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[Illustration:
Sun with six orbits, each with symbol:
Mercurius, Venus, Ceres et Proserpina, Mars, Jupiter, Saturnus
Sun utters: Ame omnes
"Ceres and Proserpina" orbit continuing below sun shows earth with
orbiting moon.
Text on earth orbit: Sua fovent; Vniuersum ornant.
Text on moon's orbit: Mutuo se illuminant]
THE
DISCOVERY
OF A
WORLD
IN THE
MOONE.
or,
A DISCOVRSE
Tending
TO PROVE
that 'tis probable there
may be another habitable
World in that Planet.
_Quid tibi inquis ista proderunt? Si nihil aliud,
hoc certe, sciam omnia angusta esse._
SENECA. Praef. ad 1. Lib. _N. Q._
[Decoration]
_LONDON_,
Printed by _E. G._ for _Michael Sparl_
and _Edward Forrest_, 1638.
[Decoration]
_Perlegi haec +paradoxa+ & novitatis gracia typis
mandari permitto._
Mart. 29. 1638.
THO. WEEKES _R.P._
_Episc. Lond. Cap._
_Domest._
[Decoration]
To the Reader.
_If amongst thy leisure houres thou canst spare any for the perusall of
this discourse, and dost looke to finde somewhat in it which may serve
for thy information and benefit: let me then advise thee to come unto
it with an equall minde, not swayed by prejudice, but indifferently
resolved to assent unto that truth which upon deliberation shall seeme
most probable unto thy reason, and then I doubt not, but either thou
wilt agree with mee in this assertion, or at least not thinke it to be
as farre from truth, as it is from common opinion._
_Two cautions there are which I would willingly admonish thee of in the
beginning._
1. _That thou shouldst not here looke to find any exact, accurate
Treatise, since this discourse was but the fruit of some lighter
studies, and those too hudled up in a short time, being first
thought of and finished in the space of some few weekes, and
therefore you cannot in reason expect, that it should be so
polished, as perhaps, the subject would require, or the leisure
of the Author might have done it._
2. _To remember that I promise onely probable arguments for the
proofe of this opinion, and therefore you must not looke that every
consequence should be of an undeniable dependance, or that the truth
of each argument should be measured by its necessity. I grant that
some Astronomicall appearances may possibly be solved otherwise then
here they are. But the thing I aime at is this, that probably they
may so be solved, as I have here set them downe: Which, if it be
granted (as I thinke it must) then I doubt not, but the indifferent
reader will find some satisfaction in the maine thing that is to be
proved._
_Many ancient Philosophers of the better note, have formerly defended
this assertion, which I have here laid downe, and it were to be wished,
that some of us would more apply our endeavours unto the examination of
these old opinions, which though they have for a long time lien
neglected by others, yet in them may you finde many truths well worthy
your paines and observation. Tis a false conceit, for us to thinke, that
amongst the ancient variety and search of opinions, the best hath still
prevailed. Time (saith the learned _Verulam_) seemes to be of the nature
of a river or streame, which carrieth downe to us that which is light,
or blowne up, but sinketh that which is weighty and solid._
_It is my desire that by the occasion of this discourse, I may raise up
some more active spirit to a search after other hidden and unknowne
truthes. Since it must needes be a great impediment unto the growth of
sciences, for men still so to plod on upon beaten principles, as to be
afraid of entertaining any thing that may seeme to contradict them. An
unwillingnesse to take such things into examination, is one of those
errours of learning in these times observed by the judicious _Verulam_.
Questionlesse there are many secret truths, which the ancients have
passed over, that are yet left to make some of our age famous for their
discovery._
_If by this occasion I may provoke any reader to an attempt of this
nature, I shall then thinke my selfe happy, and this work successefull._
Farewell.
[Decoration]
The First Proposition, by way of Preface.
