REVIEW OF THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE
§ 1. We have now concluded such detailed examination of the morality
of Common Sense as, on the plan laid down in chap. i. of this Book,
it seemed desirable to undertake. We have not discussed all the terms
of our common moral vocabulary: but I believe that we have omitted
none that are important either in themselves or relatively to our
present inquiry. For of those that remain we may fairly say, that they
manifestly will not furnish independent maxims: for reflection will
show that the conduct designated by them is either prescribed merely as
a means to the performance of duties already discussed; or is really
identical with the whole or part of some of these, viewed in some
special aspect, or perhaps specialised by the addition of some peculiar
circumstance or condition.
Let us now pause and survey briefly the process in which we have been
engaged, and the results which we have elicited.
We started with admitting the point upon the proof of which moralists
have often concentrated their efforts, the existence of apparently
independent moral intuitions. It seemed undeniable that men judge
some acts to be right and wrong in themselves, without consideration
of their tendency to produce happiness to the agent or to others: and
indeed without taking their consequences into account at all, except in
so far as these are included in the common notion of the act. We saw,
however, that in so far as these judgments are passed in particular
cases, they seem to involve (at least for the more reflective part of
mankind) a reference of the case to some general rule of duty: and
that in the frequent cases of doubt or conflict of judgments as to
the rightness of any action, appeal is commonly made to such rules
or maxims, as the ultimately valid principles of moral cognition.
In order, therefore, to throw the Morality of Common Sense into a
scientific form, it seemed necessary to obtain as exact a statement as
possible of these generally recognised principles. I did not think that
I could dispense myself from this task by any summary general argument,
based on the unscientific character of common morality. There is no
doubt that the moral opinions of ordinary men are in many points loose,
shifting, and mutually contradictory, but it does not follow that we
may not obtain from this fluid mass of opinion, a deposit of clear
and precise principles commanding universal acceptance. The question,
whether we can do this or not, seemed to me one which should not be
decided _a priori_ without a fair trial: and it is partly in order
to prepare materials for this trial that the survey in the preceding
eight chapters has been conducted. I have endeavoured to ascertain
impartially, by mere reflection on our common moral discourse, what are
the general principles or maxims, according to which different kinds of
conduct are judged to be right and reasonable in different departments
of life. I wish it to be particularly observed, that I have in no case
introduced my own views, in so far as I am conscious of their being at
all peculiar to myself: my sole object has been to make explicit the
implied premises of our common moral reasoning. I now wish to subject
the results of this survey to a final examination, in order to decide
whether these general formulæ possess the characteristics by which
self-evident truths are distinguished from mere opinions.
§ 2. There seem to be four conditions, the complete fulfilment of which
would establish a significant proposition, apparently self-evident,
in the highest degree of certainty attainable: and which must be
approximately realised by the premises of our reasoning in any inquiry,
if that reasoning is to lead us cogently to trustworthy conclusions.
I. The terms of the proposition must be clear and precise. The rival
originators of modern Methodology, Descartes and Bacon, vie with each
other in the stress that they lay on this point: and the latter’s
warning against the “notiones male terminatæ” of ordinary thought is
peculiarly needed in ethical discussion. In fact my chief business in
the preceding survey has been to free the common terms of Ethics, as
far as possible, from objection on this score.
II. The self-evidence of the proposition must be ascertained by careful
reflection. It is needful to insist on this, because most persons are
liable to confound intuitions, on the one hand with mere impressions
or impulses, which to careful observation do not present themselves as
claiming to be dictates of Reason; and on the other hand, with mere
opinions, to which the familiarity that comes from frequent hearing
and repetition often gives a false appearance of self-evidence which
attentive reflection disperses. In such cases the Cartesian method of
testing the ultimate premises of our reasonings, by asking ourselves
if we clearly and distinctly apprehend them to be true, may be of real
use; though it does not, as Descartes supposed, afford a complete
protection against error. A rigorous demand for self-evidence in our
premises is a valuable protection against the misleading influence of
our own irrational impulses on our judgments: while at the same time
it not only distinguishes as inadequate the mere external support of
authority and tradition, but also excludes the more subtle and latent
effect of these in fashioning our minds to a facile and unquestioning
admission of common but unwarranted assumptions.
And we may observe that the application of this test is especially
needed in Ethics. For, on the one hand, it cannot be denied that any
strong sentiment, however purely subjective, is apt to transform
itself into the semblance of an intuition; and it requires careful
contemplation to detect the illusion. Whatever we desire we are apt to
pronounce desirable: and we are strongly tempted to approve of whatever
conduct gives us keen pleasure.[256] And on the other hand, among the
rules of conduct to which we customarily conform, there are many which
reflection shows to be really derived from some external authority:
so that even if their obligation be unquestionable, they cannot be
intuitively ascertained. This is of course the case with the Positive
Law of the community to which we belong. There is no doubt that we
ought,--at least generally speaking,--to obey this: but what it is we
cannot of course ascertain by any process of abstract reflection, but
only by consulting Reports and Statutes. Here, however, the sources of
knowledge are so definite and conspicuous, that we are in no danger of
confounding the knowledge gained from studying them with the results
of abstract contemplation. The case is somewhat different with the
traditional and customary rules of behaviour which exist in every
society, supplementing the regulative operation of Law proper: here it
is much more difficult to distinguish the rules which a moral man is
called upon to define for himself, by the application of intuitively
known principles, from those as to which some authority external to the
individual is recognised as the final arbiter.[257]
We may illustrate this by referring to two systems of rules which we
have before[258] compared with Morality; the Law of Honour, and the
Law of Fashion or Etiquette. I noticed that there is an ambiguity in
the common terms ‘honourable’ and ‘dishonourable’; which are no doubt
sometimes used, like ethical terms, as implying an absolute standard.
