Conference, is our position, and what will be our course? And without
intending, or being able to pledge, the Government in case of
contingencies which have not arisen, I think it is due to Parliament
and to the country--especially at this period of the Session--to
declare what is the view which the Government take of the position,
the duty, the interests, and the future policy of England. My Lords,
with regard to our honour, I conceive that in honour we are in no way
engaged to take part in the present war. Although it has been stated
to the contrary on the part of Denmark more than once, there has
been at no time any pledge given on the part of this country or Her
Majesty's Government promising material assistance to Denmark in this
contest. Three times Her Majesty's Government during the period I
have held the seals of the Foreign Office have endeavoured to induce
Denmark to accept propositions which we regarded as favourable to her
interests. In 1862 I made propositions to her, but those propositions
were rejected. When Lord Wodehouse went to Denmark, he and the Russian
Plenipotentiary proposed that Denmark should repeal the Constitution
which she had concurred in but a few days before; but she would not at
that time receive the proposal. We believe that, if she had consented
to the arbitration which we proposed in the Conference, the result
would have been as favourable to her as, under the circumstances in
which she was placed, she could have expected. My Lords, I do not
blame Denmark for the course she has thought fit to pursue. She has
a right--I should be sorry to reproach her in any way in her
present state of weakness--she has an undoubted right to refuse our
propositions, but we on our side have also a right to take into
consideration the duty, honour, and interests of this country, and not
to make that duty, that honour, and those interests subordinate to
the interests of any foreign Power whatever. My Lords, our honour not
being engaged, we have to consider what we might be led to do for the
interests of other Powers, and for the sake of that balance of power
which in 1852 was declared by general consent to be connected with the
integrity of Denmark. My Lords, I cannot but believe that the Treaty
of 1852 having been entered into, if there had been at an early
period--say in December or January last--if France, Great Britain, and
Russia, supported by the assistance which they might have counted upon
receiving from Sweden, had declared for the maintenance of the Treaty
of 1852--the succession of the King of Denmark might have been
established without difficulty, and might have been peaceably
maintained, and that the King and his Government would have remedied
all the grievances of which his German subjects complained. I believe
the King of Denmark would have found it to his advantage to grant
to his German subjects that freedom, those privileges, and that
self-government in their internal and domestic matters which they had
demanded, and that they would thus have become quite contented as
subjects to the King of Denmark. That desirable result, however, could
not be brought about. In reference to the Treaty of 1852, I have to
repeat what I stated on a previous occasion--that it was not a treaty
of guarantee, that the Governments of France and Russia were competent
to acknowledge the treaty, but that they had not pledged themselves
to maintain the connexion of Schleswig and Denmark, that not being a
question of the general balance of power in Europe. Well, the French
Government have frequently declared and have repeated to us only
within the last twenty-four hours, that the Emperor does not consider
it essential to the interest of France to support the line of the
Schlei. He declares he does not think that France would be inclined to
go to war for such an object. He urges that a war with Germany would
be a most serious thing to France, that our armies would not be
marshalled to oppose the invasion of Denmark, and that such a war
would consequently be attended with great cost and great risk. I
think that if that war were successful, France would expect some
compensation on account of her participation, and that compensation
could hardly be granted without exciting general jealousy among the
other nations of Europe, and thus disturbing the balance of power
which now exists. I cannot deny that if the Emperor of the French puts
forward these considerations--if he declares that for these reasons,
though he would give us moral support, he would afford us no material
assistance in such war--I must say I think he is justified in that
refusal, and in adopting such a line of conduct. I cannot but admit
that if a great war with Germany arose, whatever might be the issue,
it might reproduce those great contests which took place in 1814, and
which led to such unsatisfactory results. The Emperor of the French is
a Sovereign singularly wise and sagacious, and I will say valuing,
as he has proved that he values, the peace of Europe, I am not in a
position to find fault, nor can Her Majesty's Government find any
fault with the decision to which the Emperor has come. But the Emperor
of the French having thus declared his policy, and the Emperor of
Russia having constantly refused to join with us in affording
material support to Denmark, our position, of course, must be greatly
influenced by those decisions. In the first place, is it the duty of
this country--if we are to undertake the preservation of the balance
of power in Europe as it was recognized in 1852--is it a duty
incumbent on us alone? The French Government sees very clearly the
dangers to which France might be exposed by interfering, but it says
at the same time that it would be an easy operation for England;
that England, with her naval power, might add most materially to the
strength of Denmark and assist in bringing the war to a conclusion.
My Lords, I must say there are many considerations which induce me to
arrive at a different conclusion. I cannot but think, in the first
place, that we should suffer perhaps considerably if our commercial
marine was exposed to depredations such as might take place in the
event of our being at war with Germany. That is one consideration
which ought not to be overlooked. But there are other considerations
of still greater moment. One is--Would our interference bring this
war to a conclusion? Without giving military aid could you recover
Schleswig and Holstein, and even Jutland from the Austrian and
Prussian forces? Well, my Lords, we have for a long time in our
conduct of foreign affairs shown great forbearance and patience. I
think we were right in being forbearing, and think we were justified
in being patient. But if our honour or our interests or the great
interests of Europe should call upon us to interfere, I think such
interference ought to be clearly effectual, as nothing would more tend
to diminish the influence of this country than a course of action
which would show that while we were predominant at sea, and that no
Austrian or Prussian ships of war could venture to leave port, yet at
the same time our interference could not ensure, as we hoped it would,
the safety of Denmark, nor lead to a speedy termination of the war.
