THE CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES--VERACITY
§ 1. It may easily seem that when we have discussed Benevolence,
Justice, and the observance of Law and Contract, we have included in
our view the whole sphere of social duty, and that whatever other
maxims we find accepted by Common Sense must be subordinate to the
principles which we have been trying to define.
For whatever we owe definitely to our fellow-men, besides the
observance of special contracts, and of positive laws, seems--at least
by a slight extension of common usage--to be naturally included under
Justice: while the more indefinite obligations which we recognise seem
to correspond to the goodwill which we think ought to exist among all
members of the human family, together with the stronger affections
appropriate to special relations and circumstances. And hence it may
be thought that the best way of treating the subject would have been
to divide Duty generally into Social and Self-regarding, and again to
subdivide the former branch into the heads which I have discussed one
by one; afterwards adding such minor details of duty as have obtained
special names and distinct recognition. And this is perhaps the proper
place to explain why I did not adopt this course. The division of
duties into Social and Self-regarding, though obvious, and acceptable
enough as a rough _prima facie_ classification, does not on closer
examination seem exactly appropriate to the Intuitional Method. For
these titles naturally suggest that the happiness or well-being, of the
agent or of others, is always the end and final determinant of right
action: whereas the Intuitional doctrine is, that at least certain
kinds of conduct are prescribed absolutely, without reference to their
ulterior consequences. And if a more general meaning be given to the
terms, and by Social duties we understand those which consist in the
production of certain effects upon others, while in the Self-regarding
we aim at producing certain effects upon ourselves, the division
is still an unsuitable one. For these consequences are not clearly
recognised in the enunciation of common rules of morality: and in
many cases we produce marked effects both on ourselves and on others,
and it is not easy to say which (in the view of Common Sense) are
most important: and again, this principle of division would sometimes
make it necessary to cut in two the class of duties prescribed under
some common notion; as the same rule may govern both our social and
our solitary conduct. Take, for example, the acts morally prescribed
under the head of Courage. It seems clear that the prominence given to
this Virtue in historic systems of morality has been due to the great
social importance that must always attach to it, so long as communities
of men are continually called upon to fight for their existence and
well-being: but still the quality of bravery is the same essentially,
whether it be exhibited for selfish or social ends.
It is no doubt true that when we examine with a view to definition
the kinds of conduct commended or prescribed in any list of Virtues
commonly recognised, we find, to a great extent, that the maxims we
obtain are clearly not absolute and independent: that the quality
denoted by our term is admittedly only praiseworthy in so far as it
promotes individual or general welfare, and becomes blameworthy--though
remaining in other respects the same--when it operates adversely
to these ends. We have already noticed this result in one or two
instances, and it will be illustrated at length in the following
chapters. But though this is the case to a great extent, it is,
for our present purpose, of special importance to note the--real
or apparent--exceptions to the rule; because they are specially
characteristic of the method that we call Intuitionism.
One of the most important of these exceptions is Veracity: and the
affinity in certain respects of this duty--in spite of fundamental
differences--to the duty of Good Faith or Fidelity to Promises
renders it convenient to examine the two in immediate succession.
Under either head a certain correspondence between words and facts is
prescribed: and hence the questions that arise when we try to make the
maxims precise are somewhat similar in both cases. For example, just
as the duty of Good Faith did not lie in conforming our acts to the
_admissible_ meaning of certain words,[238] but to the meaning which we
knew to be put on them by the promisee; so the duty of Truthspeaking is
not to utter words which _might_, according to common usage, produce
in other minds beliefs corresponding to our own, but words which we
believe will have this effect on the persons whom we address. And this
is usually a very simple matter, as the natural effect of language is
to convey our beliefs to other men, and we commonly know quite well
whether we are doing this or not. A certain difficulty arises, as in
the case of promises, from the use of set forms imposed either by law
or by custom; to which most of the discussion of the similar difficulty
in the preceding chapter applies with obvious modifications. In the
case of formulæ imposed by law--such (_e.g._) as declarations of
religious belief--it is doubtful whether we may understand the terms in
any sense which they commonly bear, or are to take them in the sense
intended by the Legislature that imposed them; and again, a difficulty
is created by the gradual degradation or perversion of their meaning,
which results from the strong inducements offered for their general
acceptance; for thus they are continually strained and stretched until
a new general understanding seems gradually to grow up as to the
meaning of certain phrases; and it is continually disputed whether we
may veraciously use the phrases in this new signification. A similar
process continually alters the meaning of conventional expressions
current in polite society. When a man declares that he ‘has great
pleasure in accepting’ a vexatious invitation, or is ‘the obedient
servant’ of one whom he regards as an inferior, he uses phrases which
were probably once deceptive. If they are so no longer, Common Sense
condemns as over-scrupulous the refusal to use them where it is
customary to do so. But Common Sense seems doubtful and perplexed
where the process of degradation is incomplete, and there are still
persons who may be deceived: as in the use of the reply that one is
‘not at home’ to an inconvenient visitor from the country.