Still, when we speak of the Code of Honour we seem to mean rules of
which the exact nature is to be finally determined by an appeal to
the general opinion of well-bred persons: we admit that a man is in a
sense ‘dishonoured’ when this opinion condemns him, even though we may
think his conduct unobjectionable or even intrinsically admirable.[259]
Similarly, when we consider from the point of view of reason the
rules of Fashion or Etiquette, some may seem useful and commendable,
some indifferent and arbitrary, some perhaps absurd and burdensome:
but nevertheless we recognise that the final authority on matters of
Etiquette is the custom of polite society; which feels itself under
no obligation of reducing its rules to rational principles. Yet it
must be observed that each individual in any society commonly finds in
himself a knowledge not obviously incomplete of the rules of Honour
and Etiquette, and an impulse to conform to them without requiring any
further reason for doing so. Each often seems to see at a glance what
is honourable and polite just as clearly as he sees what is right: and
it requires some consideration to discover that in the former cases
custom and opinion are generally the final authority from which there
is no appeal. And even in the case of rules regarded as distinctly
moral, we can generally find an element that seems to us as clearly
conventional as the codes just mentioned, when we contemplate the
morality of other men, even in our own age and country. Hence we may
reasonably suspect a similar element in our own moral code: and must
admit the great importance of testing rigorously any rule which we
find that we have a habitual impulse to obey; to see whether it really
expresses or can be referred to a clear intuition of rightness.
III. The propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually
consistent. Here, again, it is obvious that any collision between two
intuitions is a proof that there is error in one or the other, or in
both. Still, we frequently find ethical writers treating this point
very lightly. They appear to regard a conflict of ultimate rules as
a difficulty that may be ignored or put aside for future solution,
without any slur being thrown on the scientific character of the
conflicting formulæ. Whereas such a collision is absolute proof that
at least one of the formulæ needs qualification: and suggests a doubt
whether the correctly qualified proposition will present itself with
the same self-evidence as the simpler but inadequate one; and whether
we have not mistaken for an ultimate and independent axiom one that is
really derivative and subordinate.
IV. Since it is implied in the very notion of Truth that it is
essentially the same for all minds, the denial by another of a
proposition that I have affirmed has a tendency to impair my confidence
in its validity. And in fact ‘universal’ or ‘general’ consent has often
been held to constitute by itself a sufficient evidence of the truth
of the most important beliefs; and is practically the only evidence
upon which the greater part of mankind can rely. A proposition accepted
as true upon this ground alone has, of course, neither self-evidence
nor demonstrative evidence for the mind that so accepts it; still, the
secure acceptance that we commonly give to the generalisations of the
empirical sciences rests--even in the case of experts--largely on
the belief that other experts have seen for themselves the evidence
for these generalisations, and do not materially disagree as to
its adequacy. And it will be easily seen that the absence of such
disagreement must remain an indispensable negative condition of the
certainty of our beliefs. For if I find any of my judgments, intuitive
or inferential, in direct conflict with a judgment of some other mind,
there must be error somewhere: and if I have no more reason to suspect
error in the other mind than in my own, reflective comparison between
the two judgments necessarily reduces me temporarily to a state of
neutrality. And though the total result in my mind is not exactly
suspense of judgment, but an alternation and conflict between positive
affirmation by one act of thought and the neutrality that is the result
of another, it is obviously something very different from scientific
certitude.
Now if the account given of the Morality of Common Sense in the
preceding chapters be in the main correct, it seems clear that,
generally speaking, its maxims do not fulfil the conditions just
laid down. So long as they are left in the state of somewhat vague
generalities, as we meet them in ordinary discourse, we are disposed to
yield them unquestioning assent, and it may be fairly claimed that the
assent is approximately universal--in the sense that any expression of
dissent is eccentric and paradoxical. But as soon as we attempt to give
them the definiteness which science requires, we find that we cannot
do this without abandoning the universality of acceptance. We find,
in some cases, that alternatives present themselves, between which
it is necessary that we should decide; but between which we cannot
pretend that Common Sense does decide, and which often seem equally
or nearly equally plausible. In other cases the moral notion seems to
resist all efforts to obtain from it a definite rule: in others it is
found to comprehend elements which we have no means of reducing to a
common standard, except by the application of the Utilitarian--or some
similar--method. Even where we seem able to educe from Common Sense
a more or less clear reply to the questions raised in the process of
definition, the principle that results is qualified in so complicated
a way that its self-evidence becomes dubious or vanishes altogether.
And thus in each case what at first seemed like an intuition turns out
to be either the mere expression of a vague impulse, needing regulation
and limitation which it cannot itself supply, but which must be drawn
from some other source: or a current opinion, the reasonableness of
which has still to be shown by a reference to some other principle.
In order that this result may be adequately exhibited, I must ask
the reader to travel with me again through the series of principles
elicited from Common Sense in the previous chapters, and to examine
them from a somewhat different point of view. Before, our primary aim
was to ascertain impartially what the deliverances of Common Sense
actually are: we have now to ask how far these enunciations can claim
to be classed as Intuitive Truths.