But, my Lords, the whole position and influence of this country with
regard to foreign countries ought to be fully considered by Parliament
and by the country; for we have great interests with multiplied
complications arising from various connexions and various treaties
with every part of the world. It is no longer a question with
reference to the balance of power in Europe. There are other parts of
the world in which our interests may be as deeply involved, and in
which we may some day or other find it necessary to maintain the
honour and interests of this country. The civil war now raging in
America, ending how it may--whether by the establishment of
an independent republic in the South, or whether it ends most
unexpectedly, as it would be to me, I confess, by restoring the
Union--still the United States of America or the Northern States,
or whatever they may be called, will then be in a totally different
position to that which they were in a few years ago. A great army will
then be maintained by the United States. A formidable navy will also
be kept up. Our relations with that Power are liable at any moment
to interruption. I hope and trust that our friendly relations may
continue uninterrupted; still, those relations must be considered and
kept in view as well as our interest in the maintenance of the balance
of power in Europe. My Lords, let us look at other parts of the world.
Look at the great commerce which has grown up in China, where it is
necessary for us always to maintain a considerable naval force to
protect it. Look at our immense possessions in India and see how
necessary it is that they should be considered at all times. In any
question, therefore, of peace or war--while it is very probable that
this country with allies could carry on a war successfully--yet when
it comes to be a war to be carried on by England alone, there are
other contingencies to be looked at, and the position of this country
is to be considered with reference not to Europe alone, but with
reference to our interests in every quarter of the world. My Lords,
these are considerations to be borne in mind with respect to this
question of Denmark. It may be said that other combinations might be
made--that although we could not ourselves attack the German Powers
with any great amount of success, yet there are vulnerable points upon
which they, and especially Austria, may be open to attack; that those
doctrines and theories which Austria and Prussia have put forward,
with regard to foreign nationalities, may be retorted upon them, and
especially upon Austria with effect--they may be applied to other
parts of Europe than Schleswig and Holstein; that the German
nationality is not the only nationality in Europe; that the Italian
nationality has as much right to be considered as the Germans; and
that if we were to enter upon a course of supporting nationalities, we
should be perfectly justified by the doctrines and conduct of Austria.
This, no doubt, would be sufficient if the object were merely to show
to Austria and Prussia that they are vulnerable on their own ground.
But, my Lords, I think it is the duty of England to show a greater
attachment to peace than Austria and Prussia have shown, and not, if
possible, to light a flame which might extend to every part of Europe,
but rather to endeavour to confine the war within the narrowest limits
possible. Therefore, my Lords, with regard to this question, it is
the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that we should maintain the
position which we have occupied, and that we should be neutral in this
war. I do not mean to say that contingencies may not arise in which
our position might become different, and in which our conduct might be
altered. It may be said, 'Will you allow these German Powers to act
as they please? If, contrary to their professions and promises, they
should decide upon sending a combined Austrian and Prussian force to
Copenhagen with the declared object of making Denmark assent to terms
which would be destructive of her independence--will you then remain
entirely indifferent to such proceedings?' My Lords, I can only say in
answer to such a question, that every Government in this country
must retain to itself a certain liberty--as long as it possesses the
confidence of Parliament--a certain liberty of decision upon such
points. All I can now say is, that if the Government should think it
necessary to come to any fresh decision--if the war should assume a
new character--if circumstances should arise which might require us
to make another decision, it would be our duty, if Parliament were
sitting, immediately to apply to Parliament upon the subject; and if
Parliament should not be sitting, then at once to call Parliament
together in order that it may judge the conduct which Her Majesty's
Government should pursue.
In the meantime, my Lords, I have given you an outline of the course
of these negotiations. I have given you an account of the efforts
we have made for peace, which, like the efforts made in 1823 by the
Governments of Lord Liverpool and Mr. Canning, have been unfortunately
unsuccessful. I say that our policy at the present time is to
maintain peace. If there is any party in Parliament--if there is any
individual in Parliament--who thinks as Lord Grey thought in 1823
that we ought to go to war, it will be competent for them to ask Her
Majesty to interfere materially in the contest. If they think that in
any respect we have failed in our duty, it is competent for them to
take any line of conduct they may think proper. But, for ourselves, I
say with confidence that we have maintained the honour of the country,
that we have done everything in our power to preserve the peace of
Europe, and that, those efforts having failed, we can rest satisfied
that nothing has been wanting on our parts which was needed by the
honour or the interests of this country--that nothing has been left
undone which it was our duty to do.
LORD STANLEY JULY 20, 1866 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA