PART I.

BLACKWOOD'S

EDINBURGH MAGAZINE.

NO. CCCCXX. OCTOBER, 1850. VOL. LXVIII.

CONTENTS.

MODERN STATE TRIALS. PART I., 373

MY NOVEL; OR, VARIETIES IN ENGLISH LIFE. PART II., 393

MILITARY LIFE IN NORTH AFRICA, 415

THE GREEN HAND--A "SHORT" YARN. A WIND-UP, 433

THE FRENCH WARS OF RELIGION, 456

A WILD-FLOWER GARLAND. BY DELTA, 471

THE MASQUERADE OF FREEDOM, 475

DIES BOREALES. NO. VIII.--CHRISTOPHER UNDER CANVASS, 479

* * * * *

EDINBURGH:

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, 45 GEORGE STREET;

AND 37 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON.

_To whom all communications (post paid) must be addressed._

SOLD BY ALL THE BOOKSELLERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS, EDINBURGH.

BLACKWOOD'S

EDINBURGH MAGAZINE.

NO. CCCCXX. OCTOBER, 1850. VOL. LXVIII.

MODERN STATE TRIALS.[1]

PART I.

The idea of this work is happily conceived, and carried into effect,

in the two volumes before us, with no little judgment and ability. The

subject is one interesting, useful, and important; and the author was

in many respects well qualified to deal with it by his talents, his

accomplishments, his professional acquirements, and his experienced

observation. It will be seen that we speak of the author, and of his

work, in different tenses; and there is a melancholy significance in

the distinction. Within a very few days of his sending to us these two

volumes, he died, unexpectedly, in the flower of his age, and just as

he had attained an honour which he had long coveted--that of being

raised to the rank of Queen's Counsel. On the first day of last Easter

term, he presented himself in each of the courts at Westminster, in his

"silk" gown, exchanging the customary obeisances with the Judges, the

Queen's Counsel, and the great body of his brethren behind the bar,

on being formally called by the Lord Chief Justice "to take his seat

within the bar, Her Majesty having been pleased to appoint him one of

Her Majesty's Counsel." He looked pleasurably excited: alas, how little

anticipating that the last day of that same term would see him stripped

of his long-coveted insignia, and clothed in the dismal vesture of the

grave! For on that day he died, after a brief but very severe illness,

in his forty-sixth year. A serious attack of rheumatic fever, several

years before, had permanently impaired his physical energies, though

not to such an extent as to prevent the exercise of his profession.

His practice, till latterly, had been chiefly at the Cheshire and

Manchester sessions, from which he gradually rose into considerable

business, both civil and criminal, on the North Wales circuit. On being

raised to his briefly-held rank, the prospect of a successful career

opened before him; for he knew his profession well, as those were aware

who were able and disposed to push him forward. During Easter term he

was engaged before a committee of the House of Commons, to conduct a

case of some importance. This was a lucrative branch of practice, which

he was naturally eager to cultivate. Fatigue, anxiety, and excitement

induced the return of an old complaint, accompanied by new and somewhat

startling symptoms; but though utterly unfit for business, he could

not be restrained from attending the committee room, though it was

necessary to carry him in a chair up the long flight of steps leading

to the corridor in the new House. He was soon, however, obliged to

return as he had gone. The palsying hand of Death had touched the

aspiring lawyer! After much suffering, he expired on the 8th of May,

the last day of Easter term, and on the 13th was buried in the vaults

of Lincoln's Inn, of which he had only a few days previously been

elected a Bencher! He was a member of Queen's College, Oxford, where he

graduated (we believe with honours) in 1824; was called to the bar in

1828; and elected Recorder of Macclesfield in 1833.--As a speaker he

was correct and fluent, though not forcible; as an advocate, judicious

and successful. He was a man of classical tastes, extensively read

in literature, and exceedingly familiar with political history and

constitutional law. What he knew he could use readily and effectively,

both as a writer and a speaker. He was very industrious with his pen

during every interval between his professional engagements; and has

left behind him, independently of his contributions to periodical

literature, three works--the _History of the House of Commons from

1688 to 1832_; the _Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges_, and the work now

before us. The first of these was published in 1843-4, in two volumes

octavo. The author's professed object was to present "a popular history

of the House of Commons, with biographical notices of those members

who have been most distinguished in its annals; and describing the

changes in its internal economy, powers, and privileges," during the

space of a hundred and forty-four years elapsing between two memorable

periods--the "noble introduction" to Parliamentary Records, "afforded

by the Convention Parliament of 1688," and the "eventful close"

witnessed in the second Parliament of William IV., which passed "the

Reform Bill." This space he subdivided into three distinguishing eras:--

"The _first_ includes a space of thirty-nine years--from

the abdication of James to the death of George I.

in 1727--characterised by master spirits, critical

events, and stirring debate. The _second_ era--sort of

mezzo-termino--comprehends the reign of George II., when men

in office were corrupt, and public morals low, and the general

topics of discourse resembled parish vestry discussions, but

still a prosperous reign--the sound common-sense of Walpole

promoting, even by inglorious acts, the national welfare, and

Chatham's genius rescuing the age from mediocrity.

"The regular publication of the debates, and troubles in

America, usher in the _last_ and most glorious epoch,--the days

of North and Burke--of Pitt and Fox--of Windham and Canning--of

Tierney, and Brougham, and Peel,--illustrated by oratory

enduring as the language, and with memories of statesmen that

can never die."

Mr Townsend's second work was published about four years

afterwards--viz., in 1848--also in two volumes, and entitled _Lives

of Twelve Eminent Judges of the Last and Present Century_. These

were--Lord Alvanley, Mr Justice Buller, Lord Eldon, Lord Ellenborough,

Lord Erskine, Sir Vicary Gibbs, Sir William Grant, Lord Kenyon, Lord

Loughborough, Lord Redesdale, Lord Stowell, and Lord Tenterden.

This work consisted of memoirs, which the author had previously

published in the _Law Magazine_, where they had attracted considerable

attention from the profession; as they contained many interesting

and entertaining anecdotes, and information not easily attainable

elsewhere.[2] Both of these works are of an entertaining character.

They are written in an easy, flowing style--occasionally, however,

somewhat loose and gossiping. It must be owned that the author's

_forte_ does not lie in the delineation of character, either moral or

intellectual. If he really possessed a quick and searching insight into

it, he would seem to have felt a greater pleasure in grouping about

each individual who was the subject of his pencil the general incidents

of his position, than in penetrating his idiosyncrasy, and detecting

the operation of those incidents upon it. He does not conceive

distinctly of _his man_, keeping his eye steadily upon him, with a

view to the development and exhibition of character; but is apt, if we

may be allowed so to speak, to lose him in his life. Still the work is

decidedly an acquisition to popular and professional literature, and,

equally with its predecessor, evidences the mild and candid temper and

character of the author. Thus much we thought it only fair to premise,

in justice to the memory of an amiable and accomplished member of the

English bar, and a man of letters; one, too, who in his political

opinions was a staunch and consistent upholder of those to which Maga

has ever been devoted. In no instance, however--in neither of the two

works at which we have been thus glancing in passing, nor in that now

lying before us--did Mr Townsend suffer his political opinions to bias

his judgment, or betray him into the faintest semblance of partiality

or injustice.

It is time now to direct attention to the last work of Mr

Townsend--which he barely lived to see published--his _Modern State

Trials_, spread over two goodly octavo volumes, containing nearly

eleven hundred pages, and these, too, pretty closely printed. Upon

this work much thought and labour have evidently been bestowed in

the collection of his materials, and dealing with them, as in the

volumes before us, in such a manner as to render the product at once

interesting and instructive to both general and professional readers.