_That the strangenesse of this opinion is no sufficient reason why it
should be rejected, because other certaine truths have beene formerly
esteemed ridiculous, and great absurdities entertayned by common
consent._
There is an earnestnesse and hungering after novelty, which doth still
adhere unto all our natures, and it is part of that primative image,
that wide extent and infinite capacity at first created in the heart of
man, for this since its depravation in _Adam_ perceiving it selfe
altogether emptied of any good doth now catch after every new thing,
conceiving that possibly it may finde satisfaction among some of its
fellow creatures. But our enemy the divell (who strives still to pervert
our gifts, and beate us with our owne weapons) hath so contriv'd it,
that any truth doth now seeme distastefull for that very reason, for
which errour is entertain'd--Novelty, for let but some upstart heresie
be set abroach, and presently there are some out of a curious humour;
others, as if they watched an occasion of singularity, will take it up
for canonicall, and make it part of their creede and profession; whereas
solitary truth cannot any where finde so ready entertainement; but the
same Novelty which is esteemed the commendation of errour and makes that
acceptable, is counted the fault of truth, and causes that to bee
rejected. How did the incredulous World gaze at _Columbus_ when hee
promised to discover another part of the earth, and he could not for a
long time by his confidence, or arguments, induce any of the Christian
Princes, either to assent unto his opinion, or goe to the charges of an
experiment. Now if he who had such good grounds for his assertion, could
finde no better entertainement among the wiser sort, and upper end of
the World; 'tis not likely then that this opinion which I now deliver,
shall receive any thing from the men of these daies, especially our
vulgar wits, but misbeliefe or derision. It hath alwaies beene the
unhappinesse of new truths in Philosophy, to be derided by those that
are ignorant of the causes of things, and reiected by others whose
perversenesse ties them to the contrary opinion, men whose envious pride
will not allow any new thing for truth which they themselves were not
the first inventors of. So that I may iustly expect to be accused of a
pragmaticall ignorance, and bold ostentation, especially since for this
opinion _Xenophanes_, a man whose authority was able to adde some credit
to his assertion could not escape the like censure from others. For
_Natales Comes_ speaking of that Philosopher,[1] and this his opinion,
saith thus,
_Nonnulli ne nihil scisse videantur, aliqua nova monstra in
Philosophia introducunt, ut alicujus rei inventores fuisse appareant._
"Some there are who least they might seeme to know nothing, will
bring up monstrous absurdities in Philosophy, that so afterward they
may bee famed for the invention of somewhat."
The same author doth also in another place accuse _Anaxagoras_[2] of
folly for the same opinion,
_Est enim non ignobilis gradus stultitiae, vel si nescias quid dicas,
tamen velle de rebus propositis hanc vel illam partem stabilire._
"'Tis none of the worst kindes of folly, boldly to affirme one side or
other, when a man knows not what to say."
[Sidenote 1: _Mytholog. lib. 3. c. 17._]
[Sidenote 2: _Lib. 7. c. 1._]
If these men were thus censur'd, I may iustly then expect to be derided
by most, and to be believed by few or none; especially since this
opinion seemes to carry in it so much strangenesse, so much
contradiction to the generall consent of others. But how ever, I am
resolved that this shall not be any discouragement, since I know that it
is not the common opinion of others that can either adde or detract from
the truth. For,
1. Other truths have beene formerly esteemed altogether as ridiculous
as this can be.
2. Grosse absurdities have beene entertained by generall opinion.
I shall give an instance of each, that so I may the better prepare the
Reader to consider things without a prejudice, when hee shall see that
the common opposition against this which I affirme cannot any way
derogate from its truth.
1. Other truths have beene formerly accounted as ridiculous as this, I
shall specifie that of the Antipodes, which have beene denied and laught
at by many wise men and great Schollers, such as were _Herodotus_, St.
_Austin_, _Lactantius_, the _Venerable Bede_, _Lucretius_ the Poet,
_Procopius_, and the voluminous _Abulensis_ with others. _Herodotus_
counted it so horrible an absurdity, that hee could not forbeare
laughing to thinke of it. +Gelo de horon ges periodous grapsantas,
pollous ede kai oudena noon echontas exegesamenon hoi Okeanon te
rheonta graphousi, perix ten te gen eousan kukloterea hos apo tornou.+
"I cannot choose but laugh, (saith he) to see so many men venture to
describe the earths compasse, relating those things that are without
all sense, as that the Sea flowes about the World, and that the earth
it selfe is round as an Orbe."
