LETTER XXVII.

Do not fear for reality and truth. Even if the elevated idea of

aesthetic appearance become general, it would not become so, as long as

man remains so little cultivated as to abuse it; and if it became

general, this would result from a culture that would prevent all abuse of

it. The pursuit of independent appearance requires more power of

abstraction, freedom of heart, and energy of will than man requires to

shut himself up in reality; and he must have left the latter behind him

if he wishes to attain to aesthetic appearance. Therefore, a man would

calculate very badly who took the road of the ideal to save himself that

of reality. Thus, reality would not have much to fear from appearance,

as we understand it; but, on the other hand, appearance would have more

to fear from reality. Chained to matter, man uses appearance for his

purposes before he allows it a proper personality in the art of the

ideal: to come to that point a complete revolution must take place in his

mode of feeling, otherwise, he would not be even on the way to the ideal.

Consequently, when we find in man the signs of a pure and disinterested

esteem, we can infer that this revolution has taken place in his nature,

and that humanity has really begun in him. Signs of this kind are found

even in the first and rude attempts that he makes to embellish his

existence, even at the risk of making it worse in its material

conditions. As soon as he begins to prefer form to substance and to risk

reality for appearance (known by him to be such), the barriers of animal

life fall, and he finds himself on a track that has no end.

Not satisfied with the needs of nature, he demands the superfluous.

First, only the superfluous of matter, to secure his enjoyment beyond the

present necessity; but afterward; he wishes a superabundance in matter,

an aesthetical supplement to satisfy the impulse for the formal, to

extend enjoyment beyond necessity. By piling up provisions simply for a

future use, and anticipating their enjoyment in the imagination, he

outsteps the limits of the present moment, but not those of time in

general. He enjoys more; he does not enjoy differently. But as soon as

he makes form enter into his enjoyment, and he keeps in view the forms of

the objects which satisfy his desires, he has not only increased his

pleasure in extent and intensity, but he has also ennobled it in mode and

species.

No doubt nature has given more than is necessary to unreasoning beings;

she has caused a gleam of freedom to shine even in the darkness of animal

life. When the lion is not tormented by hunger, and when no wild beast

challenges him to fight, his unemployed energy creates an object for

himself; full of ardor, he fills the re-echoing desert with his terrible

roars, and his exuberant force rejoices in itself, showing itself without

an object. The insect flits about rejoicing in life in the sunlight, and

it is certainly not the cry of want that makes itself heard in the

melodious song of the bird; there is undeniably freedom in these

movements, though it is not emancipation from want in general, but from a

determinate external necessity.

The animal works, when a privation is the motor of its activity, and it

plays when the plenitude of force is this motor, when an exuberant life

is excited to action. Even in inanimate nature a luxury of strength and

a latitude of determination are shown, which in this material sense might

be styled play. The tree produces numberless germs that are abortive

without developing, and it sends forth more roots, branches, and leaves,

organs of nutrition, than are used for the preservation of the species.

Whatever this tree restores to the elements of its exuberant life,

without using it or enjoying it, may be expended by life in free and

joyful movements. It is thus that nature offers in her material sphere a

sort of prelude to the limitless, and that even there she suppresses

partially the chains from which she will be completely emancipated in the

realm of form. The constraint of superabundance or physical play answers

as a transition from the constraint of necessity, or of physical

seriousness, to aesthetical play; and before shaking off, in the supreme

freedom of the beautiful, the yoke of any special aim, nature already

approaches, at least remotely, this independence, by the free movement

which is itself its own end and means.

The imagination, like the bodily organs, has in man its free movement and

its material play, a play in which, without any reference to form, it

simply takes pleasure in its arbitrary power and in the absence of all

hinderance. These plays of fancy, inasmuch as form is not mixed up with

them, and because a free succession of images makes all their charm,

though confined to man, belong exclusively to animal life, and only prove

one thing--that he is delivered from all external sensuous constraint

without our being entitled to infer that there is in it an independent

plastic force.