It is no slight matter to make one's-self thoroughly master of a great

case, in all its bearings; to seize its true governing characteristics;

to select, condense, and arrange facts and incidents; to assign to

every actor, whether judge, jury, witness, or counsel, his proper

proportion and position; and all this with a view to interesting and

instructing widely different classes of readers--and those, again,

general and professional. To do all this effectually, requires

powerful talents, much knowledge of life and character, practical

acquaintance with the law of the country, a sound judgment, and a vivid

imagination. There is scarcely any point of view in which a great trial

will not appear deeply interesting to a competent observer, watching

how each individual plays his part in the agitating drama. Whether

the judge holds the sacred scales even; whether he sees clearly and

acts promptly, calmly, resolutely, in detecting fallacy, in order

to shield an unsophisticated jury from its subtle and deleterious

agency; whether, for this purpose, his intellect and his knowledge

are superior, equal, or inferior to those of the advocates pleading

before him. How those advocates conduct themselves, intellectually

and morally; whether they be clear-headed, acute, ready, learned--or

cloudy, obtuse, superficial, and ignorant; whether evenly or over

matched; whether they play the gentleman or the scoundrel; whether

they will, however difficult the task, nobly recognise the obligations

of truth and honour, or villanously disregard them, to secure a

paltry triumph in defeating justice! How the witnesses discharge

their momentous duties; whether constantly mindful of their oath,

or forgetful of it, or wilfully disregarding it, from hostility or

partiality to the prisoner, or any other wicked motive. Whether the

judge, or the advocates, are equal to the discomfiture of a wicked

witness. How the jury are conducting themselves--whether with watchful

intelligence, or stolid listlessness. How the prisoner, standing in

the midst of all these--with life, with honour, character, liberty,

everything at stake--and depending on the word which one of that jury

will utter--how _he_ is demeaning himself, knowing, as he does, the

truth or falsehood of the charge on which he is being tried; what he is

thinking of the exertions of his counsel, of the temper and spirit of

the witnesses, of the jury, of the judge; whether he adverts at all to

the spectators around him, and the feelings by which they are animated

towards him; whether he is aware of, or appreciates, the true strain

and pressure of the case--the sudden chances and perils occurring in

its progress.

How striking and instructive to observe the abstract rules of justice

brought to bear, with equal readiness and precision, upon ordinary

and extraordinary combinations of circumstances!--to witness the

dead letter of the law become animated with potent vitality for the

regulation of human affairs!

Again, it has often occurred to us that there is another point of view

from which important trials--nay, almost any trial--may be contemplated

with lively interest by a logical observer, with reference to _the use

made of facts_ by judicial and forensic intellect. How little even the

acutest layman could have anticipated such dealing with facts as that

which he here beholds; how he must appreciate the practised, watchful

art with which the slightest circumstance is seized hold of, and in

due time so combined with others with which it seemed to have no

conceivable connexion, as to justify conclusions exactly the reverse

of those which had till then seemed inevitable! What totally different

aspects the same facts may be made to wear by different dealers with

them, having different objects in view! By their different arrangement

and combination, what _unexpected_ inferences may be drawn from the

self-same facts, and even when similarly arranged and combined! How

exciting to see a defence constructed by experienced astuteness and

eloquence out of the slightest materials--out of a hopeless case--in

the teeth of one overpowering for the prosecution! The desperate

determination, the exquisite subtlety, the consummate judgment, often

exhibited on such occasions by eminent advocates--struggling, too, at

once with their own sense of right and wrong, and the desire to do

their utmost for one who has intrusted his all to them--conscious,

too, that though a jury of twelve plain common-sense people may be

unable to see through the fallacies which are presented to them, it

will doubtless be very far otherwise with one who has to follow,

who has the last word! and with that last word may at once lay bare

the sophistries of forensic effrontery, and perhaps rebuke him who

attempted to trifle with and mislead the understandings of those

so solemnly sworn to give a just and true verdict according to the

evidence. "But what is one to do?" exclaims the anxious advocate. "How

am I to defend yonder trembling being who has selected me to stand

between him and--the scaffold, it may be--if I am to play the judge,

and not the advocate; to yield pusillanimously to an array of fearfully

plain facts, and make no attempt to square them with the hypothesis

of my client's innocence, or persuade a jury that they are--whatever

my own secret opinion--pregnant with too much doubt to warrant a

verdict of guilty?" Only one who has been placed in the situation can

conceive the faintest idea of what is endured on such occasions by the

sensitive and conscientious advocate, who is called upon in desperate

emergencies--in moments of intense eagerness and anxiety--the spasms,

as it were, of which are _publicly_ exhibited, and before gifted and

critical rivals and merciless public censors, to see and _observe_

the delicate but decisive line of right--of duty; to maintain at once

the character of the zealous, effective advocate, and the Christian

gentleman. If sufficient allowances were made for persons placed in

such circumstances of serious embarrassment and responsibility, less

uncharitable judgments would be passed on the manner in which advocates

exercise their functions than are sometimes seen; judgments formed and

pronounced, too, in the closet--by those speaking after the event--calm

and undisturbed by anxieties and agitation, which have probably _never

been personally experienced_. This topic, however, we shall hereafter

treat more at large, in giving to the volumes before us that extended

examination which is at present contemplated. They contain a series

of trials of undoubted public interest and importance. They have been

selected upon the whole judiciously, with a view to the end which the

author had proposed to himself; though the propriety of the title

which he has chosen--_i. e._ "Modern _State_ Trials"--is not at first

sight apparent. The idea conveyed by these words is, trials directly

affecting _the state_, political prosecutions in respect of political

offences. It is difficult to bring trials for murder, duelling,

forgery, abduction, libel, blasphemy, and conspiracy, under this

category; and this Mr Townsend felt. Such, nevertheless, constitute a

large proportion of the trials contained in these volumes, and are,

in our opinion, also those of most popular interest, and worthiest of

being dealt with, as it was Mr Townsend's expressed intention to deal

with them.

The "trials" contained in the volumes before us are fifteen in number,

of which only four, or at most five, (Mr Townsend seems to have

thought six,) have any pretensions to be designated "_State_ trials."

These five are--John Frost, Edward Oxford, and Smith O'Brien for

high treason; Daniel O'Connell, and eight others, for a treasonable

conspiracy; and Charles Pinney, for alleged neglect of his duty as

mayor of Bristol, during the fiery and bloody "Reform Riots," as the

were called, in that place, in October 1831. The remaining ten trials

consist of two for duelling--the late James Stuart for killing Sir

Alexander Boswell, and the Earl of Cardigan for shooting Captain

Tucket; three for murder, (in addition to James Stuart, who was tried

for the _murder_ of Sir Alexander Boswell)--viz. Conrvoisier for

the murder of Lord William Russell; M'Naughton for the murder of Mr

Drummond; Hunter and others for conspiracy and the murder of John

Smith, the Glasgow cotton-spinner, in 1837; Alexander (the titular

Earl of Stirling) for forgery; Lord Cochrane, and seven others, for

a conspiracy to raise the funds; the Wakefields for conspiracy,

and abduction of an heiress; John Ambrose Williams for a libel on

the Durham clergy; and Mr John Moxon, for blasphemy, in publishing

the poems of Percy Bysshe Shelley. It will be observed that all

these are _criminal_ trials, and occurred in England, Scotland, and

Ireland; affording thus a favourable opportunity for comparing the

different methods of proceeding in their respective courts, and the

characteristics of their respective judges and advocates. The English

trials are ten, the Scottish three, and the Irish two in number:

and whether they are precisely those which could have been most

advantageously selected, it were needless, for present purposes, to

inquire. Mr Townsend made his choice, and thus generally states his

objects and intentions:--

"The present edition of _Modern State Trials_ is meant to

include those of the most general interest and importance which

have occurred during the last thirty years. None are inserted

in these volumes which have been previously comprised in any

collection; but the editor regrets want of space, which compels

him to omit several not uninstructive. In making a selection,

he has endeavoured to present a faithful, but abridged, report

of such legal proceedings as would be most likely to command

the attention of all members of the community, and to be read

by them with pleasure and profit. This appears to be the

popular description of the term "State Trials," in which Mr

Evelyn and Mr Hargreave acquiesced, or they would not have

included convictions for witchcraft, and the prosecution of

Elizabeth Canning for perjury, in their collection. Were the

definition restricted to political offences merely, the work,

however logically correct, would be wanting in spirit and

variety."--(Introd. vol. i. p. 5.)

After stating that no technical objection can be raised to those of the

above trials which immediately affect the State, he observes, that,

"for the propriety of inserting the rest under the same title, a just

apology may be made." The trial of the Earl of Cardigan, before the

House of Lords, is represented as interesting, from the rank of the

accused and from the rarity of the trial, as being the first time that

duelling was attempted to be brought within a recent statute, (1 Vict.

c. 85) enacting that the shooting at a person, not with premeditated

malice, but deliberately, and causing a bodily injury dangerous to

life, should be a capital offence; and that whoever should shoot any

person with intent to commit murder, or to do some grievous bodily

harm, should, though no bodily harm were inflicted, be guilty of

_felony_, and liable to transportation or imprisonment. The social

position of the titular Earl of Stirling, and the extraordinary nature

of the evidence, are said to justify the insertion of _his_ trial;

while, "in the records of criminal jurisprudence, there occur few

proceedings of more deep and painful interest than the prosecution of

Lord Cochrane, for Conspiracy to commit a fraud on the Stock Exchange."

