184 note 1
Hallam, 423 note 1
Hamilton, 139, 180-182;
(_Lectures on Metaphysics_) 180 note 3
Happiness--as End, 7, 8, 78;
and Duty, connexion between, 162-175 _passim_;
and Duty, are they coincident? 162, 163, 165, 176;
and Duty, Plato’s view of relation between, 171-172;
and Virtue, 174-175, 459;
and Virtue, connexion of, in Aristotle’s view, 121-122;
determination and measurement of, an inevitable problem for
Ethics, 176;
production of, 176-177;
relation of, to mental concentration and dissipation, 193;
and Self-development, 192-193;
rejection of, as end, leaves us unable to frame a coherent account
of Ultimate Good, 406;
an objection to, as Ultimate Good, considered, 407 note 1;
principle of distribution of, required, 416, 417;
universal, as divine end, 503-505;
Christian view of, 120, 138;
Sources of, 151 _seq._
‘Happiness,’ 41 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 93 note 1;
ambiguity of, 92;
precise meaning of, 120
Harm, 292, 293
Harmony as cause of Pleasure, 189
Health, 153, 154, 159
‘Hedonism,’ meaning of, 93
Hedonism (Ethical), the two Methods of, are Universalistic and
Egoistic, 11;
connexion between the two Methods of, 84, 497 _seq._;
objections to, stated and considered:--(_a_) that the calculation
required by the Empirical-reflective method is too complex for
practice, 131, 132;
(_b_) that “pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived,” 132, 133;
(_c_) that “a sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning,”
133, 134;
(_d_) that transient pleasures are unsatisfying, 135;
(_e_) that the pursuit of pleasure tends to defeat its own end,
136 _seq._;
(_f_) that the habit of introspective comparison of pleasures
is unfavourable to pleasure, 138-140;
(_g_) that any quantitative comparison of pleasures is vague and
uncertain, 140-150;
Deductive, 176-195 _passim_;
deductive, Spencer’s view of, 177 note 1;
Method of, must be empirical, 195;
Empirical, method of, 460;
and Intuitionism, 461;
and Pessimism, 131 Note
Hedonistic Zero (or neutral feeling), 124, 125
Helvetius, 88
Highest Good, the (cf. _The Good_ and _Ultimate Good_), 106
Hobbes, 44 note 1, 56, 86, 89, 103, 109, 300 note 1, 423, 476;
(_Leviathan_) 89 note 1
Holmes, O. W., jun., _The Common Law_, 281 note 1
Honour, Code of, 30, 31, 168, 340
Hume, 23, 86, 104, 220, 384, 419, 423, 424, 423 notes 1 and 2,
426, 440, 441, 493;
(_Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_) 44 note 2,
220 note 2, 424
Humility, 334-336 _passim_, 355, 356 note 1, 429
Hunger, 45, 46
Hutcheson, 44 note 2, 50, 86, 86 note 2, 104, 366;
(_System of Moral Philosophy_) 366 note 1
Hypothetical Imperatives imply an ulterior end, 6, 7, 37
Ideal and Actual, relation between, 79;
connected (_a_) in the conception of “God’s Will,” 79,
(_b_) in the notion of “Nature,” 80-83
Ideal--Government, no consensus as to what kind is legitimate,
299 _seq._;
and Traditional Authority, 296;
Society, ethics of, how far useful, 22-24, 465
“Idols of the Cave” and “Idols of the Tribe,” 152
Impulse to do acts _quâ_ recognised as right (= Moral Motive), 77
Impulses, extra-regarding and self-regarding may conflict, 51, 52, 136
Indifference (Neutrality) of feeling, cf. _Hedonistic Zero_
Individualistic--Ideal, 286-287;
and Socialistic Ideals, 293, 294, 444-445
Inequality, Reasonable, 268 _seq._
Ingenuity, 236
Intention, 60 note 1, 202, 202 note 1
Interest, meaning of, 7, 120;
ethical character of, in Butler’s view, 176 note 1
‘Internal acts,’ 204
Instinctive impulses regarded as inherited experience, 193, 194
Intrinsic value, how determined, 288, 289
Intuition of rightness of acts, excludes consideration of (_a_)
ulterior consequences, 96, 97, (_b_) “induction from experience”
of pleasures, 97, 98 (cf. 102 note 1)
Intuitional--Method, cf. _Intuitionism_;
moralists, English, may be broadly classified as Dogmatic and
Philosophical, 103, 104
‘Intuitional’--sense in which used, 96, 97, 98;
wider and narrower senses of, 97, 102 note 1, 201
Intuitionism, 3, 8, 17, 20, 96-104 _passim_, 199-216 _passim_;