The reader should observe that throughout this examination a double
appeal is made; on the one hand to his individual moral consciousness,
and, on the other hand, to the Common Sense of mankind, as expressed
generally by the body of persons on whose moral judgment he is
prepared to rely. I ask him (1) whether he can state a clear, precise,
self-evident first principle, according to which he is prepared to
judge conduct under each head: and (2) if so, whether this principle
is really that commonly applied in practice, by those whom he takes to
represent Common Sense.[260]
§ 3. If we begin by considering the duty of acting wisely, discussed in
chap. iii., we may seem perhaps to have before us an axiom of undoubted
self-evidence. For acting wisely appeared to mean taking the right
means to the best ends; _i.e._ taking the means which Reason indicates
to the ends which Reason prescribes. And it is evident that it must be
right to act reasonably. Equally undeniable is the immediate inference
from, or negative aspect of, this principle; that it is wrong to act
in opposition to rational judgment. This, taken in connexion with
the empirical fact of impulses in our minds conflicting with Reason,
gives--as another self-evident principle--the maxim of Temperance or
Self-control in its widest interpretation; _i.e._ ‘That reason should
never give way to Appetite or Passion.’[261] And these principles have
sometimes been enounced with no little solemnity as answering the
fundamental question of Ethics and supplying the basis or summary of a
doctrine of Practice.
But this statement of principles turns out to be one of those stages,
so provokingly frequent in the course of ethical reflection, which,
as far as practical guidance is concerned, are really brief circuits,
leading us back to the point from which we started. Or rather, to
prevent misapprehension, it should be observed that the maxims just
given may be understood in two senses: in one sense they are certainly
self-evident, but they are also insignificant: in another sense they
include more or less distinctly a direction to an important practical
duty, but as so understood they lose their self-evidence. For if the
rules of Wisdom and Self-control mean (1) that we ought always to do
what we see to be reasonable, and (2) that we are not to yield to any
impulse urging us in an opposite direction; they simply affirm that it
is our duty (1) generally, and (2) under special temptations, to do
what we judge to be our duty;[262] and convey no information as to the
method and principles by which duty is to be determined.
But if these rules are further understood (as they sometimes are
understood) to prescribe the cultivation of a habit of acting
rationally; that is, of referring each act to definitely conceived
principles and ends, instead of allowing it to be determined by
instinctive impulses; then I cannot see that the affirmation of this
as an universal and absolute rule of duty is self-evidently true. For
when Reason is considered not in the present as actually commanding,
but as an End of which a fuller realisation has to be sought in the
future; the point of view from which its sovereignty has to be judged
is entirely changed. The question is no longer whether the dictates of
Reason ought always to be obeyed, but whether the dictation of Reason
is always a Good; whether any degree of predominance of Reason over
mere Impulse must necessarily tend to the perfection of the conscious
self of which both are elements. And it is surely not self-evident
that this predominance cannot be carried too far; and that Reason is
not rather self-limiting, in the knowledge that rational ends are
sometimes better attained by those who do not directly aim at them
as rational. Certainly Common Sense is inclined to hold that in many
matters instinct is a better spring of action than reason: thus it
is commonly said that a healthy appetite is a better guide to diet
than a doctor’s prescription: and, again, that marriage is better
undertaken as a consequence of falling in love than in execution of a
tranquil and deliberate design: and we before observed (chap. iv.) that
there is a certain excellence in services springing from spontaneous
affection which does not attach to similar acts done from pure sense
of duty. And in the same way experience seems to show that many acts
requiring promptitude and vigour are likely to be more energetic and
effective, and that many acts requiring tact and delicacy are likely
to be more graceful and pleasant to others, if they are done not in
conscious obedience to the dictates of Reason but from other motives.
It is not necessary here to decide how far this view is true: it
suffices to say that we do not know intuitively that it is not true
to some extent; we do not know that there may not be--to use Plato’s
analogy--_over-government_ in the individual soul no less than in the
state. The residuum, then, of clear intuition which we have so far
obtained, is the insignificant proposition that it is our duty to do
what we judge to be our duty.
§ 4. Let us pass now to what I have called the duties of the
Affections, the rules that prescribe either love itself in some degree,
or the services that naturally spring from it in those relations where
it is expected and desired. Here, in the first place, the question
how far we are bound to render these services when we do not feel the
affection is answered differently in many cases by different persons,
and no determination of the limit seems self-evident. And similarly
if we ask whether affection itself is a duty; for on the one hand it
is at least only partially within the control of the will, and in so
far as it can be produced by voluntary effort, there is thought to
be something unsatisfactory and unattractive in the result; and on
the other hand, in certain relations it seems to be commonly regarded
as a duty. On those points the doctrine of Common Sense is rather a
rough compromise between conflicting lines of thought than capable of
being deduced from a clear and universally accepted principle. And
if we confine ourselves to the special relations where Common Sense
admits no doubt as to the broad moral obligation of at least rendering
such services as affection naturally prompts, still the recognised
rules of external duty in these relations are, in the first place,
wanting in definiteness and precision: and secondly, they do not, when
rigorously examined, appear to be, or to be referable to, independent
intuitions so far as the _particularity_ of the duties is concerned.
Let us take, for example, the duty of parents to children. We have
no doubt about this duty as a part of the present order of society,
by which the due growth and training of the rising generation is
distributed among the adults. But when we reflect on this arrangement
itself, we cannot see _intuitively_ that it is the best possible. It
may be plausibly maintained that children would be better trained,
physically and mentally, if they were brought up under the supervision
of physicians and philosophers, in large institutions maintained out
of the general taxes. We cannot decide _a priori_ which of these
alternatives is preferable; we have to refer to psychological and
sociological generalisations, obtained by empirical study of human
nature in actual societies. If, however, we consider the duty of
parents by itself, out of connexion with this social order, it is
certainly not self-evident that we owe more to our own children than
to others whose happiness equally depends on our exertions. To get the
question clear, let us suppose that I am thrown with my family upon a
desert island, where I find an abandoned orphan. Is it evident that I
am less bound to provide this child, as far as lies in my power, with
the means of subsistence, than I am to provide for my own children?
