said he rose only to save himself from misinterpretation, has declared
that he has no objection to peace. Now I should expect a warmer
declaration from that honourable gentleman, when I recollect his
conduct on a former occasion. I recollect a time when he came to
rebuke the violence of the Minister. [Mr. Sheridan read a motion, made
by Mr. Wilberforce, for an address to His Majesty, praying that the
Government of France might not be made an obstacle to peace, when
an opportunity should arrive.] Now, as the honourable gentleman is
anxious to escape from the charge of inconsistency, I should expect he
would state the reason for this difference in his conduct now. Then
the Government was a provisional government; a government from its
nature not intended to stand; a government of furious Jacobins; and
yet the honourable gentleman implored to supplicate His Majesty that
it might not be suffered to stand in the way of peace; but now, when
it is of a less objectionable description, he justifies his friend
from an arrogant, violent, inconsiderate, and I hope he will not find
an unfortunate note, refusing to accept peace from such a government.
An honourable gentleman who has spoken in the debate put a very just
question, whether the country will endure to be governed by words, and
not by facts? I admit it right that it should not be so governed, but
I unfortunately have the authority of the present Government that it
is. The honourable gentleman spoke with great eloquence, I may say
irritation; but never did I see eloquence so misapplied. He has shown
his dexterity in driving the subject from its proper basis; he guides,
urges, and inflames the passions of his hearers on Jacobinical
principles, but he does not show how they bear on the present
question. He has not dared to say, that so far as respects the
restoration of the House of Bourbon, we have suffered by the defection
of Russia. What that Power may still do with regard to La Vendée, or
reconciling the people of Ireland to the Union, I do not inquire;
but with regard to the great object, the restoration of monarchy
in France, we are _minus_ the Emperor of Russia: that Power may be
considered as extinct. Is it, then, to be endured, that the Minister
shall come down and ask for a subsidy under such circumstances? Is it
to be endured, that we shall be told we are at war for the restoration
of monarchy in France, that Russia is pledged to the accomplishment
of that purpose, that Russia is the rock on which we stand, that the
magnanimous Emperor of Russia, the gallantry of whose troops, and the
skill of whose great generals, place them above all the troops and
generals in Europe, is all we have to rest on? Is it to be endured, I
say, that this rock should prove as brittle as sand, and that those
who held this language should come down in a week after, and say, give
us two millions and a half to subsidize Germany, and then we shall
have a better army than we had with Russia? After such unqualified
praise upon Russia, and after her defection, is not such language,
I ask, inconsistent, absurd, and preposterous? If Germany possessed
these wonderful forces before, why were they not called into action;
and if not, why are we to subsidize the _posse comitatus_, the rabble
of Germany? But who is the person that applies for this subsidy? As
to the Elector of Bavaria, I leave him out of the question. It is the
Emperor of Germany. Is there anything in his conduct and character to
incline us to listen to him? I think not, and for these two reasons.
First, he applied once on a false pretence, and secondly, he failed in
performing his stipulated engagement. What was his false pretence? He
said he could not open the campaign without the pecuniary assistance
of this country; and yet he did do so, and displayed more vigour,
energy, and resources than ever. Now, if to this we add experience,
and the evidence of facts, when he dared, though bound to this
country, to break faith with her, and make a separate peace, does it
not furnish a reasonable cause for declining to grant a subsidy to
such a Power? The honourable gentleman is offended at our connecting
the situation of the country, and the present scarcity, with the
question of war. I do not know to what extent this principle is to
be carried. I see no more objection to state the pressure in this
particular from the continuance of the war, than there would be
to advance the increase of the public debt, the situation of the
finances, or any other of those reasons so often repeated without its
having been ever objected that they were of an improper kind. Sir, I
say, there is no more impropriety in urging this argument, than in
urging Ministers not to press the people too far, but to apportion the
burden to their strength to bear it. What has my honourable friend
said? We see an opulent commercial prosperity; but look over the
country, and we behold barracks and broth-houses, the cause and the
effect, the poverty and distress of the country; for surely it will
not be contended, but that among the calamities of war are to be
reckoned families left without support, and thrown upon charity
for subsistence. That the war is unnecessary, as being useless, is
self-evident, and nobody can deny it. But, say they, Buonaparte has
taken us at an unguarded moment: we do not object to peace, but we
have a fear and jealousy of concluding one, except with the House of
Bourbon: in a peace concluded with it we should have confidence, but
we can have none in the present Government of France. I say, were that
event arrived, and the House of Bourbon seated on the throne, the
Minister should be impeached who would disband a single soldier; and
that it would be equally criminal to make peace under a new King as
under a republican government, unless her heart and mind were friendly
to it. France, as a republic, maybe a bad neighbour; but than
monarchical France a more foul and treacherous neighbour never was. Is
it, then, sufficient to say, let monarchy be restored, and let peace
be given to all Europe? I come now, Sir, to the object of the war as
expressed in the note. It is there stated, that the restoration of
monarchy is the _sine qua non_ of present negotiation; and then it
proceeds to say, that it is possible we may hereafter treat with some
other form of government, after it shall be tried by experience and
the evidence of facts. What length of time this trial may require is
impossible to ascertain; yet we have, I acknowledge, some thing of
experience here by which we may form a kind of conjecture.
At the time of the negotiation at Lisle, the then republican
Government had stood two years and a half. Previous to that time, it
had been declared improper to enter into negotiation with it; but,
from experience and the evidence of facts, Ministers discovered that
it was then become good and proper to treat with; and yet so it
happened that, immediately after this judgement in its favour, it
crumbled to pieces. Here, then, we have a tolerable rule to judge by,
and may presume, on the authority of this case, that something more
than two years and a half must expire before any new government will
be pronounced stable. The note, Sir, then proceeds to pay an handsome
compliment to the line of princes who maintained peace at home, and
to round the period handsomely, it should have added, tranquillity
abroad; but instead of this are substituted respect and consideration,
by which we are to understand exactly what is meant by the
consideration with which the note is subscribed, being equivalent to
'I am, Sir, with the highest respect and sincerest enmity, yours',
for, Sir, this consideration which the line of princes maintained,
consisted in involving all the Powers within their reach and influence
in war and contentions. The note then proceeds to state, that this
restoration of monarchy would secure to France the uninterrupted
possession of her ancient territory, by which we are to understand,
I suppose, we would renounce our Quiberon expeditions. In this note,
Sir, the gentlemen seem to have clubbed their talents, one found
grammar, another logic, and a third some other ingredient; but is it
not strange that they should all forget that the House of Bourbon,
instead of maintaining peace and tranquillity in Europe, was always
the disturber of both? In the very last transaction of monarchical
France, I mean her conduct in the American war. His Majesty's speech
begins thus: 'France, the disturber of the tranquillity of Europe.'
But were a person to judge hereafter, from the history of the present
time, of the war we carried on, and the millions we expended for
the monarchy of France, he would be led to conclude that it was our
nearest and dearest friend. Is there anything, then, in the knowledge
of human nature, from which we can infer, that with the restoration
of monarchy in France, a total change in the principles of the people
would take place? or that Ministers of the new King would renounce
them? What security have we, that a change of principles will take
place in the restored monarch, and that he will not act upon the
principles cherished by his ancestors? But if this security is
effected by maiming France, does the right honourable gentleman think
that the people of France would submit to it? Does he not know that
even the emigrants have that partiality for the grandeur of their
country, that even they cannot restrain their joy at republican
victories? But with regard to the practicability of the course to be
pursued, the right honourable gentleman says, he is looking forward
to a time when there shall be no dread of Jacobin principles. I ask
whether he does not think, from the fraud, oppression, tyranny, and
cruelty with which the conduct of France has marked them, that they
are not now nearly dead, extinct, and detested? But who are the
Jacobins? Is there a man in this country who has at any time opposed
Ministers, who has resisted the waste of public money and the
prostitution of honours, that has not been branded with the name? The
Whig Club are Jacobins. Of this there can be no doubt, for a right
honourable gentleman [Mr. Windham] on that account struck his name
off the list. The Friends of the People are Jacobins. I am one of the
Friends of the People, and consequently am a Jacobin. The honourable
gentleman pledged himself never to treat with Jacobin France until we
had
Toto certatum est corpore regni.
Now he did treat with France at Lisle and Paris, but perhaps there
were not Jacobins in France at either of these times. You, then, the
Friends of the People, are the Jacobins. I do think, Sir, Jacobin
principles never existed much in this country; and even admitting they
had, I say they have been found so hostile to true liberty, that in
proportion as we love it, and whatever may be said, I must still
consider liberty an inestimable blessing, we must hate and detest
these principles. But more, I do not think they even exist in France;
they have there died the best of deaths, a death I am more pleased to
see than if it had been effected by a foreign force; they have stung
themselves to death, and died by their own poison. But the honourable
gentleman, arguing from experience of human nature, tells us that
Jacobin principles are such, that the mind that is once infected with
them, no quarantine, no cure can cleanse. Now if this be the case, and
that there are, according to Mr. Burke's statement, eighty thousand
incorrigible Jacobins in England, we are in a melancholy situation.
The right honourable gentleman must continue the war while one of the
present generation remains, and consequently we cannot for that period
expect those rights to be restored to us, to the suspension and
restrictions of which the honourable gentleman attributes the
suppression of these principles. A pretty consolation this, truly!
Now I contend that they do not exist in France to the same extent as
before, or nearly. If this, then, be the case, what danger can be
apprehended? But if this, then, be true, and that Buonaparte, the
child and champion of Jacobin principles, as he is called, be resolved
to uphold them, upon what ground does the honourable gentleman presume
to hope for the restoration of the House of Bourbon? So far I have
argued on the probability of the object, but the honourable gentleman
goes on, and says, there is no wish to restore the monarchy without
the consent of the people. Now if this be the case, is it not better
to leave the people to themselves, for if armies are to interfere, how
can we ascertain that it is a legitimate government established with
the pure consent of the people? As to Buonaparte, whose character has
been represented as marked with fraud and insincerity, has he not made
treaties with the Emperor and observed them? Is it not his interest to
make peace with us? Do you not think he feels it? And can you suppose,
that if peace were made, he has not power to make it be observed by
the people of France? And do not you think that the people of France
are aware that an infraction of that peace would bring with it a new
order of things, and a renewal of those calamities from which they are
now desirous to escape? But, Sir, on the character of Buonaparte I
have better evidence than the intercepted letters, I appeal to Carnot,
whether the instructions given with respect to the conduct to be
observed to the Emperor, were not moderate, open, and magnanimous?
[Here Mr. Sheridan read an extract from Carnot's pamphlet, in support
of his assertion.] With regard to the late note, in answer to his
proposal to negotiate, it is foolish, insulting, and undignified. It
is evidence to me, that the honourable gentlemen themselves do not
believe his character to be such as they describe it; for, if they
did, they must know their language would irritate such a mind; the
passions will mix themselves with reason in the conduct of men, and
they cannot say that they will not yet be obliged to treat with
Buonaparte. I am warranted in saying this, for I do not believe in
my heart, that since the defection of Russia, Ministers have been
repenting of their answer. I say so because I do not consider them so
obstinate and headstrong as to persevere with as much ardour for the
restoration of monarchy as when they were pledged with Russia. There
was not a nation in Europe which Ministers did not endeavour to draw
into the war. On what was such conduct founded, but on Jacobinical
principles? Indeed Ministers, by negotiating at one time with a
Jacobinical government in France, plainly proved they were not so
hostile to its principles as they would now wish to appear. Prussia
and Austria, as well as this country, have acted also on Jacobinical
principles. The conduct of this country towards Ireland has been
perfectly Jacobinical. How, then, can we define these principles,
when persons who would now disavow them fall by some fatality into an
unavoidable acknowledgement of them? The objections that have been
raised to peace have been entirely Jacobinical. If we seek for peace,
it must be done in the spirit of peace. We are not to make it a
question who was the first aggressor, or endeavour to throw the blame
that may attach to us on our enemy. Such circumstances should be
consigned to oblivion, as tending to no one useful purpose. France, in
the beginning of the Revolution, had conceived many romantic notions.