differences of its method due to two causes, 103;
its method issues in Universalistic Hedonism (Utilitarianism),
406-407;
chronological development of the method of, in England, 103-104;
and Utilitarianism, 85-86, 388-389, 423-457 _passim_, 496-497;
Philosophical, 102-104, 373-389 _passim_;
Perceptional, 98-100, 102;
Dogmatic, 100-101 (cf. _Intuitionism_, _Intuitive Morality_,
_Positive Morality_, _Morality of Common Sense_);
Dogmatic, fundamental assumption of, 101, 200, 201;
three phases of, 102, 103;
a variety of, constituted by substituting for ‘right’ the notion
‘good,’ 105-107;
Æsthetic, 228, 392;
Jural or Rational, 228-229
‘Intuitive’ or ‘_a priori_’ Morality generally used to mean Dogmatic
Intuitionism or Morality of Common Sense, 101-102
Irrational choice--sometimes conscious and deliberate, 36, 37-38,
41-42, 58, 59, 110;
Socratic and Aristotelian view compared with modern view of,
59 note 1
Jural method of Ethics, 100-101
Just claims--arising from contract, 269;
arising from natural and normal expectations, 269, 270, 270 note 1
‘Justice,’ ‘justify,’ etc., uses of, 264 note 2, 270, 286, 442
Justice, 20, 99, 264-294 _passim_, 349-352, 355, 440-448 _passim_;
or Equity, essence of, 496;
specially difficult to define, 264;
intuitional view of the definition of, 264;
involves notion of distribution, 265, 266, 268, 271;
and Law, connexion between, 265, 266, 267 note 1;
distinct from Order (or Law-observance), 265;
and Equality, 266, 267, 267 note 1, 268, 268 note 1, 279,
285 note 1;
and taxation, 266, 266 note 1;
Conservative and Ideal, 272-273, 273 note 1, 274, 293, 294;
Ideal, 273, 274, 293, 294, 444, 445;
Ideal, and Natural Eights, 274, 275;
Ideal, and Freedom, 278, 279;
Corrective, 281;
Reparative, 281, 282, 281 note 1, 282 note 1, 293;
Reparative and Retributive, distinguished, 282-283, 282 note 2;
and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 285;
and ‘Equity’ or ‘Fairness,’ 285, 286;
Hume’s treatment of, 440
Kant, 6, 7, 11 note 1, 36, 58, 58 note 1, 209, 210, 210 note 1,
222, 223, 239, 240, 315, 327 note 1, 366, 385, 386, 386 note 1,
389-390 Note, 486, Appendix 510;
(_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_) 209 note 1, 389-390 Note;
(_Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_) 223 note 1,
327 note 1, 366 note 3, 386 note 2, 389 Note;
(_Kritik der reinen Vernunft_) 366 note 3
Kant’s Fundamental Moral Rule or Categorical Imperative as criterion
of rightness, 209-210, 209 note 1, 210 note 1, 339 note 1, 386,
389 Note, 486
Knowledge--as an End, 114, 399, 401;
and Feeling (= Cognition and Pleasure or Pain), relation between,
139, 140;
and Feeling, Hamilton’s view of the relation between, 139
_Laisser faire_ and economic production, 445 note 2
Law, 295-303; and Morality, relation between, 29, 457;
and Positive Morality, 164;
Austin’s definition of, 300 note 1
Laws--just, characteristics of, 266, 267, 271-272;
that ought to be obeyed, are laid down by rightful authority, 296
Law-observance (or Order), 295-303 _passim_, 352, 440, 441;
and Good Faith, 295, 303;
in regard to _mala prohibita_, 302 note 1
Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 50 note 1, 399 note 1, 427 note 1
Legal obligation and punishment, 29
Liberality, 324-326, 325 note 1, 355
Libertarian position, 58, 64-65, 66
Liberty, Sentiment of, 58
Locke, (_Essay_) 205, 280 note 1, 503;
ethical view of, 205, 206
Love, 50, 244, 245, 367, 368;
common sense estimate of, 245, 258, 258 note 1
Loyalty, 223, 244, 254
Mackenzie, J. S., 47, 48
Maine, Sir H., (_Ancient Law_) 461 note 2
Malevolence--character of, as motive, 364;
sometimes sweepingly condemned, 321, 324;
sometimes partially approved on Utilitarian grounds, 322, 323, 324
Malevolent affections natural and normal, 320, 321
Marcus Aurelius, 376 note 1
‘Market value,’ 286 _seq._
Marriage, Plato’s ideal of, 358-359 (cf. 348 note 1)
Martineau, 366, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372;
(_Types of Ethical Theory_) 367 note 1, 369 note 1
Maxims--of Virtue, dependence or independence of, 313;