According to some, my special duty to the latter would arise from the
fact that I have brought them into being: but, if so, it would seem
that on this principle I have a right to diminish their happiness,
provided I do not turn it into a negative quantity; since, as without
me they would not have existed at all, they can, as my children, have
no claim upon me for more than an existence on the whole above zero in
respect of happiness. We might even deduce a parental right (so far as
this special claim is concerned) to extinguish children painlessly at
any point of their existence, if only their life up to that point has
been on the whole worth having; for how can persons who would have had
no life at all but for me fairly complain that they are not allowed
more than a certain quantity?[263] I do not mean to assert that these
doctrines are even implicitly held by Common Sense: but merely to show
that here, as elsewhere, the pursuit of an irrefragable intuition may
lead us unaware into a nest of paradoxes.
It seems, then, that we cannot, after all, say that the special
duty of parents to children, considered by itself, possesses clear
self-evidence: and it was easy to show (cf. chap. iv.) that as
recognised by Common Sense its limits are indeterminate.
The rule prescribing the duty of children to parents need not detain
us; for to Common Sense it certainly seems doubtful whether this is
not merely a particular case of gratitude; and we certainly have no
clear intuition of what is due to parents who do not deserve gratitude.
Again, the moral relation of husband and wife seems to depend chiefly
upon contract and definite understanding. It is, no doubt, usually
thought that Morality, as well as law prescribes certain conditions
for all connubial contracts: and in our own age and country it is held
that they should be (1) monogamic and (2) permanent. But it seems clear
that neither of these opinions would be maintained to be a primary
intuition. Whether these or any other legal regulations of the union
of the sexes can be deduced from some intuitive principle of Purity,
we will presently consider: but as for such conjugal duties as are not
prescribed by Law, probably no one at the present day would maintain
that there is any such general agreement as to what these are, as would
support the theory that they may be known _a priori_.[264]
If, then, in these domestic relations--where the duties of affection
are commonly recognised as so imperative and important--we can find no
really independent and self-evident principles for determining them,
I need not perhaps spend time in showing that the same is the case in
respect of the less intimate ties (of kindred, neighbourhood, etc.)
that bind us to other human beings. Indeed, this was made sufficiently
manifest in our previous discussion of those other duties.
No doubt there are certain obligations towards human beings generally
which are, speaking broadly, unquestionable: as, for example, the
negative duty of abstaining from causing pain to others against
their will, except by way of deserved punishment (whether this is
to be placed under the head of Justice or Benevolence); and of
making reparation for any pain which we may have caused. Still,
when we consider the extent of these duties and try to define their
limits,--when we ask how far we may legitimately cause pain to other
men (or other sentient beings) in order to obtain happiness for
ourselves or third persons, or even to confer a greater good on the
sufferer himself, if the pain be inflicted against his will,--we do
not seem able to obtain any clear and generally accepted principle
for deciding this point, unless the Utilitarian formula be admitted
as such. Again, as regards Reparation, there is, as we have seen,
a fundamental doubt how far this is due for harm that has been
involuntarily caused.
Similarly, all admit that we have a general duty of rendering services
to our fellow-men and especially to those who are in special need, and
that we are bound to make sacrifices for them, when the benefit that
we thereby confer very decidedly outweighs the loss to ourselves; but
when we ask how far we are bound to give up our own happiness in order
to promote that of our fellows, while it can hardly be said that Common
Sense distinctly accepts the Utilitarian principle, it yet does not
definitely affirm any other.
And even the common principle of Gratitude, though its stringency is
immediately and universally felt, seems yet essentially indeterminate:
owing to the unsolved question whether the requital of a benefit ought
to be proportionate to what it cost the benefactor, or to what it is
worth to the recipient.
§ 5. When we pass to consider that element of Justice which presented
itself as Gratitude universalised, the same difficulty recurs in a more
complicated form. For here, too, we have to ask whether the Requital
of Good Desert ought to be proportioned to the benefit rendered, or to
the effort made to render it. And if we scrutinise closely the common
moral notion of Retributive Justice, it appears, strictly taken, to
imply the metaphysical doctrine of Free Will; since, according to
this conception, the reasonableness of rewarding merit is considered
solely in relation to the past, without regard to the future bad
consequences to be expected from leaving merit without encouragement:
and if every excellence in any one’s actions or productions seems
referable ultimately to causes other than himself, the individual’s
claim to requital, from this point of view, appears to vanish. On the
other hand it is obviously paradoxical in estimating Desert to omit
the moral excellences due to hereditary transmission and education: or
even intellectual excellences, since good intention without foresight
is commonly held to constitute a very imperfect merit. Even if we cut
through this speculative difficulty by leaving the ultimate reward of
real Desert to Divine Justice, we still seem unable to find any clear
principles for framing a scale of merit. And much the same may be said,
_mutatis mutandis_, of the scale of Demerit which Criminal Justice
seems to require.
And even if these difficulties were overcome, we should still be
only at the commencement of the perplexities in which the practical
determination of Justice on self-evident principles is involved. For
the examination of the contents of this notion, which we conducted
in chap. v., furnished us not with a single definite principle, but
with a whole swarm of principles, which are unfortunately liable to
come into conflict with each other; and of which even those that when
singly contemplated have the air of being self-evident truths, do not
certainly carry with them any intuitively ascertainable definition
of their mutual boundaries and relations. Thus, for example, in
constructing an ideally perfect distribution of the means of happiness,
it seems necessary to take into account the notion (as I called it) of
Fitness, which, though often confounded with Desert, seems essentially
distinct from it. For the social ‘distribuend’ includes not merely the
means of obtaining pleasurable passive feelings, but also functions and
instruments, which are important sources of happiness, but which it is
obviously reasonable to give to those who can perform and use them.
