Having asserted that principle to the world, what did we do? These

two things, gentlemen: secretly, without the knowledge of Parliament,

without even the forms of official procedure, Lord Salisbury met Count

Schouvaloff in London, and agreed with him upon the terms on which the

two Powers together should be bound in honour to one another to act

upon all the most important points when they came before the Congress

at Berlin. Having alleged against Russia that she should not be

allowed to settle Turkish affairs with Turkey, because they were but

two Powers, and these affairs were the common affairs of Europe, and

of European interest, we then got Count Schouvaloff into a private

room, and on the part of England and Russia, they being but two

Powers, we settled a large number of the most important of these

affairs, in utter contempt and derogation of the very principle for

which the Government had been contending for months before; for which

they had asked Parliament to grant a sum of £6,000,000; for which they

had spent that £6,000,000 in needless and mischievous armaments. That

which we would not allow Russia to do with Turkey, because we pleaded

the rights of Europe, we ourselves did with Russia, in contempt of the

rights of Europe. Nor was that all, gentlemen.

That act was done, I think, on one of the last days of May in the year

1878, and the document was published, made known to the world, made

known to the Congress at Berlin, to its infinite astonishment, unless

I am very greatly misinformed,--to its infinite astonishment.

But that was not all. Nearly at the same time we performed the same

operation in another quarter. We objected to a treaty between Russia

and Turkey as having no authority, though that treaty was made in the

light of day--namely, to the Treaty of San Stefano; and what did

we do? We went not in the light of day, but in the darkness of the

night--not in the knowledge and cognizance of other Powers, all of

whom would have had the faculty and means of watching all along, and

of preparing and taking their own objections and shaping their own

policy--not in the light of day, but in the darkness of the night, we

sent the Ambassador of England in Constantinople to the Minister of

Turkey, and there he framed, even while the Congress of Berlin was

sitting to determine these matters of common interest, he framed that

which is too famous, shall I say, or rather too notorious as the

Anglo-Turkish Convention. Gentlemen, it is said, and said truly, that

truth beats fiction; that what happens in fact from time to time is

of a character so daring, so strange, that if the novelist were to

imagine it and to put it upon his pages, the whole world would reject

it from its improbability. And that is the case of the Anglo-Turkish

Convention. For who would have believed it possible that we should

assert before the world the principle that Europe only could deal with

the affairs of the Turkish Empire, and should ask Parliament for

six millions to support us in asserting that principle, should send

Ministers to Berlin who declared that unless that principle was acted

upon they would go to war with the material that Parliament had placed

in their hands, and should at the same time be concluding a separate

agreement with Turkey, under which those matters of European

jurisdiction were coolly transferred to English jurisdiction; and the

whole matter was sealed with the worthless bribe of the possession

and administration of the island of Cyprus! I said, gentlemen, the

worthless bribe of the island of Cyprus, and that is the truth. It is

worthless for our purposes, worse than worthless for our purposes--not

worthless in itself; an island of resources, an island of natural

capabilities, provided they are allowed to develop themselves in the

course of circumstances, without violent and unprincipled methods

of action. But Cyprus was not thought to be worthless by those who

accepted it as a bribe. On the contrary, you were told that it was to

secure the road to India; you were told that it was to be the site of

an arsenal very cheaply made, and more valuable than Malta; you were

told that it was to revive trade. And a multitude of companies were

formed, and sent agents and capital to Cyprus, and some of them, I

fear, grievously burned their fingers there, I am not going to dwell

upon that now. What I have in view is not the particular merits of

Cyprus, but the illustration that I have given you in the case of the

agreement of Lord Salisbury with Count Schouvaloff, and in the case of

the Anglo-Turkish Convention, of the manner in which we have asserted

for ourselves a principle that we had denied to others--namely, the

principle of over-riding the European authority of the Treaty of

Paris, and taking the matters which that treaty gave to Europe into

