SELF-REGARDING VIRTUES
§ 1. I conceive that according to the morality of Common Sense, an
ultimate harmony between (1) Self-interest and (2) Virtue is assumed
or postulated; so that the performance of duty and cultivation of
Virtue generally may be regarded as a “duty to self,” as being always
conducive to the agent’s true interest and well-being. But further,
Common Sense (in modern Europe) recognises a strict duty of preserving
one’s own life, even when the prospect life offers is one in which
pain preponderates over pleasure; it is, indeed, held to be right and
praiseworthy to encounter certain death in the performance of strict
duty, or for the preservation of the life of another, or for any very
important gain to society; but not merely in order to avoid pain to
the agent. At the same time, within the limits fixed by this and other
duties, Common Sense considers, I think,[247] that it is a duty to
seek our own happiness, except in so far as we can promote the welfare
of others by sacrificing it. This “due concern about our own interest
or happiness” may be called the Duty of Prudence. It should, however,
be observed that--since it is less evident that men do not adequately
desire their own greatest good, than that their efforts are not
sufficiently well directed to its attainment--in conceiving Prudence as
a Virtue or Excellence, attention is often fixed almost exclusively on
its intellectual side. Thus regarded, Prudence may be said to be merely
Wisdom made more definite by the acceptance of Self-interest as its
sole ultimate end: the habit of calculating carefully the best means
to the attainment of our own interest, and resisting all irrational
impulses which may tend to perturb our calculations or prevent us from
acting on them.
§ 2. There are, however, current notions of particular virtues, which
might be called Self-regarding; but yet with respect to which it is
not quite clear whether they are merely particular applications of
Prudence, or whether they have independent maxims. Of these Temperance,
one of the four cardinal virtues anciently recognised, seems the most
prominent. In its ordinary use, Temperance is the habit of controlling
the principal appetites (or desires which have an immediate corporeal
cause). The habit of moderating and controlling our desires generally
is recognised by Common Sense as useful and desirable, but with less
distinctness and emphasis.
All are agreed that our appetites need control: but in order to
establish a maxim of Temperance, we have to determine within what
limits, on what principle, and to what end they ought to be controlled.
Now in the case of the appetites for food, drink, sleep, stimulants,
etc., no one doubts that bodily health and vigour is the end naturally
subserved by their gratification, and that the latter ought to be
checked whenever it tends to defeat this end (including in the notion
of health the most perfect condition of the mental faculties, so far
as this appears to depend upon the general state of the body). And,
further, the indulgence of a bodily appetite is manifestly imprudent,
if it involves the loss of any greater gratification of whatever kind:
and otherwise wrong if it interferes with the performance of duties;
though it is perhaps doubtful how far this latter indulgence would
commonly be condemned as ‘intemperance.’
Some, however, deduce from the obvious truth, that the maintenance
of bodily health is the chief natural end of the appetites, a more
rigid rule of restraint, and one that goes beyond prudence. They say
that this end ought to fix not only the negative but the positive
limit of indulgence; that the pleasure derived from the gratification
of appetite should never be sought _per se_ (even when it does not
impair health, or interfere with duty, or with a greater pleasure of a
different kind); but only in so far as such gratification is positively
conducive to health. When we consider to what a marked divergence from
the usual habits of the moral rich this principle would lead, we might
be disposed to say that it is clearly at variance with Common Sense:
but it often meets with verbal assent.
There is, again, a third and intermediate view which accepts the
principle that the gratification of appetite is not to be sought for
its own sake, but admits other ends as legitimate besides the mere
maintenance of health and strength:--_e.g._ “cheerfulness, and the
cultivation of the social affections.”[248] Some such principle seems
to be more or less consciously held by many persons: hence we find that
solitary indulgence in the pleasures of the table is very frequently
regarded with something like moral aversion: and that the banquets
which are given and enjoyed by moral persons, are vaguely supposed to
have for their end not the common indulgence of sensual appetites, but
the promotion of conviviality and conversational entertainment. For
it is generally believed that the enjoyment in common of a luxurious
meal develops social emotions, and also stimulates the faculties of
wit and humour and lively colloquy in general; and feasts which are
obviously not contrived with a view to such convivial and colloquial
gratifications seem to be condemned by refined persons. Still it would
be going too far to state, as a maxim supported by Common Sense in
respect of sensual pleasures generally, that they are never to be
sought except they positively promote those of a higher kind.