But this great ignorance is not so much to be admired in him, as in
those learneder men of later times, when all sciences began to flourish
in the World. Such was Saint _Austin_ who censures that relation of the
Antipodes to be an incredible fable,[1] and with him agrees the eloquent
_Lactantius_,[2]
_quid illi qui esse contrarios vestigiis nostris Antipodes putant?
num aliquid loquuntur? aut est quispiam tam ineptus, qui credat esse
homines, quorum vestigia sunt superiora quam capita? aut ibi quae apud
nos jacent inversa pendere? fruges & arbores deorsum versus crescere,
pluvias & nives, & grandinem sursum versus cadere in terram? &
miratur aliquis hortor pensiles inter septem mira narrari, quum
Philosophi, & agros & maria, & urbes & montes pensiles faciunt? &c._
"What (saith he) are they that thinke there are Antipodes, such as
walke with their feet against ours? doe they speake any likelyhood?
or is there any one so foolish as to believe that there are men whose
heeles are higher than their heads? that things which with us doe lie
on the ground doe hang there? that the Plants and Trees grow
downewards, that the haile, and raine, and snow fall upwards to the
earth? and doe wee admire the hanging Orchards amongst the seven
wonders, whereas here the Philosophers have made the Field and Seas,
the Cities and Mountaines hanging."
What shall wee thinke (saith hee in _Plutarch_) that men doe clyng to
that place like wormes, or hang by their clawes as Cats, or if wee
suppose a man a little beyond the Center, to bee digging with a spade?
is it likely (as it must bee according to this opinion) that the earth
which hee loosened, should of it selfe ascend upwards? or else suppose
two men with their middles about the center, the feete of the one being
placed where the head of the other is, and so two other men crosse them,
yet all these men thus situated according to this opinion should stand
upright, and many other such grosse consequences would follow (saith
hee) which a false imagination is not able to fancy as possible. Upon
which considerations, _Bede_[3] also denies the being of any Antipodes,
_Neque enim Antipodarum ullatenus est Fabulis accommodandus assensus_,
"Nor should wee any longer assent to the Fable of Antipodes." So also
_Lucretius_ the Poet speaking of the same subject, sayes:
_Sed vanus stolidis haec omnia finxerit error._[4]
[Sidenote 1: _De civit. Dei. lib. 16. cap. 9._]
[Sidenote 2: _Institut. l. 3. c. 24._]
[Sidenote 3: _De ratione temporum, Cap. 32._]
[Sidenote 4: _De nat. rerum, lib. 1._]
That some idle fancy faigned these for fooles to believe. Of this
opinion was _Procopius Gazaeus_,[1] but he was perswaded to it by another
kinde of reason; for he thought that all the earth under us was sunke in
the water, according to the saying of the Psalmist,[2] Hee hath founded
the Earth upon the Seas, and therefore hee accounted it not inhabited by
any. Nay _Tostatus_ a man of later yeeres and generall learning doth
also confidently deny that there are any such Antipodes, though the
reason which hee urges for it bee not so absurde as the former, for the
Apostles, saith hee,[3] travelled through the whole habitable world, but
they never passed the Equinoctiall; and if you answer that they are said
to goe through all the earth, because they went through all the knowne
world, hee replies, that this is not sufficient, since Christ would have
all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of his truth,[4] and
therefore 'tis requisite that they should have travelled thither also,
if there had been any inhabitants, especially since he did expressely
command them to goe and teach all nations, and preach the Gospell
through the whole world,[5] and therefore he thinkes that as there are
no men, so neither are there seas, or rivers, or any other conveniency
for habitation: 'tis commonly related of one _Virgilius_, that he was
excommunicated and condemned for a Heretique by _Zachary_ Bishop of
_Rome_, because hee was not of the same opinion. But _Baronius_
saies,[6] it was because hee thought there was another habitable world
within ours. How ever, you may well enough discerne in these examples
how confident many of these great Schollars were in so grosse an errour,
how unlikely, what an incredible thing it seemed to them, that there
should be any Antipodes, and yet now this truth is as certaine and
plaine, as sense or demonstration can make it. This then which I now
deliver is not to be rejected; though it may seeme to contradict the
common opinion.