The two cases of Courvoisier and M'Naughton respectively "involve

topics of absorbing interest at the period of the occurrence, and of

enduring interest to all time: in the one being involved the rights

and duties, the privileges and immunities of counsel for prisoners; in

the other, the fearful question of responsibility for crime--how far

moral insanity alone may exonerate the alleged subject of it from the

temporal consequences of his guilt." This latter topic is also involved

in Oxford's case. The trials of Mr Stuart for killing Sir Alexander

Boswell, and of Mr Moxon for blasphemy, are inserted for one and the

same reason--namely, "a desire to embalm the very beautiful speeches of

Lord Cockburn, Lord Jeffrey, and Mr Justice Talfourd." As to the trial

of Ambrose Williams, it is inserted on account of the celebrated speech

in defence by Lord Brougham--"one of the most vivid specimens extant,

in either ancient or modern literature, of keen irony, bitter sarcasm,

and vehement vituperation." The prosecution of the Wakefields for

conspiracy, and the abduction of Miss Turner, "forms a singular chapter

in legal history; interesting not less to the student of human nature,

on account of its characters and incidents, than to the lawyer, for the

elaborate discussions on the Scottish law of marriages, and the right

of the wife, even should there have been a legal marriage, to appear as

a witness against the offending husband--matters argued with profuse

learning and ability."

"In setting forth, under a condensed form," says Mr

Townsend,[3] "this and the other most interesting trials of

our time, it has been the object of the editor to free the

work from dry severity by introducing the '_loci lætiores_' of

the advocates, the salient parts of cross-examination--those

little passages of arms between the rival combatants which

diversified the arena, the painting of the forensic scene,

the poetry of action of these legal dramas. He has sought to

give the expressed spirit of eloquence and law, upon occasions

which peculiarly called them forth; pruning what was redundant,

rejecting superfluities, weeding out irrelevant matter, but

omitting no incident or episode that all intelligent witness

would have been disappointed at not hearing."

We present the ensuing paragraph, which immediately follows the

preceding, because it will afford us an opportunity of making a remark

which is applicable to the entire structure of the work before us.

"In the extracts here given from some of the most celebrated

speeches of modern days, the editor has also had the great

advantage of the last corrections of the speakers themselves,

and has thus been enabled to preserve the _ipsissima verba_, by

which minds were captivated and verdicts won; those treasures

of oratory which would have gladdened the old age of Erskine,

could he have seen how his talisman had been passed from hand

to hand, and the mantle of his inspiration caught. The vivid

appeals of Whiteside, the magnificent defence of Cockburn, the

persuasive imagery of Talfourd, will exist as ®kthêmata heis

aehi®--trophies of forensic eloquence, beacon lights it may be,

in the midst of that prosaic mistiness which has begun to creep

around our courts."

The remark to which we have alluded is this: that the work before us

is pervaded by a tone of uniform, excessive, and undistinguishing

_eulogy_, which, however creditable to the amiable and generous

dispenser of it, is calculated to lower our estimate of his critical

judgment, and even--unless one should be on one's guard--to provoke

a harsh and disparaging spirit towards the subjects of such undue

eulogy, and a suspicion that here "praise undeserved," and the remark

is applicable equally to praise "excessive, is censure in disguise!" No

judge, no counsel, can say or do _anything_, in the course of any of

the trials here brought under our notice, without speaking and acting

in such a way as to merit applause for exhibiting the highest qualities

of mind and character. Let it not be supposed, that, in making these

observations, we wish to apply them to the particular instances cited

by Mr Townsend of Messrs Whiteside, Cockburn, and Talfourd--all of whom

are distinguished, accomplished, able, and eloquent advocates; but we

believe that each would, in spite of the fondest self-love, in his own

mind, somewhat mistrust his title to the _amount_ of applause here

bestowed upon him. What more than he has said of them, could he have

said of the greatest orators and advocates whom the world has produced?

In a corresponding strain, Mr Townsend speaks of every one--senior and

junior counsel--and every writer, great and small, whom he has occasion

to mention. Those who knew the late Mr Townsend, and appreciated his

simple and manly character, will refer the defect which we have felt

compelled thus to point out to its true cause--the kindliness of his

heart; and we believe that, had he lived to see these observations, his

candour would have caused him promptly to recognise their justice.

Each of the trials is preceded and followed by "Introductory Essays"

and "Notes."

"The Essays, chiefly historical, have been introduced in order to

familiarise the reader with the subject, and prevent the monotony

which, but for these occasional dissertations, might pervade so many

recurring trials. The notes are added with a similar object."[4] We may

say generally, that these "Essays" and "Notes" always display judgment,

and the writer's complete knowledge of his subject. No reader should

enter on the trial, without carefully perusing the "Essay" which ushers

it in, shedding light upon all its details, and the circumstances

attending the committing of these offences--and indicating with

distinctness the leading features of interest and importance. In the

report of the trial itself, great pains have evidently been taken,

and successfully, to observe rigid impartiality, and secure accuracy

of statement; and the conflicts of counsel with each other and with

witnesses--the temperate, and timely interpositions of the judges,

and their satisfactory summings-up to the jury--are presented to the

reader with no little vividness. The fault of Mr Townsend's style is,

diffuseness, a tendency to colloquiality, and a deficiency of vigour.

With these little exceptions, added to that above noticed, we have no

hesitation in commending these volumes as an acquisition to popular and

professional literature, reflecting credit on the author's memory, and

the bar to which he belonged.

Having thus briefly indicated the general character of this work, and

given the author's own account of it, we propose in the present, and

one, or perhaps two, following articles, to take our own view of some

of the leading "Trials" thus collected by Mr Townsend, incidentally

observing on his treatment of the subject. With him, we regard several

of these trials as exhibiting features of remarkable interest; and are

much indebted to him for having so disposed his materials as to rouse

and rivet the attention of all classes of intelligent readers, but

in an especial degree that of the youthful student of jurisprudence.

Without further preface, we shall commence with that which stands first

in Mr Townsend's collection--the trial of Frost, for high treason.

This affords a very favourable specimen of Mr Townsend's capabilities.

He appears to have worked it out perhaps more exactly to his own

idea than any of the ensuing ones; and, by his able and judicious

treatment of the subject, has given us an opportunity of exhibiting

in glowing colours a forensic battle-field: the stake, life or death;

the combatants, evenly matched, the very flower of the bar; their

tactics clear and decisive, with the odds tremendously against one

party--that is to say, facts too strong for almost any degree of

daring or astuteness to contend against hopefully. Let us see, under

such circumstances, how the combatants acquitted themselves; or, if

one may change the figure, let us see how was played a great game of

chess on the board of life, by skilful and celebrated players. Who were

they? Four in number--Sir John Campbell and Sir Thomas Wilde, then

respectively Attorney and Solicitor-General, representing the Crown;

Sir Frederick Pollock and Mr Fitzroy Kelly, Queen's Counsel for the

prisoner. Ten years have since elapsed, and behold the changes in the

relative positions of these gentlemen! Sir John Campbell is a peer of

the realm, and Lord Chief-Justice of the Queen's Bench: having also,

during the interval, become a laborious and successful biographer of

the Lord Chancellors and Lord Chief-Justices of England. Sir Thomas

Wilde is also a peer of the realm, and Lord High Chancellor, having

been previously Attorney-General and Chief-Justice of the Common

Pleas. Sir Frederick Pollock, having been subsequently appointed

Attorney-General, is now Chief Baron of the Exchequer; while Mr Kelly,

having since become Solicitor-General, lost office on the break-up

of Sir Robert Peel's ministry, and remains--such are the chances and

changes of political life--plain Sir Fitzroy Kelly, but occupying a

splendid position at the bar. These four were the leading counsel; but

besides the Attorney and Solicitor General, the Crown was represented

by two gentlemen of great legal learning and eloquence, since raised

to the bench--Mr Justice Wightman and Mr Justice Talfourd; and by Mr

Serjeant Ludlow, since become a Commissioner of Bankruptcy; and the

Hon. John C. Talbot, now so highly distinguished in Parliamentary

practice. The judges sent as the special commission consisted of the

late Chief-Justice Tindal, the present Mr Baron Parke, and the late

Mr Justice Williams, forming, it is superfluous to say, an admirably

constituted court--the chief being most consummately qualified for his

post by temper, sagacity, and learning.

It was the business of the Attorney and Solicitor General to establish

a case of high treason against the prisoner, and of Sir Frederick

Pollock and Mr Kelly to defend him _à l'outrance_; but God forbid that

we should say _per fas aut nefas_. It were idle to characterise the

intellectual and professional qualifications of these four combatants;

the eminence of all is undisputed, though their idiosyncrasies are

widely different from each other. Suffice it to say, that everything

which great experience, sagacity, learning, power, and eloquence could

bring to bear on that contest might have been confidently looked for.

One circumstance is proper to be borne in mind--that the prisoner's

counsel (of course abhorring the acts imputed to their client) were

stimulated to the very uttermost exertion by the fact that their own

political opinions were notoriously adverse to those entertained by the

prisoner, and those--viz., Chartists--who so confidently summoned two

Tories to the rescue of their imperilled brother Chartists.