of Justice, Prudence and Benevolence, self-evident element in,
380-382
‘Maximum Happiness’ as criterion of conduct, 134
Meanness, notion of, examined, 325, 326
Meekness, 321
Mercy, 321
Merit, 68 note 2, 284 _seq._;
(cf. _Desert_)
Method of Ethics, definition of, 1;
only one rational, 6, 12;
more than one natural, 6
_Methods of Ethics, The_, purpose of, 11-14, 78
Mildness, 321
Mill, J. S., 44, 85, 87, 94, 121, 177 note 1, 412 notes 1 and 2,
414, 418, 440, 478, 504;
(_Utilitarianism_) 93 note 1, 461 note 1, 499 note 1;
(_On Liberty_) 478 notes 1 and 2
_Mind_, 87 Note, 477 note 1
Modern ethical thought quasi-jural in character, 106
Moral Faculty--a function of Reason, 23-38 _passim_;
why subject of ethical discussion, 4, 5;
Utilitarian theory of origin of, 461, 462, 497
Moral Judgment, 23-38;
object of, 60, 61, 201-202, 202 note 1, 222, 362, 364;
(or Practical) Reason, 33-34, 34 notes 1, 2, 3; 39, 40, 100 _seq._;
Sense, 34;
Reasoning, the most natural type of, 6, 12 _seq._, 102-103, 493-494;
Sentiment, 26-28, 77;
Sentiments, (_a_) difficulties of admitting or rejecting them as
motives, 365-367, (_b_) theory of their derivation from
experiences of pleasure and pain, 461, 462;
and Quasi-moral Sentiments, 28, 173, 174;
Motive, 77, 204 _seq._, 223;
Motive, varying forms of:--(_a_) Reverence for Authority,
(_b_) Religious Sentiment, (_c_) Self-respect,
(_d_) sentiment of Freedom, (_e_) Admiration or Aspiration,
39-40;
instincts and crude Utilitarian reasonings--discrepancy between,
466, 467;
Intuitions, 211-216 _passim_;
Intuitions, existence of, 211, 212, 337;
Intuitions, connexion between (_a_) Existence and Origin of,
211, 212, (_b_) Origin and Validity of, 34 note 1, 212-213,
212 note 2, 214;
Intuitions, Particular and General, 99-102, 214-216;
Rules, imperative and indicative forms of, 101 note 1;
Rules and Axioms, importance of, 229;
Axioms, abstract but significant, 379-384, 505;
Axioms, Kant’s view of, 385-386, 386 notes 1 and 2;
Maxims, 337-361 _passim_;
Maxims which _are_, and which are _not_, directly self-evident,
distinction between, 383;
Responsibility, 59-60;
Obligation, 217;
and non-moral excellence distinguished, 426, 427
‘Moral’ (in narrower sense) and ‘Prudential’ distinguished, 25-26
Moral Courage, 333 note 3
Moral Philosophy, some problems of modern, 374
Morality--‘inductive’ and ‘intuitive,’ double ambiguity of antithesis
between, 97-99;
_a priori_ and _a posteriori_ (or inductive and intuitive), 97;
and growth of Sympathy, 455-456, 455 note 1
Morality of Common Sense (Intuitionism), 85, 102, 229, 263 Note,
337-361 _passim_;
and Positive Morality, 215;
and Egoism, 498-499 (cf. _Happiness and Duty_);
development of, not perfectly Utilitarian, 455-456;
axiomatic character of its maxims questioned, 338, 342, 343;
furnishes valuable practical rules but not ultimate axioms,
360, 361;
and Utilitarianism, 361 note 1, 423-457 _passim_, 461, 498, 499;
first principles of, as “middle axioms” of Utilitarianism, 461;
Mill’s view of, 461 note 1;
not to be accepted by Utilitarianism without modification,
461 _seq._, 467
Motive meaning of, 202, 362, 363;
and Intention, 202, 203, 203 note 1;
-s, different views of Right, 204-207;
and Desire, Green’s view of, 363 note 1;
and Disposition, Utilitarian estimate of, 493, 494
Motives to action, 23;
as subjects of moral judgment, 362-372;
as affecting morality of actions, 60-61, 224;
regarded as _better_ and _worse_ rather than _good_ and
_bad_, 363-364;
‘seductive,’ 364;
(“Springs of action”) Dr. Martineau’s table of (369)
ethically estimated, 371, 372;
‘higher’ not always to be preferred to ‘lower,’ 369, 370, 371;
moral regulation of, 370
Natural, The--Interpretation of, 80 _seq._;
gives no definite practical criterion of right conduct, 82
Natural--Selection, effect of, on impulses, 194;
and normal claims, indefiniteness of, 270, 271, 272, 272 note 1;
expectations, ambiguity of, 272, 273, 352;
Rights--difficulty of determining, 298;
Good, 477
Nature--Life according to, 79 _seq._, 377, 378;
conformity to, 80;