However, apart from the use of conventional phrases, the rule ‘to
speak the truth’ is not generally difficult of application in conduct.
And many moralists have regarded this, from its simplicity and
definiteness, as a quite unexceptionable instance of an ethical axiom.
I think, however, that patient reflection will show that this view is
not really confirmed by the Common Sense of mankind.
§ 2. In the first place, it does not seem clearly agreed whether
Veracity is an absolute and independent duty, or a special application
of some higher principle. We find (_e.g._) that Kant regards it as
a duty owed to oneself to speak the truth, because ‘a lie is an
abandonment or, as it were, annihilation of the dignity of man.’ And
this seems to be the view in which lying is prohibited by the code of
honour, except that it is not thought (by men of honour as such) that
the dignity of man is impaired by _any_ lying: but only that lying for
selfish ends, especially under the influence of fear, is mean and base.
In fact there seems to be circumstances under which the code of honour
prescribes lying. Here, however, it may be said to be plainly divergent
from the morality of Common Sense. Still, the latter does not seem to
decide clearly whether truth-speaking is absolutely a duty, needing
no further justification: or whether it is merely a general right
of each man to have truth spoken to him by his fellows, which right
however may be forfeited or suspended under certain circumstances. Just
as each man is thought to have a natural right to personal security
generally, but not if he is himself attempting to injure others in
life and property: so if we may even kill in defence of ourselves and
others, it seems strange if we may not lie, if lying will defend us
better against a palpable invasion of our rights: and Common Sense does
not seem to prohibit this decisively. And again, just as the orderly
and systematic slaughter which we call war is thought perfectly right
under certain circumstances, though painful and revolting: so in the
word-contests of the law-courts, the lawyer is commonly held to be
justified in untruthfulness within strict rules and limits: for an
advocate is thought to be over-scrupulous who refuses to say what he
knows to be false, if he is instructed to say it.[239] Again, where
deception is designed to benefit the person deceived, Common Sense
seems to concede that it may sometimes be right: for example, most
persons would not hesitate to speak falsely to an invalid, if this
seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a dangerous
shock: nor do I perceive that any one shrinks from telling fictions to
children, on matters upon which it is thought well that they should
not know the truth. But if the lawfulness of benevolent deception in
any case be admitted, I do not see how we can decide when and how far
it is admissible, except by considerations of expediency; that is, by
weighing the gain of any particular deception against the imperilment
of mutual confidence involved in all violation of truth.
The much argued question of religious deception (‘pious fraud’)
naturally suggests itself here. It seems clear, however, that Common
Sense now pronounces against the broad rule, that falsehoods may
rightly be told in the interests of religion. But there is a subtler
form in which the same principle is still maintained by moral persons.
It is sometimes said that the most important truths of religion cannot
be conveyed into the minds of ordinary men, except by being enclosed,
as it were, in a shell of fiction; so that by relating such fictions
as if they were facts, we are really performing an act of substantial
veracity.[240] Reflecting upon this argument, we see that it is not
after all so clear wherein Veracity consists. For from the beliefs
immediately communicated by any set of affirmations inferences are
naturally drawn, and we may clearly foresee that they will be drawn.
And though commonly we intend that both the beliefs immediately
communicated and the inferences drawn from them should be true, and
a person who always aims at this is praised as candid and sincere:
still we find relaxation of the rule prescribing this intention claimed
in two different ways by at least respectable sections of opinion.
For first, as was just now observed, it is sometimes held that if
a conclusion is true and important, and cannot be satisfactorily
communicated otherwise, we may lead the mind of the hearer to it
by means of fictitious premises. But the exact reverse of this is
perhaps a commoner view: viz. that it is only an absolute duty to make
our actual affirmations true: for it is said that though the ideal
condition of human converse involves perfect sincerity and candour, and
we ought to rejoice in exhibiting these virtues where we can, still in
our actual world concealment is frequently necessary to the well-being
of society, and may be legitimately effected by any means short of
actual falsehood. Thus it is not uncommonly said that in defence of a
secret we may not indeed _lie_,[241] _i.e._ produce directly beliefs
contrary to fact; but we may “turn a question aside,” _i.e._ produce
indirectly, by natural inference from our answer, a negatively false
belief; or “throw the inquirer on a wrong scent,” _i.e._ produce
similarly a positively false belief. These two methods of concealment
are known respectively as _suppressio veri_ and _suggestio falsi_, and
many think them legitimate under certain circumstances: while others
say that if deception is to be practised at all, it is mere formalism
to object to any one mode of effecting it more than another.
On the whole, then, reflection seems to show that the rule of Veracity,
as commonly accepted, cannot be elevated into a definite moral axiom:
for there is no real agreement as to how far we are bound to impart
true beliefs to others: and while it is contrary to Common Sense
to exact absolute candour under all circumstances, we yet find no
self-evident secondary principle, clearly defining when it is not to be
exacted.