our own separate jurisdiction. Now, gentlemen, I am sorry to find that

that which I call the pharisaical assertion of our own superiority has

found its way alike into the practice and seemingly into the theories

of the Government. I am not going to assert anything which is not

known, but the Prime Minister has said that there is one day in the

year--namely, the 9th of November, Lord Mayor's Day--on which the

language of sense and truth is to be heard amidst the surrounding din

of idle rumours generated and fledged in the brains of irresponsible

scribes. I do not agree, gentlemen, in that panegyric upon the 9th of

November. I am much more apt to compare the 9th of November--certainly

a well-known day in the year--but as to some of the speeches that have

lately been made upon it, I am very much disposed to compare it with

another day in the year, well known to British tradition; and that

other day in the year is the 1st of April. But, gentlemen, on that day

the Prime Minister, speaking out,--I do not question for a moment his

own sincere opinion,--made what I think one of the most unhappy and

ominous allusions ever made by a Minister of this country. He quoted

certain words, easily rendered as 'Empire and Liberty'--words (he

said) of a Roman statesman, words descriptive of the State of

Rome--and he quoted them as words which were capable of legitimate

application to the position and circumstance of England. I join issue

with the Prime Minister upon that subject, and I affirm that nothing

can be more fundamentally unsound, more practically ruinous, than the

establishment of Roman analogies for the guidance of British policy.

What, gentlemen, was Rome? Rome was indeed an Imperial State, you may

tell me--I know not, I cannot read the counsels of Providence--a State

having a mission to subdue the world; but a State whose very basis it

was to deny the equal rights, to proscribe the independent existence,

of other nations. That, gentlemen, was the Roman idea. It has been

partially and not ill described in three lines of a translation from

Virgil by our great poet Dryden, which run as follows:

O Rome! 'tis thine alone with awful sway

To rule mankind, and make the world obey,

Disposing peace and war thine own majestic way.

We are told to fall back upon this example. No doubt the word 'Empire'

was qualified with the word 'Liberty'. But what did the two words

'Liberty' and 'Empire' mean in a Roman mouth? They meant simply

this--'Liberty for ourselves, Empire over the rest of mankind'.

I do not think, gentlemen, that this Ministry, or any other Ministry,

is going to place us in the position of Rome. What I object to is the

revival of the idea--I care not how feebly, I care not even how, from

a philosophic or historic point of view, how ridiculous the attempt

at this revival may be. I say it indicates an intention--I say it

indicates a frame of mind, and that frame of mind, unfortunately, I

find, has been consistent with the policy of which I have given you

some illustrations--the policy of denying to others the rights that

we claim ourselves. No doubt, gentlemen, Rome may have had its work to

do, and Rome did its work. But modern times have brought a different

state of things. Modern times have established a sisterhood of

nations, equal, independent; each of them built up under that

legitimate defence which public law affords to every nation, living

within its own borders, and seeking to perform its own affairs; but if

one thing more than another has been detestable to Europe, it has been

the appearance upon the stage from time to time of men who, even in

the times of the Christian civilization, have been thought to aim at

universal dominion. It was this aggressive disposition on the part

of Louis XIV, King of France, that led your forefathers, gentlemen,

freely to spend their blood and treasure in a cause not immediately

their own, and to struggle against the method of policy which, having

Paris for its centre, seemed to aim at a universal monarchy. It was

the very same thing, a century and a half later, which was the charge

launched, and justly launched, against Napoleon, that under his

dominion France was not content even with her extended limits, but

Germany, and Italy, and Spain, apparently without any limit to this

pestilent and pernicious process, were to be brought under the

dominion or influence of France, and national equality was to be

trampled under foot, and national rights denied. For that reason,

England in the struggle almost exhausted herself, greatly impoverished

her people, brought upon herself, and Scotland too, the consequences

of a debt that nearly crushed their energies, and poured forth their

best blood without limit, in order to resist and put down these

intolerable pretensions.