And even as regards the material means of comfort and luxury--wealth,
in short--we do not find that the same amount produces the same result
of happiness in every case: and it seems reasonable that the means of
refined and varied pleasure should be allotted to those who have the
corresponding capacities for enjoyment.[265] And yet these may not be
the most deserving, so that this principle may clearly conflict with
that of requiting Desert.
And either principle, as we saw, is liable to come into collision with
the widely-accepted doctrine that the proper ultimate end of Law is
to secure the greatest possible Freedom of action to all members of
the community: and that all that any individual, strictly speaking,
owes to any other is non-interference, except so far as he has further
bound himself by free contract. But further, when we come to examine
this principle in its turn, we find that, in order to be capable
at all of affording a practical basis for social construction, it
needs limitations and qualifications which make it look less like an
independent principle than a “middle axiom” of Utilitarianism; and that
it cannot without a palpable strain be made to cover the most important
rights which Positive Law secures. For example, the justification of
permanent appropriation is surely rather that it supplies the only
adequate motive for labour than that it, strictly speaking, realises
Freedom: nor can the questions that arise in determining the limits
of the right of property--such as whether it includes the right of
bequest--be settled by any deductions from this supposed fundamental
principle. Nor again, can even the enforcement of contracts be fairly
said to be a realisation of Freedom; for a man seems, strictly
speaking, freer when no one of his volitions is allowed to cause
an external control of any other. And if we disregard this as a
paradoxical subtlety, we are met on the opposite side by the perplexity
that if abstract Freedom is consistent with any engagement of future
services, it must on the same grounds be consistent with such as are
perpetual and unqualified, and so even with actual slavery. And this
question becomes especially important when we consider that the duty
of obeying positive laws has by many been reconciled with the abstract
right of Freedom, by supposing a ‘tacit compact’ or understanding
between each individual and the rest of his community. This Compact,
however, seems on examination too clearly fictitious to be put forward
as a basis of moral duty: as is further evident from the indefinitely
various qualifications and reservations with which the ‘understanding’
has by different thinkers been supposed to be ‘understood.’ Hence
many who maintain the ‘Birthright of Freedom’ consider that the only
abstractedly justifiable social order is one in which no laws are
imposed without the _express_ consent of those who are to obey them.
But we found it impossible really to construct society upon this basis:
and such Representative Governments as have actually been established
only appear to realise this idea by means of sweeping limitations
and transparent fictions. It was manifest, too, that the maximum of
what may be called Constitutional Freedom--_i.e._ the most perfect
conformity between the action of a government and the wishes of the
majority of its subjects--need by no means result in the realisation of
the maximum of Civil Freedom in the society so governed.
But even if we could delineate to our satisfaction an ideal social
order, including an ideal form of government, we have still to
reconcile the duty of realising this with the conformity due to the
actual order of society. For we have a strong conviction that positive
laws ought, generally speaking, to be obeyed: and, again, our notion of
Justice seemed to include a general duty of satisfying the expectations
generated by custom and precedent. Yet if the actual order of society
deviates very much from what we think ought to exist, the duty of
conforming to it seems to become obscure and doubtful. And apart from
this we cannot say that Common Sense regards it as an axiom that Laws
ought to be obeyed. Indeed, all are agreed that they ought to be
disobeyed when they command what is wrong: though we do not seem able
to elicit any clear general view as to what remains wrong after it has
been commanded by the sovereign. And, again, the positive laws that
ought to be obeyed as such must be the commands issued by a (morally)
rightful authority: and though these will ordinarily coincide with the
commands legally enforced, we cannot say that this is always the case;
for the courts may be temporarily subservient to a usurper; or, again,
the sovereign hitherto habitually obeyed may be one against whom it
has become right to rebel (since it is generally admitted that this is
sometimes right). We require, then, principles for determining when
usurpation becomes legitimate and when rebellion is justifiable: and we
do not seem able to elicit these from Common Sense--except so far as
it may be fairly said that on this whole subject Common Sense inclines
more to the Utilitarian method than it does in matters of private
morality.
Still less can we state the general duty of satisfying ‘natural
expectations’--_i.e._ such expectations as an average man would form
under given circumstances--in the form of a clear and precise moral
axiom. No doubt a just man will generally satisfy customary claims: but
it can hardly be maintained that the mere existence of a custom renders
it clearly obligatory that any one should conform to it who has not
already promised to do so; especially since bad customs can only be
abolished by individuals venturing to disregard them.
§ 6. We have still to examine (whether as a branch of Justice or
under a separate head) the duty of fulfilling express promises and
distinct understandings. The peculiar confidence which moralists have
generally felt in this principle is strikingly illustrated by those
endeavours to extend its scope which we have just had occasion to
notice: and it certainly seems to surpass in simplicity, certainty,
and definiteness the moral rules that we have hitherto discussed.
Here, then, if anywhere, we seem likely to find one of those ethical
axioms of which we are in search. Now we saw that the notion of a
Promise requires several qualifications not commonly noticed to make
it precise: but this alone is no reason why it may not be fitly
used in framing a maxim, which when enunciated and understood will
properly claim universal acceptance as self-evident. For similarly
the uninstructed majority of mankind could not define a circle as a
figure bounded by a line of which every point is equidistant from the
centre: but nevertheless, when the definition is explained to them,
they will accept it as expressing the perfect type of that notion
of roundness which they have long had in their minds. And the same
potential universality of acceptance may, I think, be fairly claimed
for the propositions that the promise which the Common Sense of mankind
recognises as binding must be understood by promiser and promisee in
the same sense at the time of promising, and that it is relative to
the promisee and capable of being annulled by him, and that it cannot
override determinate[266] prior obligations.