[Sidenote 1: _Comment. in 1. Cap. Gen._]
[Sidenote 2: _Psal. 24. 2._]
[Sidenote 3: _Comment. in_ 1. Genes.]
[Sidenote 4: 1 Tim. 2. 4.]
[Sidenote 5: Mat. 28. 19]
[Sidenote 6: _Annal. Eccles. A.D. 748._]
2. Grosse absurdities have beene entertained by generall consent. I
might instance in many remarkeable examples, but I will onely speake of
the supposed labour of the Moone in her eclipses, because this is
neerest to the chiefe matter in hand, and was received as a common
opinion amongst many of the ancients, and therefore _Plutarch_ speaking
of a Lunary eclipse, relates, that at such times 'twas a custome amongst
the _Romanes_ (the most civill and learned people in the world) to sound
brasse Instruments, and hold great torches toward the heaven. +Ton de
Romaion (hosper esto enomismenon) chalkou te patagois anakaloumenon
to phos autos kai pura polla dalois kai dassin anechonton pros ton
ouranon+,[1] for by this meanes they supposed the Moone was much eased
in her labours, and therfore _Ovid_ calls such loud Instruments the
auxiliaries or helpes of the Moone.[2]
_Cum frustra resonant aera auxiliaria Lunae._
and therefore the Satyrist too describing a loud scold, saies, she was
able to make noise enough to deliver the labouring Moone.[3]
_Vna laboranti poterit succurrere Lunae._
[Sidenote 1: _In vita Paul. AEmil._]
[Sidenote 2: _Metam. l. 4._]
[Sidenote 3: _Iuven. Sat. 6_]
Now the reason of all this their ceremonie, was, because they feared the
world would fall asleepe, when one of its eyes began to winke, and
therefore they would doe what they could by loud sounds to rouse it from
its drowsinesse, and keepe it awake by bright torches, to bestow that
light upon it which it began to lose. Some of them thought hereby to
keepe the Moone in her orbe, whereas otherwise she would have fallen
downe upon the earth, and the world would have lost one of its lights,
for the credulous people believed, that Inchanters, and Witches could
bring the Moone downe, which made _Virgil_ say,
_Cantus & e coelo possunt deducere Lunam._
And those Wizards knowing the times of her eclipses, would then threaten
to shew their skill, by pulling her out of her orbe. So that when the
silly multitude saw that she began to looke red, they presently feared
they should lose the benefit of her light, and therefore made a great
noise that she might not heare the sound of those Charmes, which would
otherwise bring her downe, and this is rendered for a reason of this
custome by _Pliny_ and _Propertius_:
_Cantus & e curru lunam deducere tentant,
Et facerent, si non aera repulsa sonent._[1]
[Sidenote 1: _Nat. hist. lib. 2. c. 12._]
_Plutarch_ gives another reason of it, and he sayes, 'tis because they
would hasten the Moone out of the darke shade wherein shee was involv'd,
that so she might bring away the soules of those Saints that inhabit
within her, which cry out by reason they are then deprived of their
wonted happinesse, and cannot heare the musicke of the Spheares, but are
forced to behold the torments, and wailing of those damned soules which
are represented to them as they are tortured in the region of the aire,
but whether this or what ever else was the meaning of this superstition,
yet certainly 'twas a very ridiculous custome, and bewrayed a great
ignorance of those ancient times, especially since it was not onely
received by the vulgar, such as were men of lesse note and learning, but
believed also, by the more famous and wiser sort, such as were those
great Poets, _Stesichorus_ and _Pindar_. And not onely amongst the more
sottish heathens, who might account that Planet to be one of their Gods,
but the primitive Christians also were in this kinde guilty; which made
S. _Ambrose_ so tartly to rebuke those of his time, when he said,
_Tum turbatur carminibus Globus Lunae, quando calicibus turbantur &
oculi_.