Gentlemen, it is but in a pale and weak and almost despicable

miniature that such ideas are now set up, but you will observe

that the poison lies--that the poison and the mischief lie--in the

principle and not the scale. It is the opposite principle which, I

say, has been compromised by the action of the Ministry, and which I

call upon you, and upon any who choose to hear my views, to vindicate

when the day of our election comes; I mean the sound and the sacred

principle that Christendom is formed of a band of nations who are

united to one another in the bonds of right; that they are without

distinction of great and small; there is an absolute equality between

them,--the same sacredness defends the narrow limits of Belgium, as

attaches to the extended frontiers of Russia, or Germany, or France.

I hold that he who by act or word brings that principle into peril or

disparagement, however honest his intentions may be, places himself in

the position of one inflicting--I won't say intending to inflict--I

ascribe nothing of the sort--but inflicting injury upon his own

country, and endangering the peace and all the most fundamental

interests of Christian society.

WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE

APRIL 2, 1880

THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF RUSSIA

Now, I have charged at various times what I think an essential

count in this indictment--that intelligence had been kept back from

Parliament. Intelligence necessary to full understanding and to

competent discussion has been withheld from Parliament at the very

time of that discussion. I have shown various instances; I might show

more. But I will name now only very briefly that remarkable case of

the Afghan War. We were carried into that war, gentlemen, as you will

recollect, without any previous notice or preparation. No papers had

been laid upon the table to enable us to judge of the state of our

relations with Afghanistan. Some suspicion had arisen, and a question

had been put in the House of Lords; and the answer had been that there

was no change of policy, or no sensible and serious change of policy

towards Afghanistan intended. At that moment there were in possession

of the Government--and for twelve months after--papers of the

most vital consequence--what are called the conferences at

Peshawur--opening up the whole case in every one of its aspects; and

the Government, with these papers in their hands, kept them back for

eighteen months, until they had hurried us into this deplorable, and,

I must say, into this guilty war. The island of Cyprus was

taken; responsibility of governing Asia Minor was assumed; a

_quasi_-territorial supremacy was asserted over Syria in common with

the rest of Asia Minor, which was a matter with respect to which we

knew very well that the jealousies of France were sure to be aroused;

but we were called upon and compelled, gentlemen, to discuss that

matter, I think, in the end of July, 1878, at the celebrated epoch of

'peace with honour'--we were called upon to discuss that matter

in total ignorance that France had remonstrated, that France had

complained; and the Government never let drop in the debate the

slightest intimation or inkling that such was the case. We had to

debate, we had to divide, we had to take the judgement of Parliament,

in utter ignorance of the vital fact that great offence had been given

to a faithful and a powerful ally by the steps taken by the Ministry;

and it was only when the papers were laid, two or three months after,

by the French Government, before the French Chamber, that we became

aware of the fact that these papers were presented to us. How is it

possible for any House of Commons to perform its duty if it consents

to be treated in such a way,--if it consents not only to exercise

every patience and forbearance, which must often be the case before

intelligence can be produced, but if it consents to be dragged through

the mire by being set to pronounce formal judgement upon national

emergencies of the highest import, and to do that without the

information necessary for a judgement; and when it is believed that

information has been withheld, no notice whatever is taken of the

fact, and perfect satisfaction is felt by the members of that majority

whom you are now called upon to try?

Well, that is the withholding of information, gentlemen; but there has

been even worse than that--worse, I am grieved to say it. I cannot

help saying it without being in a condition to trace home the charge

if this was thought needful, and I am very unwilling to fasten it upon

any one without that full and demonstrative evidence which the

case hardly admits of; but I will say this, that news--that

intelligence--has been falsified to bewilder and mislead to their

own peril and detriment the people of this country. You remember,

gentlemen, what happened at the outbreak of the great war between

France and Germany in 1870. At that time there existed for a few

days a condition of things which produced in that case excitement of

expectation as to the points upon which the quarrel turned; and you

remember that a telegram was sent from Berlin to Paris, and was

published in Paris, or rather, if I recollect aright, it was announced

by a Minister in the Chamber, stating that the King of Prussia, as he

was then, had insulted the ambassador of France by turning his back

upon him in a garden, where they had met, and refusing to communicate

with him. The consequence was an immense exasperation in France; and

the telegram, which afterwards proved to be totally and absolutely

false, was a necessary instrument for working up the minds of the

French people to a state in which some of them desired, and the rest

were willing to tolerate, what proved to be a most disastrous war.