Stoic use of, 377, 378 note 1;
Butler’s use of, 378
Neighbourhood and Nationality, duties of, 250, 251, 252
Neutral excitements, 186 note 1 (cf. _Hedonistic Zero_)
‘Objective’ and ‘subjective,’ ethical application of, 207, 207 note 1,
208 notes 1 and 2, 208, 209, 210, 344 note 2, 394, 395, 429, 430
Objective Hedonism, meaning of, 151;
and Common Sense, 151-161;
advantages of, 151;
defects of, 151 _seq._, 458, 459
Objective relations of conscious mind, how far desirable, 400, 401
Objectivity of Moral Judgment, 27, 33
Order, cf. _Law-observance_
Origin of Moral Intuitions, ethical importance of, 383, 384,
384 note 1
‘Ought,’ 23-38 _passim_;
relative and unconditional uses of, 6, 7, 39;
implies reasonableness, 25;
and ‘right’ imply the same notion, 1 note 1, 23, 25;
does not refer to matters of fact, 25;
implies objectivity, 27, 33;
does not merely signify (_a_) appropriateness of means to ends,
26, (_b_) an emotion of the person judging, 26-28, nor
(_c_) bound under penalties, 29 _seq._;
an elementary and irresolvable notion, 32-33;
narrower and wider sense of, 33, 34, 34 note 4;
carries with it an impulse to action, 34;
implies possible conflict with reason (thus distinguishable from
‘right’), 34, 35, 217;
determinist sense of, 78;
loose meaning of, 508
Owen, Robert, 291
Pain--definition of, 42-43 note 1, 180, 191;
the negative quantity of pleasure, 124, 125;
physical concomitant of, 183 _seq._;
Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 _seq._, 180 note 1,
181 note 1;
Mr. Stout’s theory of, 182, 188, etc.;
Mr. Spencer’s theory of, 183 _seq._;
Grant Allen’s view of, 187;
biological theory of, 190 _seq._
Paley, 86, 121
Parents and children, duties of, 243, 243 note 1, 248-250,
248 note 1, 346, 347
Patriotism, 223, 244, 245;
duties of, 251, 252, 252 note 1
‘Perception,’ ethical use of, by Dugald Stewart, 103 Note
Perfection or Excellence as End, 10, 11, 10 notes 3 and 4,
20 note 1, 78, 114, 115;
and Intuitionism, 11, 83, 84, 97;
Kant’s treatment of, 386 note 2
Perfectionists, view of, 97
Philosophical Intuitionism, its relation to Common Sense Morality, 373
φρόνησις, 231 note 1
Pity or Compassion, 262
Placability, 321
Plato, (_Republic_) 21, 171, 172;
140, 145, 148, 171, 172, 281, 345, 348 note 1, 358, 375 note 1, 376;
(_Gorgias_) 405 note 1; 441
Pleasure--definitions of, 42, 43, 43 note 1, 125, 127 _seq._,
131, 190;
ambiguities of, 43, 44, 93 _seq._;
forecast of, must take account of moral or quasi-moral pleasures,
40, 173;
the less sometimes chosen in preference to the greater, 41, 42,
42 note 1, 136;
of Virtue, its ‘disinterestedness’ not abnormal, 50, 51;
as aim of unconscious action, 52, 53;
as ‘original’ aim of action, 53, 54;
application of the term, 93;
has only quantitative differences, 94, 95, 121;
maximum, deductive methods of determining, 121, 122;
rational as opposed to impulsive pursuit of, 124 note 1;
‘quality’ of, 94, 95, 121, 128-129, 128 note 1;
as Feeling, conceivableness of, 132, 133;
permanent sources of, 135, 136, 153;
how estimated, 141 _seq._ (cf. 127, 128, 398);
from others’ pain, various modes of, 321 note 1;
and Appetite, identified by Hobbes, 44 note 1;
and Desire, controversy as to relation between, 39-56;
Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 _seq._, 180 note 1,
181 note 1;
Mr. Stout’s theory of, 182, 188, etc.;
Mr. Spencer’s theory of, 183 _seq._;
Grant Allen’s view of, 187;
biological theory of, 190 _seq._;
and Desire, (_a_) Mill’s view of, 43-44, (_b_) Butler’s view of,
44, (_c_) Bain’s view of, 54-56;
effect of desire on estimate of, 144, 145;
and Preservation, 190, etc.;
(Hobbes’ view of) 89;
and Perfection or Reality, (Self-development), Spinoza’s view
of, 90;
and ‘quantity of life,’ 192;
‘pure’ 143;
of pursuit, 46 _seq._, 47 note 1, 55-56;
of attainment, 47;
of business, 49;
intellectual and æsthetic, 107-108, 153, 157, 472;
benevolent and sympathetic, 49, 50;
of virtue, 153, 170, 171, 174, 175;
-s, of the animal life, 154, 157, 159;
of wealth and greatness, Adam Smith’s view of, 155 note 1--(cf.