All the main facts of the case were universally known before the trial

took place, together, of course, with the legal category to which they

must be referred, to satisfy the conditions of high treason. The nature

of that offence was thus tersely and beautifully explained by the Chief

Justice,--[5]

"Gentlemen, the crime of high treason, in its own direct

consequences, is calculated to produce the most malignant

effects upon the community at large; its direct and immediate

tendency is the putting down the authority of the law, the

shaking and subverting the foundation of all government, the

loosening and dissolving the bands and cement by which society

is held together, the general confusion of property, the

involving a whole people in bloodshed and mutual destruction;

and, accordingly, the crime of high treason has always been

regarded by the law of this country as the offence of all

others of the deepest dye, and as calling for the severest

measure of punishment. But in the very same proportion as it

is dangerous to the community, and fearful to the offender

from the weight of punishment which is attached to it, has

it been thought necessary by the wisdom of our ancestors to

define and limit this law within certain express boundaries, in

order that, on the one hand, no guilty person might escape the

punishment due to his transgression by an affected ignorance

of the law; and, on the other, that no innocent man might be

entangled or brought unawares within the reach of its severity

by reason of the law's uncertainty."

The following were fearful words to be heard, or afterwards read, by

those who were charged with the defence of Frost. They occur, like the

preceding passage, in the luminous charge of the Chief Justice to the

Grand Jury, on the 10th December 1839:--

"An assembly of men, armed and arrayed in a warlike manner,

with any treasonable purpose, is a levying of war, although no

blow be struck; and the enlisting and drilling and marching

bodies of men are sufficient overt acts of that treason,

without coming to a battle or action. And, if this be the case,

the actual conflict between such a body and the Queen's forces

must, beyond all doubt, amount to a levying of war against the

Queen, under the statute of Edward. It was quite unnecessary to

constitute the guilt of treason that the tumultuous multitude

should be accompanied with the pomp and pageantry of war, or

with military array. Insurrection and rebellion are more humble

in their first infancy; but all such external marks of pomp

will not fail to be added with the first gleam of success. The

treasonable design once established by the proper evidence, the

man who instigated, incited, procured, or persuaded others to

commit the act, though not present in person at the commission

of it, is equally a traitor, to all intents and purposes, as

the man by whose hand the act of treason is committed. He who

leads the armed multitude towards the point of attack, and then

retires before the blow is struck--he who remains at home,

planning and directing the proceedings, but leaving the actual

execution of such plans to more daring hands--he who, after

treason has been committed, knowingly harbours or conceals the

traitor from the punishment due to him, all these are equally

guilty in the eye of the law of the crime of high treason."

The head of treason applicable to the facts of the case under

consideration is the third in statute 25 Edward III. c. 2, which

concisely declares it to exist "_if a man do levy war against our lord

the King in his realm_." This has been the law of the land for just

five centuries, _i. e._ since the year 1351. But in the application

of these words, of fearful significance, the object with which arms

are taken up must be a GENERAL one--"the _universality of the design_

making it a rebellion against the state, a usurpation of the power of

Government, and an insolent invasion of the King's authority"--"under

pretence to reform religion and the laws, or to remove evil

counsellors, or other grievances, whether real or pretended."[6]

Or, to adopt the definition of Mr Kelly, in addressing the jury in

this very case, it is necessary to prove "that the prisoner levied

war against her Majesty, with intent by force to alter the law, and

subvert the constitution of the realm."[7] To appreciate the position

of the prisoner, and the difficulties with which his counsel had to

struggle, it may here be mentioned, that he admitted the prisoner to

be a Chartist, as it was called--that is, a supporter of the following

five points of sweeping change in the political institutions of the

country,--"Universal suffrage, vote by ballot, annual parliaments, no

property qualification, and payment of members of parliament." This was

also, during the trial, avowed by the prisoner.[8]

Having thus got a clear view of the law, let us briefly indicate the

_facts_--the palpable, notorious, leading facts, known to be such by

the prisoner's counsel, as soon as they had perused their briefs.

A body of ten thousand men, principally miners from the surrounding

country, headed, in three divisions, by Frost, and two other men, Jones

and Williams, (Frost having five thousand under his command,) and armed

indiscriminately with muskets, pikes, axes, staves, and other weapons,

was to make a descent upon the peaceful town of Newport, during the

night of Sunday, the 3d November 1839! Tempestuous weather prevented

the preconcerted junction of these three bands; but, between eight and

nine o'clock on the Monday morning, Frost's division, five thousand

strong, marched into the town--and, headed after a fashion by him,

commenced an attack upon a small inn, where they knew that a handful

of troops was stationed, about thirty in number, under command of a

lieutenant. As soon as the mob, who formed steadily, saw the soldiers

drawn up in the room--the windows of which were thrown open--they

cruelly fired into it, and also rushed through the doors into the

passage. On this, the lieutenant gave the word of command to fire. He

was obeyed--and with deadly effect, as far as regarded some thirty or

forty, known to have received the fire, many of whom were shot dead on

the spot. But this cool promptitude and determination of the troops

put an end _instanter_ to the insane insurrection. This vast body of

supposed desperadoes fled panic-struck in every direction; and Frost

himself, who was unquestionably on the very spot at the very time when

and where the attack commenced, fled in ridiculous terror,[9] and was

arrested that evening at a friend's house adjoining his own, armed with

three loaded pistols, and having on him a powder-flask and a quantity

of balls. His brother heroes, Williams and Jones, were also arrested,

together with many others; and there ended the formidable outbreak,

which had more astounded than alarmed the public; leaving, however,

the instigators and conductors to a speedy and very dismal reckoning

with that same public. The active management of matters by Frost was

beyond all doubt, and it seemed never to have been wished to conceal

it. He was the Jack Cade of the affair. He planned the order of march;

the time, place, and mode of attack; and explained the immediate and

ulterior objects of the movement. Shortly before the outbreak, he

was asked by one of his adherents, "_what he intended to do_?" He

answered,--

"First, they should go to the new poor-house and take soldiers

and arms; then, he said, there was a storehouse, where there

was plenty of powder; then, they would blow up the bridge, that

would stop the Welsh mail which did run to the north, and that

would be tidings; and they would commence there in the north on

Monday night, and he should be able to see two or three of his

friends or enemies in Newport."--(vol. i., p. 36.)

Similar observations he made to another of his followers, who asked

him, on hearing him give orders for the guns to take the front, the

pikes next, the bludgeons next,--"in the name of God, what was he going

to do? was he going to attack any place or people?" he said,--

"He was going to attack Newport, and take it--and blow up

the bridge, and prevent the Welsh mail from proceeding to

Birmingham: that there would be three delegates there, to

wait for the coach an hour and a half after the time; and if

the mail did not arrive there, the attack was to commence at

Birmingham, and be carried thence to the North of England,

and Scotland, _and that was to be the signal for the whole

nation_."--(vol. i., p. 33.)

The coal and iron trade in these parts, from which the population

derived their subsistence, had seldom been more prosperous than at the

time when this movement was concerted and made: employment was easily

obtained; wages were high; and those concerned in the affair had no

private grievances to redress. At the same time, it was notorious that

political agitation, on the subject of the Charter aforesaid, had for

some time prevailed there--that the population had been organised for

combined and effective action by affiliated societies; and Frost,

the prime mover--a pestilent agitator, who, occupying the position

of a decent tradesman, a linendraper, in Newtown, had been rashly

raised to the local magistracy, from which he was soon degraded for

sedition--declared his object to be, to make the Charter the law of the

land. All these, and many other facts, which had been elicited during

the preliminary examinations, were known to the prisoner's counsel, who

had copies of all the depositions which had been made by the witnesses;

and also knew the precise terms in which the indictment was framed, and

the name, calling, and residence of every witness to be produced in

proof of that indictment.

How was this towering array of facts to be encountered, with these

enlightened judges to conduct the inquiry, and guide the jury, and

very able and determined counsel to elicit and arrange the facts,

and enforce them on the jury--and _have the last word_ with the jury

in so doing? We may well imagine how anxious and disheartening were

the consultations of the prisoner's counsel before going into court.