§ 3. There is, however, one method of exhibiting _a priori_ the
absolute duty of Truth, which we must not overlook; as, if it be
valid, it would seem that the exceptions and qualifications above
mentioned have been only admitted by Common Sense from inadvertence and
shallowness of thought.
It is said that if it were once generally understood that lies were
justifiable under certain circumstances, it would immediately become
quite useless to tell the lies, because no one would believe them; and
that the moralist cannot lay down a rule which, if generally accepted,
would be suicidal. To this there seem to be three answers. In the first
place it is not necessarily an evil that men’s confidence in each
other’s assertions should, _under certain peculiar circumstances_,
be impaired or destroyed: it may even be the very result which we
should most desire to produce: _e.g._ it is obviously a most effective
protection for legitimate secrets that it should be universally
understood and expected that those who ask questions which they have
no right to ask will have lies told them: nor, again, should we be
restrained from pronouncing it lawful to meet deceit with deceit,
merely by the fear of impairing the security which rogues now derive
from the veracity of honest men. No doubt the ultimate result of
general unveracity under the circumstances would be a state of things
in which such falsehoods would no longer be told: but unless this
ultimate result is undesirable, the prospect of it does not constitute
a reason why the falsehoods should not be told so long as they are
useful. But, secondly, since the beliefs of men in general are not
formed purely on rational grounds, experience shows that unveracity
may long remain partially effective under circumstances where it is
generally understood to be legitimate. We see this in the case of
the law-courts. For though jurymen are perfectly aware that it is
considered the duty of an advocate to state as plausibly as possible
whatever he has been instructed to say on behalf of any criminal he may
defend, still a skilful pleader may often produce an impression that he
sincerely believes his client to be innocent: and it remains a question
of casuistry how far this kind of hypocrisy is justifiable. But,
finally, it cannot be assumed as certain that it is never right to act
upon a maxim of which the universal application would be an undoubted
evil. This assumption may seem to be involved in what was previously
admitted as an ethical axiom, that what is right for me must be right
for ‘all persons under similar conditions.’[242] But reflection will
show that there is a special case within the range of the axiom in
which its application is necessarily self-limiting, and excludes the
practical universality which the axiom appears to suggest: _i.e._ where
the agent’s conditions include (1) the knowledge that his maxim is not
universally accepted, and (2) a reasoned conviction that his act will
not tend to make it so, to any important extent. For in this case the
axiom will practically only mean that it will be right for all persons
to do as the agent does, if they are sincerely convinced that the act
will not be widely imitated; and this conviction must vanish if it
_is_ widely imitated. It can hardly be said that these conditions are
impossible: and if they are possible, the axiom that we are discussing
can only serve, in its present application, to direct our attention to
an important danger of unveracity, which constitutes a strong--but not
formally conclusive--utilitarian ground for speaking the truth.[243]
NOTE.--Mr. Stephen (_Science of Ethics_, chap. v. § 33) explains the
exceptions to the rule of truth-speaking as follows:--
“The rule, ‘Lie not,’ is the external rule, and corresponds
approximately to the internal rule, ‘Be trustworthy.’ Cases occur
where the rules diverge, and in such cases it is the internal rule
which is morally approved. Truthfulness is the rule because in the
vast majority of cases we trust a man in so far as he speaks the
truth; in the exceptional cases, the mutual confidence would be
violated when the truth, not when the lie, is spoken.”
This explanation seems to me for several reasons inadequate. (1)
If we may sometimes lie to defend the life or secrets of others,
it is paradoxical to say that we may not do so to defend our own;
but a falsehood in self-defence obviously cannot be justified as an
application of the maxim “be trustworthy.” (2) Even when the falsehood
is in legitimate defence of others against attacks, we cannot say
that the speaker manifests “trustworthiness” without qualification;
for the deceived assailant trusts his veracity, otherwise he would
not be deceived: the question therefore is under what circumstances
the confidence of _A_ that I shall speak the truth may legitimately
be disappointed in order not to disappoint the confidence of _B_
that I shall defend his life and honour. This question Mr. Stephen’s
explanation does not in any way aid us to answer.
The general question raised by Mr. Stephen, as to the value of
“internal rules,” expressed in the form “Be this,” in contrast to
external rules, expressed in the form “Do this,” will be dealt with in
a subsequent chapter (xiv. § 1).
FOOTNOTES:
[238] The case where set forms are used being the _exceptio probans
regulam_.
[239] It can hardly be said that the advocate merely _reports_ the
false affirmations of others: since the whole force of his pleading
depends upon his adopting them and working them up into a view of the
case which, for the time at least, he appears to hold.
[240] _E.g._ certain religious persons hold--or held in 1873--that it
is right solemnly to affirm a belief that God created the world in 6
days and rested on the 7th, meaning that 1 : 6 is the divinely ordered
proportion between rest and labour.
[241] Cf. Whewell, _Elements of Morality_, Book ii. chap. xv. § 299.
[242] Cf. chap. i. § 3 of this Book.
[243] See Book iv. chap. v. § 3 for a further discussion of this axiom.