_Health_, _Wealth_, etc.);
Stoic view of, 129;
Green’s view of, 132 _seq._;
Plato’s view of its illusoriness, 140;
Spencer and Grant Allen’s ‘Intermittence’ theory of, 187
Pleasures and Pains, Moral, 170 _seq._, 171 note 1;
of Sympathy, 49, 50, 499-502, 499 note 1;
scale of, involves assumption of a Hedonistic zero, 124, 125;
commensurability of, 123-125, 124 note 1, 128 note 1, 131,
132, 140-150;
difficulties of a clear, definite and consistent evaluation of,
140-150;
incommensurable intensity of, doubtful, 123, 124;
intensity of, commensurable with duration, 124;
Bentham’s four dimensions of, 124 note 1;
volitional efficacy of, 125-127;
their relation to normal activities, 185, etc.;
Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 _seq._;
Stout’s theory of, 182;
Wundt’s theory of, 184;
Spencer’s biological theory of, 190 _seq._
Plutarch, 376
Politeness (Good Breeding, Fashion, Etiquette), 253;
Code of, 30, 340, 341
Political order, Rousseau’s view of an ideally just, 298
Politics--and Ethics, 15-22;
definition of, 1 note 1, 15 (cf. Law)
Positive Morality--and Morality of Common Sense, 215;
relation of, to preservation and to happiness, 464, 465;
alteration of, 164, 480
Power, 156, 157, 159
Practical efficacy and speculative truth, relation between, 507 note 1
Practical Empirical Hedonism, an assumption of, 131
Practical (or Moral) Judgment, 23 seq.
Practical (or Moral) Reason, 23-38 _passim_;
its relation to Interest and to non-rational and irrational
desires, 36;
and Nature, 81;
a postulate of, 6, 12;
Dualism of, 404 note 1, 366, 200, 205-206, 499, 507-509 (cf.
_Happiness and Duty_)
Praise, common sense award of, explained by utility, 428, 429
Priestley, 88 Note
Promise, 303-311 _passim_;
conditions and meaning of, 304;
conditions of bindingness of a, 311
Proof of a first principle, how possible, 419, 420
Proof--of Egoism may be demanded, 418, 419;
of ordinary moral rules is often required and given, 419
Proof of Utilitarianism, 418-422 _passim_;
clear demand of common sense for, 418, 419;
addressed to Egoism, 420, 421, 497-498;
addressed to Intuitionism, twofold character of, 421, 422
“Proof” of Utilitarian principle, Mill’s, 387, 388
Property and Right of Bequest, 277
Prudence (or Forethought), 7, 36, 96, 391;
common sense view of, 327, 328;
Kant’s and Butler’s views of, 327 note 1;
self-evident maxim of impartiality educible from the rule of, 381;
and Benevolence, subordination of other virtues to, 496-497
‘Prudential’ and ‘Moral,’ 25-26
Psychological Hedonism, 40 _seq._;
of Bentham, 85;
ethical import of, 41, 205
Public Opinion, Code of, 30
Public and private virtue, Utilitarian and Intuitionist estimates
of, 495
Punishment, 281, 290 _seq._, 290 note 1, 291 note 1;
preventive and retributory views of, 71-72
Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2, 357-359
Quantitative Hedonism, 129
Quasi-moral Sentiment, 27-28, 173-174
Quasi-moral Sentiments and Rational Self-love, 173-174
Rank of Motives, difficulties of estimating, 365-367, 369;
conflicting estimates of, by moralists, 366;
difficulty due to complexity of motive, 368
Rational action, not to be identified with (_a_) disinterested or
(_b_) free action, 57;
Spinoza’s view of the principle of, 89-90
Rational Benevolence, 96;
may be self-limiting, 385;
Kant’s treatment of, 385-386 Note, 389-390
Rational Self-love (Rational Egoism, Prudence)--and Conscience,
172, 200, 200 note 2, 366;
and Rational Benevolence, 386 note 4, 498 _seq._
Reason--and Ultimate Ends, 9, 77, 77 note 1;
relation of, to Will and Desire, 23 _seq._;
reference of moral judgments to, signifies merely their
_objectivity_, 33;
conflict with, implied in the terms _dictate_, _precept_,
_imperative_, _ought_, _duty_, _moral obligation_, 34, 35;
dictate or precept of, is a rule which may be deviated from, 41;
dictates or imperatives of, 34, 36, 77;
and the Divine Will, 79, 80;
dictate of, implied by _right_, _rightness_, and their equivalents,
105;
and instinct, 193-195;
may be self-limiting, 345;
_dictates_ and _dictation_ of, 345, 395, 404
Reason for doing what is seen to be right, why men demand a, 5-6
Reasonableness of Self-love, Butler’s view of, 119, 120;
Clarke’s view of, 120;
Christian view of, 120;
common sense view of, 120
Rebellion, when justifiable?, 299, 300, 301, 352
Reciprocity, principle of, 167, 168
Religious deception, 316, 316 note 2
Renan quoted, 108 note 1
Reputation, 155
Resentment, instinctive and deliberate, 322, 323;
deliberate, Butler’s view of, 323 note 1, 371;
universalised the principle of retributive (criminal) justice, 281;
evaluation of, 449
Resolutions, 37;
general, may be contradicted by particular volitions, 37-38
Respect, tokens of, 336, 336 note 1
Reverence for Authority, 39
‘Right’--notion involved in, is unique, 25;
and ‘good,’ 3, 4;
and ‘ought,’ distinction between, 34, 35;
conduct and ‘good’ conduct, 106, 113
Right Conflict and Ultimate Good, 3
Rights, 274, etc.