"When your heads are troubled with cups, then you thinke the Moone to be
troubled with charmes."
And for this reason also did _Maximus_ a Bishop,[1] write a Homily
against it, wherein hee shewed the absurditie of that foolish
superstition. I remember, that _Ludovicus Uives_ relates a more
ridiculous story of a people that imprisoned an Asse for drinking up the
Moone, whose image appearing in the water was covered with a cloud, as
the Asse was drinking, for which the poore beast was afterward brought
to the barre to receive a sentence according to his deserts, where the
grave Senate being set to examine the matter, one of the Counsell
(perhaps wiser than the rest) rises up, and out of his deepe judgement,
thinkes it not fit that their Towne should lose its Moone, but that
rather the Asse should be cut up, and that taken out of him, which
sentence being approved by the rest of those Politicians, as the
subtillest way for the conclusion of the matter was accordingly
performed. But whether this tale were true or no I will not question,
however there is absurdity enough in that former custome of the
ancients, that may confirme the truth to be proved, and plainly declare
the insufficiency of common opinion to adde true worth or estimation
unto any thing. So that from that which I have said may be gathered thus
much.
[Sidenote 1: _Turinens. Episc._]
1. That a new truth may seeme absurd and impossible not onely to the
vulgar, but to those also who are otherwise wise men, and excellent
schollers; and hence it will follow, that every new thing which
seemes to oppose common Principles is not presently to be rejected,
but rather to be pry'd into with a diligent enquiry, since there
are many things which are yet hid from us, and reserv'd for future
discovery.
2. That it is not the commonnesse of an opinion that can priviledge it
for a truth, the wrong way is sometime a well beaten path, whereas
the right way (especially to hidden truths) may bee lesse trodden
and more obscure.
True indeed, the strangeness of this opinion will detract much from its
credit; but yet we should know that nothing is in its selfe strange,
since every naturall effect has an equall dependance upon its cause, and
with the like necessity doth follow from it, so that 'tis our ignorance
which makes things appeare so, and hence it comes to passe that many
more evident truths seeme incredible to such who know not the causes of
things: you may as soone perswade some Country peasants that the Moone
is made of greene Cheese (as wee say) as that 'tis bigger than his
Cart-wheele, since both seeme equally to contradict his sight, and hee
has not reason enough to leade him farther than his senses. Nay, suppose
(saith _Plutarch_) a Philosopher should be educated in such a secret
place, where hee might not see either Sea or River, and afterwards
should be brought out where one might shew him the great Ocean telling
him the quality of that water, that it is blackish, salt, and not
potable, and yet there were many vast creatures of all formes living in
it, which make use of the water as wee doe of the aire, questionlesse he
would laugh at all this, as being monstrous lies & fables, without any
colour of truth. Just so will this truth which I now deliver appeare
unto others; because we never dreamt of any such matter as a world in
the Moone, because the state of that place hath as yet been vailed from
our knowledge, therefore wee can scarcely assent to any such matter.
Things are very hardly received which are altogether strange to our
thoughts and our senses. The soule may with lesse difficulty be brought
to believe any absurdity, when as it has formerly beene acquainted with
some colours and probabilities for it, but when a new, and an unheard of
truth shall come before it, though it have good grounds and reasons, yet
the understanding is afraid of it as a stranger, and dares not admit it
into its beliefe without a great deale of reluctancy and tryall. And
besides things that are not manifested to the senses, are not assented
unto without some labour of mind, some travaile and discourse of the
understanding, and many lazie soules had rather quietly repose
themselves in an easie errour, then take paines to search out the truth.
The strangenesse then of this opinion which I now deliver will be a
great hinderance to its beliefe, but this is not to be respected by
reason it cannot bee helped. I have stood the longer in the Preface,
because that prejudice which the meere title of the booke may beget
cannot easily be removed without a great deale of preparation, and I
could not tell otherwise how to rectifie the thoughts of the Reader for
an impartiall survey of the following discourse.