Neither they, nor their attorneys, could disguise from themselves the

desperate nature of the case in which they were concerned. They would

probably determine to cross-examine the witnesses very cautiously

and rigorously, with a view to breaking down important links in the

case; and it is likely that their paramount object in conducting the

defence, would be to aim at supplying Frost with some other than _a

general object_--something else than establishing the Charter as the

law of the land. A hopeful prospect! But besides all this, it must

have been determined, of course, to throw no single chance away,

whereon--however, whenever it presented itself--to fight the fearful

case for the Crown inch by inch, and foot by foot--contesting every

technical point, with a view to detecting any possible slip in either

the preliminary or any other part of the proceedings of the experienced

and watchful Crown officers. Here, again, was a hopeful prospect! Their

proceedings had been doubtless advised beforehand by the Attorney and

Solicitor General, and conducted by Mr Maule, the Solicitor of the

Treasury, in person--himself a barrister, and consummately qualified

for his post. He was also a humane man, always anxious to discharge his

duties firmly, but at the same time to afford a prisoner every degree

of consideration and indulgence consistent with the public interest.

By this time the reader may be aware how very serious a thing is the

conduct, on the part of the Crown, of a prosecution of high treason,

in every one of its stages--in the slightest particulars--especially

where the great _facts_ of the case are so clear against the prisoner,

as to compel his advocate to watch and test every link in the chain

fixed around his client. Here, in fact, correlative duties are cast

on the opposing parties--to _take_ every possible objection; and to

be beforehand _prepared for_ every possible objection, by vigilant

exactitude in complying with every legal requisite.

On the _eleventh_ day of December 1839, the Grand Jury returned a

true bill for high treason, against John Frost and thirteen of his

followers; and on the very next day--viz., Thursday the _twelfth_,

in order to oblige the prisoner, by giving him the longest possible

time for availing himself of the important information contained in

the _indictment_, and the _jury list_--copies of these instruments

were delivered to him by the Solicitor of the Treasury. On the

ensuing Tuesday, the 17th, he delivered to the prisoner a _list of

the witnesses_; and, the trial having been appointed to take place on

the 31st December, five days previously to the latter day--viz., on

the 26th December--Sir Frederick Pollock and Mr Kelly were assigned

to John Frost, as his counsel, on his application pursuant to the

statute to Mr Bellamy, the clerk of the Crown. It is here essential,

in order to appreciate the immense importance of the earliest moves

in this life-and-death game, to weigh every word in the following

brief enactment, under which the above documents were delivered to the

prisoner: the humane object of the legislature being to afford him

ample time to prepare his defence.--"When any person is indicted for

high treason, a list of the _witnesses_, and of the _jury_, mentioning

the names, profession, and place of abode of the said witnesses and

jurors, be also given at the same time that the copy of the indictment

is delivered to the party indicted--which copy of the indictment shall

be delivered ten days before the trial."[10] Thus it will be seen that

as the trial was to take place on Tuesday the 31st December, Mr Maule

might have delayed delivering these documents to the prisoner till

the 20th, and perhaps till the 21st December; but, solely to favour

the prisoner, he delivered two of them--viz., the indictment and jury

list--so early as the 12th, and the list of witnesses so early as the

17th December. Let us see, by and by, whether anything comes of this,

and of the lengthened study, by the prisoner's counsel, of these three

documents.

On Tuesday the 31st December 1839, all the fourteen prisoners were

arraigned on an indictment consisting of four counts: two for levying

war against her Majesty in her realm; a third for compassing to depose

the Queen from her royal throne; and the last, for compassing to

levy war against the Queen, with intent to compel her to change her

measures. To this indictment each of the fourteen prisoners pleaded

not guilty; and it is to be particularly observed that they all did so

without making any objection on any score. Thus was taken the first

move by the Crown counsel, who may possibly, for aught we can at

present see, have thereby gained some very great advantage. Let us now

conceive the solemnly-exciting scene of the court house at Monmonth, on

this memorable trial. Three judges sitting, in their imposing scarlet

and ermine vestments, calm and grave; a phalanx of counsel sitting

beneath them; the prisoners standing at the bar, on their deliverance,

silent as the grave, while the fate-fraught procedure of the court was

methodically going on; the spectators crowding every part of the court

that they could occupy, and all silent, nothing heard but official

voices; while without that court all was excitement--repressed,

however, by the stern presence of the civil and military power;

detachments of troops at that moment scouring the adjacent hills in

quest of malcontents, and preventing any fresh rising of the population.

The first step taken by the prisoner's counsel was to state that

they appeared for John Frost alone, and should challenge the jury

separately: on which all the other prisoners were removed from the bar,

John Frost remaining to take his trial alone. Then came the swearing of

the jury--the name of every one, with his calling in life, and place

of abiding, being known to the prisoner and his counsel, who objected

to the very first step taken by the clerk of the Crown. He had begun

to call over the names in their alphabetical order on the panel--the

usual course for a great series of years; but Sir Frederick Pollock

objected to his doing so, insisting on each juror's name being taken

from the ballot-box. The Lord Chief-Justice was about to have overruled

the objection; but the Attorney-General intimated that he consented

to the course proposed by the prisoner's counsel. Each witness was

sworn first on the _voir dire_, (_i. e._ _dicere verum_) as to his

qualification, before he was sworn to try. First came a juryman who was

challenged peremptorily on the part of the Crown; but the prisoner's

counsel, doubtless for very good reasons, wishing him to remain on the

jury, insisted, first, that the Crown had no such right--an objection

at once overruled; secondly, that the crown was too late, as the juror

had actually got the New Testament into his hand to be sworn to try

before the Crown challenged. But, on the court's inquiry, it turned

out that the witness had himself taken the book, without having been

directed to do so by the clerk of the Crown. Under these circumstances,

the court decided that the Crown were in time with their challenge--and

the juryman was excluded. In this kind of out-skirmishing the whole of

the first day was consumed!--a full jury not having been sworn till the

evening, when they were "charged" with the prisoner and then dismissed

for the night--but with the unpleasant information from the court, that

they themselves were thenceforth prisoners (though with every kind of

proper indulgence) till the trial was over.

On the next morning, just as the Attorney-General was rising to state

the case of the Crown, he was interrupted by Sir Frederick Pollock,

and doubtless sufficiently astonished by what fell from him: "I feel

myself bound, at the earliest moment--and this is the first opportunity

that I have had,--to take an objection which must occur the moment

that the first witness is put into the box,--namely, that the prisoner

has never had a list of the witnesses, _pursuant to the statute_, and

that therefore _no witness can be called_!" What could be the meaning

of this? inquired the Attorney-General's companions among themselves,

with no little anxiety; but he himself somewhat sternly censured the

interruption, as premature, (as it certainly was,) and proceeded with

his address to the jury. He made a lucid and very temperate statement

of the case--drawing attention prominently to the necessity imposed on

him of proving that what had been done by Frost and his companions was

with a _general_, and not a particular object,--a _public_, and not

a private purpose. His proposed proof was crushing: but immediately

on the Solicitor-General's calling the name of the first witness,

Sir Frederick Pollock rose, and required him to prove the delivery of

a list of the witnesses, containing the particular one in question,

pursuant to the statute. The Attorney-General then called Mr Maule,

who proved having done what has already been explained: whereupon Sir

Frederick Pollock disclosed the exact objection, which he himself

had been the first to detect--that whereas the statute required all

these documents,--_i. e._, the indictment, the jury list, and witness

list--to be delivered "_at the same time_," in the present instance

that had not been done, the first two having been delivered on the

12th, and the list of witnesses on the 17th December! This was a very

formidable move on the part of the prisoner: who stood at the bar on

his deliverance--the jury being bound to convict or acquit according

to evidence, and none could be offered them! If that _were_ so, he

must of necessity be pronounced not guilty, and be for ever safe. The

objection was urged with extreme tenacity and ingenuity by both the

prisoner's counsel, who insisted on the statute of Anne receiving a

strict literal construction of the words "at the same time,"--admitting

the benevolent intentions by which Mr Maule had been actuated.

The Attorney-General argued very earnestly against this startling

objection, denying that it had any validity--asserting that the statute

had been substantially complied with; and that the objection, if valid,

had been waived; and that it was made too late--viz., not till after

the prisoner had pleaded to the indictment, and the jury been charged

with the prisoner. The Attorney-General's astute argument, however,

was interrupted by the Lord Chief-Justice, stating that the court had

a sufficient degree of doubt on the point to reserve it for further

consideration by the judges at Westminster, should it become necessary:

for, if their objection were valid, it affected every one of the

fourteen prisoners awaiting their trial! Then came another desperate

attempt of Sir Frederick Pollock, to secure his client the benefit of

_an acquittal_, in the event of the judges ultimately deciding that

the objection ought to have been decided in the prisoner's favour at

the trial. This, however, the Attorney-General again strongly opposed;

and the court cautiously ruled, that, in the event contemplated, the

prisoner would be entitled then to the same benefit to which he would

have been entitled at the trial--without saying what that would have

been. The witness thus provisionally objected to was then admitted; but

only to be, at first, sworn on the _voir dire_, on which a lengthened

examination and some argument ensued--each of the judges delivering

judgment on the excessively refined and astute objection to the manner

in which the witness's place of abode had been described in the

list--which was such as that it was just imaginable, and nothing more,

that an inquirer might have been misled! The objection was overruled in

the case of the first witness; but on the ensuing two witnesses--and

most important witnesses--being called, a similar objection was

taken, but too successfully, and their evidence, consequently,

altogether excluded!--excluded solely on account of the anxious

"_over_-particularity" of the Crown! Nor were these the only witnesses

whose testimony was, on such grounds, rendered unavailable to the Crown.