But the case is different with the other qualifications which we had to
discuss. When once the question of introducing these has been raised,
we see that Common Sense is clearly divided as to the answer. If we ask
(_e.g._) how far our promise is binding if it was made in consequence
of false statements, on which, however, it was not understood to be
conditional; or if important circumstances were concealed, or we were
in any way led to believe that the consequences of keeping the promise
would be different from what they turn out to be; or if the promise was
given under compulsion; or if circumstances have materially altered
since it was given, and we find that the results of fulfilling it will
be different from what we foresaw when we promised; or even if it be
only our knowledge of consequences which has altered, and we now see
that fulfilment will entail on us a sacrifice out of proportion to the
benefit received by the promisee; or perhaps see that it will even be
injurious to him though he may not think so;--different conscientious
persons would answer these and other[267] questions (both generally and
in particular cases) in different ways: and though we could perhaps
obtain a decided majority for some of these qualifications and against
others, there would not in any case be a clear _consensus_ either way.
And, moreover, the mere discussion of these points seems to make it
plain that the confidence with which the “unsophisticated conscience”
asserts unreservedly “that promises ought to be kept,” is due to
inadvertence; and that when the qualifications to which we referred are
fairly considered, this confidence inevitably changes into hesitation
and perplexity. It should be added, that some of these qualifications
themselves suggest a reference to the more comprehensive principle
of Utilitarianism, as one to which this particular rule is naturally
subordinate.
Again, reflection upon the place of this duty in a classified system
of moral obligations tends to confirm our distrust of the ordinary
enunciations of Common Sense in respect of it. For, as was seen,
Fidelity to promises is very commonly ranked with Veracity; as though
the mere fact of my having said that I would do a thing were the ground
of my duty to do it. But on reflection we perceive that the obligation
must be regarded as contingent on the reliance that another has placed
on my assertion: that, in fact, the breach of duty is constituted by
the disappointment of expectations voluntarily raised. And when we see
this we become less disposed to maintain the absoluteness of the duty:
it seems now to depend upon the amount of harm done by disappointing
expectations; and we shrink from saying that the promise ought to be
kept, if the keeping it would involve an amount of harm that seems
decidedly to outweigh this.
The case of Veracity we may dismiss somewhat more briefly, as here
it was still more easy to show that the common enunciation of the
unqualified duty of Truth-speaking is made without full consideration,
and cannot approve itself to the reflective mind as an absolute first
principle. For, in the first place, we found no clear agreement as to
the fundamental nature of the obligation; or as to its exact scope,
_i.e._ whether it is our actual affirmation as understood by the
recipient which we are bound to make correspondent to fact (as far as
we can), or whatever inferences we foresee that he is likely to draw
from this, or both. To realise perfect Candour and Sincerity, we must
aim at both: and we no doubt admire the exhibition of these virtues:
but few will maintain that they ought to be exhibited under all
circumstances. And, secondly, it seems to be admitted by Common Sense,
though vaguely and reluctantly, that the principle, however defined,
is not of universal application; at any rate it is not thought to be
clearly wrong that untruths should be told to children, or madmen, or
invalids, or by advocates, or to enemies or robbers, or even to persons
who ask questions which they have no right to ask (if a mere refusal
to answer would practically reveal an important secret). And when
we consider the limitations generally admitted, it seems still more
plain than in the last case, that they are very commonly determined by
utilitarian reasonings, implicit or explicit.
§ 7. If, then, the prescriptions of Justice, Good Faith, and Veracity,
as laid down by Common Sense, appear so little capable of being
converted into first principles of scientific Ethics, it seems scarcely
necessary to inquire whether such axioms can be extracted from the
minor maxims of social behaviour, such as the maxim of Liberality or
the rules restraining the Malevolent Affections: or, again, from such
virtues as Courage and Humility, which we found it difficult to class
as either social or self-regarding. Indeed, it was made plain in chap.
viii. that as regards the proper regulation of resentment, Common Sense
can only be saved from inconsistency or hopeless vagueness by adopting
the ‘interest of society’ as the ultimate standard: and in the same way
we cannot definitely distinguish Courage from Foolhardiness except by
a reference to the probable tendency of the daring act to promote the
wellbeing of the agent or of others, or to some definite rule of duty
prescribed under some other notion.
It is true that among what are commonly called “duties to self”
we find the duty of self-preservation prescribed with apparent
absoluteness,--at least so far as the sacrifice of one’s life is not
imperatively required for the preservation of the lives of others,
or for the attainment of some result conceived to be very important
to society. I think, however, that when confronted with the question
of preserving a life which we can foresee will be both miserable and
burdensome to others--_e.g._ the life of a man stricken with a fatal
disease which precludes the possibility of work of any kind, during the
weeks or months of agony that remain to him,--though Common Sense would
still deny the legitimacy of suicide, even under these conditions, it
would also admit the necessity of finding reasons for the denial. This
admission would imply that the universal wrongness of suicide is at any
rate not self-evident. And the reasons that would be found--so far as
they did not ultimately depend upon premises drawn from Revelational
Theology--would, I think, turn out to be utilitarian, in a broad sense
of the term: it would be urged that if any exceptions to the rule
prohibiting suicide were allowed, dangerous encouragement would be
given to the suicidal impulse in other cases in which suicide would
really be a weak and cowardly dereliction of social duty: it would
also probably be urged that the toleration of suicide would facilitate
secret murders. In short, the independent axiom of which we are in
search seems to disappear on close examination in this case no less
than in others.