From this play of free association of ideas, which is still quite

material in nature and is explained by simple natural laws, the

imagination, by making the attempt of creating a free form, passes at

length at a jump to the aesthetic play: I say at one leap, for quite a

new force enters into action here; for here, for the first time, the

legislative mind is mixed with the acts of a blind instinct, subjects the

arbitrary march of the imagination to its eternal and immutable unity,

causes its independent permanence to enter in that which is transitory,

and its infinity in the sensuous. Nevertheless, as long as rude nature,

which knows of no other law than running incessantly from change to

change, will yet retain too much strength, it will oppose itself by its

different caprices to this necessity; by its agitation to this

permanence; by its manifold needs to this independence, and by its

insatiability to this sublime simplicity. It will be also troublesome to

recognize the instinct of play in its first trials, seeing that the

sensuous impulsion, with its capricious humor and its violent appetites,

constantly crosses. It is on that account that we see the taste, still

coarse, seize that which is new and startling, the disordered, the

adventurous and the strange, the violent and the savage, and fly from

nothing so much as from calm and simplicity. It invents grotesque

figures, it likes rapid transitions, luxurious forms, sharply-marked

changes, acute tones, a pathetic song. That which man calls beautiful at

this time is that which excites him, that which gives him matter; but

that which excites him to give his personality to the object, that which

gives matter to a possible plastic operation, for otherwise it would not

be the beautiful for him. A remarkable change has therefore taken place

in the form of his judgments; he searches for these objects, not because

they affect him, but because they furnish him with the occasion of

acting; they please him, not because they answer to a want, but because

they satisfy a law which speaks in his breast, although quite low as yet.

Soon it will not be sufficient for things to please him; he will wish to

please: in the first place, it is true, only by that which belongs to

him; afterwards by that which he is. That which he possesses, that which

he produces, ought not merely to bear any more the traces of servitude,

nor to mark out the end, simply and scrupulously, by the form.

Independently of the use to which it is destined, the object ought also

to reflect the enlightened intelligence which imagines it, the hand which

shaped it with affection, the mind free and serene which chose it and

exposed it to view. Now, the ancient German searches for more

magnificent furs, for more splendid antlers of the stag, for more elegant

drinking-horns; and the Caledonian chooses the prettiest shells for his

festivals. The arms themselves ought to be no longer only objects of

terror, but also of pleasure; and the skilfully-worked scabbard will not

attract less attention than the homicidal edge of the sword. The

instinct of play, not satisfied with bringing into the sphere of the

necessary an aesthetic superabundance for the future more free, is at

last completely emancipated from the bonds of duty, and the beautiful

becomes of itself an object of man's exertions. He adorns himself. The

free pleasure comes to take a place among his wants, and the useless soon

becomes the best part of his joys. Form, which from the outside

gradually approaches him, in his dwelling, his furniture, his clothing,

begins at last to take possession of the man himself, to transform him,

at first exteriorly, and afterwards in the interior. The disordered

leaps of joy become the dance, the formless gesture is changed into an

amiable and harmonious pantomime, the confused accents of feeling are

developed, and begin to obey measures and adapt themselves to song.

When, like the flight of cranes, the Trojan army rushes on to the field

of battle with thrilling cries, the Greek army approaches in silence and

with a noble and measured step. On the one side we see but the

exuberance of a blind force, on the other the triumph of form, and the

simple majesty of law.

Now, a nobler necessity binds the two sexes mutually, and the interests

of the heart contribute in rendering durable an alliance which was at

first capricious and changing like the desire that knits it. Delivered

from the heavy fetters of desire, the eye, now calmer, attends to the

form, the soul contemplates the soul, and the interested exchange of

pleasure becomes a generous exchange of mutual inclination. Desire

enlarges and rises to love, in proportion as it sees humanity dawn in its

object; and, despising the vile triumphs gained by the senses, man tries

to win a nobler victory over the will. The necessity of pleasing

subjects the powerful nature to the gentle laws of taste; pleasure may be

stolen, but love must be a gift. To obtain this higher recompense, it is

only through the form and not through matter that it can carry on the

contest. It must cease to act on feeling as a force, to appear in the

intelligence as a simple phenomenon; it must respect liberty, as it is

liberty it wishes to please. The beautiful reconciles the contrast of

different natures in its simplest and purest expression. It also

reconciles the eternal contrast of the two sexes in the whole complex

framework of society, or at all events it seeks to do so; and, taking as

its model the free alliance it has knit between manly strength and

womanly gentleness, it strives to place in harmony, in the moral world,

all the elements of gentleness and of violence. Now, at length, weakness

becomes sacred, and an unbridled strength disgraces; the injustice of

nature is corrected by the generosity of chivalrous manners. The being

whom no power can make tremble, is disarmed by the amiable blush of

modesty, and tears extinguish a vengeance that blood could not have

quenched. Hatred itself hears the delicate voice of honor, the

conqueror's sword spares the disarmed enemy, and a hospitable hearth

smokes for the stranger on the dreaded hillside where murder alone

awaited him before.