Then came the usual contests, from time to time, as to acts and

declarations of third parties, which were offered as evidence against

the prisoner, though done and said in his absence, and before and

after the actual outbreak--viz., to what extent he had rendered

himself liable for the consequences of such acts and declarations,

by embarking in a common enterprise, having a common intent with

these third parties. The result of such contests was practically

this,--The court acted on the rule of law, as rule established, that,

in treason and conspiracy, the Crown may prove either the conspiracy,

which renders admissible as evidence the acts and declarations of the

co-conspirators; or the acts and declarations of the different persons,

and so prove the conspiracy. A witness, for instance, said that he was

at a party at a Chartists' lodge on the 2d November, when a man named

_Reed_ gave them directions to go to Newport on the following night,

and explained for what purpose they were to go: but the witness did not

see Frost till two days _afterwards_, when on his march to Newport. The

Lord Chief-Justice overruled the objections of Sir F. Pollock and Mr

Kelly, and received the evidence which they had attempted to exclude.

A great mass of proof was given during the trial, establishing most

satisfactorily the acts and doings of Frost, throughout the progress

of the conspiracy, and down to the very moment of the actual attack

on the inn, and the Queen's troops stationed in it--a mass of proof

on which the attempt to make an impression seemed absurd. There was

only one faint ray of hope for the prisoner's counsel, throughout the

palpable obscure--that they might be able to escape from the generality

and publicity of object attributed to the prisoner, by persuading the

jury that the object was a private, temporary, and specific one--viz.,

to effect the release of one Vincent, a Chartist, then in confinement

at Monmouth! To pave the way for this hopeful line of defence, first,

an artful turn was sought, in cross-examination, to be given to one

of the early witnesses. He swore that he had heard one of those who

attacked the inn, exclaim at the time, presenting his gun at one

of the special constables at the door, "Surrender _yourselves_ our

prisoners;" to which the gallant answer was, "No, never!" On this Mr

Kelly very warily cross-examined the witness, with a view of showing

that, in the confusion, he could not hear very distinctly, so as to

report distinctly, as to precise expressions; that the mob intended

merely to rescue Vincent; and that the expressions used must have

been, not "Surrender _yourselves_ our prisoners," but "Surrender up

our prisoners!" or simply, "Surrender our prisoners,"--thus rejecting,

from the witness's answer, the single significant word "yourselves."

The attempt, however, was wholly ineffectual; but out of two other

witnesses were extorted on cross-examination, the following (so to

speak) crumbs of comfort: from one--"I have heard Vincent's name

mentioned many times; I have heard Williams (one of the leaders of the

three bands forming the ten thousand) say that Vincent was a prisoner

at Monmouth: the people there liked him very much; the people knew

he was in jail. I have heard them speak about him." Another witness

said,--"I knew of Vincent's being sent to prison: I believe the

Chartists took a great interest in his fate: I do recollect something

of dissatisfaction about Vincent's treatment, and about a petition to

be drawn up: I recollect people's minds being dissatisfied about it."

Another witness, however, said "that at midnight on the Sunday, (the

3d November,) Williams came to his house with a number of armed men:"

the witness inquired, "Where are you going?"--"Why do you ask?" said

Williams. "Because," answered the witness, "some of the men who were

with me have told me, this morning, that they were going to Monmouth,

to draw Vincent out of prison."--"_No_," replied Williams, "_we do not

attempt it_: we are going to give a turn as far as Newport."

The Attorney-General closed his case with the arrest of Frost, heavily

armed, and in concealment, on the evening of the day on which he

had attacked the inn with his five thousand men; and thus stood the

matter, when, after a considerable interval for repose and reflection,

courteously conceded by the Lord Chief-Justice, at the implied request

of Sir Frederick Pollock, that most able and upright advocate rose to

address the jury for the defence. Judging from the specimens afforded

us by Mr Townsend, Sir Frederick Pollock's address appears to have

been pervaded by a strain of dignified and earnest eloquence, and also

characterised by a candour in dealing with facts which was in the

highest degree honourable to him, and also equally advantageous to the

prisoner, on whose behalf such conduct was calculated to conciliate

both the judges and the jury. His line of defence was, that, admitting

enormous indiscretion on the part of Frost in assembling so vast a body

of men, and marching and appearing with them as he did at Newport,

there was no satisfactory evidence of his having done so with a

_treasonable_ purpose. He had been guilty of a heinous misdemeanour;

but the treasonable declarations and exclamations put into his and

their mouths, in order to give the affair a treasonable complexion,

had been either misunderstood or perverted by the witnesses. The

sole object of Frost and his friends was the release of Vincent;

that they had never dreamed of _taking_, or _attacking_ the town of

Newport--least of all, as an act of general rebellion; that all they

had meant was to take a "turn" as far as Newport, to get Vincent

out of prison; and that "that was the true character of the whole

proceedings;" that Frost did not know that the military were in the

inn; and that, the instant they had become visible, and had fired,

the crowd succumbed, threw down their arms, and ran away--_i. e._

they did this "the very moment there was any prospect of what they

were doing being construed into treason." That Frost could not have

contemplated treason, and throwing the whole country into confusion,

would be evidenced by proof, and his having made provision for the

payment of a bill of exchange, and actually paying it on the very

Monday on which the outbreak occurred. Sir Frederick Pollock properly

insisted on the burthen of proving treason lying on the Crown, and not

of disproof on the prisoner. Then were called one or two witnesses,

with a view to showing expressions of the crowd that they had come to

Newport in quest of their prisoners who were there; but the evidence

proved ridiculously insufficient and contradictory. Then was read, with

the Attorney-General's consent, a letter of Frost's in the previous

September, to one of the visiting magistrates of the gaol of Monmouth,

requesting some relaxation of the prison discipline to which Vincent

and other prisoners were subject; and it appeared, also, that a similar

application had been made to the Lord-Lieutenant of the county. Then

was proved Frost's having taken up his acceptance on the 4th November;

and his character for humanity as specially instanced in his having

protected Lord Granville Somerset from personal violence, during the

Reform riots of 1832. Finally was called a witness, with the view of

negativing the design imputed to Frost of preventing the Welsh mail

from going to Birmingham, by showing the absurdity of that course,

since a new and different mail started from Bristol to Birmingham,

and not the same coach which had come from Newport. But to this

witness were put the following significant, and probably unsuspected,

questions:--

"_Attorney-General._--You took an interest, I suppose, in

Vincent?--_A._ I did so.

"_Attorney-General._--You had not been told that there was

to be any meeting for Vincent on the 4th of November, had

you?--_A._ No.

"_Attorney-General._--You, living at Newport, can tell us that

there was no notice by placard, or in any other way, of a

meeting to be held on the 4th November?--_A._ _I never saw any._

"_Attorney-General._--_Nor heard of any?_--_A._ _No._"

Such was the meagre case in behalf of the prisoner in point of

evidence. And at its close, his second counsel, Mr Kelly, rose to

address the jury on his behalf--a privilege accorded to no prisoner,

except one tried on a charge of high treason. We shall present the

reader with an extract from the opening passage in Mr Kelly's address,

inasmuch as it is highly characteristic of that eminent counsellor's

style of advocacy--of his imposing display of fervent confidence in his

case--his terse and nervous expression, and the clearness and precision

of his reasoning. We have some ground for believing that the following

is exactly what fell from his lips:--

"The Attorney-General, in his opening, seemed to anticipate

that we might deviate from the straight and honourable course

before us, in defending the prisoner, into something like an

attempt to induce you to depart from the strict letter of

the law. So far from this, it is in the law, in the strict

undeviating performance of the law, that I place my hope, my

only trust. It is my prayer, therefore, that you should follow

it; that you should be guided and governed by it; that you

should attend and adhere to the law, and to the law alone;