§ 3. In the last section we have spoken chiefly of the appetites for
food and drink. It is, however, in the case of the appetite of sex
that the regulation morally prescribed most clearly and definitely
transcends that of mere prudence: which is indicated by the special
notion of Purity or Chastity.[249]
At first sight it may perhaps appear that the regulation of the sexual
appetite prescribed by the received moral code merely confines its
indulgence within the limits of the union sanctioned by law: only that
here, as the natural impulse is peculiarly powerful and easily excited,
it is especially necessary to prohibit any acts, internal as well as
external, that tend even indirectly to the transgression of these
limits. And this is to a great extent true: still on reflection it will
appear, I think, that our common notion of purity implies a standard
independent of law; for, first, conformity to this does not necessarily
secure purity: and secondly, all illegitimate sexual intercourse is
not thought to be impure,[250] and it is only by inadvertence that the
two notions are sometimes confounded. But it is not very clear what
this standard is. For when we interrogate the moral consciousness of
mankind, we seem to find two views, a stricter and a laxer, analogous
to the two interpretations of Temperance last noticed. It is agreed
that the sexual appetite ought never to be indulged for the sake of the
sensual gratification merely, but as a means to some higher end: but
some say that the propagation of the species is the only legitimate,
as it is obviously the primary natural, end: while others regard the
development of mutual affection in a union designed to be permanent as
an end perfectly admissible and right. I need not point out that the
practical difference between the two views is considerable; so that
this question is one which it is necessary to raise and decide. But
it may be observed that any attempt to lay down minute and detailed
rules on this subject seems to be condemned by Common Sense as tending
to defeat the end of purity; as such minuteness of moral legislation
invites men in general to exercise their thoughts on this subject to an
extent which is practically dangerous.[251]
I ought to point out that the Virtue of Purity is certainly not merely
self-regarding, and is therefore properly out of place in this chapter:
but the convenience of discussing it along with Temperance has led me
to take it out of its natural order. Some, however, would go further,
and say that it ought to be treated as a distinctly social virtue: for
the propagation and rearing of children is one of the most important of
social interests: and they would maintain that Purity merely connotes
a sentiment protective of these important functions, supporting the
rules which we consider necessary to secure their proper performance.
But it seems clear that, though Common Sense undoubtedly recognises
this tendency of the sentiment of Purity to maintain the best possible
provision for the continuance of the human race, it still does not
regard that as the fundamental point in the definition of this rule
of duty, and the sole criterion in deciding whether acts do or do not
violate the rule.
There seem to be no similar special questions with respect to most
other desires. We recognise, no doubt, a general duty of self-control:
but this is merely as a means to the end of acting rationally
(whatever our interpretation of rational action may be); it only
prescribes that we should yield to no impulse which prompts us to act
in antagonism to ends or rules deliberately accepted. Further, there
is a certain tendency among moral persons to the ascetic opinion that
the gratification of merely sensual impulse is in itself somewhat
objectionable: but this view does not seem to be taken by Common Sense
in particular cases;--we do not (_e.g._) commonly condemn the most
intense enjoyment of muscular exercise, or warmth, or bathing. The only
other case, besides that of the appetites above discussed, in which
the Common Sense of our age and country seems to regard as right or
admirable the repression of natural impulses, beyond what Prudence and
Benevolence would dictate, is that of the promptings of pain and fear.
An important instance of this is to be found in the before-mentioned
rule prohibiting suicide absolutely, even in face of the strongest
probability that the rest of a man’s life will be both miserable and
burdensome to others. But in other cases also praise is apparently
bestowed on endurance of pain and danger, beyond what is conducive to
happiness; as we shall have occasion to observe in the next chapter.
FOOTNOTES:
[247] Kant argues (_Met. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre_, Th. I., § iv.)
that as every one “inevitably wills” means to promote his own happiness
this cannot be regarded as a duty. But, as I have before urged (Book i.
chap. iv. § 1), a man does not “inevitably will” to do what he believes
will be most conducive to his own _greatest_ happiness.
The view in the text is that of Butler (Dissertation _Of the nature
of Virtue_); who admits that “nature has not given us so sensible a
disapprobation of imprudence and folly as of falsehood, injustice,
and cruelty”; but points out that such sensible disapprobation is for
various reasons less needed in the former case.
[248] See Whewell’s _Elements of Morality_, Book ii. chap. x.
[249] The notion of Chastity is nearly equivalent to that of Purity,
only somewhat more external and superficial.
[250] In so far as mere illegitimacy of union is conceived to be
directly and specially prohibited, and not merely from considerations
of Prudence and Benevolence, it is regarded as a violation of Order
rather than of Purity.
[251] It was partly owing to the serious oversight of not perceiving
that Purity itself forbids too minute a system of rules for the
observance of purity that the mediæval Casuistry fell into disrepute.