That war never was desired by the French nation at large, but by false

intelligence heat was thrown into the atmosphere, party feeling and

national feeling to a certain extent were excited, and it became

practicable to drag the whole nation into the responsibility of the

war. I remember well at that time what passed through my mind. I

thought how thankful we ought to be that the use of methods so

perilous, and so abominable--for the word is not too strong--never

could be known in our happy country. Yes, gentlemen; but since that

time it has been known in our happy country. Since that time false

telegrams about the entry of the Russian army into Constantinople have

been sent home to disturb, and paralyse, and reverse the deliberations

of Parliament, and have actually stopped these deliberations, and

led experienced statesmen to withhold their action because of this

intelligence, which was afterwards, and shortly afterwards, shown to

be wholly without ground. Who invented that false intelligence I

do not know, and I do not say. All I say is, that it was sent from

Constantinople. It was telegraphed in the usual manner; it was

published in the usual manner; it was available for a certain purpose.

I can no more say who invented it than I can say who invented the

telegram that came to Paris about the King of Prussia and the French

ambassador; but the intelligence came, and it was false intelligence.

That was not the only, nor was it the most important case. You

remember--I am now carrying your recollections back to the time of

the outbreak of the war with Afghanistan, and if you recollect the

circumstances of that outbreak, at the most critical moment we were

told that the Ameer of Afghanistan had refused to receive a British

Mission with insult and with outrage, and that insult and outrage were

represented as at once enlisting our honour and reputation in the

case, as making it necessary to administer immediate chastisement. I

do not hesitate to express my full belief that without that statement

the war with Afghanistan would not have been made, would not have

been tolerated, by the country; but it was difficult, considering the

nature of our Indian Empire, considering how it is dependent upon

opinion in Asia, and upon the repute of strength, it was difficult to

interfere strongly--indeed. Parliament was not sitting--but it was

difficult even by opinion out of doors strongly to protest against

military measures taken in a case where the authority of the Crown

had been insulted, and outrage committed upon it by the Ameer of

Afghanistan. That intelligence was sent. We were never undeceived

about it until we were completely committed to the war, and until our

troops were in the country. The Parliament met; after long and most

unjustifiable delays the papers were produced, and when the papers

were produced and carefully examined, we found that there was not a

shred of foundation for that outrageous statement, and that the temper

and pride of the people of this country had been wrought up, and the

spirit of wrath fomented and kindled in their bosoms, by intelligence

that was false intelligence, and that somebody or other--somebody or

other having access to high quarters, if not dwelling in them--had

invented, had fabricated for the evil purpose of carrying us into

bloody strife.

All these are among the acts which I am sorry to say it is my business

to charge upon the majority of the late Parliament, and upon every

member of that majority; and all these are the acts which those

who are invited to vote or who intend to vote for my noble

opponent--whatever may be his personal claims, all these are the

acts, the responsibility of which they are now invited to take upon

themselves, and the repetition of which, by giving that vote, they

will directly encourage.