because I feel that, by that law, I shall prove to you, clearly

and satisfactorily, that the prisoner, whatever may have been

his misconduct in other respects, however high the crimes and

misdemeanours for which in another form he might have been

indicted or punished--I feel that, by the law of high treason,

he is as guiltless as any one of you, whose duty, I hope, it

will soon be so to pronounce him. Gentlemen, if the prisoner

at the bar be at this moment in any jeopardy or danger, it is

from the law not prevailing, or not being clearly and perfectly

understood. It is because the facts, which are in evidence

before you, undoubtedly disclose a case of guilt against

him; because they do prove that he has committed a great and

serious violation of the law; because he has subjected himself

to indictment and to punishment, that the danger exists--a

danger from which it is for me, by all the humble efforts I

can command, to protect him--that you, finding that he has

offended against the justice of the country, should condemn

him, not for the misdemeanour which he has really committed,

but for the great and deadly crime with which he is charged by

this indictment. I therefore, Gentlemen, beseech your calm and

patient attention, while I endeavour as shortly, as concisely,

and, I will venture to add, as fairly and candidly as I can, to

lay before you, subject to the correction of their Lordships,

the law, as it affects this high and serious charge. And if

I should be fortunate enough to do so, I undertake then to

satisfy you--to convince the most doubting among you, if there

be any more doubting than the rest, when I shall refer you to

the testimony of the witnesses,--that this charge is not only

not proved, but that it is absolutely and totally disproved,

even by the evidence for the prosecution. The question here

is,--not whether a great and alarming riot has been committed;

the question is, not whether blood has been shed, whether

crimes, which are, as they ought to be, punishable by law,

have been perpetrated by many who may be the subjects of this

indictment; but the question is, whether the prisoner at the

bar has, by competent legal proof, been proved, beyond all

reasonable doubt in the mind of any one of you, to have levied

war against Her Majesty, with the treasonable intent which is

stated in this indictment? The Crown must satisfy you that the

prisoner at the bar has levied war; that he has levied war

against Her Majesty--that is, that he has conducted these armed

multitudes, and committed, if he has committed, outrages with

them, and concerted with them, or engaged them, to commit them;

and not merely that he has done all these acts, but that he has

done them against the Queen, that he has levied war against the

Queen and her Government. And then, further, it must be proved

to you that that was done with the intent, with the design,

which is stated in this indictment."--(I. p. 52, 53.)

Mr Kelly's speech was long, elaborate, eloquent, and most

ingenious--adhering closely to the line of defence taken by Sir

Frederick Pollock--pressing on the jury in every possible way,

with many varied illustrations, the improbability of Frost having

contemplated the rebellious objects imputed to him, and the alleged

certainty that his only view had been--the rescue of Vincent. He

vehemently assailed the credibility of those witnesses who had given

the strongest evidence against Frost; and concluded with a most

impassioned appeal to the feelings of the jury. When he had concluded,

the Lord Chief-Justice accorded still another privilege to Frost--viz.,

that of himself then addressing the jury, after both his counsel

had done so; to which Frost prudently replied--"My Lord, I am so

well satisfied with what my counsel have said, that I decline saying

anything upon this occasion."[11]

The Solicitor-General then rose to reply on the part of the Crown;

and if any one inexperienced in forensic contests were incredulous as

to the potency of _the last word_ (from competent lips) in any case,

civil or criminal, let him read the outline of this reply, with the

copious specimens of it, given with much judgment by Mr Townsend.

It is true that Sir Thomas Wilde's case was in itself crushing, but

his dealing with it made that crushing character fearfully clear to

the plainest capacity. Its opening passages seem tinctured by some

sternness of allusion to the concluding topics of Mr Kelly's address;

but the remainder of the reply is characterised by mingled moderation

and power; by irresistible closeness and cogency of argument, and

by extraordinary skill in dealing with facts, in combining and

contrasting them, and pointing out a significancy lurking in them,

which the prisoner's counsel had possibly not chosen to see, or

skilfully striven to conceal. Our limits restrict us to one or two

samples of the present Lord Chancellor's mode of advocacy when at the

bar. After explaining that it was the real object contemplated by the

prisoner--viz., to raise, rebellion--with which the jury had to deal,

the Solicitor-General thus pithily disposed of all arguments which

had been drawn from the prisoner's want of power to do all that he

intended:--

"It is also immaterial to this Case whether or not he had the

power to do all he intended. We need not talk of punishing

successful rebellion--it is unsuccessful rebellion that

comes under the cognisance of the law. I cannot restrain the

expression of some surprise at the course of argument that was

taken by the learned counsel who last addressed you. His course

of argument was this: when the prisoner was interrupted in

what he was doing, 'Look and see what he has done;' where he

has accomplished his purpose, 'Do not believe the witnesses.'

The party having been dispersed by the soldiers, the learned

gentleman says, 'see if they went to the post-office; see if

they went to the bridge; see if they went to other places'--he

knowing that they were stopped before they reached those

places; 'but as to marching there with arms to take the town,

that I dispose of by asking you not to believe the witnesses;

so that, as regards what was prevented, I ask you to see what

was done; and as regards what was done, I ask you to disbelieve

the witnesses, and there is an end of the charge.'"--(I. p. 75.)

This single paragraph annihilated a third of the case set up on behalf

of Frost; as did the following a second third:--

"They could not have raised these men with a view to relieve

the prisoners at the Westgate, because at the time they

collected on the mountain they had not been taken. But had

it any relation to Vincent? What is their intention? We have

been told again and again that Mr Frost must not be supposed

likely to do absurd things; that he is a man of the world and a

man of intelligence. What then, gentlemen, do you think of an

attempt to induce the Monmouthshire magistrates to relax the

prison discipline in favour of a person who has been convicted

of sedition, or seditious libel, or something of that sort, by

marching into Newport with ten thousand men armed? What do you

think of a man of the world resorting to that mode of inducing

the magistrates to relax in favour of a prisoner? Is Mr Frost

a man of intelligence? Is he a man of the world? Suppose he

had been the worst foe that Vincent ever had, suppose that he

had desired to procure additional restrictions to be put upon

him, and had wished that he should sustain the last hour of

the sentence which had been pronounced upon him, could he have

resorted to a more maliciously effective mode than by showing

that those who were connected with Vincent were persons so

little acquainted with their duty, so little obedient to the

law, so little to be depended upon for their peaceable conduct,

as that they would march at that hour of the night into a town,

alarming and frightening every body?"--(I. p. 79.)

Again:--

"Gentlemen, will you judge of the criminal intentions of

persons engaged in an insurrection by the probability of their

success? If you do, you will judge of a mob by a rule that

never was found correct yet. They always imagine--and they

would not begin if they did not imagine, though they always

imagine wrong, but they never will learn wisdom--they always

imagine that they can accomplish more than they can; of course

they begin, not with the idea of fastening a halter round their

necks, but with the idea that they shall succeed, and by their

success escape. With those thousands of men (you will see as

I pass on what the number of the soldiers were,) was it an

unnatural thing that, coming at between one and two o'clock

in the morning, they should surprise the poor-house; that the

soldiers, not being aware that they were coming, might not be

prepared--might be taken by surprise--might be either overcome

or murdered before they could put themselves in a condition to

defend themselves?

"Are their sayings inconsistent? What conspiracy ever was

consistent? You would indeed give the most perfect freedom

to conspiracy, rebellion, and treason, if you disbelieved

witnesses coming to prove declarations inconsistent if made at

the same time, though not inconsistent when made at different

times. They may at first think the soldiers to be Chartists

and their friends, and, in the next moment, talk of attacking

them in their barracks. But will you give a _carte blanche_ to

conspirators and traitors by saying, that if witnesses prove

inconsistent declarations, they are not to be believed? It is

not, gentlemen, the inconsistency of the witnesses, but of

those engaged in transactions, the conduct and management of

which must vary from hour to hour according as circumstances

arise; and that which a man may contemplate one minute, may

the following minute or the next hour be inconsistent with

the views that had prevailed arising out of the then existing

circumstances."--(I. p. 89.)

The circumstance of Frost's having been found with the loaded pistols,

and not having attempted to use them, is thus significantly disposed

of:--

"Give him the benefit of the circumstance that _he did not use_

the three loaded pistols which he had about him. But I think,

unfortunately, that they speak much more strongly as indicating

violent intentions _when those pistols were provided_, than

they speak peaceable intentions when he was apprehended."--(I.

p. 24.)

There has been no counsel at the English bar, in modern times, whose

reply was more dreaded by an opponent than Sir Thomas Wilde; and that

reply, in Frost's case, abundantly shows how well founded was that

apprehension.