So again, reflection seems to show that the duties of Temperance,
Self-control, and other cognate virtues, are only clear and definite
in so far as they are conceived as subordinate either to Prudence (as
is ordinarily the case), or to Benevolence or some definite rule of
social duty, or at least to some end--such as ‘furtherance of moral
progress’[268]--of which the conception involves the notion of duty
supposed to be already determinate. Certainly the authority of Common
Sense cannot be fairly claimed for any restriction even of the bodily
appetites for food and drink, that is not thus subordinated.
In the case, however, of the sexual appetite, a special regulation
seems to be prescribed on some independent principle under the notion
of Purity or Chastity. In chap. ix. of this Book, where we examined
this notion, it appeared that Common Sense is not only not explicit,
but actually averse to explicitness, on this subject. As my aim in the
preceding chapters was to give, above all things, a faithful exposition
of the morality of Common Sense, I allowed my inquiry to be checked
by this (as it seemed) clearly recognisable sentiment. But when it
becomes our primary object to test the intuitive evidence of the moral
principles commonly accepted, it seems necessary to override this
aversion: for we can hardly ascertain whether rational conviction is
attainable as to the acts allowed and forbidden under this notion and
its opposite, without subjecting it to the same close scrutiny that
we have endeavoured to give to the other leading notions of Ethics.
Here the briefest account of such a scrutiny will be sufficient. I am
aware that in giving even this I cannot but cause a certain offence to
minds trained in good moral habits: but I trust I may claim the same
indulgence as is commonly granted to the physiologist, who also has
to direct the student’s attention to objects which a healthy mind is
naturally disinclined to contemplate.
§ 8. What, then, is the conduct which Purity forbids (for the principle
is more easily discussed in its negative aspect)? As the normal and
obvious end of sexual intercourse is the propagation of the species,
some have thought that all indulgence of appetite, except as a means
to this end, should be prohibited. But this doctrine would lead to a
restriction of conjugal intercourse far too severe for Common Sense.
Shall we say, then, that Purity forbids such indulgence except under
the conditions of conjugal union defined by Law? But this answer,
again, further reflection shows to be unsatisfactory. For, first, we
should not, on consideration, call a conjugal union impure, _merely_
because the parties had wilfully omitted to fulfil legal conditions,
and had made a contract which the law declined to enforce. We might
condemn their conduct, but we should not apply to it this notion.
And, secondly, we feel that positive law may be unfavourable to
Purity, and that in fact Purity, like Justice, is something which the
law ought to maintain, but does not always. We have to ask, then,
what kind of sexual relations we are to call essentially impure,
whether countenanced or not by Law and Custom? There appear to be no
distinct principles, having any claim to self-evidence, upon which
the question can be answered so as to command general assent. It
would be difficult even to state such a principle for determining the
degree of consanguinity between husband and wife which constitutes
a union incestuous; although the aversion with which such unions
are commonly regarded is a peculiarly intense moral sentiment; and
the difficulty becomes indefinitely greater when we consider the
_rationale_ of prohibited degrees of affinity. Again, probably few
would stigmatise a legal polygynous connexion as impure, however they
might disapprove of the law and of the state of society in which
such a law was established: but if legal Polygyny is not impure, is
Polyandry, when legal and customary--as is not unfrequently the case
among the lower races of man--to be so characterised? and if not, on
what rational principle can the notion be applied to institutions
and conduct? Again, where divorce by mutual consent, with subsequent
marriage, is legalised, we do not call this an offence against Purity:
and yet if the principle of free change be once admitted, it seems
paradoxical to distinguish purity from impurity merely by less rapidity
of transition;[269] and to condemn as impure even ‘Free Love,’ in so
far as it is earnestly advocated as a means to a completer harmony of
sentiment between men and women, and not to mere sensual license.
Shall we, then, fall back upon the presence of mutual affection (as
distinguished from mere appetite) as constituting the essence of pure
sexual relations? But this, again, while too lax from one point of
view, seems from another too severe for Common Sense: as we do not
condemn marriages without affection as impure, although we disapprove
of them as productive of unhappiness. Such marriages, indeed, are
sometimes stigmatised as “legalised prostitution,” but the phrase is
felt to be extravagant and paradoxical; and it is even doubtful whether
we do disapprove of them under all circumstances; as (_e.g._) in the
case of royal alliances.
Again, how shall we judge of such institutions as those of Plato’s
Commonwealth, establishing community of women and children, but at the
same time regulating sexual indulgence with the strictest reference
to social ends? Our habitual standards seem inapplicable to such novel
circumstances.
The truth seems to be, that reflection on the current sexual morality
discovers to us two distinct grounds for it: first and chiefly, the
maintenance of a certain social order, believed to be most conducive
to the prosperous continuance of the human race: and, secondly,
the protection of habits of feeling in individuals believed to be
generally most important to their perfection or their happiness. We
commonly conceive that both these ends are to be attained by the same
regulations: and in an ideal state of society this would perhaps be
the case: but in actual life there is frequently a partial separation
and incompatibility between them. But further, if the repression of
sexual license is prescribed merely as a means to these ends, it
does not seem that we can affirm as self-evident that it is always
a necessary means in either case: on the contrary, it seems clear
that such an affirmation would be unreliable apart from empirical
confirmation. We cannot reasonably be sure, without induction from
sociological observations, that a certain amount of sexual license
will be incompatible with the maintenance of population in sufficient
numbers and good condition. And if we consider the matter in its
relation to the individual’s perfection, it is certainly clear that he
misses the highest and best development of his emotional nature, if
his sexual relations are of a merely sensual kind: but we can hardly
know _a priori_ that this lower kind of relation interferes with the
development of the higher (nor indeed does experience seem to show that
this is universally the case). And this latter line of argument has a
further difficulty. For the common opinion that we have to justify does
not merely condemn the lower kind of development in comparison with the
higher, but in comparison with none at all. Since we do not positively
blame a man for remaining celibate (though we perhaps despise him
somewhat unless the celibacy is adopted as a means to a noble end):
it is difficult to show why we should condemn--in its bearing on the
individual’s emotional perfection solely--the imperfect development
afforded by merely sensual relations.