The next charge is the charge of broken laws. We have contended--it is

impossible to trouble you with argument--but we have contended, and I

think we have demonstrated, in the House of Commons, sustained by a

great array of legal strength and bearing, that in making that war in

Afghanistan, the Government of this country absolutely broke the laws

which regulate the Government of India. I do not say they admit it;

on the contrary, they deny it. But we have argued it; we believe, we

think we have shown it. It is a very grave and serious question; but

this much, I think, is plain, that unless our construction of that

Indian Government Act, which limits the power of the Crown as to the

employment of the Indian forces at the cost of the Indian revenue

without the consent of Parliament--unless our construction of that Act

be true, the restraining clauses of that Act are absolutely worthless,

and the people who passed those restraining clauses, and who most

carefully considered them at the time, must have been people entirely

unequal to their business; although two persons--I won't speak of

myself, who had much to do with them, but two persons who next to

myself were most concerned, were the present and the late Lord Derby,

neither of them persons very likely to go to work upon a subject

of that kind without taking care that what their hand did was done

effectually.

Now besides the honour, if it be an honour, of broken laws, the

Government has the honour of broken treaties. When I discussed the

case of broken laws, I told you fairly that the Government denied the

breaking of the laws, and make their own argument to show--I suppose

they think they show--that they did not break the laws. But when I

pass to the next head, of the broken treaties, the case is different,

especially in one of the most material points, which I will state in a

few words, but clearly. The first case which we consider to be that of

a distinctly broken treaty is that of sending the warships of England

through the Dardanelles without the consent of the Sultan of Turkey.

We believe that to be a clear breach of the Treaty of Paris. But that

also, if I remember aright, was argued on both sides, and, therefore,

I pass on from it, and I charge another breach of the Treaty of

Paris. That famous Anglo-Turkish Convention, which gave to you the

inestimable privilege of being responsible for the government of the

island of Cyprus without deriving from it any possible advantage; that

famous Anglo-Turkish Convention, which invested us with the right of

interference, and caused us to interfere both as to the integrity

and as to the independence of the Sultan by our own sole act; that

Anglo-Turkish Convention was a direct and an absolute breach of the

Treaty of Paris, which, bearing as it did the signature of England, as

well as the rest of the Powers, declared that no one of these Powers

should of themselves interfere in any matter of the integrity or

independence of Turkey without the consent of the rest. And here I

must tell you that I never heard from the Government, or any friend

of the Government, the slightest attempt to defend that gross act of

lawlessness, that unpardonable breach of international law, which is

the highest sanction of the rights of nations and of the peace of

Europe.

It is not, however, in matters of law only. We have been busy in

alienating the sympathies of free peoples. The free Slavonic peoples

of the East of Europe--the people of Roumania, the people of

Montenegro, the people of Servia, the people of Bulgaria--each and all

of these have been painfully taught in these last few years to look

upon the free institutions of this country as being for them a dream,

as being, perhaps, for the enjoyment of this country, but not as

availing to animate a nation with a generous desire to extend to

others the blessings they enjoyed themselves. In other times--it

was so when Mr. Canning was the Minister of this country, when Lord

Palmerston was the Minister of this country, when Lord Clarendon was

the Minister of this country at the Foreign Office--it was well known

that England, while regardful of her own just interests, and while

measuring on every occasion her strength and her responsibility,

yet was willing to use and willing to find opportunities for giving

cordial aid and sympathy to freedom; and by aid and sympathy many a

nation has been raised to its present position of free independence,

which, without that sympathy, would probably never have attained to

such a height in the order of civilization. The sympathies of free

people ought to be a dear and precious object of our ambition.

Ambition may be a questionable quality: if you give a certain meaning

to the phrase, it ill comports with the Christian law. But there

is one sense in which ambition will never mislead men; that is the

ambition to be good, and the ambition to do good in relieving from

evil those who are grievously suffering, and who have not deserved the

evils they endure: that is the ambition which every British statesman

ought to cherish. But, as I have said, for the last two years

especially--and even for more than two years--more or less, I

think, during the whole active period of the foreign policy of the

Beaconsfield Administration--the sympathies of these now free peoples

of the East have been constantly more and more alienated; and except,

perhaps, in a single case which I am glad to cling to--the single

and isolated case of Eastern Roumania--except this case, the whole

strength of England, as far as they have been conversant with it, has

been exercised for the purpose of opposing their best interests.

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