In the midst of the formidable realm of forces, and of the sacred empire

of laws, the aesthetic impulse of form creates by degrees a third and a

joyous realm, that of play and of the appearance, where she emancipates

man from fetters, in all his relations, and from all that is named

constraint, whether physical or moral.

If in the dynamic state of rights men mutually move and come into

collision as forces, in the moral (ethical) state of duties, man opposes

to man the majesty of the laws, and chains down his will. In this realm

of the beautiful or the aesthetic state, man ought to appear to man only

as a form, and an object of free play. To give freedom through freedom

is the fundamental law of this realm.

The dynamic state can only make society simple possibly by subduing

nature through nature; the moral (ethical) state can only make it morally

necessary by submitting the will of the individual to the general will.

The aesthetic state alone can make it real, because it carries out the

will of all through the nature of the individual. If necessity alone

forces man to enter into society, and if his reason engraves on his soul

social principles, it is beauty only that can give him a social

character; taste alone brings harmony into society, because it creates

harmony in the individual. All other forms of perception divide the man,

because they are based exclusively either in the sensuous or in the

spiritual part of his being. It is only the perception of beauty that

makes of him an entirety, because it demands the co-operation of his two

natures. All other forms of communication divide society, because they

apply exclusively either to the receptivity or to the private activity of

its members, and therefore to what distinguishes men one from the other.

The aesthetic communication alone unites society because it applies to

what is common to all its members. We only enjoy the pleasures of sense

as individuals, without the nature of the race in us sharing in it;

accordingly, we cannot generalize our individual pleasures, because we

cannot generalize our individuality. We enjoy the pleasures of knowledge

as a race, dropping the individual in our judgment; but we cannot

generalize the pleasures of the understanding, because we cannot

eliminate individuality from the judgments of others as we do from our

own. Beauty alone can we enjoy both as individuals and as a race, that

is, as representing a race. Good appertaining to sense can only make one

person happy, because it is founded on inclination, which is always

exclusive; and it can only make a man partially happy, because his real

personality does not share in it. Absolute good can only render a man

happy conditionally, for truth is only the reward of abnegation, and a

pure heart alone has faith in a pure will. Beauty alone confers

happiness on all, and under its influence every being forgets that he is

limited.

Taste does not suffer any superior or absolute authority, and the sway of

beauty is extended over appearance. It extends up to the seat of

reason's supremacy, suppressing all that is material. It extends down to

where sensuous impulse rules with blind compulsion, and form is

undeveloped. Taste ever maintains its power on these remote borders,

where legislation is taken from it. Particular desires must renounce

their egotism, and the agreeable, otherwise tempting the senses, must in

matters of taste adorn the mind with the attractions of grace.

Duty and stern necessity must change their forbidding tone, only excused

by resistance, and do homage to nature by a nobler trust in her. Taste

leads our knowledge from the mysteries of science into the open expanse

of common sense, and changes a narrow scholasticism into the common

property of the human race. Here the highest genius must leave its

particular elevation, and make itself familiar to the comprehension even

of a child. Strength must let the Graces bind it, and the arbitrary lion

must yield to the reins of love. For this purpose taste throws a veil

over physical necessity, offending a free mind by its coarse nudity, and

dissimulating our degrading parentage with matter by a delightful

illusion of freedom. Mercenary art itself rises from the dust; and the

bondage of the bodily, at its magic touch, falls off from the inanimate

and animate. In the aesthetic state the most slavish tool is a free

citizen, having the same rights as the noblest; and the intellect which

shapes the mass to its intent must consult it concerning its destination.

Consequently, in the realm of aesthetic appearance, the idea of equality

is realized, which the political zealot would gladly see carried out

socially. It has often been said that perfect politeness is only found

near a throne. If thus restricted in the material, man has, as elsewhere

appears, to find compensation in the ideal world.

Does such a state of beauty in appearance exist, and where? It must be

in every finely-harmonized soul; but as a fact, only in select circles,

like the pure ideal of the church and state--in circles where manners are

not formed by the empty imitations of the foreign, but by the very beauty

of nature; where man passes through all sorts of complications in all

simplicity and innocence, neither forced to trench on another's freedom

to preserve his own, nor to show grace at the cost of dignity.

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Aesthetical Essays of Friedrich Schiller · 第 39 / 57 题