Rightful authority, how known?, 296;
what are its limits?, 301, 302
Rousseau, 298;
his political ideal, difficulty of realising, 298, 299
‘Rule of Equity,’ Clarke’s, 384-385
‘Rule of Love or Benevolence,’ Clarke’s, 385
‘Rules of Righteousness,’ Clarke’s, 384, 384 note 4, 385
Rules prescribing actions as _good_ or _right_ open to Utilitarian
interpretation, 430
Sagacity, 236
Sanctions, 164-175 _passim_, 498, 499, 500 _seq._, 502, 505, 507-508;
conflict of, 164, 165;
legal, and happiness, 165, 166, 165 note 1;
social, and happiness, 166, 167;
social, and extra-legal duty, 167, 168;
internal, and happiness, 170, 170 note 1, 171, 171 note 1, 172,
173, 501-502
Scottish School of Ethical Thought, 104
Self-control, 235-237, 331, 344, 345, 356
Self-development (Self-realisation), indefiniteness of the notion,
90, 91;
as ethical aim, 192, 193;
understood as = _yielding to instinctive impulses_, 193-194
Self-evidence, difficulty of discerning real, 339, 340, 341
Self-interest, 25, 26
Self-love, ordinary use and ambiguity of, 89;
and certain elevated impulses, 137-138;
Butler’s view of, 93;
and benevolence and affection, 138, 403, 502
Self-preservation, 89
Self-realisation, 80, 90, 95
Self-regarding virtues, 327-331
Self-sacrifice, 109 note 1, 138, 431, 432
Self-satisfaction, Green’s view of, 133, 135, 135 note 3
Selfishness, 499
Services, comparative worth of, how determined, 286, 287;
reward of, how determined, 290
Shaftesbury, 86, 86 notes 1 and 2, 138, 423, 423 note 1, 433, 501
Sidgwick, _Principles of Political Economy_, 267 note, 445 note 2,
446 note 1
Sincerity, 355
Smith, Adam, 424, 461, (_Wealth of Nations, Theory of Moral
Sentiments_) 155 note 1
Social Contract, 17, 297-298, 303, 351
Social rank and status, 153, 155
Socialistic ideal, 289, 293-294
Sociology--scope and subject of, 2;
present condition of, 472, 473
Socrates, 59 note 1, 98-99, 215, 231 note 1, 299
Socratic Induction, 98-99
Socratic principle of “Government by experts,” 299
σοφία, σοφός, 231, 231 note 1
Sources of Happiness, 135, 136, 153 _seq._;
judgments of common sense respecting them, only roughly
trustworthy, 158-160;
common sense estimates of (_a_) at best are only true for
ordinary persons, (_b_) are vitiated by mal-observation,
(_c_) confuse between objects of natural desire and sources of
experienced pleasure, 151, 152, (_d_) mix moral and æsthetic
preferences with hedonistic, 153, (_e_) are found to be full
of inconsistencies, 153-158
Sovereign power, Hobbist and Austinian views of, 300 note 1
Special moral codes, 30, 31, 168, 169, 340, 341
Special need, duties arising out of, 261, 262
Spencer, H., 125-126, 177 note 1, 183 _seq._, 194 note 1, 470,
471, 470 notes 1 and 2, 473;
(_Social Statics_), 18 note 2, 194 note 1;
(_Data of Ethics_), 18 note 2, 177 note 1, 194 note 1, 470 note 1
“Sphere of individual option” determined by Utilitarian calculation,
477-479
Spinoza, 90
Stephen, Leslie, 319 Note, 471, 471 note 2, 472, 473;
(_Science of Ethics_), 42 note 1, 471
Stewart, Dugald, 454, 455;
(_Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers_), 92 note 2, 454 note 1
Stoic system, its place in the development of ethical thought, 106;
ethics, circular reasonings of, 376, 377
Stoicism, later compared with earlier, 376 note 1
Stoics, 92, 105, 129
Stout, G. F., 180 note 2, 182, 186;
(_Analytic Psychology_), 182 note 1
Subjective, cf. _Objective_
_Suggestio falsi_, 317
Suicide prohibited by Common Sense, 327, 331, 356
Sully, _Pessimism_, 136 note 1, 186 note 1
_Suppressio veri_, 317
Sympathy--and Moral Sensibility, relation between, 170 note 1,
500-501;
with impulses prompting to action, 463, 463 note 2;
limitations and perversions of, 464;
twofold operation of, on moral impulses, 483;
confusion in Mill’s view of, 499 note 1;