I must needs confesse, though I had often thought with my selfe that it
was possible there might be a world in the Moone, yet it seemed such an
uncouth opinion that I never durst discover it, for feare of being
counted singular and ridiculous, but afterward having read _Plutarch_,
_Galilaeus_, _Keplar_, with some others, and finding many of mine owne
thoughts confirmed by such strong authority, I then concluded that it
was not onely possible there might bee, but probable that there was
another habitable world in that Planet. In the prosecuting of this
assertion, I shall first endeavour to cleare the way from such doubts as
may hinder the speed or ease of farther progresse; and because the
suppositions imply'd in this opinion may seeme to contradict the
principles of reason or faith, it will be requisite that I first remove
this scruple, shewing the conformity of them to both these, and proving
those truths that may make way for the rest, which I shall labour to
performe in the second, third, fourth, and fifth Chapters, and then
proceede to confirme such Propositions, which doe more directly belong
to the maine point in hand.
Proposition 2.
_That a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of
reason or faith._
Tis reported of _Aristotle_ that when hee saw the bookes of _Moses_ he
commended them for such a majesticke stile as might become a God, but
withall hee censured that manner of writing to be very unfitting for a
Philosopher because there was nothing proved in them, but matters were
delivered as if they would rather command than perswade beliefe. And
'tis observed that hee sets downe nothing himselfe, but he confirmes it
by the strongest reasons that may be found, there being scarce an
argument of force for any subject in Philosophy which may not bee picked
out of his writings, and therefore 'tis likely if there were in reason a
necessity of one onely world, that hee would have found out some such
necessary proofe as might confirme it: Especially since hee labours for
it so much in two whole Chapters. But now all the arguments which he
himselfe urges in this subject,[1] are very weake and farre enough from
having in them any convincing power. Therefore 'tis likely that a
plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason.
However, I will set downe the two chiefe of his arguments from his owne
workes, and from them you may guesse the force of the other. The 1. is
this,[2] since every heavy body doth naturally tend downwards, and every
light body upwards, what a hudling and confusion must there bee if there
were two places for gravity and two places for lightnesse: for it is
probable that the Earth of that other World would fall downe to this
Center, and so mutually the aire and fire here ascend to those Regions
in the other, which must needes much derogate from the providence of
nature, and cause a great disorder in his workes. To this I answere,
that if you will consider the nature of gravity, you will plainely see
there is no ground to feare any such confusion, for heavinesse is
nothing else but such a quality as causes a propension in 'its subject
to tend downewards towards its owne Centre, so that for some of that
earth to come hither would not bee said a fall but an ascension, since
it moved from its owne place, and this would bee impossible (saith
_Ruvio_) because against nature,[3] and therefore no more to bee feared
than the falling of the Heavens.
[Sidenote 1: _De Coelo_ l. 1. c. 8. 9.]
[Sidenote 2: _Ibid._]
[Sidenote 3: _De Coelo_ l. 1. c. 9. q. 1.]
Another Argument hee had from his master _Plato_,[1] that there is but
one World, because there is but one first mover, God.[2]
[Sidenote 1: _Metaphys._ l. 12. c. 8.]
[Sidenote 2: _Diog. Laert. lib._ 3.]
But here I may deny the consequence, since a plurality of worlds doth
not take away the unity of the first mover.
_Vt enim forma substantialis, sic primum efficiens apparentem
solummodo multiplicitatem induit per signatam materiam_
(saith a Countreyman of ours.)[1] As the substantiall forme, so the
efficient cause hath onely an appearing multiplicity from its particular
matter. You may see this point more largely handled, and these Arguments
more fully answered by _Plutarch_ in his Booke (why Oracles are silent)
and _Iacob Carpentarius_ in his comment on _Alcinous_.
[Sidenote 1: _Nic. Hill. de Philosop. Epic. partic. 379._]
But our opposites the Interpreters themselves, (who too often doe
_jurare in verba magistri_) will grant that there is not any strength in
these consequences, and certainely their such weake arguments could not
convince that wise Philosopher, who in his other opinions was wont to
bee swayed by the strength and power of reason: wherefore I should
rather thinke that he had some by-respect, which made him first assent
to this opinion, and afterwards strive to prove it. Perhaps it was
because hee feared to displease his scholler _Alexander_, of whom 'tis
related[1] that he wept to heare a disputation of another world, since
he had not then attained the Monarchy of this, his restlesse wide heart
would have esteemed this Globe of Earth not big enough for him, if there
had beene another, which made the Satyrist say of him,
_AEstuat infoelix angusto limite mundi._[2]
"That he did vexe himselfe and sweate in his desires, as being pend
up in a narrow roome, when hee was confin'd but to one world."