Thus, then, the counsel on both sides having played out their

parts in the case, it stood awaiting the intervention of the Lord

Chief-Justice--the very model of judicial excellence. Tranquil,

grave, patient; exact, ready, profound in legal knowledge, and of

perfect impartiality--all these high qualities and qualifications

were exhibited by him in his luminous and masterly summing-up on this

occasion. In order to give all due weight to the sole substantial

suggestion offered on behalf of the prisoner--_i. e._, that his object

had been the liberation of Vincent--the Lord Chief-Justice read to the

jury the following important passage from that great authority, Sir

Matthew Hale--"If men levy war to break prisons, to deliver _one or

more particular persons_ out of prison, this was ruled, on advice of

the judges, to be not high treason, but only a great riot; but if it

was to break prisons, or deliver _persons generally_ out of prison,

this is treason."[12] Having taken at once a minute and comprehensive

view of the evidence, he left the following as the exact question for

their determination,--"Whether it was Frost's object, by the terror

which bodies of armed men would inspire, to seize and keep possession

of the town of Newport, making this a beginning of an extensive

rebellion, _which would be high treason_; or whether he had no more in

view than to effect, by the display of physical force, the amelioration

of the condition of Vincent and his companions in Monmouth jail, if

not their liberation, _which would be a dangerous misdemeanour only_;

and the jury were to look at the evidence with all possible candour

and fairness, and see if the Crown had conclusively disproved this

limited object and design."[13] We conceive that neither Frost nor any

one of his ten thousand dupes, on that "day of dupes" which led to

this inquiry, could have taken objection to this mode of submitting

the all-critical question to his jury--a jury of his peers, with the

selection of whom he himself had had as much concern as the Crown.

That jury retired from court for half-an-hour, and then returned,

amidst the solemn excited silence of the court--crowded to

suffocation--with the fatal verdict, "Guilty;" adding, "My lords, we

wish to recommend the prisoner to the merciful consideration of the

court." Sentence was not immediately passed upon him. He was removed

from court; and on its re-assembling on the ensuing morning, Zephaniah

Williams was placed at the bar, tried, and in due course found guilty;

on which William Jones was in like manner arraigned, tried, and found

guilty; each being recommended by the jury to mercy. Scared by this

result, five of the ringleaders resolved to throw themselves on the

mercy of the Crown, withdrawing their pleas of not guilty, and pleading

guilty--it having been intimated that the sentence of death should be

commuted into transportation for life. The Attorney-General thought it

expedient, in the case of the remaining four prisoners, who were less

deeply implicated, to allow a verdict of not guilty to be recorded.

On the 16th January, Frost, Williams, and Jones were brought up to

the bar to receive sentence of death, which the Lord Chief-Justice

prefaced by a very solemn address, listened to in breathless silence.

An imposing scene of judicial solemnity and terror, indeed, the court

at that agitating moment exhibited. Without were strong detachments

of soldiery, foot and horse, guarding the public peace: within were

an anxious auditory, commanded to keep silence under pain of fine

and imprisonment, while sentence of death was being passed upon the

prisoners. There were, in the midst of the throng, two groups awfully

contrasted in character and position--the three prisoners, standing

pale and subdued; and, sitting opposite, the three judges, each wearing

his black cap; while the following heart-sickening words fell from the

lips of the Lord Chief-Justice:--

"And now nothing more remains than the duty imposed upon the

court--to all of us a most painful duty--to declare the last

SENTENCE OF THE LAW; which is that you, John Frost, and you,

Zephaniah Williams, and you, William Jones, be taken hence to

the place whence you came, and be thence drawn on a hurdle to

the place of execution, and that each of you be there hanged

by the neck until you be dead; _and that afterwards the head

of each of you shall be severed from his body, and the body of

each, divided into four quarters, shall be disposed of, as her

majesty shall think fit. And may Almighty God have mercy on

your souls!_"

Whether the words placed in italics should ever again be pronounced on

such an occasion, barbarously prescribing a revolting outrage on the

dead, which it is known, at the time, cannot be perpetrated in these

days of enlightened humanity, is a point which cannot admit of debate.

The practice ought forthwith to be abolished, and by statute, if such

be necessary.

Under the mortal pressure of this capital sentence remained these three

unhappy and misguided men, from the 16th till the 28th of January.

On the 25th, an elaborate argument was had at Westminster before

the fifteen judges, which lasted till the 28th, on a case framed by

Lord Chief-Justice Tindal for their opinion, on the point which had

been raised at the trial by Sir Frederick Pollock. The Chief-Justice

submitted these two questions for consideration,--"_First_, whether the

service of the list of witnesses was a good service, under the statute

7 Anne, c. 21, § 11; _secondly_, whether, at all events, the objection

was taken in due time." There was a great array of counsel on both

sides; but the argument was conducted by the Attorney-General alone, on

behalf of the Crown; and by Sir Frederick Pollock, Sir William Follett,

and Mr Kelly on behalf of the prisoners. The utmost possible ingenuity

was displayed on both sides; and with such effect, that at the close of

the argument the Lord Chief-Justice of the Common Pleas wrote a letter

to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, (the Marquis of

Normanby,) announcing the following somewhat perplexing result,--that,

"first, a majority of the Judges, in the proportion Of NINE to SIX,

were of opinion that the delivery of the list of witnesses was NOT a

good delivery in point of law:

"But, secondly, a majority of the Judges, in the proportion of nine to

six, are of opinion that the OBJECTION to the delivery of the list of

witnesses was _not taken in due time_.

"All the Judges agreed, that if the objection had been made in time,

the effect of it would have been a postponement of the trial, in order

to give time for a proper delivery of the list."

The AYES on this occasion were--

_Justices_ Littledale, Patteson, Williams, Coleridge, Colins,

Erskine; Barons Parke, Alderson, Rolfe.

The NOES--

Lord Chief-Justice Denman, Lord Chief-Justice Tindal, Lord

Chief-Baron Abinger; _Justices_ Bosanquet and Maule, and Baron

Gurney.

Those last (the NOES) decided also that the objection had

not been taken in time; and three of the former class, (the

AYES,) viz. Baron Alderson, Baron Rolfe, and Justice Coleridge,

concurred in that decision.[14]

Here was a question for the Executive to decide! A capital conviction

for high treason, with a decision of the majority of the Judges of the

land, that a statutory requisition as to the period for delivery of

a list of the witnesses had not been exactly complied with, but that

the prisoner did not make the objection till the time had gone by for

making it; and that, had he made it in time, the utmost effect would

have been to cause a postponement of the trial for a few days. The

prisoner's objection was avowedly _strictissimi juris_; and he did

not affect to show that he had suffered the slightest detriment from

the over-anxious kindness of the Crown solicitor. That, under these

circumstances, the lives of the three traitors were absolutely at the

mercy of the Ministry, is indisputable; and no one, we conceive, could

have censured them, if they had allowed the capital sentence to be

carried into effect. They inclined, however, to the merciful exercise

of their anxious discretion; and the capital sentence was remitted, on

the condition of the three prisoners being transported for the term of

their natural lives. They have now been ten years at the Antipodes; and

how many times, during that lengthened period of bitter, dishonoured

existence, they have cursed their own folly and crime, who can tell?

Have they ever appreciated the skill and vigilance with which they

were defended? It is true that this one chance objection--which it

is wonderful should have occurred to any one at all--was ultimately

pronounced, but only by a majority of the Judges after lengthened

debate, to have been taken too late; but if it had not occurred to

the vigilant advocate when it did--if no one had taken it at any

time--would not the three traitors have been executed? Unquestionably:

public justice, the public safety required it. Whether Sir Frederick

Pollock purposely delayed making the objection till the moment when he

did, (and the Attorney-General insinuated, before the fifteen Judges,

that such was the case,[15]) thinking that course more advantageous to

the prisoners, or whether the objection had not, in fact, occurred to

him till it was too late, we cannot at present say. This much, however,

we can say in conclusion, that we are very much indebted to the late

Mr Townsend for having enabled us to present this entertainment--for

such we hope it has proved--to our readers; who may hereafter look

with great interest on a great trial, especially if they have the

opportunity of witnessing it. They may then appreciate the exquisite

anxieties and responsibilities imposed on those concerned in conducting

it--the difficulties with which they have to contend on the spot,

without time for consideration, though life itself be the stake played

for. They will also, probably, be of the opinion, that in the great

game at Monmouth all the players played their parts well--may we not

say admirably?--that the uttermost justice was done on both sides. Two

practical deductions from the whole may yet be made: first, have a

look-out, gentlemen prosecutors, in taking every single step of your

course, however apparently unimportant at the time it may seem to you;

bearing in mind that, in proportion to the desperate exigencies of

the defence, will be the piercing scrutiny to which every formality

will be subjected; so that a blot may be hit which might easily

have been avoided, but, when hit, is fatal. Secondly, in your turn,

gentlemen counsel, be encouraged by the result of this interesting and

instructive trial, to watch every single step of your opponents--even

those in which error, omission, or miscarriage is least likely--with

sleepless vigilance, and be prompt in action. Thus much for the trial

of John Frost.

MY NOVEL; OR, VARIETIES IN ENGLISH LIFE.

BY PISISTRATUS CAXTON.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol. 68, No 420, October 1850 · 第 1 / 7 章