She was to put an end to war, and produce, by a pure form of
government, a perfectibility of mind which before had never been
realized. The monarchs of Europe, seeing the prevalence of these new
principles, trembled for their thrones. France, also, perceiving
the hostility of kings to her projects, supposed she could not be a
republic without the overthrow of thrones. Such has been the regular
progress of cause and effect; but who was the first aggressor, with
whom the jealousy first arose, need not now be a matter of discussion.
Both the republic, and the monarchs who opposed her, acted on the same
principles: the latter said they must exterminate Jacobins, and the
former that they must destroy monarchs. From this source have all
the calamities of Europe flowed; and it is now a waste of time and
argument to inquire farther into the subject. Now, Sir, let us come to
matter of fact. Has not France renounced and reprobated those Jacobin
principles, which created her so many enemies? Are not all her violent
invectives against regular governments come into disesteem? Has
not the Abbé Sièyes, who wrote in favour of monarchy--has not
Buonaparte--condemned the Jacobinical excesses of the Revolution in
the most pointed manner, the very men who have had so large a share
in the formation of the present Government? But I maintain that
Buonaparte himself is also a friend to peace. There is in his
correspondence with the Ministers of this country a total renunciation
of Jacobinical principles. In the dread, therefore, of these, I can
see no argument for the continuance of war. A man who is surprised at
the revolution of sentiment in individuals or nations shows but little
experience. Such instances occur every day. Neither would a wise man
always attach to principles the most serious consequences. Left to
themselves, the absurd and dangerous would soon disappear, and wisdom
establish herself only the more secure on their ruins. I am a friend
to peace at this time, because I think Buonaparte would be as good a
friend and neighbour to this country as ever were any of the Bourbons.
I think also that there can be no time when we can hope to have better
terms. If the King of Prussia should join France, such an alliance
would greatly change the state of things; and from her long and
honourable neutrality, in spite of the remonstrance and entreaties of
this country, an event of that kind is by no means unlikely to happen.
It must be considered also that the First Consul of France must feel
no little portion of resentment towards this country, arising from the
indignity with which his overtures of negotiation have been treated.
It is not improbable that, to satisfy his revenge, he would make
large sacrifices to the House of Austria, that he might contend more
successfully against this country. Such are my fears and opinions; but
I am unhappily in the habit of being numbered with the minority, and
therefore their consequences are considerably diminished. But there
have been occasions when the sentiments of the minority of this House
have been those of the people at large: one, for instance, when a war
was prevented with Russia concerning Oczakow. The minority told the
Minister that the sentiments of the country were contrary to those
of the majority: and the fact justified them in the assertion; the
dispute was abandoned. In the year 1797, the opinions of the minority
on peace were those of the people, and I believe the same coincidence
exists now upon the same subject.
[Footnote 1: Not the King of Prussia; but Francis II of
Austria.--_Ed_.]
WILLIAM PITT
FEBRUARY 3, 1800
OVERTURES OF PEACE WITH FRANCE
Sir, I am induced at this period of the debate to offer my sentiments
to the House, both from an apprehension that, at a later hour, the
attention of the House must necessarily be exhausted, and because the
sentiment with which the learned gentleman[1] began his speech, and
with which he has thought proper to conclude it, places the question
precisely on that ground on which I am most desirous of discussing
it. The learned gentleman seems to assume, as the foundation of his
reasoning, and as the great argument for immediate treaty, that
every effort to overturn the system of the French revolution must
be unavailing; and that it would be not only imprudent, but almost
impious, to struggle longer against that order of things, which, on I
know not what principle of predestination, he appears to consider as
immortal. Little as I am inclined to accede to this opinion, I am not
sorry that the honourable gentleman has contemplated the subject in
this serious view. I do, indeed, consider the French revolution as
the severest trial which the visitation of Providence has ever yet
inflicted upon the nations of the earth; but I cannot help reflecting,
with satisfaction, that this country, even under such a trial, has not
only been exempted from those calamities which have covered almost
every other part of Europe, but appears to have been reserved as a
refuge and asylum to those who fled from its persecution, as a barrier
to oppose its progress, and, perhaps, ultimately as an instrument to
deliver the world from the crimes and miseries which have attended
it. Under this impression, I trust the House will forgive me if I
endeavour, as far as I am able, to take a large and comprehensive view
of this important question. In doing so, I agree with my honourable
friend, that it would, in any case, be impossible to separate the
present discussion from the former crimes and atrocities of the French
revolution; because both the papers now on the table, and the whole
of the learned gentleman's argument, force upon our consideration the
origin of the war, and all the material facts which have occurred
during its continuance. The learned gentleman has revived and retailed
all those arguments from his own pamphlet, which had before passed
through thirty-seven or thirty-eight editions in print; and now gives
them to the House embellished by the graces of his personal delivery.