Before he thought to seate himselfe next the Gods, but now when hee had
done his best, hee must be content with some equall, or perhaps
superiour Kings.
[Sidenote 1: _Plutarch. de tranq. anim._]
[Sidenote 2: _Iuvenal._]
It may be, that _Aristotle_ was moved to this opinion, that hee might
thereby take from _Alexander_ the occasion of this feare and discontent,
or else, perhaps, _Aristotle_ himselfe was as loth to hold the
possibility of a world which he could not discover, as _Alexander_ was
to heare of one which he could not conquer. Tis likely that some such
by-respect moved him to this opinion, since the arguments he urges for
it are confest by his zealous followers and commentators, to be very
sleight and frivolous, and they themselves grant, what I am now to
prove, that there is not any evidence in the light of naturall reason,
which can sufficiently manifest that there is but one world.
But however some may object, would it not be inconvenient and dangerous
to admit of such opinions that doe destroy those principles of
_Aristotle_, which all the world hath so long followed?
This question is much controverted by the _Romish_ Divines; _Campanella_
hath writ a Treatise[1] in defence of it, in whom you may see many
things worth the reading and notice.
[Sidenote 1: _Apologia pro Galilaeo._]
To it I answer, that this position in Philosophy, doth not bring any
inconvenience to the rest, since tis not _Aristotle_, but truth that
should be the rule of our opinions, and if they be not both found
together, wee may say to him, as hee said to his Master _Plato_,
+amphoin gar ontoin philoin, hosion protiman ten aletheian+.[1]
"Though _Plato_ were his friend, yet hee would rather adhere to
truth than him."
[Sidenote 1: _Ethic. l. 1. c. 6._]
I must needs grant, that wee are all much beholden to the industry of
the ancient Philosophers, and more especially to _Aristotle_, for the
greater part of our learning, but yet tis not ingratitude to speake
against him, when hee opposeth truth; for then many of the Fathers would
be very guilty, especially _Iustin_, who hath writ a Treatise purposely
against him.
But suppose this opinion were false, yet 'tis not against the faith, and
so it may serve for the better confirmation of that which is true; the
sparkes of errour, being forc'd out by opposition, as the sparkes of
fire, by the striking of the flint and steele. But suppose too that it
were hereticall, and against the faith, yet may it be admitted with the
same priviledge as _Aristotle_, from whom many more dangerous opinions
have proceeded: as that the world is eternall, that God cannot have
while to looke after these inferiour things, that after death there is
no reward or punishment, and such like blasphemies, which strike
directly at the fundamentalls of our Religion.
So that it is justly to be wondred why some should be so superstitious
in these daies, as to sticke closer unto him, than unto Scripture, as if
his Philosophy were the onely foundation of all divine truths.
Upon these grounds both St. _Uincentius_and _Senafinus_ _de firmo_ (as I
have seene them quoted) thinke that _Aristotle_ was the viol of Gods
wrath, which was powred out upon the waters of Wisedome by the third
Angel;[1] But for my part, I thinke the world is much beholden to
_Aristotle_ for all its sciences. But yet twere a shame for these later
ages to rest our selves meerely upon the labours of our Fore-fathers, as
if they had informed us of all things to be knowne, and when wee are set
upon their shoulders, not to see further then they themselves did.
'Twere a superstitious, a lazie opinion to thinke _Aristotles_ workes
the bounds and limits of all humane invention, beyond which there could
be no possibility of reaching. Certainly there are yet many things left
to discovery, and it cannot be any inconvenience for us, to maintaine a
new truth, or rectifie an ancient errour.
[Sidenote 1: Rev. 16. 4.]