and happiness of agent, 170 note 1, 499 note 1, 499-503
Systematic Morality, explanation of indifference or hostility
to, 99-100
Tautological propositions offered as ethical axioms, 374 _seq._
Temperance, 224, 328, 329, 344 note 1, 356
Torquemada, 226 note 1
‘True Good,’ 3 (cf. _Good_, _Ultimate Good_)
Truth, Cartesian Criterion of, 339
Ultimate End, for the individual and for the whole, 404, 497-498
Ultimate Good, My, 109 _seq._, 109 note 1, 497-498
Ultimate Good, The (the Good), 3, 106 _seq._, 391-407 _passim_
Ultimate reasonableness, different views of, implicit in ordinary
thought, 6
Ultimate reasons for conduct, 78, 79;
differences in, correspond to different aspects of human
existence, 78 (cf. 79)
‘Ultra-intuitional,’ 100
‘Unconscious Utilitarianism’ of Common Sense Morality, 453 _seq._,
489, etc.
Universal Happiness as standard and motive, 413
Universalistic and Egoistic Hedonism, connexion between (_a_) in
Bentham’s view, 87 Note;
(_b_) in Paley’s view, 121
Unveracity, common, 316 _seq._, 486
Utilitarian--formula of distribution not really at variance with
Common Sense, 432, 433;
justification of special affections, 433, 434;
ideal code, difficulties of constructing such, for present human
beings, 467-470;
rectification of Common Sense Morality must proceed by empirical
method, 476-480;
innovation, negative and destructive, probable effects of
(_a_) on the agent, 481, 482-483, (_b_) on others, 482, 483;
innovation, positive and supplementary, as affecting the agent
and others, 483, 484;
innovation in relation to degree of publicity and generality of
acceptance, 489-490, 489 note 1;
reform, consists largely in enforcing old rules, 484;
exceptions to current morality (_a_) may generally be stated as
fresh rules, 485, 489, (_b_) special and rare cases of, 486-487;
Duty and Religious Sanction, 503-506;
Sanction, 500 _seq._
Utilitarianism, 8, 11, 119;
(= Universalistic or Benthamite Hedonism), 84, 119, 411;
Proof of, 418-422;
Principle of, 87, (Mill’s view of) 387, 388;
Method of, 460-495;
meaning of, 411-417 _passim_;
to be distinguished from (_a_) Egoistic Hedonism, 411, 412,
(_b_) any psychogonical theory of the Moral Sentiments, 412-413;
_motive_ and _standard_ of, to be discriminated, 413;
contradictory objections to, 87;
and Intuitionism, relation between, 85-86, 386 _seq._, 496-497;
and Intuitionism, history of relation between, in English
ethical thought, 86, 423, 424;
and Egoism, relation between, 497, 498;
and Egoism, harmony of, (_a_) not empirically demonstrable, 503,
(_b_) required by Reason, 506;
and Common Sense Morality, 8, 423-457 _passim_, 468, 469, 475,
476, 480 _seq._, 498, 499;
justifies the unequal distribution which Common Sense approves,
432 _seq._;
more rigid than Common Sense, 499, 504;
function of, as arbiter to Common Sense, 454, 455;
reasonable attitude of, to Common Sense Morality, 473-474, 475-476;
aims at remedying imperfections of Common Sense Morality, 476;
and Axiom of Benevolence, 387, 388, 496-497, 498;
and Conjugal and Parental Duties, 435, 436;
and Duties of Special Need, 436, 437;
and Gratitude, 437, 438;
and benevolent Duties, 435 _seq._;
and Law-observance, 440, 441;
and Impartiality, 441, 442, 447, 447 note 1;
and Normal Expectations, 442-443;
and Good Faith, 443, 444, 443 note 3;
and Freedom, 444, 445;
and distribution according to Desert, 445-447;
and Justice, 440 _seq._, 447;
and Veracity, 448, 449, 483;
and Malevolence, 449;
and Self-regarding virtues, 450;
and Purity, 449-450;
and Sympathy, 500 _seq._;
and Christianity, 504
‘Utility,’ Hume’s and Bentham’s uses of, 423 note 2
Veracity, 97, 224, 313, 314-319 _passim_, 355, 448, 449;
and Good Faith, 303, 304, 313, 314
Virtue (Moral Perfection or Excellence), 10, 14, 78, 106,
219, 219 note 1, 220, 220 note 3, 221, 222, 226, 227;