The First Consul has also thought fit to revive and retail the chief
arguments used by all the Opposition speakers, and all the Opposition
publishers, in this country during the last seven years. And (what is
still more material) the question itself, which is now immediately at
issue--the question, whether, under the present circumstances, there
is such a prospect of security from any treaty with France as ought
to induce us to negotiate, cannot be properly decided upon without
retracing, both from our own experience and from that of other
nations, the nature, the causes, and the magnitude of the danger
against which we have to guard, in order to judge of the security
which we ought to accept.
I say, then, that before any man can concur in opinion with that
learned gentleman--before any man can think that the substance of His
Majesty's answer is any other than the safety of the country required;
before any man can be of opinion, that to the overtures made by the
enemy, at such a time, and under such circumstances, it would have
been safe to have returned an answer concurring in the negotiation--he
must come within one of the three following descriptions: he must
either believe that the French revolution neither does now exhibit,
nor has at any time exhibited, such circumstances of danger, arising
out of the very nature of the system and the internal state and
condition of France, as to leave to foreign Powers no adequate ground
of security in negotiation; or, secondly, he must be of opinion, that
the change which has recently taken place has given that security,
which, in the former stages of the revolution, was wanting; or,
thirdly, he must be one who, believing that the danger existed, not
undervaluing its extent, nor mistaking its nature, nevertheless
thinks, from his view of the present pressure on the country, from his
view of its situation and its prospects, compared with the situation
and prospects of its enemies, that we are, with our eyes open, bound
to accept of inadequate security for everything that is valuable and
sacred, rather than endure the pressure, or incur the risk, which
would result from a farther prolongation of the contest.
In discussing the last of these questions, we shall be led to consider
what inference is to be drawn from the circumstances and the result of
our own negotiations in former periods of the war;--whether, in the
comparative state of this country and France, we now see the same
reason for repeating our then unsuccessful experiments;--or whether
we have not thence derived the lessons of experience, added to the
deductions of reason, marking the inefficacy and danger of the very
measures which are quoted to us as precedents for our adoption.
Unwilling, Sir, as I am to go into much detail on ground which has
been so often trodden before, yet, when I find the learned gentleman,
after all the information which he must have received, if he has read
any of the answers to his work (however ignorant he might be when
he wrote it), still giving the sanction of his authority to the
supposition that the order to M. Chauvelin to depart from this kingdom
was the cause of the war between this country and France, I do feel it
necessary to say a few words on that part of the subject.
Inaccuracy in dates seems to be a sort of fatality common to all who
have written on that side of the question; for even the writer of the
note to His Majesty is not more correct, in this respect, than if
he had taken his information only from the pamphlet of the learned
gentleman. The House will recollect the first professions of the
French Republic, which are enumerated, and enumerated truly, in that
note--they are tests of everything which would best recommend a
Government to the esteem and confidence of foreign Powers, and the
reverse of everything which has been the system and practice of
France now for near ten years. It is there stated, that their first
principles were love of peace, aversion to conquest, and respect for
the independence of other countries. In the same note, it seems,
indeed, admitted, that they since have violated all those principles;
but it is alleged that they have done so only in consequence of the
provocation of other Powers. One of the first of those provocations
is stated to have consisted in the various outrages offered to their
Ministers, of which the example is said to have been set by the King
of Great Britain in his conduct to M. Chauvelin. In answer to this
supposition, it is only necessary to remark that, before the example
was given, before Austria and Prussia are supposed to have been thus
encouraged to combine in a plan for the partition of France, that
plan, if it ever existed at all, had existed and been acted upon for
above eight months: France and Prussia had been at war eight months
before the dismissal of M. Chauvelin. So much for the accuracy of the
statement.
[Mr. Erskine here observed that this was not the statement of his
argument.]