§ 9. Much more might be said to exhibit the perplexities in which the
attempt to define the rule of Purity or Chastity involves us. But I do
not desire to extend the discussion beyond what is necessary for the
completion of my argument. It seems to me that the conclusion announced
in § 2 of this chapter has now been sufficiently justified. We have
examined the moral notions that present themselves with a _prima facie_
claim to furnish independent and self-evident rules of morality: and
we have in each case found that from such regulation of conduct as
the Common Sense of mankind really supports, no proposition can be
elicited which, when fairly contemplated, even appears to have the
characteristic of a scientific axiom. It is therefore scarcely needful
to proceed to a systematic examination of the manner in which Common
Sense provides for the co-ordination of these principles. In fact, this
question seems to have been already discussed as far as is profitable:
for the attempt to define each principle singly has inevitably led
us to consider their mutual relations: and it was in the cases where
two moral principles came into collision that we most clearly saw
the vagueness and inconsistency with which the boundaries of each
are determined by Common Sense. For example, the distinction between
perfectly stringent moral obligations, and such laxer duties as may be
modified by a man’s own act, is often taken: and it is one which, as we
saw, is certainly required in formulating the Common-Sense view of the
effect of a promise in creating new obligations: but it is one which we
cannot apply with any practical precision, because of the high degree
of indeterminateness which we find in the common notions of duties to
which the highest degree of stringency is yet commonly attributed.
It only remains to guard my argument from being understood in a more
sweeping sense than it has been intended or is properly able to bear.
Nothing that I have said even tends to show that we have not distinct
moral impulses, claiming authority over all others, and prescribing
or forbidding kinds of conduct as to which there is a rough general
agreement, at least among educated persons of the same age and country.
It is only maintained that the objects of these impulses do not admit
of being scientifically determined by any reflective analysis of common
sense. The notions of Benevolence, Justice, Good Faith, Veracity,
Purity, etc., are not necessarily emptied of significance for us,
because we have found it impossible to define them with precision. The
main part of the conduct prescribed under each notion is sufficiently
clear: and the general rule prescribing it does not necessarily lose
its force because there is in each case a margin of conduct involved in
obscurity and perplexity, or because the rule does not on examination
appear to be absolute and independent. In short, the Morality of Common
Sense may still be perfectly adequate to give practical guidance to
common people in common circumstances: but the attempt to elevate it
into a system of Intuitional Ethics brings its inevitable imperfections
into prominence without helping us to remove them.[270]
FOOTNOTES:
[256] Hence the practical importance of the Formal test of Rightness,
on which Kant insists: cf. _ante_, chap. i. § 3 of this Book.
[257] The final arbiter, that is, on the question what the rule is:
of course the moral obligation to conform to any rule laid down by an
external authority must rest on some principle which the individual’s
reason has to apply.
[258] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. § 2.
[259] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. § 2.
[260] It has been fairly urged that I leave the determinations of
Common Sense very loose and indefinite: and if I were endeavouring
to bring out a more positive result from this examination, I ought
certainly to have discussed further how we are to ascertain the
‘experts’ on whose ‘consensus’ we are to rely, in this or any other
subject. But my scientific conclusions are to so great an extent
negative, that I thought it hardly necessary to enter upon this
discussion. I have been careful not to _exaggerate_ the doubtfulness
and inconsistency of Common Sense: should it turn out to be _more_
doubtful and inconsistent than I have represented it, my argument will
only be strengthened.
[261] In chap. ix. Temperance was regarded as subordinate to, or a
special application of, Prudence or Self-love moralised: because this
seemed to be on the whole the view of Common Sense, which in the
preceding chapters I have been endeavouring to follow as closely as
possible, both in stating the principles educed and in the order of
their exposition.
[262] The admission that these maxims are self-evident must be taken
subject to the distinction before established between “subjective” and
“objective” rightness. It is a necessary condition of my acting rightly
that I should not do what I judge to be wrong: but if my judgment is
mistaken, my action in accordance with it will not be “objectively”
right.
[263] It may be noticed that a view very similar to this has often been
maintained in considering what God is in justice bound to do for human
beings in consequence of the quasi-parental relation in which He stands
to them.
[264] It is not irrelevant to notice the remarkable divergence of
suggestions for the better regulation of marriage, to which reflective
minds seem to be led when they are once set loose from the trammels of
tradition and custom; as exhibited in the speculations of philosophers
in all ages--especially of those (as _e.g._ Plato) to whom we cannot
attribute any sensual or licentious bias.
[265] For example, many seem to hold that wealth is, roughly speaking,
rightly distributed when cultivated persons have abundance and the
uncultivated a bare subsistence, since the former are far more capable
of deriving happiness from wealth than the latter.
[266] I refer later (p. 360) to the difficulty before noticed in
respect of such prior obligations as are not strictly determinate.
[267] I have omitted as less important the special questions connected
with promises to the dead or to the absent, or where a form of words is
prescribed.
[268] It was this conception that seemed to give the true standard of
Humility, considered as a purely internal duty.
[269] It should be observed that I am not asking for an exact
quantitative decision, but whether we can really think that the
decision depends upon considerations of this kind.
[270] It should be observed that the more positive treatment of
Common-sense Morality, in its relation to Utilitarianism, to which we
shall proceed in chap. iii. of the following Book, is intended as an
indispensable supplement of the negative criticism which has just been
completed.