or Right Action, its relation to the Good, 106;
and Happiness, 119, 120, 174-175, 461;
Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of, 376;
involves reference to an Ultimate Good which is not Virtue,
393, 394, 395;
and Duty, 217-230 _passim_;
and emotion, 222-223, 226;
voluntariness of, 220, 227;
and motive, 223-224;
and habit, 227;
and moral effort, relation between, 224, 225, 429;
intellectual conditions of, 225;
is Knowledge, Socratic doctrine that, 227 note 1;
felicific character of, 424, 425
Virtues, intellectual, 231-237 _passim_;
self-regarding, 327-331 _passim_
Virtuous conduct, commonly regarded as disinterested, 77, 78
Virtuous motives, admitted by some moralists, 365, 366;
Dr. Martineau’s rejection of, 367
Vivisection controversy, 402, 406 note 1
Volition, analysis of, 61, 62;
Determinist view of, 62 note 1;
conception of, how far inevitably Libertarian, 67, 71;
causes muscular contractions, 73;
affects thought and feeling, 73, 74;
acting through resolutions alters men’s tendencies to action,
74, 75, 75 note 1;
its emotional antecedents of secondary ethical importance, 77
Voluntary action, definition of, 59
Voluntary choice and irresistible impulse, 67 note 3
Wayland, _Elements of Moral Science_, 256 note 2
Wealth, 153, 154, 155
Well-being (the Good attainable in human life), 92, 92 note 1;
Stoic view of, 92;
Aristotle’s view of, 92, 92 note 2;
not = mere promise of future being, 396, 397
Whewell, 58, 86;
(_Elements of Morality_), 58 note 2, 317 note 1, 329 note 1
Will--Subjective Rightness of, and Ultimate Good, 394, 395;
divorced from Objective Rightness is fanaticism, 395
Wisdom, 230, 231-236 _passim_, 344, 345, 393, 430;
meaning and use of term, 231;
Greek view of, 231;
common sense definition of, 233;
refers to ends as well as means, 231-233;
in selection of ends and means, how far voluntary, 233-235;
in adoption of selected ends, 235;
comprehensiveness of, 238;
and Temperance and Justice, tautological maxims of, 375;
and Caution and Decision, do not furnish independent rules, 237 Note
Wundt, 184 note 3
Zeal or Moral Ardour, 237, 392
Zeno, 376
THE END
_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.
* * * * *
Transcriber's Note
Many references in the index are to the original numbers of the notes,
which do not correspond to the renumbering used in this e-text.
The following apparent errors have been corrected:
p. ix "more that" changed to "more than"
p. xii "chap iv." changed to "chap. iv."
p. xix "chap iv." changed to "chap. iv."
p. xxviii "201" changed to "201-207"
p. xxxv "legal code" changed to "legal code."
p. 44 "his own," changed to "his own."
p. 55 "adapted by" changed to "adopted by"
p. 272 (note) "§ 2" changed to "§ 2."
p. 318 (note) "chap i." changed to "chap. i."
p. 415 (note) "appear" changed to "appears"
p. 492 "let as" changed to "let us"
p. 518 "285:" changed to "285;"
p. 519 "cf. Law" changed to "cf. _Law_"
p. 519 "cf. Perfection" changed to "cf. _Perfection_"
p. 520 "180-182," changed to "180-182;"
p. 521 "Hedonistic Zero" changed to "_Hedonistic Zero_"
p. 522 "Note; 486" changed to "Note, 486"
p. 523 "203 note 1," changed to "203 note 1;"
p. 524 "84, 97:" changed to "84, 97;"
p. 526 "Good, Ultimate Good" changed to "_Good_, "Ultimate Good"
The following possible errors have been left as printed:
p. 177 evaluing
p. 524 405 note 1; 441
The following are used inconsistently in the text:
Common-sense and Common-Sense
counterbalancing and counter-balancing
fairminded and fair-minded
goodwill and good-will
highminded and high-minded
lawgiver and law-giver
note and Note
truthspeaking, truth-speaking, Truthspeaking and Truth-speaking
twofold and two-fold
_vice versâ_ and _vice versa_
wellbeing, well-being, Wellbeing and Well-being
widespread and wide-spread
wrongdoing and wrong-doing